



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
BOOKLET

10 YEARS OF
SlovakAid

A VISION OF DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION FOR
A CHANGING WORLD

October 16 - 17, 2013
Bratislava, Slovakia



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Title International Conference Booklet

10 years of SlovakAid: a Vision of Development Cooperation for a Changing World

Published by © Pontis Foundation, Zelinárska 2, 821 08 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Edited by Heather Allan

Simona Gembická

Designed by Dodo Dobřík

Assembled by Simona Gembická

Printed by Ševt, Plynárenská 6, 821 09 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Circulation 300 copies

Photos Zuzana Gavulcová

ISBN 978 – 80 – 971310 – 1 – 2

EAN 9788097131012

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of the Slovak Republic

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CONFERENCE VENUE

Congress Hall and Palugyay Palace of the Ministry of Foreign and European
Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Hlboká cesta 2, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

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OPENING REMARKS



MIROSLAV LAJČÁK
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs
of the Slovak Republic

Dear Deputy Prime Ministers,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassadors,
Dear guests, ladies and gentlemen,

Let me welcome you in Bratislava, in the premises of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

I am very pleased that you have accepted the invitation to this conference.

As you can see from the title of the conference we will be talking not only about the past but also about the future of our Slovak development assistance and about the future of the development assistance as such.

Let me begin with a personal remark.

Ten years ago, in 2003, when the development aid of Slovakia was only at its beginning, I was posted as an Ambassador in Belgrade. At that time, Serbia and Montenegro were only at the beginning of their European integration efforts. Slovak example was a great inspiration and motivation for them. It was only natural that this country became the main priority of SlovakAid.

In short time, we prepared the first strategic framework of cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro. Slovak experts, consultants, technologies or, for instance, bridge constructions were directed into the country almost immediately. Montenegro has been in accession talks with the EU for over a year now and Serbia got an invitation to open accession negotiations with the EU. I am very glad to say that Slovakia and our development assistance contributed to this success.

Back in 2003 Slovakia celebrated ten years of independence. We went through a complex and difficult process of economic reforms, social transformation and institution building. We joined the club of the most developed countries of the world, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and we were standing in front of the gates of the European Union and NATO. Our success story raised worldwide interest and respect. In

Slovakia, we had a feeling that we have a unique experience to share. Moreover, we were aware that what we have achieved was also thanks to valuable help of the developed countries and we should repay this “debt”.

The Official development assistance of the Slovak Republic was established quickly and naturally. Already during the first year, our development assistance had a medium-term strategy, national program and, most importantly, budget. Slovak entities started to implement the first development projects under the logo of SlovakAid. The development aid department and a few years later, also development agency, were established. The act on development assistance was also adopted. However, we would not be able to make such fast progress, if it was not for the help we received from traditional donors. Our special gratitude goes to all of them - Canadian Agency CIDA, Austrian Agency ADA, European Commission, UN Development Program (UNDP), to name just a few.

In the past ten years the family of partners of SlovakAid became significantly bigger. We have implemented more than 400 projects in nearly 20 countries around the world. Many of these projects left a considerable trace in the development of partner countries. Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, has nearly as many inhabitants as Slovakia. However, if you ever visit Kenya you will probably come across a social center, health center, or a school built thanks to the development assistance of Slovakia. In Mombasa, in Eldoret, or in Nakuru one can meet dozens of Slovak doctors, volunteers, or representatives of our non-governmental organizations. In Kenya, as well as in Serbia and other partner countries, I feel proud and happy that our development assistance is meaningful.


I am always delighted to hear from my partners, ministers of foreign affairs of countries from the Western Balkans or Eastern Partnership, their appreciation for advice and recommendations of Slovak experts and how the Slovak know-how helps them in their integration process, institution building or market economy. It is always a great pleasure for me to meet graduates from Slovak universities in countries like Mongolia or Vietnam. To hear them speak, in fluent Slovak, about their achievements in their home country and cooperation with Slovakia. I admire Slovak doctors, experts and volunteers willing to leave their families and friends and risk their own health and life to help local communities in Kenya, South Sudan or Afghanistan.

Exactly a month ago Slovakia was accepted as a full-fledged member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This can be perceived as a symbolic accomplishment of our 10-year long integration into the international donor community of which we are now becoming a firm part.

I think it is also a challenge for us to build modern, transparent and effective system of SlovakAid, as the international community is defining the new global development agenda beyond 2015. We are working hard on a new Medium-term strategy for 2014-2018, upgrading our business model, amending ODA act, narrowing down and streamlining our ODA priorities. At the end of September, during the official week of the UN General Assembly in New York I participated in the inauguration of the High-level Political Forum aimed at the post-2015 sustainable development.

I realized that in 2000 when the world agreed on Millennium Development Goals, Slovakia was still a net aid recipient. Today, 13 years later, the position of Slovakia in the world is completely different; and different is also our responsibility. Our story shows that effective transformation is possible if determination and political will is real and reforms are not just approved, but also implemented. This is one of the key messages incorporated in our development aid. We want to build upon it and develop it further. Let us start right now, at this conference.

I wish you fruitful discussions and a pleasant stay in Bratislava and I thank you for your attention.



Deputy Prime Minister,
Dear Ministers,
Excellences,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good morning to you. Well, it's a pleasure to be here to celebrate 10 years of SlovakAid with you. The title you have chosen for this session "A vision of development cooperation for a changing world" could hardly be more appropriate. Our modern world is changing at fast pace and the EU has a duty to respond to that. Including through the development cooperation's pursuit and I am pleased to confirm that Slovakia has been increasingly playing its part over the last 10 years. Slovakia development aid strategy is in line with the new development policy enshrined in the so-called agenda for change. Your aid is focused on a limited number of countries, Kenya, South Sudan and Afghanistan, to name just three, and on targeted sectors. I am convinced that this is a scene we should all follow to get high impact and visible results from the aid we provide.

One of the clear added values of the Slovak Cooperation is the capacity to share the experience of the transitions process. Along with most of the countries that joined the EU 9 years ago, Slovakia has a unique experience of state building, of reforming the economy and of establishing a democratic system, all essential elements for a successful development policy. Recent events in North Africa for instance, have shown that transformation experience is useful beyond the Balkans and our Eastern Neighbourhood. It has a universal application. So a clear development policy, such as we have now put in place is all well and good, but to have any real impact it must be supported by democratic means. As you know, the EU has promised to meet a collective target to set aside 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) as aid by 2015. Countries like Slovakia who joined in 2004 committed to a 0.33% target.

Well today's picture is mixed, on one hand the EU and its member states are by far the most generous donor in the world, accounting for more than 50% of the global aid. We should be proud of the leadership we show and you should be proud of your part in it. On the other hand, the EU credibility is at stake, since we are still far from meeting these targets. Aid accounts for 0.42% of the GNI and at just over 60million euros Slovakia's official development assistance in 2013 is set to remain at about 0.09% of GNI. I am fully aware of the tough economic situation that most EU member states have to face. However I believe, aid is also an investment in the future, I therefore recall the call by the heads of state and government in June for us all to redouble our efforts to reach our other targets by 2015. I believe that Slovakia can and will, step up to the play. Slovakia recently became the 27th member of the

OECD development assistance committee, which is excellent news. It reflects the ambition to be a serious partner in development cooperation and this ambition is most welcome at a time when poverty continues to destroy lives.

We live in a world where every 8th person suffers from hunger. A world in which every minute a child dies from such easily preventable causes as a lack of food or drinkable water and a woman dies from pregnancy related complications. I think you will all agree with me that in today's world when we have the technology and resources to eradicate extreme poverty in our lifetime; failure is simply not an option. Therefore my vision for the next years is one of a world free from extreme poverty and put on a sustainable development path. To turn that vision into reality we will have to act on two fronts, first we have important unfinished business ahead of us in terms of meeting the millennium development goals before their target date of 2015. The EU has been and will remain at the forefront in supporting partner countries to reach their crucial goals. Notably also through our MDG initiative focused on those countries and on MDGs most lagging behind. Slovakia is contributing to this effort through the European Development Fund. Second, the EU and its member states together must continue to show leadership and play a full and constructive role in shaping the right post 2015 framework to succeed the millennium development goals.

All the EU member states agree that the next framework to address the twin aims of eradicating poverty and securing sustainable development of the planet. It should seek to provide a decent life of all by 2030, building on 5 key elements. The need for basic living standards to empower people, including sustainable growth to benefit all, sustainable resource management to preserve the environment, justice and equity to ensure fundamental human rights and decent stability. This forms the core of the clear vision we presented as an UN special event on MDGs in New York last month. In New York we recognized that action to end poverty must go hand in hand with action on sustainability. This is of interest to all the worlds' citizens, rich and poor. At the event we also decided that this process should cumulate in a single comprehensive and universal post2015 framework. It should build though a genuine partnership bringing together all people, governments from all countries, international organizations, civil society and the private sector. And I am confident that the EU and its member states, including Slovakia are both ready and able to play a central role in shaping this framework.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, thanks to Slovak Aid the Slovak Development Agenda has come a long way in just 10years. It is now an effective instrument and integral part of the Slovak Republic foreign policy. This is a far cry from 1989, back then we were looking outward to the world for assistance, now we are still looking outward to the world only this time you are there to help. That is a remarkable transformation and one that I hope you will continue to share proudly with our partner countries around the world. Thank you very much for your attention.



PETER BURIAN

State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign
and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear colleagues,

Let me welcome you in the premises of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for the second day of the international conference we hold on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of SlovakAid.

Yesterday we had an opportunity to discuss achievements as well as new prospects of Slovak development cooperation on the political level. We heard words of appreciation from our partner countries, being it Moldova, Kenya, Republic of Macedonia or Montenegro, from governmental or non-governmental representatives. At the same time, we carefully listened to their needs and challenges they have to face in the short or long run. Discussions gave us an inspiration of how to move forward with our development cooperation program in order to better reflect priorities of partner countries and yield sustainable results in the field.

Today we can deliberate on the Slovak development cooperation more deeply and from different angles. Viewpoints of non-governmental organizations, academic sector or think-tanks serve as an important input for increasing efficiency and effectiveness of our ODA system. Although they sometimes differ from perceptions of the official authorities, this divergence enriches discussions and helps find better solutions to the common goal – to improve quality of life of less fortunate countries and assist them in ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

When reading the conference program of today, I was delighted to see themes of the panels chosen so eloquently.

You will have a possibility to discuss in an informal way development cooperation of Slovakia with the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries, regions which are key beneficiaries of our reform and integration experience. This reform agenda is, however, very relevant also to the Southern Neighborhood countries like Tunisia or Egypt, where Slovakia has been very active in the last two years.

Furthermore, complementary to yesterday, you will explore other important elements of development cooperation – engagement of the private sector and global education.

Regarding the first one, ODA can serve as a catalyst of private sector investments in developing countries. That's

why the Ministry is fostering its partnership with Slovak private companies engaged in development cooperation with emphasis on creating synergies with NGO's activities in the field.

Second, global education and its firm part, development education, we perceive it as an effective tool for gaining public support for and raising awareness of our ODA activities. Education at all levels plays a unique role in forming lifetime opinions and attitudes of young generation and we cannot miss this opportunity. For these reasons, in 2012, we adopted the National Strategy on Global Education for 2012 – 2016 that we implement together with the Ministry of Education and NGOs.

Last, but not least, you will touch upon partnership with the EU and using its funds more efficiently for development purposes. Slovakia contributes to designing and shaping EU development cooperation instruments and advocates for more extensive use of available funds by Slovak entities. Each year, the Ministry provides an opportunity to co-finance EU projects with participation of Slovak NGOs and we will continue to do that also in the future. I will be glad to hear from the panel devoted to this theme about your experience and challenges.

Since my colleague from the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Vazil Hudák, is here with us, I cannot resist to touch upon financial resources devoted to official development assistance. As you all know, Slovakia is a small donor providing around 61 mil. EUR on ODA (in 2012) which represents 0,09 % ODA/GNI. Despite economic crises that has triggered necessary budgetary cuts and fiscal consolidation; we managed to keep the ODA volume, mainly its bilateral part, at a stable level in the last five years. Having committed to meet EU targets (to reach the level of ODA/GNI 0,33 % in 2015) and being a new DAC member, Slovakia should make every effort to increase level of ODA when economic situation allows it. We want to be a responsible member of donor community that sticks to its political commitments. This is even more important in the context of upcoming review of achievement of Millennium Development Goals and defining new post-2015 development agenda.

The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs realizes that in order to absorb more financial resources, the mechanism of development cooperation must undergo necessary improvements. Our aid requires more programmatic approach, revision of legal framework, strengthening human and administrative capacities, systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation or more policy coherence for development across state administration. All these measures were also recommended by the OECD/DAC during our accession process. We are committed to implement most of them in the coming years, as a part of a new medium-term ODA strategy that is currently being developed.

I believe that today's discussions and their outcomes will feed into the foreseen reforms and improvements of our development cooperation system.



VAZIL HUDÁK

State Secretary
of the Ministry of Finance
of the Slovak Republic

Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,

It is a great privilege to stand here, in front of you, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of SlovakAid.

Fifteen years ago Slovakia was undergoing transformation and was asking for support from our foreign partners, besides European Union I can name American foundations, like Ford Foundation, Ch. S. Mott Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and many others. We needed support and we greatly appreciated receiving it.

Ten years later the status of Slovakia has substantially changed – from the recipient of the financial and technical aid it has become a new donor. It is indeed an extraordinary coincidence that only a month ago Slovakia has become the 27th member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee – the leading international forum for bilateral providers of development assistance. This is an acknowledgement of our effort in this arena, but, at the same time, the commitment to continue with our effort and improve the quality of our work.

The aim of this conference is to stimulate a professional dialogue among various stakeholders on lessons learnt and future orientation of Slovakia's development cooperation. As you are aware, I represent the governmental sector, namely Ministry of Finance (MoF), which is usually considered as one of the key stakeholders since it is responsible for public finances. Even though Slovakia has not been able to reach the ODA/GNI target set for new EU members, we have been able to more than triple our volume of official development assistance (ODA) since 2004 – as acknowledged by OECD. Unfortunately this absolute increase is not reflected in relative ODA/GNI ratio. There are a few factors behind this state that have played a key role, like economic growth of Slovakia in recent years – highest in the European Union, consolidation of public finances in Slovakia as Eurozone member during which we have been challenged by limited space for increasing absolute ODA volume, or capacity of key stakeholders. All these factors strongly influence ODA budget and it is important to take them into account during the strategic planning process.

Slovakia is a small country and therefore we are considering those options for provision of ODA, which utilize our comparative advantages. As you are aware, our GDP is export driven. We are confident, that we can export not only goods, but knowledge and experience, too. We are glad that also OECD has acknowledged that our transformation

experience, together with our knowledge of the eastern region of Europe and the Western Balkans, gives us a comparative advantage relative to other donors in these areas.

At the MoF we are aware of the development agenda and of international commitments in development cooperation. We are mainly involved in the multilateral development assistance providing e.g. contributions to European Union development budget, European Development Fund, capital increase of World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Council of Europe Development Bank, regular contributions to WB International Development Association, IMF Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, under guarantee agreement between EU Member Countries and European Investment Bank, two recent contributions to the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Fund and others. We are taking measures to facilitate involvement of Slovak entities in procurement procedures of these institutions. We are aware, that either NGOs or private companies from Slovakia that have previously mainly relied on domestic resources have to become competitive to utilize these international resources – to which Slovakia contributes. Moreover Slovakia has been taken a leadership when discussing the issue of post-graduation policy between EU 11 countries and management of the EBRD. Recognition for better involvement of new donors in development co-operation through clear and transparent post-graduation policies of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and participation of new donors in the projects financed by IFIs and from EU funds would be an important step forward.

There are examples of our commitment which can illustrate that we have made proactive steps in order to show our stake in this agenda. Being aware of the importance of cooperation and partnerships, two of our pilot initiatives were prepared and are implemented in cooperation with our multilateral partners.

First example is the Public Finance for Development programme. It has been implemented in cooperation with United Nations Development Programme Bratislava Regional Centre since 2009. So far almost 2 million USD have been provided by MoF for the implementation of this Programme. It focuses on improving public finance management in partner countries. Montenegro and Moldova are our most committed partner countries and we can already see tangible results. I think that we can agree that strong public sector and sound financial management contribute to improved allocation of scarce public resources and better delivery of basic services and are critical for poverty alleviation. Public finance reform of Slovakia is considered a success case of transformation. We are a Eurozone member, we have steady public finances and we are considered a reliable and predictable partner – as a few days ago confirmed by our partners during my visit of the USA. Focus on sharing our experience in public finance reform does not mean imposing of the models we have accepted. We are willing to share lessons learnt, including best practices as well as failures and obstacles. I am glad to say that our support for this Programme was positively assessed by OECD who considers it as good practice that can be built upon on the way to new Slovak ODA business model based on modalities built on partner countries ownership of development and alignment with their strategies.

Whereas the MoF plays the key role in managing multilateral funding through the IFIs, including allocations, policy and relationships, it is highly interested in intensifying its cooperation with these institutions and is making use of modalities that are designed for using the Slovak technical assistance – such as the Slovak Republic-EBRD Technical Cooperation Fund, the second example of our development initiative. The bilateral fund was established in July 2009 and since then 4,725 million EUR was contributed by MoF. For Slovakia it is the tool for sharing more intensely expertise of Slovak companies and consultants with transitional countries. Our economic relations have so far been mainly focused on EU countries and it is important to strengthen their diversification. Active involvement in Eastern

Europe and Central Asia region is very important. Results achieved through the Fund are satisfactory. It is worth to mention that the EBRD has identified the Slovak Republic as best practice in the field of expertise for energy efficiency legislation of buildings and also in model transformation of water sector.

MoF programmes like these two mentioned should as well contribute to development of sufficient track record of Slovak consultants/companies and getting experience for Slovak entities in development cooperation. We would recommend more intensive focus of Slovak ODA on sharing transition experience since we can see its appreciation by our partner countries.

Development assistance is mainly about working with people, helping improving their quality of life. Anyway, there are a lot of administrative issues that have to be followed if we want to ensure high quality of our assistance – statistical agenda being one of them. Therefore the last example of successful initiatives led by our Ministry I would like to mention the agenda of statistical reporting of data on development assistance. MoF decided to initiate the project aimed at building the system of the Slovak Republic development assistance recording and reporting in order to contribute to effective allocation of public resources assigned for ODA. We believe that accurate and comprehensive reporting is a crucial tool for building a solid information base, inevitable for following effectiveness and transparency of spent public resources and for long-term strategic planning of development assistance. In cooperation with the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) and private company we have developed system called DEV – meaning “development”. The system is designed to facilitate OECD-compliant reporting of development assistance flows for not only Government but also local administration, NGOs and private donors. It is connected to Budgetary Information System and thus fits well into the overarching budgetary planning. According to OECD Development Cooperation Directorate information, Slovak Republic is the first of EU12 countries having developed such information system which we are proud of.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize that the leadership and competence of the MFEA is well recognised from our side. We have had good and intense cooperation with MFEA so far and we are ready to continue in this close co-operation in the future, too.

Development assistance is very important. Its importance is internationally recognized and goes beyond any frontiers. I believe that there is still room for improving the horizontal cooperation of Slovak stakeholders – public, non-governmental as well as private representatives. I work for the central government institution, I am intensely involved in cooperation with the private sector – e.g. through chairing the EXIMBANK Supervisory Board, and ten years ago, in the first years of building of the Slovak development assistance capacities, I was working for a global think-tank whose aim is to forge collective action for a safer and better world. Therefore I am confident to say that in Slovakia we have values, experience and knowledge we can share with our partners and that we can contribute to visible change.

I hope that we will fully use the opportunity of having here experts from Slovakia and abroad and that we will be successful in looking for innovative ideas and new prospects for the Slovak development agenda – as is the goal of this conference. Thank you for your attention. I wish you fruitful and inspiring day.



LENKA SUROTCHAK
Director of the Pontis Foundation

Dear Distinguished Guests of the International Conference “10 Years of SlovakAid.”

Allow me, just briefly, to live up to the name of our Pontis Foundation, and in few short points bridge yesterday and today.

First, the mission of SlovakAid – the most basic understanding and also explaining to our Slovak citizens and taxpayers – why we as Slovakia are in development. It had been truly powerful to have the stage kicked off by Deputy Prime Minister Lajčák who emphasized our paying back the moral debt, our belonging to the OECD, and with that connected commitments, as well as with the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries - similar historical experience, close economic ties, proximity of language and culture, common interest in spreading stability and prosperity within the region.

Followed by Mr. Commissioner Pielbalgs and Madam Mohamed who pointed out that it is about the basic humankind – about the fact that it is humanly and morally unacceptable to have people dying or living in extreme poverty – “you just do not want to look at the pictures of that...”

Furthermore, extreme poverty is a source of conflict, pandemic, illegal migration and extremism – as it is more effective to address the root causes rather than the syndroms.

It is also about the investment into our own future – true political and economic partnership, about Europe’s future growth and jobs, as it was emphasized both by Ms. Mohamed and Mr. Burian.

Concluding on the mission, there is great potential and interest on both sides of bringing the Slovak business and academic entities even closer together in development cooperation. We are going to look at this in two of the afternoon’s panels for inspiration on design and effective mechanisms of how to build capacities in these areas.

Second, a quick reflection on WHAT we are actually delivering to our partners? What are some of the key Slovak know how, our unique niche?

As again Deputy Prime Minister Lajčák mentioned that in the Western Balkans we moved from “hard” projects to delivering “software” – our experience from transformation and the Euro and Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

His partners Ms. Gherman and Sonja Licht talked about deep appreciation of Slovak know-how in EU integration process, institution building or market economy having the European perspective as a key driver of domestic policy priorities and reforms.

Furthermore, in Africa, delivering of medical services of Slovak doctors, experts and volunteers to help local communities in Kenya or South Sudan.

Especially Ms. Mohamed mentioned lots of interesting examples of projects assisting her country with sustainable economic growth, social inclusion and improving living standards of African population. They are carried out by number of projects of Slovak NGOs addressing high youth unemployment, raising social inequalities or fragile good governance.

Emotionally resonated remarks of both Ms. Gherman and Licht who talked about the great difference that even a small country can make, even though it is not coming to the table with the most cash, but can gain respect and serve as a source of inspiration and encouragement if it is serious and responsible in its internal and international commitments and behavior.

Concluding also here with a challenge, there is one that stands out: how to create more synergies amongst service and local economy oriented projects to make them locally owned and sustainable in the long term. We will be addressing the effectiveness of some of the policies in the morning panel on the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership.

Third, the question of how we are delivering our aid. Again, also here Deputy Prime Minister Lajčák set the floor when he mentioned the key principle in understanding that in order to be useful, one must be relevant. This was followed by confirmation of other speakers that it should be locally owned and where possible based on the long term strategies of our partner countries.

The cooperation has been praised many times of the countries that have similar experience such as the Visegrad Four. We also have a speaker from the powerful Visegrad Four Fund, Karla Wursterová who will be participating in one of the panels this morning.

Also, the often celebrated form of microgrants is an important tool of SlovakAid, and here I must add the key role Slovak Ambassadors in Kenya, Western Balkans and other places play in assisting us on the ground, bringing visibility to the projects and opening the doors to some of the local governmental actors.

And why talking about how we do things, what can be a better compliment than the request of our Macedonian friends for passing the torch on sharing our SlovakAid know how in consultations on how to establish "MacedonianAid".

This is especially important when we still realize our own challenges, such as finding support for building capacities of development implementers, as well as professionalization of all of its actors, educating new development professionals also in academia, upgrading our business model, narrowing down and streamlining our ODA priorities, sharing the pride of our accomplishments and having its grasped by Slovak citizens and the media.

The panels that you are about to enjoy will hopefully serve as such inspiration. Some of you told me that it is so hard to choose and you would want to be at all of them at once. Well, it was partially our intention. We added also a panel on Tunisia and Egypt where we started working only recently and are thankful to its panelists for participating. We would like to stay connected with all of you, we also want you to stay here until the afternoon when we will do the wrap-up but also we want you to read the bulletin that will compile the presented materials and will be published shortly after the conference, and most importantly we hope that you will suggest the topics and your contributions for the next year's conference and come back.

Thanks again for being here, enjoy the presentations that will be held in Palugyay Palace.

DISCUSSION PANEL 1

SLOVAKIA AND WESTERN BALKANS: SHARING TRANSITION EXPERIENCE



Moderator: **Mr. Pavol Demeš**, German Marshall Fund of the U.S.

Speakers:

- H. E. Miroslav Lajčák**, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
- H. E. Vujica Lazović**, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Policy and Financial System and Minister for Information Society and Telecommunications, Government of Montenegro
- H. E. Jovan Andonovski**, State Secretary for European Affairs, Government of the Republic of Macedonia
- Ms. Sonja Licht**, President of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

The panel attempted to provide a response to the question of how Slovakia has assisted the region of the Western Balkans in the past 10 years. The region is one of the most important regions in the world for all of Slovakia, politicians, civil society but also the general public. The region is not only the leading tourist destination for Slovaks but how we “emotionally feel attached to these countries” [and] “we feel that this is the region [where] we can develop these connections” as Pavol Demeš, moderator of the panel remarked.

Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign and European Affairs Minister reminded us of the beginnings of SlovakAid. 10 years ago Slovakia was setting up the philosophy of development aid. It was crucial to define what was Slovakia’s added value due to the limited resources. However, the Slovak authentic experience from building the statehood, forming democratic institutions and creating the market economy mediated through Slovak development assistance proved to be unique. The Western Balkans has set up EU integration as their ultimate goal

and through following the same path were offered the Slovak experience. With no hidden agenda Slovakia can have the privilege of being a strong supporter but as well a loud and clear critic. The first program country was Serbia and Montenegro, then being one country. The first stage of development assistance focused on reconciliation and reconstruction, building bridges in 6 regions of Serbia, not only the physical but also the symbolic as they bridged communities. Later on, Slovak assistance moved from hardware to software, in the second stage we offered technical assistance and transfer of preparation for EU membership. The last stage brings Slovakia's experience to the EU succession funds and using tools as IPA, twinning or TAIEX. Serbia with over 100 implemented projects is the biggest recipient in the Development Assistance program. From building bridges, Slovakia moved to helping consolidation of democracy and rule of law. Since 2011 CETIR (Centre for Transfer of Experience from Integration and Reforms) Program has been actively used for mutual cooperation. In Montenegro the project of the National Convention on European Integration has been very successful. This project being an export article of Slovakia has been in demand in Ukraine, Moldova and recently Albania showed their interest to learn from our experience. Sectors of Environment being the priority and Public Finance for the Development to strengthen national capacities in combating corruption and ensuring efficient use of public funds have been supported. In cooperation with international donors, Slovakia supported the fight against terrorism and liquidation of small arms and light weapons. Regarding Macedonia, the focus has shifted from infrastructure and capacity building to the transfer of experience. Slovakia has implemented 12 projects, ranging from civil society capacity building to rule of law. Setting up a parliamentary library and archives institute is successful example of trilateral development cooperation, with the Czech parliament, USAID and SwissAID being involved, too. Consultations with Macedonia on how to establish Macedonia Aid and how to become a donor country itself are now underway. This symbolic handover is proof of success and the progress these countries have made.

10 years of Slovak Aid is not only an anniversary for Slovakia, but also for Montenegro, as the country relies on Slovak expertise and experience in planning and implementing development policies as Vujica Lazović, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Policy and Financial System and Minister for Information Society and Telecommunications, Government of Montenegro noted at the beginning. In 2006, the period of the independence and restoration of Montenegro's relationship with Slovak diplomats were crucial for the modern history of Montenegro. Miroslav Lajčák, the then EU Representative for the Montenegrin referendum and Slovak Ambassador František Lipka through their authority and experience contributed to a successful demonstration of the proof of Montenegrin maturity and democratic capacity of the Western Balkans. Montenegro appreciates the knowledge and Euro-Atlantic experience that Slovakia shares with which is demonstrated by various projects undertaken, for example the EU National Convention or Government Communication Strategy for NATO. "We do not feel pressed by deadlines of NATO and EU membership but strive to implement standards of quality in development of society in Montenegro in a prompt a quality way", underlined Mr Lazović. Prospects of early opening of the two most complex negotiation chapters is highly motivating for Montenegro hoping to open negotiations in chapters 23 and 24, that of Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom and Security respectively, by the end of 2013. Mr Lazović called on the Slovak experts for their support and expertise in these chapters. In the near future an invitation to NATO is expected. In his opinion, Montenegro has been recognized as a leader of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans. Beside integration processes other important factors for the development are support of development of civil society, democratic institutions and market economy and development of European standards in veterinary and phytosanitary, agriculture, competitiveness and other sectors. Slovak support for the third consecutive year in a row has been significant in this area. Projects focusing on EU integration processes, awareness raising regarding NATO in Montenegro and lastly on the transfer of experience from reforms (with 11 state administration visits) form the scope of cooperation between Slovakia and Montenegro.

According to Jovan Andonovski, State Secretary for European Affairs, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, cooperation of Central Europe and entire Western Balkans became crucial five to seven years ago. It was then when traditional EU partners, old donors started to leave the region. The key reason for the phase out was the advanced status of Macedonia in terms of EU accession processes as well as the fact that all mentioned countries contribute to the budget of the EU funds. The global financial crisis played an important role in their decision. Bilateral cooperation is now a major focus, with a thematic emphasis on reform of public administration, judiciary and building democratic institutions and improvement of economic situation. Amongst the new partners, Slovakia is considered being one of the most active one. "In financial terms Slovak aid may not match that from the traditional donors, but in the context of good timing, open approach, openness for discussion when defining priorities and valuable experience offered, the practical value from Slovak aid exceeds its financial aspects", noted Mr Andonovski. He also emphasized similarities of the issues and problems the two countries have faced; high degrees of public ability to address these problems with minor adjustments to specific national conditions and potential for cooperation between institutions and should be used for mutual benefits. Macedonia is interested in continuation of cooperation with Slovak experts in various areas of reforms, mostly focusing on adoption and implementation of EU acquis. Development of support and creation of a platform between businesses and civil society organisations in both countries is in their mutual interest. Establishment of civil society support facility could be a good way to move forward. An important issue of cooperation between experts is that it should go beyond the project life. Macedonia hopes to move forwards with the issues of EU integration and continue with the creation of their own capacity as a donor country.

Ms Sonja Licht, President of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence drew attention to the Progress Reports which the EU happened to publish on the very same day. They represent a mirror of the progress individual countries have made towards their shared dream; the EU membership. This dream helps overcome the horrible experience of the 90s. She underlined that the Western Balkans is the only post conflict region in the world that has the potential for becoming a member of the EU. Contribution to making this goal realistic started in 1999 in Bratislava when the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was drafted. She appreciated personal involvement of Eduard Kukan, the then Slovak Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, the then assistant to the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the Balkans and Vazil Hudak, Senior Vice President of the East West Institute who in July 1999 contributed to the Bratislava Process. In order to involve Serbia in the plan of how to overcome Milosevic regime, a conference was convened, having two important points on agenda – how to create a democratic alliance for change within Serbia and Montenegro and how to develop international partnerships. Ms Licht esteemed that Slovakia played a major role in designing this international partnership in this part of the world. In her words, Slovakia understood that it had strength to be more ambitious and strive for this and played an important role in the development of the European perspective. National Convention for EU Integration was also offered to Serbia and was successful. Early October 2013 discussions initiated the support of direct rebuilding of the convention because they came to the conclusion of needing the convention to make sure that Serbian accession process is as inclusive as possible. This proves that Slovak support and presence is much more important than the financial support. Belgrade Security Forum got its inspiration from the Globsec. "Would it be possible without this inspiration and without the ongoing support from the Slovak government and Slovak Aid? Maybe possible but not the same," mused Ms Licht. "We in the Western Balkans say we are in the most unhappy position [...] but if we look at the broader picture that we have achieved so much and we are the most successful post conflict in the world as we have this fascinating opportunity of European perspective".

In the question series both the panelists from Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia could re-affirm that European integration processes have strong support amongst all important political stakeholders, public and all layers of society with 90 per cent of supporters in Macedonia and 63 per cent in Serbia. Despite the global financial crisis, the integration processes are unstoppable. Croatia became the 28th EU member state, Montenegro opened the negotiations, Serbia is about to do so soon and there is a clear perspective for the rest of the region. Macedonia since being granted candidate status in 2005 and since 2009 they have received a positive recommendation to start the negotiation process but due to bilateral disputes with Greece they could not have started the negotiations. This fact that they are ready to start the negotiations does not mean they are ready to join the union. A lot yet needs to be done mostly in the area of building democratic institutions, fight against corruption and organized crime, reform of judiciary and public administration, improvement of economic situation and good neighbourly relations. The role of entire society is central in implementing these reforms. “[...]Place of the Balkans is in the EU and the EU politicians together with the Balkan politicians have now a historical role and chance to create life long lasting peace in the Balkans” noted Mr Andonovski. Now it is on the Western Balkans’ experts to mediate their experience to other regions, troubled and conflict ones, for example that of MENA. Mr Lajčák assured that lessons learnt from bad practices are shared alongside with best practices as well as honest truth and tough messages. It is important to “tell how things are and not how you want to hear them”. It is important to be firm about setting the goals, determination is crucial, however, at the same time; they must reflect the local environment, history and mentality. No compromises on principles should be accompanied by respect for one’s own people and history. International community makes mistakes of replanting ideas that work in one region to another; however, this does not prove to be a viable approach. According to Mr Andonovski the role of the donor community is to match the assistance with the needs of the society since the reforms are done for the benefits of all people, not because of Brussels. Ms Licht appreciated democratic changes happening now in Serbia due to the EU and European future. The Slovak development assistance, if it wants to be useful, it must be relevant. Hence Moldova, where the Slovak experience is relevant; Afghanistan, where Slovakia tries to contribute to development through development, humanitarian assistance and military presence; and Kenya, where Slovakia want to see a coordinating approach and impact in the country in terms of development assistance, political dialogue and support. These are the three program countries for the next period. Development assistance must not be seen in isolation, but in a broader perspective. It is part of the concerted approach to solving problems and exporting stability and making the European perspective for the Western Balkans region a reality.

Written by Andrea Cox, Pontis Foundation

DISCUSSION PANEL 2

SLOVAK-AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: PAST AND FUTURE



Moderator: **Mr. Marián Čaučík**, eRko Christian Children Communities Movement

Speakers: **H. E. Andris Piebalgs**, European Commissioner for Development
H. E. Amina C. Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Republic of Kenya
Mr. Peter Burian, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
Mr. Serge Tomasi, Deputy Director of OECD Development Co-operation Directorate

Marián Čaučík: Why is it important for small European country like Slovakia to have partners in Africa? Where do you see the benefits of such bilateral cooperation especially in the times of economic and financial crises?

Amina C. Mohamed: We in Kenya do not see Slovakia as a small country, we see Slovakia as a big country with even a bigger heart. We have had a relationship for a very long time; your civil society organizations have been operating in my country for a very long time. They are quite well respected; they have carried out extremely important projects in many parts of the country.

Kenya was one of the countries that were 1st to recognize the Slovak Republic (1993) and have had close relations with and in 2004 we started to have diplomatic relations. Kenya has been one of the biggest recipients of SlovakAid with 5,8 million EUR in the last 10 years. I have been surprised by the projects and the

scope of support. Slovak NGOs went into the poorer parts of the country where the government does not have resources to go and assist. The assistance is targeted and focused on achieving specific results, which have been effective.

Where do we go from here? I think the relationship with Slovak republic and Slovak NGOs is going to be long term. Africa is part of the world which is growing fastest; in Kenya we were able to discover recently large deposits of oil, large deposits of minerals and a large lake of fresh water. Natural resources need to be developed, exploited and contribute to wealth and national development. These are the areas where we are going to talk to the Slovak government about; to enter joint ventures, seek support and invite their businesses to come in to support our own national development aid programs. But also the small grants that were given to start businesses in some parts of the country could turn into joint venture enterprises.

We are really hopeful to move forward and to take this relationship to the next level. Our relationship is just at the beginning and I think it is a dynamic relationship. It is going to be a very positive for national development and a win-win situation, when your businesses will come in. What are also very important are the partnerships with Kenyan NGOs and developing their capacities.

Andris Piebalgs: I am glad that Slovakia is second from the CEE countries to support Africa. African countries today are deciding the international agenda. There is a huge political interest for European countries to combat conflict in Africa, as the European future is closely linked to this. Africa is growing and has challenges: How we can accommodate the huge young labor market? We need to make a difference, not through charity but through education and mutual profit. It is crucial to our own prosperity to work with African countries.

Definitely you have to make your choice; you cannot work with all African countries, that is clear. But the presence of the Cabinet Secretary here at the conference is a clear indication that the Kenyan government is also willing to work with Slovakia. So please, use this chance, I think this is an important chance considering that Kenya is one of most dynamic African countries in regard to economic development. If I see its growth figures, the market reforms, if I see the access to energy, it has huge potential. But it requires investment and work.

When I come to my business in development: We are now trying to change the philosophy and this is challenging. For a long time our philosophy particularly towards sub-Saharan Africa has been to elevate poverty to provide services through the government and through NGOs: access to education, access to health and not really believing that these countries can deal with these issues. Today there has been a shift in this perception. Governments are trying to take all the social services provision under their own wings. But there are challenges still faced in growth and income. And I believe that it is in this area that we have to divert our strategies and focus on the areas that could help the countries to sustain and increase growth. I see in the current philosophy two particular sectors where grant support could be very crucial.

One is agriculture, food security, and nutrition. The challenge with the agricultural sector particularly in Africa is access to finance. It is difficult to establish this through the banks, because it is seasonal, incomes are fluctuating and there are a lot of smallholder farmers. Investment need is huge and the money supply is small. So what we are trying to do in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa is use the local sector to help understand the different approaches in different countries and link it to the individual country strategy.

Second is access to energy and that is where I think Kenya is making the biggest progress, like access to thermal energy. Many countries across the world have the potential, but the only country with new capacities for this is Kenya. The same can be said in regard to wind energy. We need to collaborate with other African countries.

Our main goal is to support African growth for African people: support governance, human development, peace and security - this should be done, but the change of philosophy is to help African countries to move through the transitional phase as smoothly as possible. For this we have 1 billion euro grants. If the grants can be used strategically, it could make a difference. The most important message for sustainability is to adapt to the national strategy. Because at the end of the day to have sustainability, you need that the country owns it.

In my opinion trade is also crucial for development. In this respect of this policy coherence for development we are moving to a new level which makes a difference.

Let me speak briefly about joint programming. EU channels the money not only through the European Commission. Actually through EC we have only 15-18% of all grants. Most of the money goes through the member states. We work under the leadership of countries according to their national development strategy and we need to plan our activities ex ante.

Development aid has still an important role to play, but it is not charity, it is more a strategic aid. I wish also success on the Post 2015 agenda: MDG policy was right for its time - to address extreme poverty. Now people ask for more. They ask for jobs, prosperity, the access to judiciary institutions and these demands are much higher all across the world. The agenda should reflect this and respond to this. Finally let us not forget we must have sustainability.

Serge Tomasi: Slovak government joins DAC and I think it is an important step, because it is a recognition of the efforts you have done to increase the volume of your ODA, it is recognition of putting in place legal framework for the development cooperation. And I hope you can benefit of the accession, as it will increase your credibility and visibility at the international level.

You can benefit from the technical support of the secretariat, you can benefit from experience of other DAC members, from the peer reviews of the national development cooperation policy of each DAC member. Slovakia can learn from the experiences of other members.

I hope that the fact of being the member of DAC will create incentives to increase your ODA and to improve the efficiency of your development cooperation policy. And I hope that also it can be of benefit for the DAC. You have a lot to bring; you can bring your experience of economic and political transition. The development process is a transformative process.

Let me add a few words on Africa and why is it important for the ODA members. Africa is a big continent, with a huge growing population and huge opportunities. Africa growth in the last years is more than 6% per year; there are several countries with growth of 10-11% a year. There is a need for economic and political transitions to improve the business environment.

Regarding the MDGs and Post 2015 Agenda: the fragile states and the LDCs are far from reaching of the MDGs and most of the LDCs are in sub-Saharan Africa. The objective to end absolute poverty in Africa is a huge challenge and therefore I think at DAC we have to pay a special attention to the LDCs and Africa.

Peter Burian: First of all I would like to respond to your question: Why it is important for a country like Slovakia with limited financial resources to be engaged in ODA and in Africa?

I really believe this is really an important question for many of our people; many of our public would ask this question and understanding the value of the ODA for the policy makers and for the public is very important for the success of our endeavor.

It is totally right what Commissioner Piebalgs said, that we should not consider ODA as charity, it is rather an investment in the future and we should approach it in this way. Why? Prevention is much cheaper than addressing the consequences of humanitarian catastrophes and crisis (Syria, Horn of Africa). ODA is a very important foreign policy tool for Slovakia who wishes to live in a secure world.

Through modest investment we can argue that we can address and focus at the local level on issues of healthcare, security and poverty elevation. Even a smaller country with a modest investment can make a difference. In Kenya many Slovak NGOs have been engaged even without SlovakAid support. We need to precisely map the work being done and the scope and impact of the engagement and work in these areas. Slovakia, being a small country has limited resources and therefore I believe we should narrow the focus on priority areas where Slovakia can bring added value like education, vocational trainings and job creation - where I see role of the private sector and cooperation with NGOs as crucial, new technologies – water purification, solar energy.

Our best value is experience from the recent transformation from a recipient to a donor; hence we have a greater sensitivity and understanding of the recipient position. I think it is important to reflect this experience in our ODA projects and activities and shaping the ODA discussions in the EU and DAC where we recently became a member.

It is important to rely on national ownership and on the wisdom of the local people in a country like Kenya. They know what their problem is; we just have to find a way to help maybe with the sharing of our experience from our transformation processes. The diversity of the projects is showing that we have capabilities; we have skills for people in many areas. We have to narrow the focus to the areas where we really can provide added value. We are focusing on providing education to the most vulnerable. When the value added is efficiently used, the impact can be great

Important conclusions and ideas from the discussion:

- Support of all panelist to continue the support of South Sudan, a country that is only 2 years old with many development challenges, help to South Sudan must be unconditional
- Possible trilateral cooperation between Slovakia, Kenya and South Sudan as an alternative because South Sudan lost its program country status of SlovakAid and lack of funds
- Role of NGOs in development is crucial, programs, advocacy, links between our partner countries and our societies, programs will be further supported by the EC

- NGO advocacy for development cooperation, higher ODA levels, consultative processes with civil society are important
- partnerships of Slovak NGOs with local NGOs in Kenya - local NGOs need capacity building
- strengthening the accountability of the recipient governments and local NGOs
- Private sector involvement in ODA – financial vehicles for mitigating the investment risks for SMEs provided by the EC
- Public-Private Sector Partnerships encouraged and welcome
- Supporting municipalities – especially after Kenya’s decentralization reform – also possible cooperation between Slovak MFA and ZMOS (Slovak Union of Municipalities)

Written by Marián Čaučík, eRko Christian Children Communities Movement

DISCUSSION PANEL 3

SHARED VALUES AND COOPERATION WITH THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES



Moderator: **Mr. Peter Hulényi**, Director of the Department of Humanitarian and Development Aid, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Speakers: **H. E. Nathalia Gherman**, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova

Mr. Ľubomír Rehák, Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Ms. Olga Stuzhinskaya, Founder of the Office for a Democratic Belarus

Mr. Alexander Duleba, Director of Slovak Foreign Policy Association

It was not a coincidence that the third and the last panel of the first day of the conference focused on the work of SlovakAid in countries of the Eastern Partnership. Slovak NGOs have been working in Africa (the second panel's topic) since the mid-1990s and SlovakAid has had a presence in the Western Balkans (the first panel's topic) since 2003. However, Slovak development cooperation in the Eastern Partnership countries has been forming only in the past five years, following approval of the Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance for 2009 – 2013. Scattered activities of Slovak NGOs, national institutions and businesses conducted in this region until 2009 have been gradually replaced by a more systematic and coordinated approach within SlovakAid. This process is influenced by the launch of the EU's Eastern Partnership project and the successful advancement of the integration process in the Western Balkans. Donors, including the SR, are, therefore, naturally shifting their attention to the countries on the EU's Eastern borders.

The dynamics of Slovak development cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries was discussed by **Natalia Gherman**, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, **Olga Stuzhinskaya**, founder and director of the Brussels-based NGO *Office for a Democratic Belarus* (ODB), **Alexander Duleba**, director of the development centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) and Ľubomír Reháč, political director of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic (MFEA SR).

The panel sought to find answers to 3 questions: “What has SlovakAid achieved in the Eastern Partnership countries over the past years?”; “What has been the positive and negative experience from development cooperation with this region?” and “How should the development cooperation proceed in the following years?” The panel’s composition allowed the questions to be answered from various points of view – from the viewpoint of the government of a recipient country, an NGO based in Brussels, a Slovak think-tank and the actual donor, the MFEA SR.

“You chose us as your development priority, but it is also true vice-versa...”

(Natalia Gherman)

The discussion was opened by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, followed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, signed an agreement on development cooperation between the two countries. Several months earlier (in July 2013) both ministers had inaugurated the Slovak Embassy in Chisinau. Cooperation between Slovakia and Moldova is accelerating and SlovakAid is becoming one of the driving forces in this cooperation. The Moldovan Minister expressed her appreciation that Moldova will be from 2014 one of the three programme countries of SlovakAid (it is included among the programme countries in the Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation for 2014 – 2018, that is currently being prepared). She emphasised that it was not just Slovakia that had chosen Moldova as its priority, but that it is also true vice versa. For Moldova, Slovakia is a unique example of a country that has gone through the process of establishing its own statehood, through a complicated democratisation process and painful economic transformation to catch up with other countries in the region and, together with them, join the European and transatlantic structures. “Slovakia is for us an inspiration, motivation and a good model of successful transformation and integration”, the Minister said. She expressed her appreciation for several specific projects and activities conducted by Slovak NGOs and state institutions. The National Convention on the EU in Moldova, the preparation of students and teachers using e-learning, the creation of healthy business environment, building of civil society, or hazardous waste management, are just a few examples of this intensive cooperation. A common denominator to all development activities is sharing of transformation experience and support for building democratic institutions and establishing the rule of law. According to Moldovan Minister, Slovakia is an example of a donor that can have a significant impact even with relatively limited resources. Favourable conditions for the development cooperation of Slovakia and Moldova have already been created and the cooperation should be launched by launching of the Medium-Term Strategy for 2014 – 2018 to further this cooperation. From December 2013 onwards, a development diplomat will work at the newly-opened Slovak Embassy in Chisinau (a staff member of the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation); in the first half of the next year the MFEA SR, in cooperation with Moldovan partners, will prepare a Country Strategy Paper and the funding for the budget for the development cooperation with Moldova will be increased. All this is according to Minister Gherman evidence of Slovak genuine interest in seeing further development in her country. Therefore, she remains an optimist before the summit in Vilnius. “I believe that in the near future we will see acceleration of Moldova’s economic integration into the single European market. We rely on Slovak strong support”, stressed the Minister.

“We are looking forward to the development of sectorial cooperation between Slovakia and Belarus”*(Olga Stuzhinskaya)*

The director of the NGO *Office for a Democratic Belarus* (ODB), Olga Stuzhinskaya, sees Slovak cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries from two different points of view. The first one is based on the location of her organization in the heart of the EU, in Brussels, while the second one is specific and complicated status of Belarus among the Eastern Partnership countries. Olga Stuzhinskaya has seven years' experience with Slovak development cooperation, since her organisation ODB was founded in 2006 thanks to SlovakAid support. “Thanks to Pontis Foundation, the ODB has received significant expert support and strategic direction and has established a network in the EU, particularly among the Visegrad countries”, stressed the ODB director in the beginning of her speech. It is, of course, important to strengthen ties between the EU and Belarus through activities in Brussels, but even more important is to work in Minsk itself. Therefore, Olga Stuzhinskaya initiated establishing of the *Office for European Expertise and Communication*, as a branch of the ODB, in Belarus in 2011. In this case, she again relied on the expert experience of Slovakia. She appreciates the activities of the Slovak entities in the country. With the support of SlovakAid there have been many projects implemented in Belarus; i.e. support of economic reforms, small and medium-sized enterprises, environmental protection, development of the NGO sector, media freedom and freedom of speech. Likewise, the ODB supports projects of technical assistance in the field of education, energetics, environmental protection and transport. Since there are common interests with SlovakAid, the ODB director is looking forward to the development of sectorial cooperation between Slovakia and Belarus. “Slovak experience with the reform processes is for Belarus easier to grasp than the knowledge and know-how offered by the original EU members”, she emphasised. Besides energy and transport, the ODB places particular emphasis on promoting education. It is, nonetheless, important to choose an appropriate approach which should, in her opinion, be based particularly on the reform of higher education in Belarus and on promoting economic modules. The introduction of modern studies in the field of economics in Belarus will contribute to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and to the creation of a stable, healthy and attractive business environment. On the other hand, scholarships for Belarusian students abroad may in certain cases be counterproductive in terms of resulting in a brain drain, since successful graduates will not return back to Belarus. “Slovak entities should also continue in corporate social responsibility projects and encourage other international donors to join these activities, too”, said Olga Stuzhinskaya.

“The National Convention on the EU is both a practical tool and a dream at the same time”*(Alexander Duleba)*

Following the two presentations focused on SlovakAid cooperation with Moldova and Belarus, a presentation given by the director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association's Development Centre, Alexander Duleba, offered a closer look at Slovak activities in Ukraine. The SFPA has been implementing development projects in this country since 2004, with remarkable progress. The team led by Alexander Duleba created a project “National Convention on the EU”, which has become one of the flagships of SlovakAid. The project has been successfully implemented not only in Ukraine, but also in the Western Balkan countries and Moldova. Sharing of experience in the field of EU sectorial policies is a traditional activity of European donors. The National Convention on the EU is nevertheless unique, as Alexander Duleba explained. The Convention is a platform for facilitating structured debate on sectorial policies among key actors in a partner country. It is a shift from public debate toward shaping national interests, building national capacities and education all in one. “It is at a practical tool and a dream at the same time”. Thanks to the National Convention, Ukrainians obtain information primarily from other Ukrainians and Slovak experts act as well

as mediators in this process. "In order to make this tool operational, it was essential to build and cultivate a long-term collaboration with the Ukrainian partner and Ukrainian government", stressed Alexander Duleba. In case of National Convention, similarly as in other projects in Eastern Partnership countries, it is vital that local specifics are being recognised and applied sensitively. "We cannot expect that the same approach that worked in Ukraine can be automatically applied also in Moldova, and vice versa".

"Slovakia has no hidden agenda and this makes us an attractive partner for countries in this region"

(Lubomír Reháč)

The Political Director of the MFEA SR, Lubomír Reháč, in the introduction to his contribution took a closer look at the SlovakAid mission. He said that Slovak development cooperation is based on two pillars, each with its own weight and meaning. The development interventions of Slovak subjects in less-developed countries are undoubtedly of great importance. Equally important, however, is the second pillar – the transfer of transformation experience particularly in the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries. It is in these countries that SlovakAid has significant added value and comparative advantages in comparison with traditional donors. It is not just the interest of partners that leads us to share experience, but also the feeling of solidarity and moral duty to help as much as we can in the same way as others once helped us in the difficult process of transformation. "Slovakia has no hidden agenda and this makes us an attractive partner for countries in this region", stressed Lubomír Reháč. The system of SlovakAid over the past decade has elaborated several effective tools, from grant schemes, sending volunteers, through to micro-grants. Micro-grants are, Lubomír Reháč believes, an example of how even a little funding can clearly and effectively help if the aid is targeted, flexible and quick. Besides Slovak cooperation with Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine (the focus of the previous three panellists), Lubomír Reháč also emphasized SlovakAid activities in Georgia. Development co-operation with this country focused mainly on projects helping internally displaced persons (IDPs), strengthening transparency in public procurement, environmental protection, and security sector reform. In cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries, Slovakia should intensively cooperate with other donors particularly in the Visegrad Group, as well as with the International Visegrad Fund. "We have to keep in mind that each of the Eastern Partnership countries is unique, it is at a different stage of cooperation with the EU and, therefore, requires an individual approach", concluded Lubomír Reháč.

The panel, entitled "Shared values and cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries" provided a complete mosaic of views on SlovakAid activities in the region. Reflections on cooperation with Moldova, as perceived by the Moldovan side, on cooperation with Belarus as perceived from Brussels and Belarus, on cooperation with Ukraine as perceived from Bratislava and on the comprehensive activities of SlovakAid in Eastern Partnership countries as they are perceived directly by the donor have provided a rich overview of experience, that is a good foundation for further shaping of Slovak development cooperation in the following years. The MFEA SR will have the opportunity to transform this knowledge also into a key strategic document – the Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation for 2014 – 2018, which is to be submitted for approval of the Slovak Government by the end of 2013. The Strategy devotes increased attention to the Eastern Partnership countries. Out of the ten SlovakAid territorial priorities for the coming five-year period, four should be from the region. Moldova is also included among the three programme countries for Slovak development cooperation. Discussion on the sectorial focus of SlovakAid in the Eastern Partnership countries will continue. In the case of Moldova, approval of the Country Strategy Paper will enhance this discussion and, in the case of Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus the sectors for the programme of transferring transformation experience will continue to be outlined. To a large extent, the nature and intensity of Slovak cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries will be influenced

by the euro-integration process following the summit in Vilnius. The panel regarding the Eastern Partnership represented a symbolic shift from the end of the first decade of development cooperation under the logo of SlovakAid and its future direction after 2014.

Written by Peter Hulényi, Department of Humanitarian and Development Aid, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

SLOVENSKO-KENSKÝ ROZVOJOVÝ PROJEKT CEZ OPTIKU MILÉNIOVÝCH ROZVOJOVÝCH CIEĽOV

Božena Baluchová a Juraj Jančovič

ABSTRAKT

V roku 2000 na pôde OSN potvrdilo 189 štátov svoje odhodlanie – odstrániť extrémnu chudobu (jej príčiny i následky), garantovať sociálny a ekonomický rozvoj, mier, bezpečnosť. Krajiny spoločne prijali 8 Miléniových rozvojových cieľov (MRC), 8 priorít pre zlepšenie života a najmä kvality života kdekoľvek na svete. Do stanoveného termínu v roku 2015 nebude pravdepodobne žiaden z nich dosiahnutý. Prebiehajú medzinárodné rokovania – ako má vyzerat' agenda po roku 2015 (transformácia Miléniových rozvojových cieľov do Udržateľných rozvojových cieľov). V nasledujúcom príspevku sú predstavené MRC v praxi – ako môže dobre nastavený, konkrétny slovensko-kenský rozvojový projekt (Trnavskej univerzity v regióne Kwale) napomôcť k ich naplneniu. Spomenutá je aj kritika MRC a výzvy, resp. odporúčania do budúcnosti.

KLÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ

Rozvojová spolupráca, podvýživa, Miléniové rozvojové ciele, Kwale, Keňa, Trnavská univerzita

ABSTRACT

In 2000, the UN has confirmed its commitment to eradicate extreme poverty (its causes and consequences). 189 countries promised to guarantee social and economic development, peace and security – through the adoption of the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 8 priorities for improving the live conditions and especially the quality of life anywhere in the world. The achievement of these goals will most likely not happen until the deadline in 2015. Ongoing international negotiations are discussing the post-2015 agenda (MDGs transformation to sustainable development goals, SDGs). In this paper there are presented MDGs in practice – how well-set activities of particular Slovak-Kenyan development project (of Trnava University in Kwale region) can help to their fulfillment. There will be also mentioned the criticism of the MDGs and challenges as well as recommendations for the future.

KEY WORDS

Development cooperation, malnutrition, Millenium development goals, Kwale, Kenya, Trnava University

ÚVOD

Všeobecné povedomie o Miléniových rozvojových cieľoch (MRC) na Slovensku je veľmi slabé. Nie je to nič nezvyčajné, podobne sú na tom aj ostatné krajiny Európskej únie. Podľa výsledkov Eurobarometra¹ z roku 2009: až 80 % obyvateľov a obyvateľiek EÚ nikdy nepočulo o Miléniových rozvojových cieľoch. Pričom už v roku 2000 boli na pôde OSN v rámci Miléniového samitu OSN odsúhlasené Miléniové rozvojové ciele, kde bol rozvoj definovaný pomocou ôsmich jasne opísaných priorít. Až 189 štátov potvrdilo svoje odhodlanie – odstrániť extrémnu chudobu, jej príčiny i následky, a prijalo 8 Miléniových rozvojových cieľov (Millennium Development Goals: MDGs), ako aj časový harmonogram na ich dosiahnutie (do roku 2015). V roku 2010 bola odštartovaná tretia, posledná fáza plnenia MRC. Na samite o MRC v New Yorku v septembri 2010 bol prijatý globálny akčný plán na dosiahnutie cieľov do roku 2015.

Keňa, resp. Kenská republika (s počtom obyvateľov okolo 42 miliónov) je ako bývalá kolónia Veľkej Británie členom Spoločenstva národov, ako aj Africkej únie a Hnutia nezúčastnených krajín. V mestách žije 33 % a na vidieku 67 % obyvateľstva. V Keni je až 42 % obyvateľov mladších ako 15 rokov a priemerná dĺžka života je okolo 58 rokov.² Výška HDP na obyvateľa je 1.316 USD s jeho 5.87 % medziročným rastom a výška HND na obyvateľa je 770 USD. Podľa Human development report z roku 2010 je hodnota Indexu ľudského rozvoja (HDI) 0,470 a hrubý národný dôchodok (HND) na obyvateľa je 1.628 USD. Materská úmrtnosť definovaná ako materské úmrtia na 100.000 živonarodených detí je vo výške 560. Pod hranicou biedy je viac ako 50 % obyvateľstva.³ Práve táto krajina je jednou z prioritných krajín Oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci (ODA) SR. S podporou SlovakAid tu svoj sociálno-zdravotnícky projekt realizuje aj Trnavská univerzita (v regióne Kwale). Cez optiku Miléniových rozvojových cieľov možno vidieť, ktoré priority tento projekt naplňa.

1. MILÉNIOVÉ ROZVOJOVÉ CIELE A KONKRÉTNY ROZVOJOVÝ PROJEKT SR V KENI

Za hranicu absolútnej chudoby považuje Svetová banka príjem 1,25 USD/osobu/deň. Pod touto hranicou žije približne jedna miliarda obyvateľov. Azda preto je jasné, prečo ambícia: znížiť extrémnu chudobu a hlad vo svete, je na prvom mieste spomedzi 8 Miléniových rozvojových cieľov (MRC).

A. CIEĽ 1: ODSTRÁNIŤ EXTRÉMNU CHUDOBU A HLAD:

Aj na Slovensku boli v júli 2011, keď východnú Afriku ohrozoval hladomor – najhorší za uplynulých 60 rokov, vyhlásené finančné zbierky na pomoc zasiahnutým krajinám. Hladomor vtedy postihol 13 miliónov ľudí zo Somálska, z Ugandy, Etiópie a takisto aj z Kene. Extrémne suchá, vynechanie obdobia dažďov a automaticky sa zvyšujúce ceny potravín postihli celé pastierske a poľnohospodárske komunity. Spoločenské nepokoje, lokálne konflikty, migrácia nenechali na seba dlho čakať. V utečeneckom tábore Dadaab na hraniciach Kene a Etiópie v niektorých mesiacoch bojovalo o prežitie skoro pol milióna ľudí.⁴

1 Eurobarometer 318, 2009: <http://educacionglobalresearch.net/issue1dear/>

2 CIA - The World Factbook, 2010: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2010>

3 Human development report, 2010: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/>

4 UNHCR, 2011: Helping the most vulnerable in Dadaab, <http://www.unhcr.org/4e42a1999.html>

V Keni žije pravdepodobne najviac 'street-children' (detí ulice) v rámci afrického kontinentu, až štvrt' milióna. Pričom v slumoch hlavného mesta Kene – Nairobi je to približne 60 tisíc.⁵ A práve tieto prímestské oblasti, ktoré sa vyznačujú vysokou hustotou obyvateľstva, treba mať na pamäti – keď sa hovorí o detskej chudobe v Keni. Státisíce ľudí, ktorí kvôli práci a obžive odišli z vidieka do metropoly, žijú v slumoch bez elektriny, vody, infraštruktúry, kanalizácie. Ide bezpochyby o najkritickejšie semenisko pre šírenie smrteľných chorôb, vysokú kriminalitu, prostitúciu a užívanie drog⁶ – u tých najzraniteľnejších, teda aj u detí.

Ak rodičia žijú na pokraji záujmu spoločnosti a o každodennom prísune potravy, dôstojnom bývaní, zamestnaní či financiách môžu prestali snívať, ich deti pravdepodobne nebudú mať dobré vyhliadky na spokojne-prežitú detstvo. Trnavská univerzita však v spolupráci s Vysokou školou zdravotníctva a sociálnej práce sv. Alžbety v Bratislave predsa len úsilie zabezpečiť týmto deťom plnohodnotnú budúcnosť vynaložila a založila v minulosti Resocializačné centrum pre deti ulice v Mihangu. V roku 2009 sa TU z hlavného mesta presunula do vidieckych oblastí na pobreží Kene (kde realizuje anti-malnutričný program v Kwale, Tiwi a Mkongani).

Pri miléniovom ciele č. 1 sú tri zámery: Znížiť na polovicu podiel ľudí s príjmom nižším ako 1 dolár na deň; Dosiagnúť plnú a produktívnu zamestnanosť a dôstojnú prácu pre všetkých, vrátane žien a mladých ľudí; Znížiť na polovicu podiel ľudí trpiacich hladom. Aj projekt TU v regióne Kwale môže vďaka digitalizácii údajov (Social a Measurement data) o pacientoch nutričných centier prispieť k monitoringu a analýze tohto zámeru a v prípade pozitívnych výsledkov naplnenia tohto cieľa.

B. CIEĽ 2: DOSIAHNUŤ ZÁKLADNÉ VZDELANIE PRE VŠETKÝCH

Gramotnosť Keňanov a Keňaniek je na hranici 74 %. Pričom treba zdôrazniť, že častým dôvodom negramotnosti nie je lenivosť, ale nedostupnosť k vzdelávaniu a vysoké náklady na štúdium. Deti zo základných i stredných škôl sú nesmierne nadané a v komunikácii aktívne. Od malička sa suverénne vyjadrujú v angličtine i v swahilčine. Niekedy ale ani dobré známky či talent nestačia.

V Keni je bezplatné len základné školstvo. I to vlastne úplne zadarmo nie je, lebo každé dieťa musí mať kúpenú minimálne jednu povinnú uniformu, ďalej školské pomôcky, knihy. Bez (v špeciálnom obchode zakúpenej či zdedenej) uniformy – podľa zaužívaného britského školského systému dieťa do školy nastúpiť nemôže. Strednú školu už rodičia svojim deťom pri priemernom mesačnom plate 50 eur nedokážu zaplatiť (maximálne tak jednému dieťaťu z celej rodiny), o univerzite ani nehovoriac (školné na rok sa pohybuje od 600 eur vyššie).

Naviac mnohé deti musia namiesto chodenia do školy pracovať, aby pomohli užiť rodinu – najmä ak otec, hlava početnej rodiny, odišiel za prácou stovky kilometrov a už sa nevrátil. Dievčatá a ženy získavajú podstatne menej vzdelania ako chlapci, muži – bez vzdelania v súčasnosti v rámci Kene ostáva 19 % žien a 13 % mužov. Chudobných žien je dvakrát viac ako chudobných mužov.⁷

5 Fabianová & Jančovič, 2008: Problematika detí ulice v Sub-saharskej Afrike, v Keni, s. 9-10

6 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 63

7 Kenya Demographic & Health Survey, 2008: <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/GF17/GF17.pdf>

Schopnosť čítať a písať je dôležitá pre každého jednotlivca – umožňuje zvyšovať životné príležitosti. Dôležitým ukazovateľom pokroku v tejto oblasti sa pomer prístupu chlapcov a dievčat k vzdelaniu nestal náhodou. Dve tretiny negramotných dospelých tvoria ženy.⁸ Nie náhodou sa preto ponuky vzdelávania v zahraničí a štipendijných programov sústreďujú práve na dievčatá z rozvojových krajín.

C. CIEĽ 3: PRESADZOVAŤ ROVNOSŤ POHLAVÍ A POSILNIŤ ÚLOHU ŽIEN V SPOLOČNOSTI

Vzdelanosť rodičov (a najmä matky) je kľúčová v rámci výchovy a zabezpečovania stravy i zdravia dieťaťa. Vzdelanie žien veľmi úzko súvisí aj s ich pôrodnosťou – častejšie rodia ženy, ktoré nemajú vzdelanie. Neplánované tehotenstvá sú stále bežné.

Celková plodnosť je 5 živo-narodených detí na jednu ženu. V 70. rokoch bol priemerný počet detí v rodine 8, dnes je to 4 až 5.⁹ A keďže už aj v Keni sa veľa hovorí o plánovanom rodičovstve či antikoncepcii, do roku 2050 by mal i tu klesnúť počet detí v rodine na 2.

Najefektívnejší spôsob zaistenia zdravého života dieťaťa je exkluzívne dojčenie počas prvých 6 mesiacov od narodenia. Takéto dojčenie bez prikrmovania môže zabrániť 13 % detských úmrtiam do 5. roku života detí.¹⁰ Pri voľbe dojčenia dieťaťa alebo inej formy stravovania, zohráva úlohu vzdelanosť matky. Všetko teda začína a končí u dostupnosti vzdelania nielen pre mužov, ale aj pre ženy – súčasné či budúce matky, vychovávateľky, komunitné pracovníčky, zdravotné sestry, učiteľky, farmárky atď.

Vo väčšine krajín Afriky (a teda aj v Keni) nemožno hovoriť o rodovej rovnosti, rovnoprávnosti mužov a žien. V patriarchálnych systémoch, navyše ovplyvňovaných kmeňovou či náboženskou (v pobrežnej oblasti najmä moslimskou) hierarchiou nie je jednoduché zmeniť myslenie zo dňa na deň. No svetové mimovládne organizácie volajú po odstraňovaní násilia, páchaného na ženách, a po posilňovaní postavenia žien v spoločnosti.

D. CIEĽ 4: ZNÍŽIŤ DETSKÚ ÚMRTNOSŤ

V rámci Miléniového rozvojového cieľa: Znižovanie detskej úmrtnosti si zúčastnené krajiny na pôde OSN zaumienili znížiť úmrtnosť detí do 5 rokov až o dve tretiny. Veľmi odvážny, no nie nespĺniteľný cieľ. Trnavská univerzita svojím rozvojovým projektom v dištrikte Kwale takisto pridáva aktívne ruky k dielu.

Pravdepodobnosť úmrtia detí do piatich rokov života na 1 000 živonarodených je v Keni 84 (pričom na Slovensku 7).¹¹ V rámci Subsaharskej Afriky (a teda i Kene) je práve ťažká podvýživa hlavnou príčinou chorobnosti a úmrtnosti malých detí. Príznaky podvýživy sa prejavujú poklesom kondície aj imunity, úbytkom netukovej telesnej hmoty

8 Kenya Demographic & Health Survey, 2008: <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/GF17/GF17.pdf>

9 Kenya Demographic & Health Survey, 2008: <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/GF17/GF17.pdf>

10 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 114

11 UN, 2011: World Statistics Pocketbook: <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Kenya>

aj svalovej sily, vyčerpaním, nechutenstvom. Základným prejavom proteín-energetickej malnutricie je pokles hmotnosti o 5 % za mesiac alebo o 10 % za 6 mesiacov. Pri hodnotení BMI (body mass index – index telesnej hmotnosti) sa za malnutriciu považuje hodnota menej ako 19. U rizikových skupín sa za prejav malnutricie považuje už pokles hmotnosti o 3 % za mesiac a hodnota BMI menej ako 22. Až 1,8 milióna kenských detí spadá do kategórie chronicky podvyživených¹². Rizikových faktorov podvýživy, ktoré sa predovšetkým týkajú Kene, je viacero a navzájom sa ovplyvňujú. K zdravotným rizikovým faktorom zo strany dieťaťa sa radí: nízka pôrodná hmotnosť dieťaťa, infekčné a parazitárne ochorenia, rászstep podnebia; k zdravotným rizikovým faktorom zo strany matky sa radí: nedostatočný stav výživy pred počatím alebo počas tehotenstva, a ochorenia, ako: malária, HIV/AIDS, TBC atď. Medzi sociálno-ekonomické rizikové faktory zaraďujeme: kultúru – spomínané mýty a povery, vychádzajúce z tradície kmeňa či rodiny, nezdelenosť alebo nízka úroveň vzdelania u žien.¹³

V súvislosti s dojčením a starostlivosťou o novonarodené deti však treba spomenúť i rôzne mýty a povery, ktoré môžu negatívne ovplyvniť zdravie dieťaťa i samotnej matky, a ktoré ani slovenský tím expertov nie vždy účinne dokáže odvrátiť. Napríklad, že žena počas tehotenstva nemôže dojčiť svoje maloleté deti (aby sa medzi nimi nevytvoril neprimeraný vzťah); alebo že žena môže dojčiť len z jedného prsníka; alebo ak má žena horúčku – nesmie dojčiť („chorým“ mliekom); HIV-pozitívna matka by mala svoju nákazu konzultovať so šamanom (nie so zdravotníckym pracovníkom) atď.. Vzdelávanie žien/matiek (nielen v súvislosti so správnou výživou) je budúcnosť krajiny i napredovania slovensko-kenských projektov kľúčové.

Projekt s názvom: „*Sociálno-zdravotnícka starostlivosť o podvyživené deti do 5. roku života a ich matky v regióne Kwale*“, financovaný z prostriedkov SlovakAid, realizuje na pobreží Kene Trnavská univerzita od roku 2011. S Kwale district hospital má vybudované niekoľkoročné partnerstvo. V rámci tohto projektu bolo postavené: hlavné nutričné centrum v Kwale a zariadené boli aj dve vidiecke centrá (v Tiwi i Mkongani). Plynulý chod takýchto centier, naviac plnohodnotne zabezpečovaný lokálnymi ľuďmi (vyškolenými kenskými komunitnými zdravotníckymi pracovníkmi v spolupráci s tímom slovenských i kenských expertov),¹⁴ môže úspešne zabojsovať s podvýživou v tejto ľudnatej oblasti.

E. CIEĽ 5: ZLEPŠIŤ ZDRAVIE MATIEK

Niekedy je naozaj ťažké bojovať proti zakoreneným tradíciám a rituálnym praktikám, fungujúcim stáročia v krajine, ktorá sa skladá zo 46 kmeňov. Príkazy, resp. zákazy najrôznejších náboženstiev a siekt dennodenne ovplyvňujú životy detí a samotných matiek v Keni.

Takisto často-rodiače matky, ktoré nedokážu svoj vlastný organizmus doplniť energiou a výživnou stravou, nebudú pravdepodobne schopné kvalitne kŕmiť a vychovávať ani svoje ďalšie deti. Naviac ak ide o mnohopočetnú chudobnú rodinu. Podľa prieskumu organizácie UNICEF tehotné ženy a ich deti v pobrežnom regióne Kwale vykazujú vyššiu mieru podvýživy, ako v iných oblastiach Kene. Tehotné a dojčiacie ženy konzumujú menej ako dve tretiny živín (riboflavín, niacín, vitamín A, B6 a B12, vápnik, železo, zinok). Podváha matiek je hlavným rizikovým faktorom pre

12 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 113

13 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 58

14 Baluchová, 2013: Jedinečná databáza Trnavskej univerzity ulahčí boj s podvýživou, s. 15

choroby a zbytočné úmrtia.¹⁵ Aj to je jeden z dôvodov, prečo práve v tejto oblasti realizuje Trnavská univerzita projekt starostlivosti o podvýživené deti do 5. roku života a ich matky.

Pre trvalú udržateľnosť projektu je dôležité budovanie kapacít v lokálnej komunite. Práve preto sú približne raz do mesiaca na programe pre komunitných zdravotníckych pracovníkov a pracovníčky (KZP), ako i ostatný personál kwalskej nemocnice prednášky – na zvyšovanie vedomostí i zručností v oblasti výživy. Slovenským tímom koordinovaní KZP majú potom v jednotlivých nutričných centrách na starosti príjem detí a matiek do anti-malnutričného programu, ich každotýždenný monitoring, distribúciu suplementov, a takisto prednášky pre matky (o správnom dojení, príprave stravy, vhodnej výžive, používaní výživových doplnkov či hygiene). Vďaka vzdelávaným matkám sa informácie o správnej výžive šíria ďalej v komunite (na pobreží zväčša v rámci etnickej skupiny Mijikenda).

F. CIEĽ 6: BOJOVAŤ S HIV/AIDS, MALÁRIOU A ĎALŠÍMI CHOROBAMI

Okolo 6,7 % kenského obyvateľstva trpí ochorením HIV/AIDS.¹⁶ Podfinancovanie zdravotníctva znižuje jeho schopnosť zabezpečiť primeranú úroveň zdravotnej starostlivosti pre obyvateľstvo. V hlavnom meste Nairobi je, samozrejme, viac dostupných zdravotníckych zariadení, no ostatné provincie zaostávajú, alebo vo svojich zariadeniach poskytujú len základné, ambulantné služby pre nie závažné ochorenia.

V Keni funguje národný HIV program s názvom NASCOP, ktorý zo zahraničia financujú U.S.Aid, UNICEF či WorldBank. Z darovaných peňazí sa získava najmä antivírusová liečba (ARV), ktorá je poskytovaná pacientom zadarmo v registrovaných klinikách (CCC – Comprehensive Care Clinic). Majú však mnoho problémov (nepostačujúce budovanie kapacít; odmietanie pravidelného testovania sa hlavne mužskou populáciou; matky, nenavštevujúce prenatálnu poradňu; stigmatizácia HIV pacientov atď.)¹⁷

V dištrikte Kwale je okrem hlavnej nemocnice 20 vidieckych zdravotníckych zariadení, ktorým azda decentralizačná povolebná reforma a finančná podpora priamo z rozpočtu Kwale county uľahčí prácu. S cieľom zlepšiť financovanie systému zdravotnej starostlivosti Ministerstvo zdravotníctva zavádzalo pred niekoľkými rokmi národný sociálny fond zdravotného poistenia (NSHIF), do ktorého mal prispievať každý občan. Niektoré rozhodnutia a plány sa po marcových voľbách a s novým systémom spravovania štátu (prenosu kompetencií i financií do 47 samospráv) zdynamizovali, no stále nevidieť pozitívne zmeny.

V Kensej republike však prostredníctvom Ministerstva zdravotníctva a medzinárodných organizácií možno niekoľkokrát do roka sledovať týždňové až dvojtýždňové kampane, zamerané na prevenciu, šírenie osvetu a distribúcie vitamínov, mikronutrientov, liekov či výživových prídelov (kampaň Malezi Bora – o starostlivosti o dieťa, Polio kampaň, Malaria kampaň, HIV kampaň atď.).

15 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 154

16 Kenya: Introduction, 2011: <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/kenya>

17 Baluchová, 2013: Michal Miadok: rozvojová spolupráca by mala byť rovnocenným partnerstvom, <http://prohuman.sk/>

G. CIEĽ 7: ZAJISTIŤ UDRŽATEĽNÝ STAV ŽIVOTNÉHO PROSTREDIA

Špecialista na infekciu HIV a nádorové ochorenia Jozef Šuvada sa v rozvojových krajinách najčastejšie stará o liečbu detí, ktoré stratili rodičov pre AIDS, prírodné či sociálne katastrofy. Podľa neho: "Ľudia na africkom kontinente žijú často v životnom prostredí, ktoré je zmenené práve negatívnymi prejavmi zmeny klímy – častými búrkami, vymiznutím typického obdobia dažďov či extrémnymi suchami. Tieto extrémny pripravujú deti i dospelých o strechu nad hlavou a zmena kvality pôdy, vylučovanie toxických produktov do vody ich oberá o prirodzené zdroje obživy. Potom migrujú z vidieka do mesta, často končia na ulici – v sociálne patologickom prostredí, kde sa ich stav ešte zhoršuje prísunom nekvalitnej potravy. Stávajú sa tak náchylnejší na infekcie."¹⁸

Na zdravie vplýva mnoho faktorov, ktoré nevieme ovplyvniť (následky zranení a postihnutí, nervová obrna či alzheimeroва choroba). Ale tiež je tu mnoho dôkazov o priamom alebo nepriamom vzťahu infekcií s vonkajším prostredím. To, či budeme k životnému prostrediu pristupovať aktívne alebo pasívne, pocítia pravdepodobne až ďalšie generácie.

Kontaminovaná voda, nedostatočná hygiena, znečistené ovzdušie i pôda, to všetko teda patrí k deformovanému životnému prostrediu dieťaťa, v ktorom ak vyrastá, je automaticky viac náchylné trpieť podvýživou a ďalšími vážnymi ochoreniami. Preto čoraz častejšie treba myslieť na potravinovú bezpečnosť, ktorá predstavuje dostatočný prístup obyvateľstva k bezpečnej a výživovo-hodnotnej potrave. Medzi najvýraznejšie príčiny nedostatočnej potravinovej bezpečnosti patrí vysoká miera chudoby. Ženy z Kene pri porovnaní so ženami z iných krajín s nízkym ekonomickým rastom konzumujú oveľa menej energeticky bohatých potravín. Deficit energie v strave je v Keni hlavným výživovým problémom. Lokálne pestované plodiny¹⁹ (zelená listová zelenina, kukurica, sukuma-wiki, mchicha, strukoviny) by mali mať v stravovaní detí i celej rodiny svoje miesto.

Aby bola odvrátená 50-percentná miera chudoby, je potrebná pomoc hlavne v okrajových štvrtiach veľkomiest (v sociálnej oblasti) a vo vidieckych oblastiach –prostredníctvom drobného podnikania a poľnohospodárstva. V rámci projektu Trnavskej univerzity v regióne Kwale boli ešte na jar – pred obdobím dažďov samotnými klientkami nutričných centier, matkami vysadené štyri druhy suchu-odolných plodín v modelových záhradách v rámci areálu kwalskej nemocnice. Tam si môžu ženy osvojiť zručnosti jednoduchého farmárčenia (najmä metód pestovania plodín na malej ploche a ich vhodného zavlažovania) a preniesť ich aj do svojich domovov. Hoci je tento rozvojový projekt TU primárne zameraný na sociálnu a zdravotnú starostlivosť, opierajúc sa o zvyšovanie povedomia a vzdelávanie v oblasti výživy/podvýživy, pokúša sa dotknúť aj témy potravinovej bezpečnosti a lokálneho farmárčenia. Má to svoju logiku a význam v rámci komplexnosti pomoci, resp. spolupráce a prepájania sektorových priorít v rámci Oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci (ODA).

H. CIEĽ 8: BUDOVAŤ SVETOVÉ PARTNERSTVO PRE ROZVOJ

Pre Slovensko je Keňa jednou z prioritných krajín v rámci Oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci (ODA). Vďaka finančným prostriedkom zo štátneho rozpočtu (cez podporný program SlovakAid) na území tejto východoafrickej krajiny

18 Baluchová, 2013: Prevencia HIV by nemala ostať v rovine prázdnych fráz, www.prohuman.sk

19 Jančovičová & Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 160

realizuje kvalitné projekty efektívnej rozvojovej spolupráce niekoľko slovenských mimovládnych organizácií (Nadácia Pontis, Integra, SKCH, eRKO atď.) a univerzít (predovšetkým Trnavskej univerzity a VŠ sv. Alžbety).

Pred pár rokmi vypracovala minulé kenská vláda (a tá súčasná vláda sa k vízii tiež hlási) odvážny plán Vision 2030, na základe ktorého sa chce vymaniť z označenia rozvojovej krajiny a o dve desiatky rokov sa chce ekonomicky porovnávať s ázijskými tigermi. Najprv však tento východoafrický štát s výbornou polohou v rámci kontinentu a bohatým prírodným, kultúrnym i nerastným bohatstvom musí prekonať niekoľko prekážok, vyriešiť niekoľko problémov.

Keňa čelí hlavne problémom, vyplývajúcim z nízkeho ekonomického rozvoja, vysokého nárastu populácie, silnej korupcie a nedostatkov v spravovaní krajiny. Je tam vysoká nezamestnanosť, chudoba a vysoký výskyt HIV/AIDS. Takmer polovica Keňanov nemá zaistený prístup k zdrojom na každodenné potreby a prístup k potrave z dôvodu chudoby.

Niektorí teoretici za problém pomalého rozvoja Kene označujú politicko-kmeňovú rivalitu. Pôvodne dominantným obyvateľstvom v krajine boli ľudia z kmeňa Kikuyu, rokmi však narastá počet ľudí aj z iných kmeňov, hlavne z kmeňa Luo. V súboji o prezidentské kreslo už pred 50 rokmi súperili otcovia tohtoročných hlavných rivalov (Jaramogo Oginga Odinga z komunity Luo a Jomo Kenyatta z komunity Kikuyu). V hre o prezidentské kreslo v marci 2013 boli dvaja hlavní kandidáti. Railu Odingu z ODM chceli podľa predvolebného prieskumu voliť kenská ľudia pre lepšie riadenie, správu krajiny, pozemkovú reform. Uhuru Kenyattu z CORD nakoniec za prezidenta zvolili pre strategické plánovanie hospodárskeho rastu republiky. Niektorí ho však doteraz ako prezidenta neakceptujú – pre obvinenia Medzinárodného trestného súdu²⁰ za povolebné násilie z roku 2007.

Aktivity Fakulty zdravotníctva a sociálnej práce Trnavskej univerzity v Keni začali už pred 15 rokmi v Nairobi, pričom sa realizovali hlavne zdravotné a sociálne projekty v hlavnom meste Kene. Bola zriadená klinika Nepoškvrnenej Panny Márie, sprístupnené verejnosti dobrovoľné poradenské a testovacie centrum na HIV/AIDS, ako aj antimalnutričné programy pre podvyživené deti. Neskôr sa k sociálno-zdravotníckym projektom pridali aj vzdelávacie. Súčasťou programov bola totiž výučba študentov a študentiek zo slumov v bakalárskom a magisterskom stupni odboru sociálna práca a verejné zdravotníctvo. Trnavská univerzita sa v roku 2009 zamerala i na iné regióny Kene, kde je rozvojová spolupráca potrebná. Na jeseň 2013 sa tím vyslaných slovenských expertov sústredil na koordináciu poslednej fázy projektu „*Sociálno-zdravotnícka starostlivosť o podvyživené deti do 5. roku života a ich matky v regióne Kwale*“ (zber, digitalizácia a analýza dát o podvýžive v regióne, posledná IMAM a IT prednášky pre personál nemocnice, nákup odborných, na výživu orientovaných kníh do knižnice, zabezpečenie udržateľnosti chodu nutričných centier i po skončení projektu). Dôležité je efektívne prepájanie oblastí pôsobenia a priorit oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR v Keni, ako aj spolupráca organizácií, pôsobiacich v jednotlivých regiónoch Kene.²¹ Na rozdiel od ostatných krajín V4 (najmä Českej republiky a v menšej miere Poľska), je debata o efektívnosti v komunite odborníkov na Slovensku zatiaľ len v začiatkoch.²²

20 Baluchová, 2013: Volby v Keni: Prezidentský súboj spred 50 rokov vrcholí, <http://mediaaboutdevelopment.wordpress.com/2013/03/02/>

21 Baluchová, 2013: Stretnutie s Dr. Kukanom v Keni – najmä o slovensko-kenských vzťahoch, www.hl.rs

22 Fialová, 2012: Efektívnosť rozvojovej pomoci poskytovanej slovenskými mimovládnyimi rozvojovými organizáciami, s. 86

Jednou z ciest konkrétnej spolupráce medzi organizáciami je pravidelné stretnutie zainteresovaných strán, zodpovedných za riešenie konkrétneho problému. V Kwale sa napríklad každý mesiac uskutočňovali NTF-Stakeholders mítingy (Trnavská univerzita, Kwale district hospital spolu s UNICEF, U.S.Aid, Mercy-U.S.A, Red Cross Kenya, World Food Program, Aphia Plus). Práve takýmto spôsobom možno zefektívniť vyhľadávanie podvýživných detí v teréne, ich monitoring, manažment podvýživy a zabezpečenie suplementov – teda udržateľnosť konkrétneho programu.

2. ANTI-MALNUTRIČNÝ PROGRAM V KWALE

Región Kwale sa nachádza na pobreží Kene, momentálne je jedným zo 47 samosprávnych krajov (counties) Kensej republiky. V Kwale je okrem regionálnej nemocnice ešte 20 vidieckych zdravotníckych zariadení (rural health facilities). Ide o 17 ošetrovní, 2 zdravotné strediská a 1 komunitné zdravotnícke zariadenie.

Pri tvorbe projektu, aj pri realizácii jednotlivých aktivít, bola v prvom rade na zreteli lokálna komunita. Analýza záujmov a potrieb cieľových skupín, konečných príjemcov je dôležitým krokom smerom k náležitému porozumeniu problémov.

Primárna skupina beneficentov anti-malnutričného programu TU pozostávala z vyše 500 detí vo veku 0-5 rokov života, ktoré trpeli podvýživou a žijú v regióne Kwale. Boli zaradované do výživového programu podľa zadefinovaných kritérií.

K sekundárnym príjemcom spolupráce patrilo 500 matiek, ktoré sa starali o podvýživné deti, zaradené do výživového programu. Chodievali pravidelne raz do týždňa do nutričného centra pre sociálne poradenstvo (o starostlivosti o dieťa v kontexte výživy, o hygiene, príprave stravy, dojčení). Ďalej do skupiny beneficentov určite patrí 50 vyskolených komunitných zdravotníckych pracovníkov a pracovníčok v regióne Kwale, ktorí boli vybraní podľa zadanych kritérií a absolvovali v roku 2012 dvojmesačný vzdelávací tréning,²³ zameraný na výživu, prvú pomoc, starostlivosť o dieťa, starostlivosť o ženu/matku (v kontexte výživy). Z nich 6 pracovalo v 3 zriadených výživových centrách (v Kwale, Tiwi a Mkongani) a ostatní ostali v pozícii dobrovoľníkov a dobrovoľníčok v rámci komunity. Práve v komunitách odovzdávali ďalej informácie o správnych stravovacích návykoch, základnej zdravotnej a hygienickej starostlivosti. Komunitní zdravotnícki pracovníci a pracovníčky boli vybraní z celého kwalského regiónu (čím sa pokrylo okolo 170 000 obyvateľov v regióne Kwale).

K terciárnym príjemcom patrí 500 rodín, ktorých deti boli zaradené do jedného z 3 výživových centier v regióne Kwale. Komunitní zdravotnícki pracovníci (KZP) totiž pravidelne realizovali monitoring v prirodzenom prostredí rodiny (v rámci vyhľadávania nových pacientov, alebo v rámci návštevy dieťaťa – momentálne zaradeného v anti-malnutričnom programe alebo po jeho opustení). Z projektu TU benefituje celá komunita (etnická skupina Mijikenda, zložená z 9 pôvodných kmeňov) v regióne Kwale, ktorá sa prostredníctvom matiek, navštevujúcich výživové centrá dozvie o možnosti takejto starostlivosti. Po prednáškach a konzuláciách matiek s KZP zmenené stravovacie návyky tak budú pozitívne vplývať na príslušníkov celých rodín i ostatného okolia.

23 Jančovičová, Bodo & Novotná, 2012: Vzdelávanie komunitných zdravotníckych pracovníkov v Keni v oblasti starostlivosti o matku a dieťa v Keni, v regióne Kwale, s. 109-110

Manažment dieťaťa s ťažkou podvýživou pozostáva z troch fáz: iniciálna liečba, rehabilitácia a pravidelné kontroly detí po prepustení z nemocnice.²⁴ Cieľom manažmentu proteínovo-energetickej podvýživy je zabezpečiť najlepšiu dostupnú liečbu (a znížiť riziko úmrtia), ďalej znížiť dĺžku pobytu v nemocnici, uľahčiť rehabilitáciu a v neposlednom rade úplne obnoviť zdravie dieťaťa.

Základom boja proti podvýžive je prevencia. Preventívne opatrenia obsahujú: zlepšenie dostupnosti vysoko kvalitného jedla a zdravotníckej starostlivosti, zlepšenie vedomostí a praktických zručností v oblasti výživy a zdravia, efektívna podpora a presadzovanie výlučného dojčenia počas prvých 6 mesiacov života, propagácia správneho prikrmovania detí vo veku 6 – 24 mesiacov so zameraním na zabezpečenie vhodného jedla vzhľadom na vek a potreby dieťaťa, zlepšenie dostupnosti pitnej vody, zlepšenie hygienických podmienok. Na úspešný boj proti podvýžive spôsobenej nedostatkom vitamínov, minerálov a stopových prvkov možno použiť štyri hlavné stratégie: zlepšenie výživy vrátane zvýšenej produkcie a konzumácie potravín bohatých na vitamíny, minerály a stopové prvky; fortifikáciu – obohatenie potravín o vitamíny, minerály a stopové prvky; suplementáciu – priame doplnenie mikronutrientov; a verejno-zdravotnícke a ďalšie intervencie na kontrolu ochorení²⁵

A. DISKUSIA A ODPORÚČANIA

Čo všetko možno v krajine, akou je Keňa (a najmä jej reprezentantom, lokálnym politikom, guvernérom či prezidentovi), zmeniť či zlepšiť? Celkovo treba situáciu nielen v Keni, ale v celej Východnej Afrike, charakterizovať ako politicky nestabilnú (najmä v spojení s korupciou, lokálnymi konfliktmi štátov, migráciou z vidieka do veľkých miest, zvyšovaním počtu slumov, hladomorom, HIV/AIDS), s nefungujúcim sociálnym systémom. Chudoba je bezpochyby spoločným menovateľom pre rizikové faktory a výskyt podvýživy. Rozvoj krajiny je zasa priamo úmerný výške korupcie. Index potravinovej bezpečnosti hovorí o centrálnej a východnej Afrike ako o najzraniteľnejších regiónoch v súvislosti s oblasťou potravinových problémov.²⁶

Domáce mimovládne organizácie sa snažia bojovať s podvýživou a ďalšími závažnými ochoreniami v Keni, zahraničné organizácie sa okrem iného sústreďujú na terénnu sociálnu prácu, budovanie kapacít a zvyšovanie povedomia, komunitný rozvoj (i komunitné organizovanie) a advokáciu.

Jedným z odporúčaní do budúcnosti je pravidelné informovanie miestnej samosprávy (konkrétne oddelenie v rámci úradu guvernéra) o úspechoch a neúspechoch konkrétnej kampane, programu, projektu, o prítomnosti konkrétnej organizácie v regióne (osobne i verejne, napr. cez médiá). Sledovanie spoločensko-politickej situácie v oblasti (dodržanie predvolebných sľubov, odsúhlasenie rozpočtu atď.) je takisto účinným nástrojom vo vyjednávaní lepších podmienok pre lokálnu komunitu. Neustály tlak a dobre pripravená argumentácia v diskusiách s lokálnymi politikmi z novovzniknutého Kwale county napríklad spôsobili, že sa o nutričné centrá (koordinované v Tiwi, Kwale a Mkongani tímom TU) začal zaujímať aj samotný guvernér. Aj vďaka tomu nakoniec posledná posádka terénnych pracovníkov TU presadila spolu s administrátorom nemocnice zaradenie komunitných zdravotníckych pracovníkov do zamestnaneckej a platovej štruktúry kwalskej nemocnice. I takýmto

24 Jančovičová a Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 63

25 Jančovičová a Ondrušová, 2012: Riešenia detskej podvýživy v Keni, s. 63

26 Redfern, 2010: Kenya: Region Faces Food Crisis, Warns Report, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201008200078.html>

tlakom zdola bude zabezpečená udržateľnosť projektu, keďže KZP budú môcť naďalej vykonávať svoju prácu s matkami a deťmi.

Ďalším z odporúčaní a riešení súčasnej situácie na pobreží Kene (no nielen tam) môže byť zvyšovanie počítačovej zručnosti u lokálnych ľudí (nielen mládeže, ale aj starších ľudí). V rámci konkrétneho projektu TU v lete 2013 išlo predovšetkým o zvýšenie počítačovej gramotnosti (práca s MS Office a OpenOffice), ale aj informovanie o nových médiách, bezpečnosti údajov, masovej komunikácii i fundraisingu pre zamestnancov nemocnice, no najmä pre zdravotníckych komunitných pracovníkov a pracovníčky, podieľajúcich sa na projekte TU (ktorí takýmto zručnosťami doteraz nedisponovali).²⁷ Takto sa zvýši informovanosť celej komunity, povedomie o pomeroch v krajine, a zníži nevedomosť, negramotnosť, bezbranosť.

Podľa poslednej správy o miléniových rozvojových cieľoch z roku 2011²⁸ by v roku 2015 mala celosvetová miera chudoby klesnúť pod 15 %, teda výrazne pod stanovenú hranicu 23 %, a to napriek prekážkam spôsobeným nedávnou hospodárskou, potravinovou a energetickou krízou. Počet úmrtí detí, mladších ako päť rokov, klesol z 12,4 miliónov v roku 1990 na 8,1 miliónov v roku 2009 (čo znamená, že denne zomrelo o takmer 12 000 detí menej). Postupne ubúda počet prípadov nakazenia vírusom HIV. V roku 2009 sa infekciou nakazilo asi 2,6 miliónov ľudí, čo znamená pokles o 21 % oproti roku 1997, keď počet novo nakazených vrcholil. Prístup ku zdroju kvalitnejšej pitnej vody získala v období od roku 1990 do roku 2008 približne 1,1 miliardy ľudí v mestách a 723 miliónov ľudí na vidieku.

Miléniové rozvojové ciele boli a sú ambicióznymi prioritami, ktoré nie je možné v období 15 ani 25 rokov naplniť. Ich univerzálnosť má však viac negatív ako pozitív – neberú totiž do úvahy odlišnosti a štartovacie línie cieľových krajín (dodržiavanie ľudských práv, úroveň sociálneho a zdravotného zabezpečenia, dostupnosť školstva, vek dožitia, HDP atď.). Ako veľké a finančne náročné úsilie má vynaložiť Keňa, aby zrealizovala to, k čomu sa zaviazala? Ako úspech, resp. neúspech tejto rovníkovej krajiny budú merať reprezentanti OSN v cieľovej stanici v roku 2015? Dosiahnutý pokrok je síce úspechom, no je nerovnomerný a veľká časť ľudí stále ostáva marginalizovaná. Medzi jednotlivými krajinami, ale aj vo vnútri štátov sú veľké regionálne rozdiely (inak možno merať a zaznamenať rozvoj a výšku rozvoja v centrálnej časti Kene, inak na pobreží, na hraniciach so Somálskom či hlavnom meste Nairobi).

Slovenský tím z Trnavskej univerzity má vo svojej rozvojovej práci na zreteli všetky MRC, pričom primárne sleduje predovšetkým cieľ číslo 4 – znižovanie detskej úmrtnosti. Naplno sa snaží prispieť k zlepšeniu zdravotného stavu stovák detí; k zlepšeniu zdravia a edukácii matiek, a v konečnom dôsledku k odovzdávaniu vedomostí a budovaniu kapacít v tamojšej komunite, ktorá bude na pokračovaní a udržateľnosti projektu pracovať v budúcnosti. Azda trvalo-udržateľné rozvojové ciele, oficiálne ohlásené na pôde OSN na jeseň 2013, s prioritou – zdravotníctvom, resp. bojom so závažnými ochoreniami, budú mať detailnejšie definované zámery, menej univerzálne stanovené ciele a najmä realisticky zadaný časový plán plnenia.

ZÁVER

Dnes už vieme, že v roku 2015 nebude pravdepodobne žiaden z Miléniových rozvojových cieľov dosiahnutý. To ale neznamená, že krajiny (a všetky zúčastnené strany v rámci nich) poľavia vo svojom úsilí. Trvalo-udržateľné rozvojové ciele nahradia po roku 2015 MRC a pozornosť sa zameria najmä na boj s ochoreniami, ako HIV-AIDS, tuberkulóza,

27 UN, 2011: The Millenium Development Goals Report (2011), <http://www.un.org>

28 FZaSP TU, 2013: Projekt Trnavskej Univerzity zvyšuje počítačovú gramotnosť v Kwale, <http://www.slovakaid.sk>

malária, detská a materská úmrtnosť. Koncom septembra 2013 mali byť na pôde OSN upresnené sektory a ich priority.

Aby boli tieto ciele naplnené, treba zvýšiť záujem verejnosti o túto problematiku – treba teda zvýšiť povedomie Slovákov a Sloveniek o koncepte Miléniových rozvojových cieľov – ako o medzinárodnej snahe zmierniť alarmujúce globálne problémy, napríklad prepojené s dôsledkami globálneho otepľovania – ako na Slovensku, tak v celej Európe, ale aj na africkom či inom kontinente.

Zvyšovanie povedomia o slovensko-kenskej rozvojovej spolupráci (a teda zákonite aj o MRC) brali na zreteľ terénni pracovníci a pracovníčky TU, pôsobiaci v regióne Kwale. Svojimi vedeckými, odbornými, populárno-náučnými i umeleckými výstupmi sa snažili odbornú i laickú verejnosť informovať (čo najviac objektívne, nestereotypne, nediskriminujúco) o situácii a výsledkoch rozvojového projektu v tejto východoafrickej krajine, ktorá sa podľa naštartovaného populačného trendu do 30 rokov zaradí medzi 20 najľudnatejších krajín sveta (s viac ako 75 miliónmi obyvateľov), a ktorá by sa podľa vládnej stratégie mala už v roku 2030 vymaniť spod označenia: „rozvojová krajina“.²⁹

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29 Human development report, 2010: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/>

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Autori: Božena Baluchová – Palackého univerzita v Olomouci, Česká republika a Trnavská univerzita v Trnave, Slovenská republika
Juraj Jančovič – Trnavská univerzita v Trnave, Slovenská republika

E-mail: bozena.baluchova@docunion.info
juraj.jancovic@truni.sk

RECENZIA

Práca je veľmi aktuálna, cenný je hlavne prínos autorov z praxe. Článku by prospelo menej detailné opisovanie jednotlivých činností rozvojovej pomoci v Keni, pretože v niektorých bodoch je príliš podrobné a neprehľadné. To je asi jedinou slabinou článku, kedy čitateľovi môže ujsť hlavná myšlienka, práve pre zložitú a zbytočne dlhú súvetia s viacerými faktografickými informáciami naraz. Oceňujeme holistický deduktívny prístup autorov od všeobecných téz o Miléniových rozvojových cieľoch až ku konkrétnym opatreniam v, ktoré vykonali pracovníci Trnavskej univerzity v teréne. Keňa ako programová krajina Slovenskej rozvojovej pomoci je centrom pozornosti práve pre komplexné spoločenské aj ekologické podmienky v rámci krajiny a táto práca autorov je prínosom pre vzdelávanie a môže byť využitá ako prípadová štúdia vo výučbe.

Ing. Mikuláš Černota, PhD.

BUSINESS AND CHARITY: PARTNERS OR COMPETITORS IN DEVELOPMENT?

Allan Bussard

ABSTRACT

There is a current debate about the role of business in development. While ODA funding is being re-directed toward business and new partnerships between business and charities are being formed, there is uncertainty on both sides of this equation. In particular NGOs and government ODA seems ill-equipped to work within the new reality of businesses taking an ever increasing role in what has traditionally been their development sphere. But does business know what it is getting into? This paper will argue that both business and charity approaches are necessary for sustainable development, but that this new partnership will require different patterns of thinking and working. It will close with some recommendations for a way forward.

KEYWORDS

Business, Development, Charity, Aid, Economic Growth

INTRODUCTION

The role of the private sector in development is hotly debated. With aid agencies providing increasing amounts of funding to business, and renewed calls for aid moratoria or at least a radical re-think of aid, development NGOs are unsure about the entry of this new player into a sphere where they have been active for decades. On the other hand, the question needs to be asked whether businesses that enter the aid industry are suitably equipped to deliver development where other approaches have failed. Indeed, the whole question of what is development is being asked afresh. I will begin by trying to de-mystify the concepts of business and development, so as to take a fresh view of both.

1. WHAT IS THE PRIVATE SECTOR?

When we talk about the role of the private sector in development, what do we mean by the private sector? Simply put, it is the sphere of human activity that is neither in the government sphere (public sector) nor in the charity sphere. It has come to be shorthand for the economic activity of human beings. The visible expression of the private

sector is what we call business. In order to examine the role of the private sector and its visible expression, “business” in development, we need to answer the twin questions: “what is business?”, and “what is development?”

First of all, what is business? At its core, business is not complicated. Business involves the provision of a good or service to which value has been added. This value addition is done in many ways: materials such as wood or minerals are made useful, seeds become grain which is processed, knowledge is organised and made available, services are outsourced to someone more willing or able, etc. This value addition is rewarded and the reward becomes what we call profit, and is stored and distributed through what we call money. Business is a basic human activity, and has been functioning since humanity began. It is how we all get our basic needs as well as our less basic “wants” met.

2. WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT?

What then is development? At its core, development is the ability or tendency of a community of people to store value, knowledge and assets, and to build upon them into the future. I am currently writing this in Nairobi, but my home is in Bratislava. To get to Nairobi, I did not need to walk. I flew in a plane. But I did not need to invent powered flight, build an aircraft nor create airports and an airline to be able to fly to Kenya. Others did that before I even considered the trip. The first people who developed the ability to fly in airplanes are now dead, but air travel did not die with them. This ability to store and build upon knowledge and assets created in the past and gradually make life easier and more efficient is what we call development.

This tendency of humans to store value, knowledge and assets and to use them to improve life is referred to as “economic development”. The word “economic” comes to us from the Greek, “oikonomia” which simply means household management. A household that does not use its value, knowledge and assets to improve life becomes impoverished. The same applies for a community or nation.

Societies therefore will always tend to develop “economically” and this additional value holds the potential to give life improvements to the members of this society. Such life improvements might be better and provide more food, better health care, labour saving machines, or increased ability to communicate. Though there are many examples of societies that have endured shocks, conflict, bad leadership or cultural forces that have disabled development. And of course, this potential to give life improvements is not guaranteed, since not all members of a community or society necessarily enjoy the benefits of this value addition. Exclusion from these benefits can happen in many ways, such as exploitation, ill health, lack of knowledge, prejudice, wastage of resources on non-productive activities, conflict, etc.

The use of the terms “developed” and “developing world” reflect this view. What is the difference between the two? Simply put, the developed world is the place where life is lived more easily. This is reflected in the basic measures such as children who don’t die as often and people live longer and healthier. Where life is lived with more difficulty, more children die and people live shorter lives. They find it much more difficult to provide for their basic needs such as shelter, food, water and education. Another word we use for this difficulty is poverty.

The unique role of charities (which could otherwise be known as NBOs or Non Business Organisations) is to provide some of the benefits of development to people who have been excluded from being recipients. There is value addition through economic activity, and it is spread to some, but not to the excluded. This exclusion may be in part

the fault of those being excluded, but is very often due to factors beyond their control. And it can happen at a local, national or global level. There are persons in any community who are excluded, just as there are groups or even nations that are also experiencing exclusion.

Development will always be primarily dependent on economic growth. Without economic growth, no development can be considered. Indeed, all charity resources are sourced in value addition caused by the economic activity of business. Whether directly supported by individuals, or companies, or indirectly supported by public funds that are provided by taxes, all development in one way or another has been made possible by business activity.

Although few of companies actually use the term “international development” in their work, many companies are actively involved in supporting the local communities in which they invest and market their products and services, both in traditional markets and in the emerging markets of the developing world.

Robert Zoellick, former President of the World Bank said it well, “At the end of the day, the best poverty alleviation tool is a job.” Business provides jobs, and relieves poverty in so doing. So business de-facto is involved in development, and in a sense always has been.

In the early 1950's, the Korean peninsula was devastated by war. Korean children, in the north and the south, were starving and dying. Many of the interventions that we know today to help alleviate this suffering were developed in the aftermath of the Korean war, notably child sponsorship by World Vision, which started its activities in 1953 in Korea. But we need to admit that it was not child sponsorship that changed Korea from deep poverty to one of the world's richest nations. Economic development, driven by competitive businesses was the main driver to improve the lives of millions of South Koreans in my lifetime.

The Millennium Development Goal No. 1, that of halving extreme poverty (measured by the number of people living on less than \$1.25 a day) is possibly the only MDG that will achieve its target by 2015. However, the UN admits that this is mainly due to China's phenomenal economic growth, to which the classical development interventions did not contribute significantly.³⁰ In fact, China scored among the lowest in the 2012 Charity Aid Foundation annual charity survey, with only 4% of Chinese donating to charity.³¹ Yet even without a significant charity sector, between 1981 and 2010 China lifted a stunning 680m people out poverty—more than the entire current population of Latin America. This cut its poverty rate from 84% in 1980 to about 10% now. China alone accounts for around three-quarters of the world's total decline in extreme poverty over the past 30 years.

In 1990, 43% of the population of developing countries lived in extreme poverty (then defined as subsisting on \$1 a day); the absolute number was 1.9 billion people. By 2000 the proportion was down to a third. By 2010 it was 21% (or 1.2 billion; the poverty line was then \$1.25, the average of the 15 poorest countries' own poverty lines in 2005 prices, adjusted for differences in purchasing power). Global poverty rate had been cut in half in 20 years.³² Almost completely due to economic growth.

Perhaps the real question not what role has business in development, but what role has aid in development?

30 China's Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, 2010 report, UN System in China

31 Charity Aid Foundation World Giving Index, 2012

32 Poverty, Not always with us, The Economist, June 1, 2013

3. TWO EXTREMES

It has been estimated that since the end of World War 2, over 3 trillion US dollars have been donated from the “developed world” to the “developing world” in the form of aid. Of course no one really knows the amount. But there is no doubt that a massive amount of money has been used to try to solve problems of poverty. The obvious question is, “Why has aid not worked?” This has provoked a great deal of evaluation and study, and increasing calls for aid to be ended or curtailed.

But of course, we cannot know whether aid has worked or not, since there has been no control group for comparison. We have no way to measure what the world would have been like without aid. The UN after World War 2 did not establish a “No Aid Zone” and an “Aid Zone” to allow a comparison regarding whether aid helped or not, or how much. So maybe aid is working after all, and that the world would be much worse off without the 3 trillion in aid. But, there are strong and influential voices saying that aid is actually counterproductive in the elimination of poverty.

The strongest argument against aid is that it usurps the normal role of government. This is the argument of Dambisa Moya’s influential book, “Dead Aid”. Moya argues that external aid relieves the local government structures of their responsibility to collect and use taxes for their intended purpose, which is to improve the lives of their people through investment in security, infrastructure, health care, education and social services. If external actors do this, it promotes misuse of tax money and can fuel corruption. Moya’s solution is to eliminate all but emergency humanitarian relief and to focus on economic investment into poor countries, particularly in Africa.

Related arguments against aid are that it creates dependency, fuels corruption, perpetuates imperialism, and is grossly inefficient. Those who have worked in international aid will recognise the truth, at least in part, of these criticisms. So, one extreme is that aid is so broken it cannot be fixed. Business is the only solution.

On the other extreme, there are equally strong voices raised against the role of business in international development. There is a latent and natural sense of disconnect between the profit motive that motivates business and the charity motive that motivates much development work. This cannot be dismissed easily.

Business only works efficiently when its activities and money are used to add value which can be captured in profit. But it is difficult to make this equation work when trying to alleviate the plight of AIDS sufferers, street children, the infirm elderly or the orphan. Charities exist to make a different equation. They transfer value created by economic activity and use it to improve the lives of those who are excluded from the benefits of economic activity. There are excluded and discarded corners of humanity that business can never help. No matter how strong the economic growth, it will never lift everyone out of poverty. There is a common saying, “the rising tide raises all boats”, except if the boat has a hole and already sits on the bottom.

This value transfer from business to charity is voluntary...charities are supported willingly, they do not employ coercion, but it is massive. The entire amount of charity donations in the USA in 2012 was 298 billion USD, with 88% of all American households taking part. Despite the fact that much of this money is given locally, international relief and development aid projects receive huge amounts of money and are not likely to end soon. Charity may not be perfect, but it is large and will continue to be an important player in development.

At the end of the day, if a well is drilled so that a woman in Ethiopia has access to fresh water near her home at a reasonable price, she doesn't care whether it was drilled by a business or an NGO.

So both charity and business are here to stay, and are major actors in the international development equation. So how to maximise their strengths to meet the enormous social problems the world faces?

4. SYNERGY

At the heart of business reality is the fact of competition. If a business does not provide a product or service that people choose over another, it dies. This reality causes business to be flexible, creative, knowledgeable and fast. Thus, business often has capacity and freedom to respond that charities and government often does not have, as they deal with more restricted funds and are accountable to a wider public.

But it is very difficult for business to have as its primary activity the solution to pressing human need. At best, helping the needy is a secondary or outsourced activity.

Charity brings ability to respond to a range of human need that business cannot. People fall between the cracks. This is where aid comes in. The problems of AIDS, malaria, natural disasters, street children, violence against women and children etc. do not naturally lend themselves to a business solution. They are the task of specialist groups. Like business, they provide a service or goods and get paid to do so. But the critical difference is that NGOs do not normally get paid by the customer or client to whom the good or service is provided. They get paid by an interested third party who likes what is being done (donor, company, philanthropist, government, etc.). This can make aid complicated, in that NGOs need to always respond to the needs and demands of two very different client groups, the group of the recipients and the group of the financers. At times these two "clients" have conflicting interests, which are hard to balance.

There are three emerging trends that are seeking to create synergies between the strengths of both sectors. These are: strategic partnerships between businesses and charities, ODA funding for business to carry out development activities, and the new hybrid organisations that are both business and charity. These deserve a closer examination.

Strategic partnerships: In the past the business/NGO partnership could be characterised as a love: hate relationship. NGOs were happy to receive funds from business, while convinced they were occupying the moral high ground, not being motivated by profit, but by service. Business on the other hand, often felt that NGOs were ineffective, and out of touch with the real world. But they would give funding partly (mainly?) for reason of public relations. This is a caricature, but with a measure of truth.

More recently, we have seen the emergence of NGO/business partnerships of a different type. These could be described as strategic, in that these new partnerships are designed by both parties, there is a long-term commitment of human and financial resources to the partnership, and they make use of the strengths of both.

A recent example of this kind of strategic partnership is that between Oxfam and Unilever. Unilever's goal by 2020 is to incorporate 500,000 small-hold farmers into their global supply chain, a move away from previous reliance on large

agrobusiness. By helping them to improve agricultural practice and improve quality, Unilever provides increased and stable income for farmers who previously produced crops of inconsistent quality and with unstable market access.

Oxfam's role in the Unilever project was to conduct a two-year research project, which resulted in the study, "Labour Rights in Unilever's Supply Chain,"³³ which was published in early 2013. Six key recommendations were made, and adopted by Unilever in the design of their move to include smallholder farmers in their supply chain. This change in direction is not significant. Unilever was not advising Oxfam how to do their work, Oxfam was advising Unilever. And the advice was taken.

These types of strategic partnerships are becoming increasingly common. Another example is Coca-Cola's Water Stewardship program, in which the company aims to become "water use neutral" by 2020. This means that through recycling and the provision of new water resources, Coca Cola intends to return as much water back to the communities where they operate as they use in their business operations and to create their product.

Coca Cola has been partnering in this program with the World Wildlife Fund for almost 10 years, using the WWF's research capabilities and extensive network of community activists to bring water conservation to the local level.

A. ODA FUNDING FOR BUSINESS

A second emerging phenomenon is the recent, but clear shift of government ODA funds toward increasing support of business as partners in development. Many of the major ODA actors have set up separate departments and budget lines to provide funds to businesses.³⁴ Often this funding takes the form of seed capital, which then seeks to leverage more funds from business and other actors. Another common tool is guarantee funds.

An example of this again relates to Coca Cola, which together with USAID and the Global Environment and Technology Foundation (GETF) has developed the "Water and Development Alliance" (WADA) which contributes to protecting and improving the sustainability of watersheds, increasing access to water supply and sanitation services for the poor, and enhancing productive uses of water. Beginning with a USAID commitment of \$2.5 in 2005, WADA has since leveraged a total of \$28.1 million from Coca Cola and the GETF and is active in water conservation in 22 countries.

Another example was the donation from the Shell Foundation to Marks & Spencer of more than \$1.5 million to enable M&S to move to fair trade cotton in much of their clothing line.³⁵ Initially criticized as "business feeding

33 LABOUR RIGHTS IN UNILEVER'S SUPPLY CHAIN: From compliance towards good practice, Oxfam International, 2013

34 Agence Francaise de Developpement, Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Development Cooperation, Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development UK, European Commission, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CIDA), German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, OECD, Swedish International Development Agency, Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, USAID and the World Bank Group.

35 Shell Foundation Annual Report, 2007

business at the expense of the poor” by some NGOs, it has in the end lifted thousands of cotton farmer out of poverty through the accelerated application of fair trade standards to the cotton industry.

In addition, the following UN agencies that have budget lines for the support of business in development: FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNDP, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)

Many of these agencies have gathered together into the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development. The DCED promotes economic opportunity and self-reliance through private sector development (PSD) in developing countries. It is the forum in which ODA donor and UN agencies share their practical experience of PSD.

The volume of development funding being channelled through business is growing at a much faster rate than that being channelled through NGOs. A Eurodad study projects that this is set to grow from a total of \$40 billion in 2010 to \$100 billion in 2015, nearly one-third of all development aid.³⁶

Another study carried out by the ODI (UK) found that, between the period 2000 – 2009 ODA grew from \$64.8 billion annually to \$173.3 billion. However, during the same period, the portion of this categorized as Other Official Flows (OOF) or Non Traditional Development Assistance (NTDA) grew from \$5.3 billion (8.1%) to \$53.3 billion (30.7%)³⁷ OOF or NTDA is basically public funding support to business in achieving development aims.

One major characteristic of ODA flows to business is that different funding mechanisms need to be employed. Businesses need to be able to respond flexibly to changing market conditions, and are reluctant to be tied rigidly to a budget or development plan that may need to change. Most ODA funding to business engages different mechanisms than with NGOs, and this flexibility is mitigated by an increased level of cofinancing from the side of the business.

Despite the clear trend, it needs to be stated that there are very few serious impact studies done on the development impact of funding enterprise, and so there remain many lessons to be learned as this approach gathers momentum.

B. THE NEW HYBRIDS

Another phenomenon of the past decade has been the emergence of a new type of development agency, which are neither purely business nor purely charity. A major category of these are known as DFIs (Development Finance Institutions). DFIs provide investment funding for both business and NGOs who take what is evaluated to be an enterprise based sustainable approach to development. Often this finance takes the form of debt or equity capital, guarantee facilities and at times also it takes the form of grant funding. Some funding packages contain an element of both debt and grant.

36 “Private Profit for Public Good”, Eurodad, 2012

37 The Age of Choice, ODI, 2013

The DFI sector is experiencing very rapid growth. In the period between 2006 – 2010, DFIs experienced a 190% growth in the size of their portfolios. Often DFIs make use of public funds. The main rationale for DFIs to invest public funds in the private sector is to provide financing that supports positive development outcomes for companies in developing countries that would otherwise not be able to access funds. This means companies that are either too small or risky to access finance, and are based in countries where credit supply is extremely limited, or interest rates are too high making financing for local firms scarce and costly. Almost 50% of DFI funding goes into the financial sector in developing countries, much of which is targeted to MFIs (microfinance institutions)³⁸ There is also a growing number of private DFIs. One example is the Acumen Fund. Acumen raises donations and places them as debt or equity investments in businesses that seek to alleviate poverty through business means. In the last ten years, Acumen has invested \$368 million in 44 companies in Africa and Asia.³⁹

An example of such an investment is A to Z Textile Mills in Tanzania, which produces long-lasting treated bednets to restrict the spread of malaria. A to Z is now the largest manufacturer of such bednets in Africa, producing 29 million each year and protecting millions of people from malaria. A to Z does not give away the bednets, but sells them at a price that is accessible, shown by the fact that it produces and sells millions per year, a far higher number than any other bednet distributor in Africa, charity or business. Acumen's model allowed them to take a higher risk and provide A to Z with finance when banks were unwilling.

Indeed, it can be argued that the main rationale to employ ODA, public or charity funding to business is risk mitigation. A project might have potential, but the risk is too high for traditional finance channels. The grant funding helps to jump-start a promising economic development project, finance the proof of concept and get it to a place of stability where traditional finance institutions can step on and help it grow to scale.

5. CASES

Closer to the Slovak reality, there are some cases of Slovak ODA funding of business in order to achieve a development goal. Examples of these are:

A. KIWANJANI ECO-LODGE, TAITA TAVETA, KENYA.

Kiwanjani was built during the period 2010 – 2011, and currently operates as a high-end safari hotel near Tsavo National Park in South East Kenya. The original idea was to reduce poaching and deforestation by providing a motivation for local people to preserve wildlife and habitat through increased local tourism. Kiwanjani is a for-profit business that is a partnership between three stakeholders, Finch Travels Ltd., Kenya, Kasigau Ranch, Kenya and the Integra Co-operative, Slovakia. The Kasigau Ranch has 2500 local shareholders, and Kiwanjani leases the land from this company.

³⁸ The Age of Choice", Overseas Development Institute, 2013

³⁹ www.acumen.org

Funded equally by SlovakAid grant and private investment funds, Kiwanjani has the following socio-economic goals: economic growth for the local community through leasehold payments, bed-night fees, sourcing food and services from the surrounding community, providing employment for the local community, reducing deforestation and poaching in the area around the lodge and contributing to infrastructure improvements such as road improvements and the provision of boreholes and the scooping of water holes for local cattle. Additionally, Kiwanjani has partnered in other Slovak ODA projects such as enhanced IT for local schools (Pontis Foundation) and improvements in water supply and rainwater harvesting (Integra Foundation).

B. TEN SENSES AFRICA LTD. (TSA)

TSA was founded in 2008 in Kenya as the world's first producer of fair trade macadamia nuts. Started with private capital from Slovakia and the USA, TSA employs 45 workers in a processing factory in Nairobi, and ships processed macadamia to nut importers in Europe and the USA, and more recently to China. More importantly, TSA has developed two fair trade certified farmer groups in Kenya, involving more than 700 farmers in the macadamia value chain. SlovakAid has provided a small but critically placed grant to assist in the cost of certifying one of these farmer groups, helping them to attain fair trade status. This allows for more stable markets and prices, and also provides a social premium payment that provides funds for the investment into local community development projects. SlovakAid has since approved further funding to allow TSA to expand fair trade certification to eventually 4000 cashew nut farmers in the Lamu district of Kenya.

C. KWETU TRAINING CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Človek v Ohrození (CvO) is working in partnership with the Kwetu Training Centre for Sustainable Development, and is assisting them to develop a value chain for Neem products in their centre near Mtwapa in Coastal Province, Kenya. Neem has a wide range of anti-bacterial and anti-fungicidal properties, and the Kwetu centre has a range of Neem based herbal cosmetic products including Neem soap, shower gel, shampoo, and candle, jelly, as well as Neem tea. Through consultation and workshops, CvO is assisting the Kwetu Centre to create more value addition to their Neem products through improvements in packaging, product standardisation, processing improvements and marketing.⁴⁰

D. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

Regarding the role of the private sector in international development, it is clear that it is well established, and growing at a faster pace than more traditional forms of aid. Most ODA and many private major donors already contribute significant funds to businesses in development. Additionally, many businesses carry out development projects using their own resources as well as in partnership with NGOs. Business clearly will not replace the vital

⁴⁰ Source: correspondence with Lukáš Zorad, CvO project manager

role of NGOs, but both sides need to experiment in ways to work together and to learn new ways to maximise their respective strengths.

Although there is a common assumption, and much anecdotal evidence that businesses are able to deliver effective development. There is as yet a shortage of empirical evidence to support the capability of business to substantially impact very excluded populations.

Regarding recommendations for Slovak ODA policy, there is much to be learned from other ODA providers who have a history of funding enterprise in order to achieve development goals. It would be good if a study could be commissioned by SAMRS or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to examine and apply emerging best practice in this area to Slovak ODA policy.

A key recommendation is the creation of very different funding mechanisms for business as compared to NGOs engaged in development. Most ODA actors which support business do not engage tools such as calls for proposals, fixed and detailed budgets or regular and detailed reports that follow a specific format. Often the monitoring takes the form of an annual or end of project audit, where outcomes are measured by an independent auditor. Rather, recognising that business requires a more flexible approach, emerging models of ODA funding for business tend to have the following characteristics:

- an on-going funding process, in contrast to calls for proposals.
- a much higher co-financing component, often more than 50%
- a general budget that allows flexible reallocation between budget lines according to need
- a mixture of funding types; grant, debt and guarantee
- an audit-based impact assessment approach, rather than a monitoring approach, focusing on value for money, rather than controlled spending
- guarantees taken from the side of the business, with refunds required if goals are not met
- financial bonuses if program goals are exceeded
- clarity on the goals, but with flexibility on the means of achieving these goals

While SAMRS has shown innovation in opening up funding to businesses as well as NGOs, the rather modest results thus far would call for even more innovation to be able to access this important resource and improve the impact of Slovak ODA.

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Author: Allan Bussard – Director of the Integra Foundation, Slovakia
E-mail: allan.bussard@integra.sk

RECENZIA

Príspevok jasne a logicky argumentuje v prospech užšieho spojenia privátneho sektora a aktivít mimovládnych organizácií v oblasti rozvojovej pomoci. Autorovi nerobí problém prejsť zo všeobecných konštatovaní do roviny empirickej reality, uvádza presvedčivé dôkazy svojich tvrdení a z textu je jasné, že má široký prehľad v danej oblasti ako v teoretickom spracovaní problémov tak aj v praktickom procese hľadania optimálnych riešení. Autor poskytuje celkový pohľad na situáciu v medzinárodnom kontexte, ale dobre sa orientuje aj v slovenskej realite

spätej s danou problematikou. Nesporným pozitívom textu je aj celý rad odporúčaní pre skvalitnenie vzájomnej súčinnosti mimovládnych organizácií a privátneho sektora v podmienkach Slovenska. Príspevok nie je spracovaný v klasickej forme akademického textu s množstvom citácií a odkazov na každej strane, ale zoznam zdrojov uvádzaný na záver textu je viac ako dostatočným dôkazom kvality posudzovaného textu. Jednoznačne text odporúčam na publikovanie.

prof. PhDr. Silvia Miháliková, PhD.

SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION BEYOND BORDERS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DECENTRALISED COOPERATION TO FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: THE CASE OF SLOVAKIA

Sandra Ceciari

ABSTRACT

Over the last ten years, local and regional authorities have seen their role improved and have been recognised by the European Union and on a global scale as actors of development cooperation. In 2006, the Report presented to the European Parliament by Pierre Schapira led to the creation of the NSA-LA programme (for 2007-2014) which earmarks a budget of around 30 million euro a year for local and regional authorities (LRAs), amounting to around 15% of the total budget of the programme. In this framework Platforma was launched, in November 2008, on the initiative of the CEMR – Council of European Municipalities and Regions. PLATFORMA is supported by the European Commission as part of the NSA-LA programme. The PLATFORMA secretariat is hosted by CEMR and its role is to liaise with all the associations of local and regional authorities active in this field in order to convey a coordinated message to the European Institutions. In May 2013, the European Commission published the Communication “Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes”, recognising local and regional authorities as political actors in development cooperation. PLATFORMA’s role has been crucial in securing recognition of the role of local and regional authorities in development cooperation as well as for the results obtained for the EU programming for 2014-2020.

KEY WORDS

Local and regional authorities, decentralised cooperation, Non State Actors and Local Authorities programme, DEVCO, Platforma, decentralisation, CEMR (Council of European Municipalities and Regions), UCLG (United Cities and Local Government)

INTRODUCTION

The Conference organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava on 16-17 October 2013, celebrating ten years of SlovakAid, takes place at a time when the European Union's financial programming for the 2014-2020 period is about to start and the adoption of the instruments for the new programmes on development cooperation is being finalised.

Over the last ten years, local and regional authorities have seen their role improved and have been recognised by the European Union and on a global scale. In 2006, the Report presented to the European Parliament by Pierre Schapira led to the creation of the NSA-LA programme, which earmarks a budget of around 30 million euro a year for local and regional authorities (LRAs), amounting to around 15% of the total budget of the programme.

In May 2013, the European Commission published the Communication "Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes", recognising local and regional authorities as political actors in development cooperation.

Against this background, it seems worthwhile to first analyse how decentralised cooperation and the role of the associations have developed and, secondly, to take a closer look at the instruments that can help local and regional authorities (in Slovakia in this case) become further involved in this process.

6. THE HISTORY OF DECENTRALISED COOPERATION AND ITS ROLE IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

This year, we are celebrating the 100th anniversary of the world movement of mayors launched in 1913 in Ghent with the creation of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), founded on the eve of the First World War. The timing of this international movement was not a coincidence: one of the organisers of the Conference in Ghent was Henri La Fontaine, a peace activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913.

It was after the end of the Second World War, in 1951, that a group of European mayors founded the Council of European Municipalities – the CEM which would become CEMR (Council of European Municipalities and Regions) in 1984 when membership in the organisation was opened up to regions as well.

CEMR was in fact founded by a group of mayors who had not only stood up to the Nazis, but who shared the deep desire that Europe would never again witness such a tragedy as the Second World War. Their idea was to associate the new organisation of European towns with the construction of the European Union, thus linking it to peace on the continent. The former Mayor of Lyon, one of the members of this group, used to say, "there is much that opposes the States, while there is much that brings municipalities together". The founding fathers of CEM thought that in order to build a lasting peace and avoid another world war, the main idea was to create ties between European citizens, particularly amongst those who had been fighting each other over the span of two terrible wars. Only links of friendship and cooperation between citizens would provide the basis for an enduring peace in Europe.

This is how the idea of the twinning movement was born. As early as 1950, the cities of Montbéliard (France) and Ludwigsburg (Germany) worked together to form a twinning link. The example of these two towns from these two

countries shows how the movement could work as a tool of reconciliation between two nations who had fought each other in three terrible conflicts.

According to the European Parliamentary report presented by Nicole Fontaine which resulted in the launch of the European programme for Twinning by the European Commission in 1989, around 4 000 twinning links existed in Europe at that time. They were directly supported by the municipalities and their citizens. The existence of a suitable programme supporting such actions financially was to be an incredible help in increasing twinning in Europe, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which gave rise to the need to re-establish links between two parts of Europe divided by the Cold War for 50 years.

According to a survey conducted by CEMR a few years ago, around 30 000 twinning links currently exist in Europe, and a very large number of them are links involving Central and Eastern European countries.

This brief description of how the twinning movement evolved clearly shows its impact in the international arena and particularly on European construction. The links between local governments in Europe, particularly after the Second World War, were a great contribution towards peace on our continent as they created human bridges based on friendship and trust. This is why there should be no doubt about the crucial role that local and regional authorities can play in international relations by building on the cooperation that the States establish through traditional diplomacy.

Through their history and experience, European municipalities have also worked on bringing their actions and their voices to bear on those countries still seeking to establish peace. In this regard, it seems pertinent to mention here several initiatives taken by European municipalities to help the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Even if it appears that no obvious results have been reached in this dialogue, these initiatives have constituted important steps along this difficult path. They have also provided a way for Europeans who feel concerned by this delicate issue to have a chance to play an active role.

The foregoing cases we have looked at are examples of political initiatives taken by local authorities with a view to participating in the international arena as diplomatic actors.

In addition to these political initiatives, it is just as noteworthy to mention the concrete exchanges of experiences between local and regional authorities, which have also played an important role in Europe. The twinning movement launched a form of cooperation which often led to a more technical form of collaboration between elected representatives and civil servants of cities from different countries. This was the first form of cooperation supported by the PACTE programme during the late '80s and '90s. The concept was then used in the dialogue with Central and Eastern European countries: after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Ecos programme was created, which allowed for similar exchanges between representatives from Western and Eastern Europe. The Council of European Municipalities and Regions was involved in these programmes from their inception. These experiences of course had an important impact on the preparation of the EU enlargement in 2004.

At the same time, European local authorities initiated cooperation projects with their counterparts from developing countries. The concept of decentralised cooperation was accepted by the European Commission, which set aside a very small budget for a programme for development in 1992. However, this budget was so restrictive that local authorities faced great difficulties in even presenting projects to be financed by the EC. This explains why associations

of local and regional authorities have conducted large-scale political lobbying actions in order to secure greater recognition for the role played by local and regional government in EU policies for development cooperation. To date, these actions have been largely successful, as will be shown in the second half of this document. Local authority associations have played an important role with regard to the international agenda, particularly when it comes to considering good local governance as a prerequisite for development and democracy.

7. THE ROLE OF THE ASSOCIATIONS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

As previously mentioned, the International Union of Local Authorities was established in 1913 in the Netherlands, with the intention of promoting democratic local self-government. Although it ceased operations twice during times of war in the early 20th century, it maintained the objectives and sense of direction it had established from its inception. The members of the organisation believed that close contact between different local municipalities of the world would result in both cross-cultural exchanges and mutual benefits.

This organisation would merge in 2004 with the other existing international organisation of towns – United Towns Organisation (UTO), created in 1970, and would together form United Cities and Local Government (UCLG). The founding congress took place in Paris in 2004, and the first president of the new organisation was the Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë. Today, UCLG is the world organisation for local government and is currently chaired by the Mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş. Its secretariat is based in Barcelona. Its work is made up of the contributions of its regional sections which coincide with the different continents.

The strength of this world organisation has allowed local government to have a voice in the UN. After playing an important role in the Campaign for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), UCLG has today succeeded in ensuring that the voice of local government is heard as part of the preparation of the post-2015 agenda, for which the UN needs to set forth a strategy to fight poverty.

CEMR is the European section of UCLG. It brings together all the national associations of local and regional authorities of Europe, including the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia, whom I would like to thank personally for my participation in this conference. Today, CEMR represents 57 associations in 41 countries.

I would like to place particular emphasis here on the role played by CEMR in obtaining recognition of local government as a full actor in development cooperation. This process was first started in 2003, just prior to the creation of UCLG. Some European national associations had developed links of cooperation with their counterparts from southern countries, with the support of their national governments. CEMR felt that there was a need to develop a coordinated position with a view to asking the European Union to support this type of cooperation involving local governments and their associations. To this end, we carried out effective lobbying actions which led, after several years, to the creation of the programme Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) covering the 2007-2013 period, with the help of the report presented to the European Parliament by Pierre Schapira, former member of the EP and Deputy Mayor of Paris in charge of international relations. In this respect, CEMR worked as a strong advocate for local government at European level in order to influence the European Institutions. This is how PLATFORMA was born in 2008.

PLATFORMA is supported by the European Commission as part of the NSA-LA programme. The PLATFORMA secretariat is hosted by CEMR and its role is to liaise with all the associations of local and regional authorities active in this field in order to convey a coordinated message to the European Institutions.

PLATFORMA's role has been crucial in securing recognition of the role of local and regional authorities in development cooperation as well as for the results obtained for the EU programming for 2014-2020.

8. THE INSTRUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The Treaty of Lisbon sets out a new institutional framework for the external action of the European Union, particularly with the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In this context the EEAS now works closely with the DEVCO Directorate of the European Commission to implement the EU's external policy and, consequently, in the area of development cooperation.

A new policy context has been given to European Development Policy by the Communication presented by Commissioner Piebalgs in 2011, Agenda for Change. As far as local authorities are concerned, the Communication "Empowering local authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes", published by the European Commission in May 2013, represents a big step forward. PLATFORMA is particularly proud of having cooperated closely with the European Commission in order to convey their message from the ground, which resulted in a document in which local authorities are fully recognised as political actors for development cooperation.

The legal basis of the new programming is the DCI – Development Cooperation Instrument. This document was adopted by the European Commission in 2011 but it is now subject to revisions as negotiations are still ongoing with the European Parliament and the Council.

As I have the pleasure of being able to address this information directly to a Slovakian public, the issues which seem to me of most interest to your country are:

- A. The thematic program "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities"
- B. The DEAR programme
- C. The European Neighbourhood Policy, which is of particular interest for countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

9. THE THEMATIC PROGRAMME "CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES"

The thematic programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities" is the successor of the programme "Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development" covering the period 2007-2013. The new programme will cover the period 2014-2020 and the budget provided should amount to around 1.8 billion euro.

As far as local authorities are concerned, the programme establishes the following priorities:

- Enhance LRA contributions regarding governance and development processes
- Test pilot actions promoting local development through a territorial, multi-stakeholder approach
- Reinforce regional and global LA networks
- Develop and support education and awareness raising initiatives fostering citizens' awareness of and mobilisation for development issues.

Particular attention is to be given to decentralisation in developing countries as a prerequisite for good governance and development as well as for the strengthening of national associations of local authorities in these countries.

In this context, we believe that there is an opportunity for Slovakian local and regional authorities, as well as for the national association, to take action to implement cooperation projects.

Due to the delay in the final adoption of the DCI, there will also be a wait before the multiannual framework is adopted. They should be finalised by the end of spring 2014 and the call for proposals for this programme should most likely begin around the end of 2014. Nevertheless, I am inviting Slovakian representatives today to actively participate in this programme and to bring their experience which is of great value to our partners in the South.

A. THE DEAR INITIATIVE

At a time when Europe is going through a deep economic crisis and public policies have strongly reduced the finances of local governments in many European countries, it is of course difficult to get European LRAs to commit to international cooperation. This is why the EU support is of such great importance. In this context the European Commission's DEAR initiative to promote the importance of development cooperation among European citizens is crucial. The Commission has great expectations for this initiative. And I must admit that our associations also share these same expectations. However, we have noticed with great concern the difficulty at times of attracting any attention from European representatives to the countries outside of Europe. And yet, world events are constantly reminding us how important it is to be an active part of this globalised planet where actions in Africa, Asia, Latin America can have an impact on Europe and vice-versa.

Given that our discussion is based on the role of local and regional authorities in their relations beyond Europe, it seems worthwhile to me to address the issue of the role of local authorities in fragile states. The European Commission has begun working on the link between good governance and local governance in fragile states and the conflicts in Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, are cases which confirm that local representatives can play an active role in prevention or as a mediator as well as in the reconstruction of the country.

The European Union has declared 2015 to be the European Year for Development. Let us hope that, on this occasion, European citizens will become involved in the fight against poverty and the construction of a better world. The DEAR initiative is particularly well-suited to addressing this issue.

This initiative aims at developing citizens' awareness and critical understanding of the interdependent world and of their role and responsibility in relation to a globalised society. It aims to support in this context initiatives promoted by different types of international, national and local public institutions, research centres, civil society organisations, etc.

Here too, I believe that Slovakian involvement will be of great value.

B. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Last, but not least: I would like to focus your attention on the importance of the European neighbourhood policy for a country like Slovakia.

Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union specifies that the EU is to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, with the aim of establishing an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness at the EU borders. The European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 and covers 16 partner countries to the East and South of the EU borders, namely: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

In the European Commission's initial proposal, the budget allocated to the ENI was around 18 billion euro for the 2014-2020 period.

CEMR has expressed its regrets that, in the past, this policy focused too much attention on large-scale projects for very large cities or regions (even if this was easily justified by their huge impact on development). However, for this reason, PLATFORMA has advocated, during the preparation of the last version of the ENPI instrument (which constitutes the legal basis of this programme), to also have the cooperation between local and regional authorities taken into account. It will be important to receive concrete confirmation of this from the actors on the ground.

CONCLUSIONS

There cannot be democracy without local democracy. Reinforcing democracy and development means reinforcing local democracy. Some countries, particularly in Northern Europe, have been a shining example for other countries. This is a perfect example of why the involvement of local governments is important in development cooperation. This is why European local government can contribute through concrete examples.

This year, CEMR will be celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Charter of Local Liberties which in turn inspired the Charter for Local Self-government adopted by the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in 1985 and which serves as a reference for local democracy in Europe.

Africa has now opened this debate on a new continent with the discussion of a Charter for local self-government at African level. Europe can certainly make an important contribution to this debate through its experience. I have

no doubt that the Slovakian experience in implementing decentralisation and local democracy would be precious to these countries as well.

I hope this presentation has helped to explain how and why local authorities can play an important role in external and development policy.

I strongly encourage local authorities from Slovakia to become a committed player in this process and I also call on all the development stakeholders to cooperate together to eradicate poverty and build a better world for everybody. Our associations of local authorities at national, European and world level are ready and willing to work together to this end.

Author: Sandra Ceciarini – Director of Platforma, Council of European Municipalities and Regions, France

E-mail: sandra.ceciarini@ccre-cemr.org

RECENZIA

Autorka príspevku „Solidarity and Cooperation Beyond Borders“ prináša zaujímavý pohľad na spoluprácu na úrovni miest a regiónov v EÚ. V prvej časti čerpá z histórie takejto spolupráce a poukazuje na jej význam pri udržaní mieru v regiónoch, ktoré boli postihnuté dvomi ničivými svetovými vojnami a tiež poukazuje na úlohu asociácií miestnych a regionálnych autorít v medzinárodnej aréne a upozorňuje na nástroje, ktoré sa používajú v rozvojovej spolupráci. Tieto nástroje potom bližšie rozoberá v druhej časti príspevku. Najväčším prínosom práce sú práve odporúčania pre Slovensko, ako nástroje rozvojovej pomoci vhodne využívať, či už v rámci tematického programu „Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities“, „The DEAR Initiative“ alebo „The European Neighbourhood Policy“.

Ing. Eva Jančíková, PhD.

CITLIVOSŤ NA KONFLIKT V GLOBÁLNOM A V ROZVOJOVOM VZDELÁVANÍ

Zuzana Fialová

ABSTRAKT

Citlivosť na konflikt, ako aj schopnosť analyzovať ho a pracovať s ním by mali byť súčasťou globálneho i rozvojového vzdelávania. Umenie vnímať konflikt ako nevyhnutnú súčasť globálnych problémov, ktoré sa dotýkajú aj nášho každodenného života, je veľmi dôležitou zručnosťou, ktorú by malo sprostredkovať globálne vzdelávanie. Vplyv konfliktu na rozvoj krajín, spoločností či komunit má spravidla zásadný charakter, obzvlášť vtedy, ak ide o násilný konflikt typu občianskej vojny. Podľa súčasných autorov nie je možné vysvetľovať problémy rozvoja bez štúdia konfliktov. Rozvojové vzdelávanie zas nevyhnutne pokrýva konflikt z tej praktickej stránky, nakoľko rozvojoví pracovníci prirodzene žijú v konfliktnom prostredí stretov záujmov, hodnôt či noriem správania. Príspevok upozorňuje na to, aké je dôležité zaoberať sa konfliktom na všetkých úrovniach vzdelávania v súčasnom globalizovanom svete.

KLÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ

Sociálny konflikt, občianska vojna, analýza konfliktu, riešenie konfliktu, rozvoj

ÚVOD

Najhoršia podoba sociálneho konfliktu súčasnosti je občianska vojna. Tento typ konfliktu rúca hodnoty, naštrbuje kultúrne normy a ničí sociálne inštitúcie. Spoločnosti zasiahnuté konfliktom sa nemôžu rozvíjať. Stereotypy nachádzajú živnú pôdu v chudobe, pocite diskriminácie a nenávisti. Odlišnosť sa trestá. Na príklade západného Balkánu vidno, ako ťažko sa rekonštruujú vzťahy, normy a inštitúcie raz tak hlboko zasiahnuté.

Až do konca druhej svetovej vojny sa teórie ekonomického rozvoja a teórie sociálneho konfliktu rozvíjali paralelne takmer bez prienikov (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009). Teórie rozvoja v druhej polovici dvadsiateho storočia považovali vojnu za rušivý element, takže krajiny postihnuté vojnou často vylučovali z empirického výskumu s odôvodnením, že až po skončení vojny môže krajina nastúpiť na pokojnú cestu rozvoja. Táto perspektíva sa zmenila až po explózií občianskych vojen na všetkých kontinentoch v 90tych rokoch minulého storočia. Odrazu bolo viac než rukulapné, že konflikt a rozvoj spolu úzko súvisia. Budovanie mieru (peacebuilding) sa zrazu stalo súčasťou rozvojovej agendy OSN. Fenomén občianskej vojny bol uchopený prevažne ako brzda rozvoja, v mnohých prípadoch však tiež dôsledok chudoby a zlyhania štátu.

1. PREČO KONFLIKT SÚČASŤOU GLOBÁLNEHO AJ ROZVOJOVÉHO VZDELÁVANIA

Dnes už konflikt patrí nerozlučne k diskusii o globálnych problémoch a súvislostiach. Mnohé z krajín, ktoré sa nazývajú „rozvojové“ či „rozvíjajúce sa“ (developing countries), zároveň možno označiť termínom „post-konfliktné“. Znamená to, že dané krajiny prekonalí závažný vnútropolitický, väčšinou ozbrojený konflikt, alebo sériu konfliktov sprevádzanú stratami na životoch, rozpadom infraštruktúry, sociálnej štruktúry, či kultúrnych rámcov spoločností. Práve obnova inštitúcií a sociálnych väzieb je často tou najťažšou časťou rozvoja. Predpona „post-“, však ani zďaleka neznamená, že v týchto spoločnostiach už neexistujú konflikty, práve naopak. Často sa stretávame s príkladmi afrických krajín, (Mesík 2011) v ktorých práve ozbrojené konflikty, mnohokrát podporované bohatými krajinami Severu, zapríčinili dlhotrvajúcu chudobu a navrstvené sociálne problémy. Collier (2009) uvádza konflikt v podobe občianskej vojny ako jednu zo štyroch „pascí“, v ktorých uviazli krajiny s nízkymi príjmami a ktoré im bránia v rozvoji. „Sedemdesiat tri percent ľudí žijúcich v krajinách dolnej miliardy zažilo v nedávnej dobe občiansku vojnu, alebo ju stále prežívajú.“ (Collier 2009: 33) Tieto krajiny sa nevedia vymaniť so špirály konfliktu a to im bráni v rozvoji. Väčšina štátnych prostriedkov (ktorá nie je ukradnutá skorumpovanými vládcami) sa investuje do zbraní a ozbrojených zločiek. Veľké percento populácie mladých mužov bez vzdelania, bez šance získať prácu a založiť si rodinu je časovanou rozbuškou v mnohých týchto krajinách čakajúcou na dobrodruha, ktorý povedie davu s vidinou získania moci a kontroly nad prírodnými zdrojmi krajiny. Globálne vzdelávanie by preto malo zahŕňať poznanie sociálneho konfliktu, jeho podstaty a možného pôsobenia na rozvoj, či nedostatok rozvoja krajín či celých regiónov.

Poznanie konfliktu patrí takisto aj do rozvojového vzdelávania, nakoľko rozvojoví pracovníci prirodzene existujú v konfliktom prostredí. Konflikt komunit, klanov, sociálnych skupín, či občajné konflikty medzi spolupracovníkmi, to je každodenná realita práce v teréne i v kanceláriách rozvojových agentúr.

Ďalší dôvod, prečo sa vo vzdelávaní na všetkých stupňoch zaoberať konfliktom je najzaujímavejší. Keď sa spýtate ľudí, zrejme v akejkolvek krajine, čo sa im vynorí v mysli, keď sa povie slovo „konflikt“, na začiatku dostanete veľmi podobné odpovede. Ako prvé asociácie budú nasledovať „násilie“, „vojna“, „boj“, ale aj napríklad „neprijemnosti“, „strata“ či „hádky“. Ak sa ale pýtate ďalej na to, čo ešte sa spája s konfliktom, postupne sa začínajú vynárať aj „zmena“, „diskusia“, „posun vpred“ a možno, keď sa pýtate dostatočne dlho, nájde sa aj asociácia „rozvoj“. Je bežné, že intuitívne vnímame konflikt negatívne. U ľudí z post-konfliktných krajín je toto vnímanie veľmi hlboko zakorenené. Avšak pri reflexii vlastných skúseností prichádzame na to, že konflikt môže mať rovnako pozitívne, ako aj negatívne dôsledky či sprievodné javy. Konflikt je neutrálny, pozitívne či negatívne môže byť jeho manažovanie či následky. Samo poznanie, že konflikt môže byť v niečom aj pozitívny, je veľkým posunom vpred nielen u komunit, ktoré majú za sebou desaťročia násilia a preto sa zvyčajne akéhokoľvek, aj toho najbanálnejšieho konfliktu boja a nevedia si s ním poradiť.⁴¹ Užitočné je to aj pre ľudí na Slovensku, ktorých sa takisto týkajú sociálne konflikty spojené s ekonomickou krízou, nezamestnanosťou, ale aj krízou hodnôt a problémami životného prostredia.

2. DEFINÍCIA KONFLIKTU PRE GLOBÁLNE A ROZVOJOVÉ VZDELÁVANIE

Existujú desiatky definícií sociálneho konfliktu v spoločenských vedách. „Konflikt sa všeobecne chápe ako napätie

41 V tomto príspevku sa venujeme sociálnemu konfliktu v globálnom rozvojovom kontexte, teda konfliktu medzi osobami a skupinami. Vnútorne osobné psychologické konflikty nechávame bokom.

protichodných názorov, záujmov, alebo želaní. Konflikt môže, ale nemusí zahrňovať násilie, dokonca i keď dopustíme mnoho významov pojmu 'násilie.' (Suhrke and Chaudhary 2012) „Konflikt je súperenie medzi dvoma alebo viacerými smermi konania, ktoré sú buď protikladné, alebo sa vzájomne vylučujú.“ (Mischnick 2006)

Definícia sociálneho konfliktu použiteľná v globálnom vzdelávaní by mala obsahovať najmenej tri elementy:

- a) Strany konfliktu: Môžu to byť osoby, ale aj skupiny - rodiny, klany, inštitúcie či ich jednotlivé oddelenia, štáty, etnické skupiny, politické strany, apod. V sociálnom konflikte musia byť najmenej dve strany, avšak zvyčajne sa ich počet v priebehu konfliktu rozrastá. Často máme do činenia so stranami, ktoré sú na prvý pohľad skryté, nevystupujú otvorene či nahlas.
- b) Záujmy: konflikt vzniká na záujmoch, ktoré sú nezlučiteľné, protichodné, či navzájom si konkurujúce. Strany konfliktu sa líšia od iných stakeholderov či aktérov práve tým, že v konflikte vystupuje ich priamy záujem. Záujem pritom definujeme ako uvedomelú potrebu strany, ktorú chce realizovať. Potrebu môže byť napríklad vzdelanie, ale až keď si napr. skupina presídlencov uvedomí, že bez vzdelania nemajú šancu sa zamestnať a chcu ho získať, stáva sa vzdelanie ich záujmom. Potrebu môže byť napr. sebarealizácia či pocit spolupatričnosti, ale aj sebadôvera, či ohodnotenie zo strany iných.
- c) Dosiahnutie potrieb/záujmov je nemožné bez súčinnosti, či aspoň neprekážania druhej strany či iných strán konfliktu. Niekde je táto závislosť uvádzaná ako protichodnosť, rozpor, či konkurencia. Ide o to, že jedna strana je závislá na druhej pri realizácii svojich záujmov, minimálne v tej miere, že táto musí prestať prekážať. Záujem aktivistov za ľudské práva je sloboda vyjadrovania. Štát sa teda musí vzdať praktík cenzúry a postihov novinárov a blogerov za kritické výpovede, inak tento záujem nebude realizovaný.
- d) Ostatné komponenty definície môžu obsahovať časové či priestorové ohraničenie, emócie sprevádzajúce konflikt, jeho dynamiku, či iné dôležité okolnosti a prejavy, napr. fyzické či psychické násilie prítomné v konflikte. Takto postavená definícia pripravuje študentov či poslucháčov na analýzu konfliktu, ktorá je dôležitou súčasťou poznania podstaty konfliktu a jeho zasadenia do globálnych súvislostí.

3. ANALÝZA KONFLIKTU

Analýza konfliktu má svoj veľký význam pri globálnom vzdelávaní. Núti poslucháčov hlbšie študovať problémy, pátrať po súvislostiach a zdrojoch informácií. Analýza konfliktu je tiež dôležitým praktickým nástrojom rozvojových pracovníkov, nakoľko zvyšuje kapacitu pracovníkov pracovať v komplexnom prostredí, vidieť širšie súvislosti a myslieť do budúcnosti. Pomáha im tiež lepšie pochopiť spoločenský a kultúrny kontext, v ktorom pracujú. Povzbudzuje tiež tím myslieť ponad svoje ciele a plánované dopady projektov. Vidia možné dopady svojej práce na konflikty v komunitách. Analýza konfliktu integruje „konfliktnú optiku“ do rozvojovej práce. Umožňuje vidieť realitu dynamickú a mnohorozmernú, podľa optiky rôznych aktérov. A v neposlednom rade trénuje zručnosti pomáhajúce poznať konflikty vo vlastnom prostredí (v práci, v rodine, v komunite, apod.).

Analýza konfliktu nie je liekom na každý problém. Existuje tu riziko otvorenia „Pandorinej skrinky“. Ak začneme problém analyzovať, samotný výskum môže prispieť k jeho otváraniu, eskalácii, či dynamickejšiemu priebehu. Nie

v každom momente sa dá robiť analýza konfliktu. Ak strany ešte nemajú ujasnené svoje záujmy a pozície, konflikt je ešte len v štádiu potenciálneho konfliktu, alebo naopak, konflikt je na vrchole eskalácie a emócie sú natoľko vybičované, že zozbierané informácie by boli skreslené. Mnohokrát spoločenský konflikt zasahuje aj citlivé oblasti hodnôt, morálky, apod. V niektorých spoločnostiach môžu byť kultúrne prekážky v tom, aby ľudia hovorili o istých otázkach otvorene. Treba mať na pamäti, že analýza konfliktu, ako ju robíme, je len snímkou aktuálnej situácie. Pri dynamickom konflikte sa mnoho parametrov môže rýchlo meniť, čo vyžaduje častú aktualizáciu, na ktorú nemusia byť vždy kapacity.

4. PARAMETRE ANALÝZY KONFLIKTU⁴²

Kľúčové parametre analýzy konfliktu sú konfliktný profil, strany, príčiny a dynamika konfliktu. Okrem toho používame mapovanie strán, aktérov a ich vzájomných vzťahov, problémov, postojov. Výstupom z analýzy môže byť priamo stratégia zachovania sa v danom konflikte.

Konfliktný profil je charakteristika kontextu, v ktorom sa konflikt nachádza. Opisuje, aký je politický, ekonomický a socio-kultúrny kontext, čo z charakteristík krajiny či regiónu vplyva na konflikt (geografia, životné prostredie, prírodné katastrofy, zmena klímy, história, etnické či náboženské zloženie populácie, migrácia, ekonomika, spôsob obživy obyvateľstva, priemysel či veľké investície, aktivity OSN či veľkých medzinárodných donorov, stav infraštruktúry, politické problémy, voľby, prítomnosť ozbrojených síl, obeť vojny, zamínované oblasti, kultúra, tradície, sociálna štruktúra a väzby, prípadne ich narušenie, porušovanie práv, diskriminácia, marginalizované skupiny obyvateľstva, apod.)

Dôležitým prvkom je história konfliktu, teda snaha o objektívny popis, ako sa konflikt vyvíjal. Zaznamenať tiež treba kritické udalosti, pokusy o hľadanie riešenia, externú intervenciu a jej následky, prípadne výskyt a formy násillia v konflikte.

Príčiny konfliktu rozdeľujeme na tri kategórie:

- a) Štruktúrne príčiny – faktory vyplývajúce z kontextu konfliktu, ktoré zapríčiňujú vznik a ovplyvňujú priebeh konfliktu. Napr. pri konfliktoch komunít v multi-etnických oblastiach Afganistanu medzi štruktúrne príčiny patria: navrátilci a vnútorní presídlení, ktorí si nárokujú na pôvodnú pôdu, občianska vojna medzi kmeňmi pred nástupom Talibanu a z toho vyplývajúca nedôvera, nedostatočne garantovaná vláda zákona na danom území, apod.
- b) Bezprostredné príčiny – udalosti či javy, ktoré priamo spôsobili vznik konfliktu. Napr. pri vyššie uvedených konfliktoch to môže byť sucho a následný nedostatok vody na zavlažovanie polí.
- c) Spúšťače – udalosti, ktoré spustia eskaláciu konfliktu alebo spôsobia priamu konfrontáciu strán. V tomto prípade to môže byť rozhodnutie provinčnej rady o distribúcii riečnej vody do zavlažovacích kanálov, ktoré sa môže etnickým uzbeckým dedinám, ktoré sú najďalej od zdroja, zdať ako nespravodlivé.

42 Upravené podľa Upravené podľa Mischnick, R.: Nenásilná transformácia konfliktov. Don Bosco, str. 39-47.

Dôležitým aspektom sú tiež faktory, ktoré prispievajú (alebo môžu prispieť) k vytvoreniu mieru či vyriešeniu konfliktu: komunikácia medzi stranami, participácia na rozhodnutiach, posilnenie bezpečnosti, antidiskriminačná politika, apod.

Kľúčovým elementom sú samozrejme ľudia. Aktérov môžeme rozdeliť na strany konfliktu, to sú jednotlivci, skupiny, organizácie, alebo inštitúcie, ktoré majú v konflikte priamy záujem, a potom ostatných aktérov, čo sú jednotlivci, skupiny, organizácie či inštitúcie, ktoré (zatiaľ) záujem nemajú, ale ich správanie či konanie môže konflikt ovplyvniť. Môže ho eskalovať, či naopak utlmať. Z týchto aktérov sa postupne môžu stať strany, ak sa u nich záujem vykryštalizuje.

Nie všetky strany a všetci aktéri sú na prvý pohľad viditeľní a ich miesto v konflikte očividné. Často sú stranami subjekty, ktoré sú skryté a „tahajú za nitky“. Druhým dôležitým aspektom je fakt, že skupiny, organizácie či inštitúcie často nevystupujú či nekonajú jednotne. Treba rátať s podskupinami, názorovými frakciami, či jednotlivými oddeleniami, ktoré môžu mať záujmy iné než väčšina. Parameter, ktorý sa sleduje pri aktéroch či stranách je kapacita/sila/potenciál. Teda nakoľko významnú rolu hrajú v konflikte.

Dynamika konfliktu a možné scenáre vývoja poskytujú zhodnotenie situácie v kontexte so zohľadnením predchádzajúcich parametrov. Každý konflikt má fázy „tiché“, kedy sa strany pripravujú, naberajú silu, alebo sú unavené konfliktom, a naopak fázy eskalácie, kedy dochádza k priamej konfrontácii, výbuchu emócií a rýchlemu sledu udalostí.

5. ČO ROBIŠ S KONFLIKTOM?

Nie vždy je jedinou možnou či najlepšou stratégiou pristupovať k riešeniu konfliktu. Ako strana sa môžeme cítiť príliš slabí, preto môžeme zvoliť útek, prispôbenie sa, alebo jednoducho ignorovanie konfliktu, pokiaľ je to možné. Môžeme tiež vyčkávať, „schovať konflikt pod koberec“ a medzitým naberať silu, spojencov, mobilizovať zdroje, prehlbovať know-how, a pripravovať sa na vhodnú príležitosť, kedy môžeme konfrontovať protistranu. „Schovanie pod koberec“ môže mať však aj svoje riziká. Klasickým príbehom je tzv. „Rupnikova chladnička“, metafora politológa Jacquesa Rupnika (1990), ktorý ňou popísal otvorenie horúcich národnostných konfliktov v 90tych rokoch v strednej a východnej Európe po páde totalitných komunistických režimov, ktoré tieto konflikty v desaťročia „zamrazili“. S príchodom slobody sa mraznička náhle rozmrazila a jej obsah začal zapáchať...

Riešenia konfliktov môžeme rozdeliť do dvoch kategórií (Bednařík 2001). Autoritatívne spôsoby sú tie, kde sa strany spolu nepodieľajú na hľadaní riešenia. Je to napríklad presadenie sa silou (fyzické či psychické násilie, donútenie druhej strany podriaďiť sa či prispôbiť), rozhodnutie autoritou, ktorú obe strany rešpektujú, arbitráž (po zvážení argumentov oboch strán, podľa zákona), či tiež súd (sudca rozhoduje na základe argumentov zástupcov oboch strán a podľa zákona). Alternatívne spôsoby riešenia konfliktov sú tie, kde sa strany samotné podieľajú na hľadaní riešenia. Je to napr. facilitácia, kde facilitátor usmerňuje diskusiu, nevstupuje však aktívne do hľadania riešenia. Inými príkladmi sú mediácia (sprostredkovateľ pomáha stranám uviesť si svoje záujmy a následne vyjednať dohodu dobrú pre obe strany), zmierovanie (zmierovač pomáha hľadať vzájomné porozumenie, rešpekt, obnovenie medziľudských vzťahov, aby strany mohli dospieť k dohode), či vyjednávanie (hľadanie riešenia prostredníctvom priamej komunikácie strán).

6. KONFLIKT A KULTÚRA⁴³

Kultúra zohráva dôležitú rolu v tom, ako nazeráme na konflikt aj ako s ním zaobchádzame. Kultúrne podmienený je už samotný prístup ku konfliktu. Môžeme mať kultúrne zakorenenú tendenciu ho potláčať, ignorovať, alebo naopak slobodne o ňom hovoriť a riešiť ho už v zárodku. Rôzne kultúry tiež rôzne nazerajú na spoluprácu či podriadenie sa.

Zaujímavý je tiež prístup k riešeniu problémov a k dohodám. Isté kultúry preferujú písomné, iné zas ústne dohody. Rozdielny môže byť stupeň dôvery k ústnym či písomným dohodám.

Dôležitým aspektom môže byť aj to, ako sa budujú vzťahy v jednotlivých kultúrach a ako sa získava sociálny status (napr. vzdelaním, vekom, majetkom, rodom, pracovnou skúsenosťou, apod.) a teda kto má akú silu v danom konflikte.

Treba zohľadniť tiež kultúrne podmienené vnímanie času, teda čo môže vplývať na to, ako čas ovplyvňuje konflikt. Či máme vo zvyku vyčkávať, až konflikt „vyhynie“, či naopak jeho neriešenie vytvára časový tlak. Akú hodnotu má pre nás čas a koľko času chceme venovať procedúram riešenia konfliktu je tiež legitímnou otázkou pri plánovaní spôsobov manažovania konfliktu.

Pri riešení konfliktov je tiež zaujímavé, ako jednotlivé kultúry vnímajú priestor, či majú ľudia radi väčšiu či menšiu fyzickú vzdialenosť od protistrany, kde sa chcú stretávať, aby si vydiskutovali problémy, či preferujeme otvorený, či uzavretý priestor na komunikáciu či vyjednávanie.

Sociálne štruktúry sú tiež súčasťou kultúry a ich vplyv na priebeh či manažovanie konfliktu je zvyčajne nezanedbateľný. Treba si uvedomiť, ako najmä tie väčšie štruktúry a inštitúcie ovplyvňujú konflikt a ktoré náboženské, ideologické, či rodinné štruktúry sú v danej situácii dôležité.

Ako komunikujeme je tiež výsledok istých kultúrnych vzorcov. Pochopiteľne na konflikt vplýva, či máme vo zvyku komunikovať priamo či nepriamo, či používajú všetky strany rovnaký jazyk, prípadne aká je rola tlmočníka pri komunikácii strán. Neverbálna komunikácia a jej kultúrne podmienené významy tiež môžu ovplyvňovať priebeh konfliktu. Takisto to, ako a či dokážeme v našej kultúre povedať „NIE“.

Kultúrne rôzne môžu byť tiež očakávania od roly intervenujúceho v konflikte. V niektorých kultúrach existujú tradičné štruktúry na riešenie konfliktov fungujúce paralelne s oficiálnymi, napr. rady starších vedľa občianskych súdov. Záleží tiež na tom, aké osobnostné charakteristiky a akú aktivitu očakávame od intervenujúceho v konflikte.

Je tiež zrejmé, že konflikty, kde okrem súperenia o zdroje či nehmotné statky (napr. uznanie, prestíž, moc, apod.) dochádza k rozporu medzi normami a pravidlami správania sa a videnia sveta, sú nesmierne ťažké z hľadiska manažmentu, riešenia, či zmierovania strán. Občianske vojny, ako ich opisujú rozvojoví odborníci, sú často práve konfliktami „podfarbenými“ kultúrnymi rozdielmi využitými v záujme mocenských bojov.

43 Upravené podľa Conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Rwanda. USAid 2008, str. 15.

ZÁVER

Poznanie konfliktu a jeho parametrov umožňuje vidieť globálne súvislosti komplexnejšie. Ak vyučujeme globálnu ekonomiku, otázky rozvoja či klimatických zmien, neobídeme sa bez poznania o sociálnom konflikte. Ten, v súčasnosti najmä v najhoršej z jeho podôb, občianskej vojny, udržuje celé štáty a komunity v dlhotrvajúcej chudobe a zaostalosti. Analýza konfliktu je nástrojom na pochopenie príčin, záujmov, roly rôznych hráčov v konflikte. Nástroje ponúknuté vyššie sú aplikovateľné nielen v rámci analýzy fyzicky či historicky vzdialených udalostí. Nadobudnutá zručnosť analyzovania sociálnych konfliktov rôzneho stupňa zložitosti môže byť užitočná i v bežnom živote občanov Slovenska. Každý z nás je súčasťou väčších či menších sociálnych skupín a konflikt je súčasťou spoločenského života. Umenie oddeliť emócie od faktov a vidieť prepojenia medzi nimi je dobrou výbavou do života každého človeka.

ODPORÚČANIA

- Integrovať teórie konfliktov na adekvátnej úrovni zložitosti do všetkých spoločenskovedných predmetov na všetkých stupňoch vzdelávania.
- Prepájať poznanie o parametroch sociálnych konfliktov s poznaním o ekonomických či sociálnych predpokladoch rozvoja spoločnosti.
- Vložiť analýzu a manažment konfliktu na úrovni praktických zručností do vzdelávacích cieľov pre stredné a vysoké školy v rámci spoločenskovedných predmetov.

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Autorka: Zuzana Fialová – predsedníčka Platformy mimovládnych rozvojových organizácií, Slovensko
E-mail: zuzana.fialova@mvro.sk

RECENZIA

Práca má hlavne prínos do teoretickej bázy znalostí curricula rozvojového vzdelávania. Nie je známe, či autorka v podkapitole „Parametre a analýzy konfliktu“ a „Kultúra a konflikt“ vniesla aj svoje názory, keďže už pri názve podkapitoly uvádza odkaz na použitú bibliografiu. V článku vhodne využíva dostupnú literatúru uznávaných autorov z oblasti. Autorka podáva základné metodologické a obsahové poňatie témy konfliktu prioritne v kontexte rozvojových krajín. Rozsah článku nedovoľuje ďalšie odborné rozpracovanie, takže odporúčame sa s danou problematikou zaoberať aj v budúcnosti, práve pre jej všeobecne nízku mieru rozpracovanosti u nás a taktiež pre lepšiu integráciu do učebných osnov v globálnom rozvojovom vzdelávaní. Cenné sú aj odporúčania pre vzdelávacie inštitúcie v závere, avšak práve nedostatok metodologických a teoretických poznatkov (aj domácich autorov) je prekážkou plnej integrácie témy konfliktu do vzdelávacích programov.

Ing. Mikuláš Černota, PhD.

INTERKULTÚRNE KOMPETENCIE V GLOBÁLNO M VZDELÁVANÍ

Juraj Jančovič

ABSTRAKT

V súčasnom globalizovanom svete prichádzame bežne do kontaktu s inými kultúrami v súkromnom i profesionálnom živote. Samotné kultúrne rozdiely najčastejšie vnímame priamo počas kontaktu s inou kultúrou, ale interkultúrne kompetencie (vedomosti, zručnosti a postoje k pochopeniu a prístupu k iným kultúram všeobecne) je dôležité formovať aj vo vzdelávacom procese. Príspevok upozorňuje na to, že prostredníctvom rozpoznania svojich vlastných kultúrne podmienených vzorcov správania a stereotypov môžeme rozvíjať svoje interkultúrne kompetencie. Tieto nám okrem iného pomáhajú vidieť globálne súvislosti bez zjednodušenia, ktoré práve stereotypy ľahko ponúkajú. Pochopením princípov interkultúrnej komunikácie môžeme byť schopní citlivejšie vnímať kultúrne odlišnosti okolo nás a ich dôsledky.

KLÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ

kultúra, stereotypy, kultúrna generalizácia, interkultúrna komunikácia, kultúrne kompetencie

ÚVOD

Milton J. Bennett tvrdí, že interkultúrna citlivosť nie je človeku prirodzená. Takáto citlivosť nie je súčasťou väčšej časti ľudskej histórie. Medzikultúrne kontakty boli zväčša sprevádzané krviprelieváním, útlakom alebo genocídou. Ak by sme chceli v dnešnom svete vzájomnej závislosti pokračovať týmto spôsobom, bolo by to seba deštruktívne. Pri hľadaní inej cesty sa žiaľ nemôžeme oprieť o žiadny model z histórie, ktorý by nás viedol.⁴⁴

V minulosti boli našimi susedmi ľudia, ktorí nám boli veľmi podobní – podobne sa obliekali, stravovali, hovorili rovnakým jazykom a pod. Dnes žijeme v susedstve s ľuďmi, ktorí nie sú našimi kultúrnymi replikami, aj keď rozdiely medzi nami nie sú až také veľké. V blízkej budúcnosti však môžeme očakávať, že strávime svoj život v spoločnosti ľudí, ktorí nebudú hovoriť našim materinským jazykom, budú vyznávať odlišné hodnoty a správať sa na základe iných noriem. V rámci posledných jedného alebo dvoch desaťročí sa pravdepodobnosť strávenia časti života v inej kultúre prevýšila pravdepodobnosť odchodu z rodného mesta z čias pred sto rokmi. Technologické

44 Milton J. Bennett: Towards ethno relativism: A developmental model of intercultural sensitivity, In: R. Michael Paige: Education for the intercultural experience, Yarmouth, Intercultural press, 1993.

podmienky sú na to bezpochyby už vytvorené: telekomunikačné systémy prepájajú celý svet satelitmi, lietadlá sú schopné prepravovať ľudí rýchlejšie ako je rýchlosť zvuku, počítače sú schopné vychlítiť akékoľvek fakty rýchlejšie ako ľudia stihnú naformulovať otázku. V čom sme na pochybách je to, či budeme schopní rešpektovať a využiť odlišnosti ľudí žijúcich vedľa nás.⁴⁵

1. KULTÚRA

Predpokladajme, že ľudia sa správajú určitým spôsobom na základe toho, ako vnímajú svoj okolitý svet. Vnímáním je pritom myslený výber, vyhodnocovanie a organizovanie stimulov z okolitého sveta.⁴⁶ Ak je to tak, tak ako je možné, že rovnaké stimuly sú vnímané odlišne rôznymi ľuďmi a skupinami? Jednou z odpovedí na túto otázku môže byť aj kultúra.

Kultúra je komplexný systém, ktorý sa prejavuje na viacerých úrovniach nášho každodenného života. Veľmi zjednodušene by sa dala kultúra opísať ako súbor pravidiel, ktoré organizujú určitú skupinu ľudí s cieľom zabezpečiť im plynulejšie spolunažívanie.⁴⁷ Geert Hofstede považuje kultúru za kolektívne naprogramovanie mysle, ktoré rozlišuje členov jednej skupiny alebo kategórie od inej.⁴⁸

Edward T. Hall tvrdí, že kultúra je v princípe primárne systém vytvárania, posielania, uskladňovania a spracovávania informácií.⁴⁹ Čiže naša myseľ sa programuje prostredníctvom systému informácií. Tento systém je však čoraz viac ovplyvňovaný vonkajšími vplyvmi, ktoré tento systém menia. Ľudia v danej kultúre sú tým pádom neustále podnecovaní k tomu, aby zapracovávali nové skúsenosti ako pravidlá v rámci svojej kultúry (napríklad na základe módných trendov a konvencií v obliekaní, ale aj na základe interkultúrnych stretnutí a zážitkov). Kultúra teda nevychádza iba tradícií a zvykov, ktoré sa prenášali vo vnútri kultúry po generácie, ale aj z vplyvov, ktoré vychádzajú zvonku. Najmä v dnešnej globalizovanej spoločnosti prichádza čoraz častejšie k stretom kultúr, ktoré na jednej strane dané kultúry obohacujú o nové prvky, ale na druhej strane prinášajú aj väčšie vymedzenie daných kultúr, poukazovaním na odlišnosti.⁵⁰

45 Dean Barnlund: Communication in global village, In: Milton J. Bennett: Basic concepts of intercultural communication, Intercultural press, 1998.

46 Odvodené na základe modelu vnímania – „Perceptual model“ vytvoreného Marshall R. Singerom – z „Culture: A perceptual approach, In: Milton J. Bennett: Basic concepts of intercultural communication, Intercultural press, 1998.

47 Margret Steixner: Intercultural competence, In: Juraj Jančovič a kol.: Texty k efektívnej rozvojovej spolupráci, Typi universitatis tyrnaviensis, 2012.

48 Geert Hofstede: Culture 's consequences. Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations, Sage publications, second edition, 2001, page 9.

49 Edward T. Hall: The power of hidden differences, In: Milton J. Bennett: Basic concepts of intercultural communication, Intercultural press, 1998.

50 Poznámky z tréningu „Interkultúrne kompetencie“, Horizont 3000, 7.-11.11.2011, Viedeň

2. STEREOTYPY A KULTÚRNE GENERALIZÁCIE

Stereotyp je ustálený a zjednodušený obraz alebo myšlienka o určitom type človeka alebo veci.⁵¹ Je človeku úplne prirodzený (na rozdiel od kultúrnej citlivosti) a nie je možné ho zo života úplne vytesniť a netreba sa o to ani snažiť, pretože to nie je možné. Aj keď stereotyp nemá v spoločnosti veľmi dobrú reputáciu, je potrebné povedať že je do istej miery aj prospešný. Redukuje komplexitu reality, v ktorej žijeme a pomáha nám vyhnúť sa zahlteniu dojmami. Jednoduchšie ako vnímať každého človeka osobitne ako jedinečnú bytosť je vytvoriť si „škatulky“, do ktorých môžeme ľudí zaradiť a ktoré zapadajú do vopred vykonštruovanej reality. Stereotypy zároveň vychádzajú zo skúseností a ich nositelia veria, že sa veci opakujú, čiže minulé skúsenosti sú aplikovateľné aj na situácie odohrávajúce sa v súčasnosti.

Stereotyp má však aj svoje úskalia, ktoré do istej miery vychádzajú z toho, čo už bolo napísané. Stereotyp je rezistentný na zmenu, pretože zmeny ovplyvňujú štruktúru osobnosti a bránia nám robiť nové skúsenosti. Stereotypy sú ako vybavenie nášho domova, naša filozofia, ktorú sme si obľúbili a nechceme ju nahradiť inou alebo znovu usporadúvať.⁵² Stereotypy pritom môžu byť ako pozitívne, tak aj negatívne. Pozitívna stereotypizácia nastáva vtedy, kedy je človek alebo skupina ľudí v očiach človeka z inej kultúry rešpektovaný. Častejšie však nastáva situácia negatívnej stereotypizácie, kedy sú charakteristiky človeka alebo skupiny nerešpektované. Nielen tá negatívna stereotypizácia, ale oba typy sú pri strete kultúr problematické a to z toho dôvodu, že nám dávajú falošný pocit pochopenia druhej kultúry. Naviac sa stereotypy môžu stať sebanapĺňajúcimi proroctvami, ktoré potvrdzujú predsudky človeka z inej kultúry.⁵³

Čo je pri stereotypoch dôležité je to, aby sme si ho uvedomovali a dokázali odblokovať jeho rezistenciu na zmenu a vystúpiť zo zabehnutých koľají a byť otvorený vnímať rozdielnu realitu, ktorá nám umožňuje budovať našu kultúrnu citlivosť.

Termín často zamieňaný so stereotypom je kultúrna generalizácia, ktorú je možno charakterizovať ako spôsob vysvetľovania kultúrnych reakcií, postojov a správania neutrálnym spôsobom. Kultúrna generalizácia nám pomáha analyzovať kultúrne vzorce správania ako tendencie ku konaniu. To znamená, že určitý vzorec správania neprináleží všetkým členom danej kultúry, pretože individuálne odlišnosti zohrávajú dôležitú úlohu pri tom, ako ľudia premýšľajú a konajú, ale reprezentuje normy správania ľudí, ktoré korešpondujú s tendenciami skupiny. Slúžia na medzikultúrne porovnanie, nie však zjednodušené, ktoré popierajú komplexitu sociálnych interakcií, ako v prípade stereotypu.

Príkladom toho môže byť napríklad individualizmus, respektívne kolektivismus prevažujúci v správaní zástupcov jednotlivých kultúr. Na jednej strane existujú individualistické kultúry, ktoré kladú dôraz na osobitú hodnotu a jedinečnosť každej ľudskej bytosti. Fungujú na základe rovnostárskej perspektívy, že so všetkými by sa malo zaobchádzať rovnako do takej miery ako je možné. Ľudia v individualistických kultúrach sa učia, že by sa mali snažiť byť „všetkým, čím len môžu byť“, pokiaľ ide o osobný úspech. Byť „zamestnancom mesiaca“ alebo

51 Oxford dictionary

52 Margaret Steinkner: Norms of behaviour, stereotypes and conformity, In: Juraj Jančovič a kol.: Texty k efektívnej rozvojevej spolupráci, Typi universitatis tyrnaviensis, 2012.

53 Milton J. Bennett: Intercultural communication: The current perspective, In: Milton J. Bennett: Basic concepts of intercultural communication, Intercultural press, 1998.

„najužitočnejším hráčom v tíme“ je považované za pozitívne a motivačné hodnotenie. Naopak kolektivistické kultúry minimalizujú individuálnu identitu a zameriavajú sa na blahobyt celej skupiny. Lojálnosť a sebaobetavosť v prospech druhých členov skupiny sa považujú za cnosti. Ľudia v kolektivistických kultúrach majú mimoriadne hlboké väzby s rôznymi skupinami, do ktorých patria, ako napríklad širšia rodina, kmeň, zamestnávateľ, firma, škola atď.⁵⁴

Craig Storti uvádza ako príklady individualistických kultúr Spojené štáty americké a Veľkú Britániu a ako príklady kolektivistických kultúr zmieňuje krajiny afrického kontinentu a Mexiko.⁵⁵ Je to kultúrna generalizácia, ktorá tvrdí, že ľudia v týchto kultúrach majú určité tendencie ku konaniu, a je vysvetlená neutrálnym spôsobom. Zároveň však neznamená, že v USA nie sú ľudia, ktorí sú kolektivisticky zmysľajúci a na africkom kontinente nie sú individualisticky založení ľudia. Existuje tam však určitá tendencia ku konaniu, ktorá sa však nemusí prejavíť u každého člena danej kultúry.

3. INTERKULTÚRNA KOMUNIKÁCIA

Štúdiom interkultúrnej komunikácie sa snaží zodpovedať otázku „Ako si môžu ľudia navzájom rozumieť, keď nezdediajú rovnaké kultúrne skúsenosti?“ V minulosti otázka skoro výhradne iba pre diplomatov a cestovateľov, dnes otázka pre nás všetkých, keďže žijeme v multikultúrnej spoločnosti. S existenciou multikultúrnej spoločnosti sa natískajú ďalšie dôležité otázky: „Aký typ komunikácie je potrebný v pluralistickej spoločnosti?“, „Ako môže komunikácia prispieť k vytváraniu prostredia rešpektu a tolerance odlišnosti?“⁵⁶

Komunikačné štýly sa odlišujú v závislosti od kultúry. To ako ľudia komunikujú je úzko prepojené s ich hodnotovým systémom. Existujú rôzne parametre porovnania, ktoré možno využiť, pri vysvetľovaní rozdielov v komunikácii. Komunikovať je možné priamo alebo nepriamo, alebo inými slovami vo vysokom alebo nízkom kontexte, cirkulárne alebo lineárne, a aj formálne alebo neformálne. Keď spomíname komunikačné štýly, znovu sa vraciame ku kultúrnej generalizácii.

Pri nepriamej komunikácii sa na úvod začína neutrálnymi témami a pomaly sa postupuje k téme, ktorá je jadrom správy. Pri tomto štýle komunikácie ľudia silne zohľadňujú vzťahy, ktoré majú so svojim komunikačným partnerom. V závislosti od faktorov, akými môže byť napríklad postavenie alebo vek človeka, prispôsobujú spôsob, akým prezentujú obsah správy. Je pritom dôležité „zabalit“ správu prijateľným spôsobom, aby napríklad kritika nebola vyjadrená otvorene, ale spomenutá vo všeobecnej rovine. Často krát je pritom dôležitejšie prísť k záveru, ktorý je prijateľný pre celú skupinu, ako si naplniť svoje vlastné zámery. Opakom je priama komunikácia, kedy sa človek koncentruje skôr na obsah ako na samotný spôsob podania správy, ktorú prezentuje priamo. Takýto typ komunikácie je bežný v kultúrach, kde je hodnotový systém prepojený

54 Steve Corbet, Brian Fikkert: Keď pomoc škodí, Ako zmierniť chudobu bez ublíženia chudobným a vám samotným, Porta Libri (slovenské vydanie), 2012.

55 Craig Storti: Figuring foreigners out: A practical guide, Yarmouth, Intercultural press, 1999.

56 Milton J. Bennett: Intercultural communication: The current perspective, In: Milton J. Bennett: Basic concepts of intercultural communication, Intercultural press, 1998.

s právmi a potrebami jednotlivcov.⁵⁷ Krajínami kde sa bežne komunikuje v nízkom kontexte sú napríklad USA, Veľká Británia, Nemecko alebo Škandinávské krajiny. Naopak krajiny, kde je možné sa stretnúť s komunikáciou vo vysokom kontexte, sú napríklad Mexiko, Brazília, India, Čína alebo Japonsko.

Pri stretnutí ľudí z rôznych kultúr a komunikačných kontextov môže teda prísť k rôznym nedorozumeniam. Tie môžu vzniknúť napríklad nekladením dôrazu na spôsoby, aký sa správa prezentuje, zo strany priameho komunikátora.

4. ROZVOJ KULTÚRNEJ KOMPETENCIE

Interkultúrna kompetencia môže byť definovaná ako schopnosť vhodne a efektívne reagovať v interkultúrnych situáciách.⁵⁸ K rozvoju interkultúrnej kompetencie sú potrebné tri komponenty. Prvým základným komponentom sú vedomosti (o kultúre, stereotypoch a pod.), ktoré nám pomáhajú pochopiť základnú logiku fungovania javov okolo nás. Avšak vedomosti samotné nestačia k tomu, aby sme sa mohli označiť interkultúrne kompetentnými. Pochopenie perspektívy človeka z inej kultúry nutne neznamená, že sme schopní ho prijať ako rovnocenného partnera. K tomu je potrebná aj zručnosť (napríklad schopnosť kultúrne citlivo komunikovať), ktorá je druhým komponentom kompetencie a umožňuje nám preniesť získané vedomosti do praktických životných situácií.

Na to, aby bol človek kompetentný niečo vykonávať, sú potrebné okrem vedomostí a zručností aj postoje, ktoré sú tretím komponentom akejkoľvek kompetencie. Postoje sú dôležitou súčasťou kompetencií, pretože indikujú pocity vo vzťahu k určitej záležitosti a ich rozvoj trvá dlhšie ako rozvoj vedomostí alebo zručností. Navyac sú podmienené množstvom a kvalitou už spomínaných vedomostí a zručností. V spojitosti s interkultúrnymi kompetenciami sú postoje najmä o vnímaní odlišnosti.

Vnímanie odlišnosti je základom na budovanie kultúrnej citlivosti. Túto kultúrnu citlivosť si budujeme pri návšteve inej kultúry, kedy sme konfrontovaní so zmenou. Prírodnou reakciou na zmenu je odpor. Ak však zmenu začneme vnímať ako príležitosť objaviť v sebe nové aspekty osobnosti a zlepšiť si svoje vedomosti o iných kultúrach, v tom prípade získame skúsenosti s doposiaľ nepoznanými hodnotami a normami správania.

Na odlišnosť je možné zerať rozličnými pohľadmi – etnocentrickým, kde je odlišnosť vnímaná ako nemenná a ohrozujúca a etnorelativistickým, kde je odlišnosť vnímaná ako prispôsobivá, ako zdroj vzájomného obohacovania sa a rovnováhy. Tento pohľad na odlišnosť dokáže rozlične interpretovať získané vedomosti, alebo tieto vedomosti selektívne filtrovať a má výrazný vplyv aj na naše interkultúrne zručnosti, ktorým môže dodávať náboj rôznej polarity.

Realita vnímania odlišnosti však nie je iba čierna a biela, na čo upozorňuje aj Bennett, ktorý podrobnejšie rozpracoval vnímanie odlišnosti a vytvoril model, ktorý rozdelil do šiestich štádií, ktorými môže prechádzať človek, pri vytváraní si svojej kultúrnej citlivosti. Prvé tri štádiá – popretie, obrana a minimalizácia – považuje za etnocentrické a ďalšie

57 Margret Steixner: Intercultural communication, In: Juraj Jančovič a kol.: Texty k efektívnej rozvojovej spolupráci, Typi universitatis tyrnaviensis, 2012.

58 Margret Steixner: Development of cultural competence and development approaches to intercultural learning, In: Juraj Jančovič a kol.: Texty k efektívnej rozvojovej spolupráci, Typi universitatis tyrnaviensis, 2012.

tri – akceptácia, adaptácia a integrácia - naopak za etnorelativistické. Pri rozvoji kultúrnej citlivosti človek mení svoj pohľad z etnocentrického na etnorelativistický.

Prvé štádium – popretia - je charakteristické nepripúšťaním si kultúrnych rozdielov. Presvedčenie, že „my“ sa správame normálnym spôsobom a iné spôsoby správania sú nesprávne. Ľudia v tomto štádiu sa necítia byť ohrození kultúrnymi rozdielmi, pretože ich nepripúšťajú. Počas druhého štádia – obrany - môžu ľudia začať pociťovať, že ich hodnotový systém nemusí byť absolútny, ale nie sú z toho nadšení. Pripúšťajú, že kultúrne rozdiely existujú a cítia sa byť nimi ohrození. Vidia iné kultúry v negatívnom svetle a uprednostňujú mať s nimi malý alebo žiadny kontakt. V štádiu minimalizácie sa ľudia stále cítia ohrození odlišnosťou, ale už si nemyslia, že odlišný znamená horší alebo nesprávny. Veria, že odlišnosti sú skutočné, nie však veľmi výrazné.

V štvrtom štádiu – akceptácie - ľudia prijímajú odlišnosť ako hlbokú a legitímnu a upravujú svoje správanie na kultúrne citlivejšie. Sú neutrálni ohľadom kultúrnych odlišností. Piate štádium – adaptácie - sa vyznačuje zmenou správania a postojev. Neopúšťajú svoje vlastné kultúrne hodnoty, ale integrujú do nej aspekty iných kultúr. Pri poslednom štádiu - integrácie - sa človek stáva „bikultúrny“. Iba ľudia, ktorí žijú v odlišnej kultúre dlhý čas môžu (ale nemusia) dosiahnuť štádium integrácie.

Človek ale nemusí nutne postupovať v týchto štádiách smerom nahor, ale napríklad situácie zvýšenej frustrácie môžu viesť k regresii a opačnému smerovaniu pri rozvoji kultúrnej citlivosti. Najkritickejší bod je prechod zo štádia minimalizácie do štádia akceptácie, čo je zároveň prechodom od etnocentrickej k etnorelativistickej perspektíve.⁵⁹

ZÁVER

Interkultúrne učenie je veľmi dôležitou súčasťou globálneho vzdelávania. Na to, aby sme dokázali plnohodnotne fungovať v dnešnom globalizovanom svete, je potrebné byť otvorený a schopný rešpektovať odlišnosť. Nie preto, že nám to niekto prikazuje, ale uvedomením si, že síce v multikultúrnych spoločnostiach dochádza častejšie k napätiam a medzikultúrnej konfrontácii, ale práve tieto nás učia a budujú v nás kapacity na nenásilné riešenie takýchto situácií. Avšak iba za predpokladu, že sme takémuto učeniu otvorený a uvedomujeme si bariéry ako napríklad stereotypy, ktoré nám v tomto môžu brániť. Sebareflexia je základom interkultúrneho učenia. Ak sa touto cestou vydáme, tak sa sami na vlastnej koži budeme môcť presvedčiť o tom, že multikultúrne spoločnosti nie sú brzdou rozvoja. Práve naopak - rýchlo si osvojujú inovácie, darí sa tam tvorivosti, kultúry sa navzájom obohacujú a jedna od druhej si osvojujú tie najlepšie praktiky.

ODPORÚČANIA

Ani Slovensko už nie je tak uzavretou krajinou akou bolo v minulosti a čoraz viac sa stáva súčasťou globálneho diania. Budovanie interkultúrnych kompetencií by preto malo byť jedným z cieľov vzdelávacieho procesu na všetkých

59 Margret Steixner: Development of cultural competence and development approaches to intercultural learning, In: Juraj Jančovič a kol.: Texty k efektívnej rozvojovej spolupráci, Typi universitatis tyrnaviensis, 2012.

stupňoch. Nemalo by však prebiehať oddelene od ostatných predmetov, ale malo by byť naopak prierezovou témou, ktorá bude zastúpená v ostatných predmetoch, pretože interkultúrne kompetencie sa nedajú oddeliť od ostatných vedomostí, zručností a postojov z iných oblastí života človeka.

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Autor: Juraj Jančovič – Trnavská univerzita v Trnave, Slovenská republika
Email: juraj.jancovic@truni.sk

RECENZIA:

Autor si za názov svojho príspevku zvolil tému „Interkultúrne kompetencie v globálnom vzdelávaní“. Autor poukazuje na rozvoj multikulturalizmu v súčasnom globalizovanom svete a na potrebu interkultúrneho učenia v rámci globálneho vzdelávania. Text príspevku autor členil na niekoľko častí (odsekov), v ktorých objasňuje obsah pojmov ako kultúra, stereotypy, interkultúrna komunikácia či interkultúrne kompetencie.

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JUDr. Alexandra Strážnická, PhD., LL.M.

MEETING EU COHESION POLICY IN ALBANIA: A QUESTION OF A MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE APPROACH

Dorian Jano⁶⁰

ABSTRACT

Albania's regional disparities have been persistently evidenced by official data and other international reports. There is no proper cohesion policy in Albania and its preparation in the context of EU accession is at a very early stage. The case of the Central European countries has shown that the success of structural and cohesion policy to a large extent depends on the functioning of multi-level and multi-actor type of governance. Thus, utilizing the concept of multi-level governance we draw lessons on Albania's challenges in complying with EU cohesion policy and requirements for IPA component III. In this policy paper, we argue that the Albanian government must show clear political support for converging its regional development policy with EU cohesion policy and its financial instruments, as well as enhance the implementation of the partnership principle in order to avoid delays in preparation and to secure absorption and effective use of EU financial resources under IPA.

KEYWORDS

Albania, Cohesion Policy, Instrument of Pre-Accession, Multi-level Governance

Clarification: Regional policy is the synonym term used for structural or cohesion policy in EU's terminology. This policy area focus on the redistribution of resources to lagging areas to boost economic growth and sustainable development, In the case of the EU candidate country, regional policy, is financially covered by the so-called IPA (Instrument of Pre-accession) component III – Regional development, with three subcomponents Transport-IIIa, Environment-IIIb and Regional competitiveness-IIIc, a mimicry of structural funds aiming to prepare candidate countries for cohesion policy and more effective and proper use of post-accession funds.

⁶⁰ Acknowledgement: This policy paper is the product of research undertaken in the framework of the Slovak – Balkan Public Policy program funded by the Slovak Aid with the support of Pontis Foundation and Balkan Civil Society Development Network and implemented by the European Movement Albania. Fieldwork research has entailed extensive interviews, meetings, consultations and visit in Bratislava during May 2012, with local, national and international experts from the public and non-governmental sector. Research assistance was provided by Baisa Sefa. Special thanks to Colm McClements and Daniel Pitonak for their helpful guidance, suggestions and comments. The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Albania's regional disparities have been persistently evidenced by official data and other reports.⁶¹ There is no proper cohesion policy in Albania and its preparation in the context of EU accession is at a very early stage. The regional development framework is under preparation and continuous consultations and reviewing yet to be finalized, administrative capacities for implementing IPA (Instrument of Pre-Accession) component III are at an early stage and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate programs' impact are missing. So far, issues of regional development have been handled at national level through traditional practice of hierarchical mode of governance. Policy analysis and recommendations, in the case of Albania, also have been framed within the hierarchical governance approach and do not consider the experience and the abundant literature on Cohesion Policy of Central European countries. The case of the Central European new member-states has shown that the success of structural and cohesion policy to a large extent depends on the functioning of multi-level and multi-actor type of governance. Thus, utilizing the concept of multi-level governance to draw lessons for Albania is a good practice of facing challenges in aligning with EU cohesion policy and in complying with IPA component III requirements.

The Albanian government must therefore show clear political support for convergence of its regional development policy with EU cohesion policy and its financial instruments, as well as enhance the implementation of the partnership principle in order to avoid delays in preparation and to secure absorption and efficient/effective use of EU financial resources under IPA. Regardless of gaining the status of candidate country or not, if the new proposed IPA 2014-2020 regulation is approved it will make access to all types of assistance no longer subject to candidacy status but dependent on the readiness to plan, manage, implement and monitor suitable programs, the available human resources and capacities at all levels and the appropriate involvement of all stakeholders.

This policy paper draws on the multi-level governance literature of the EU cohesion policy. It analyzes regional development policy in Albania with regards to the (possible) formalization and diffusion of the partnership principle through providing recommendations of lessons learnt and best practices from previous candidate countries. Although models of partnership process are extensive, still the appropriate model to be chosen depends on the countries specificities and needs. In the case of Albania, creating conditions for formal involvement of partners is vital and a good assumption for the introduction of the partnership principle, however it is not a guarantee for the accomplishment of the task. What is needed is regular interaction among public, non-governmental and private stakeholders that will generate trust and foster real partnership.

1. INTRODUCTION

Albania not only records the lowest levels of GDP per inhabitant among EU Member States and candidate countries,⁶² but its regional disparities⁶³ have been sharpened due to the inherited socio-economic structures

61 For a recent evidence-based review of social, economic and spatial regional disparities in Albania see Girejko, R. (ed.) (2010) "Regional Disparities in Albania", Integrated Support for Decentralization Project "Working for Regional Development", United Nations Development Program, Tirana.

62 Reference: Gasic, M. (2011) "Statistics in focus: Economy and finance", Eurostat 64/2011, Figure 1: Volume indices of GDP per capita 2010, EU27=100.

63 Reference: Girejko, R. (ed.) (2010), Table 48. Regional Development Index for Albania, p.129.

and infrastructure, the recent developments' dynamics and massive migration flows as well as the lack of proper effective and efficient development policies to address regional cohesion. If referred to the official data and other reports, the indicators reveal substantial social and economic disparities *among* and *within* the Albanian territorial units⁶⁴. At NUTS II level, the central region account for 46.4% of the overall Albania's GDP, the southern region 29.2% and the northern region only 24.3%; at NUTS III level, the capital Tirana account for the highest share (37.9%) of GDP while Kukes is the prefecture with the lowest share of only 2.3%.⁶⁵ Similar results can be drawn from a more composite Regional Development Index (including not only GDP per capita data, but also other basic indicators, efficiency enhancers and innovation factors weighted for the efficiency-driven stage of Albania's development stage),⁶⁶ where Kukes is one of the least developed regions (together with Berat and Diber) and Tirana is the most developed one. Acknowledge here that this trend of sharp regional disparities has been persistent. If referred to the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite index measuring social and economic achievements, which reported in 2002 the highest HDI level in the prefecture of Tirana and the lowest HDI in the prefecture of Kukes.⁶⁷ Yet, the preparation of regional development framework in Albania is at a very early stage, still being prepared and frequently being reviewed because of its incompatible with EU cohesion policy and funding. The Crosscutting Strategy for Regional Development (CSR D), Decision Nr.773 dt.14.11.2007 Council of Minister, is the first official draft framework aiming to address internal disparities among the regions ('qarks') of Albania and to introduce main principles of EU cohesion policy; yet CSR D and IPA III requirements do not conceptually meet in the kind of actions best pursued through regional development plans and supported out of IPA III component of regional development and in the kind of structures that are necessary needed.⁶⁸ An initial phase (2007-2009) Action Plan has been developed. Still what is missing is the further elaboration of its second phase and the clear indicators of what actions have been implemented from the initial phase.⁶⁹ Since 2007, little progress had been notice towards achieving the goals, as the CSR D is not yet put into practice. In the course of 2008 a new draft Law on Regional Development has been prepared building on the CSR D with some innovations, yet the draft is still being reviewed and has not been submitted to the Council of Minister. In 2010, the government started consulting with interested groups and other international strategic partners on the 'Strategic Coherence Framework'; a document that aims to sets out the strategy that will underpin the Operational Programmes for regional and human resources development components, thus meeting EU requirements for programs that will be co-financed by the new IPA 2014-2020.⁷⁰ Yet, experts have assessed that the draft of Strategic Coherence Framework had been seen as being more important than the Operational Programs.⁷¹

As Albania is drafting and reviewing its regional development framework and given the aim of the country to join EU, it is rational to think in advance of converging domestic regional development framework with EU

64 For statistical purposes according to the criteria of the EU's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (la Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques - NUTS), the Albanian government has adopted the division of Albania into three non-administrative territorial units at NUTS II level and twelve NUTS III regions corresponding to prefectures in Albania.

65 Reference: from the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT 2009).

66 For the detailed methodology of this Regional Development Index for Albania, methodologically similar to the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), and its shortcomings see: Girejko, R. (ed.) (2010): 126.

67 See Çabin, Y. et al. (2002) Human Development Report Albania: Challenges of Local Governance and Regional Development, Human Development Promotion Center (HDPC), UNDP Tirana, p.9

68 See McClements, C. (2010) "Cross-cutting strategy for regional development Albania", Review. Unpublished

69 Action Plan for the Regional Development Cross-cutting Strategy. Phase 1: piloting the strategy (2008-2009)

70 Strategic Coherence Framework, Third Draft, Ministry of European Integration, Tirana 2011, p.54.

71 McClements, C. (2012) "Meeting in European Commission", Memo, 14/06/2012

cohesion policy principles and requirements of instruments for structural funds. The first step to meeting with IPA III component requirements should be a priority. This is not because of the possibility of gaining the candidacy status but more importantly because the new proposed IPA 2014-2020 will make access to various types of assistance no longer subject to status candidate/potential-candidate country but dependent on readiness to plan, manage, implement and monitor suitable programs.⁷² To this end, Albania is not ready to profit from EU assistance. This is because:

- i) the drafted regional development documents do not fulfil IPA EU financial requirements;
- ii) there are no clear descriptions of the composition of the managing structure, despite the 2010 decision to set up institutional structures for managing IPA component III (Regional Development);
- iii) administrative capacities for implementing IPA component III are insufficient;
- iv) monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to measure the impact of the development programmes are missing.

Source: EU Commission (2011) "Albania 2011 Progress Report", Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2011) 1205 final, Brussels, 12.10.2011, pp. 50-51

Thus, acknowledging the persistent disparities among the most prosperous and the lagging areas in Albania, the open and yet unsettled debate on regional development framework as well as the future perspective of EU integration and the opportunities of gaining from IPA 2014-2022, makes the regional policy issues become one of the most important priorities of Albania's public policy and EU integration target. The aim of this policy paper is to contribute to the debate of the Albanian regional development in the context of the EU integration process, through identifying the challenges that Albania needs to face with regards to the governance of the regional policy to conform with the EU principle of partnership, and through proposing recommendations resulting from best practices of previous candidate countries from the Central Europe.

2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

So far, Albanian government has considered and addressed issues of regional development through the traditional practice of hierarchical mode of governance. Policy analysis and recommendations in the case of Albania are also within the traditional framework. There has been some research in the field of regional development policy in Albania focusing on aspects of decentralization or local government management, and some recent tentative to address the issue of regional development in the context of EU accession.⁷³ Yet, the limited research on cohesion policy in Albania tackles the issue at different and separate levels and do not take stock on the literature on Cohesion Policy of Central East European countries.

⁷² See: COM 838 final (2011) "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)", 2011/0404 (COD), Brussels, 7.12.2011, p.5

⁷³ E.g. In 2011, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, the Association of County Councils in Albania and Co-Plan University have organized a national conference and published research papers addressing the issue of regional governance/county as the second level of local government. Only recently, the United Nations Development Program, has been engaged in a more comprehensive approach through its Integrated Support for Decentralization Project see: <http://isd.undp.org.al/index.php>

Today, there is abundant literature on Cohesion Policy, focusing on policy multi-level governance and especially the implementation of the partnership principle. The experience of the new member-states from Central Europe has shown that the success of the structural and cohesion policy will depend on the functional multi-level and multi-actor type of governance. Thus, we retain crucial that these *new modes of governance* are to be particularly suitable for the study of any substantial analysis and appropriate policy recommendation in the area of regional development and structural funds.

Our study is closely associated with the concept of multi-level and multi-actor governance understood as a new approach to the 'old' governance mode characterized by hierarchy and management from the centre. In its narrow sense, the most typical element of the new multi-level and multi-actor mode of governance is represented by the **partnership principle**, pushing the (potentially) member-states' public administrations to *regularly* engage in an interactive dialogue and cooperation with both the regional and local level represented by civil/private sphere, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. The partnership principle although initially focused on enhancing *consultation* among competent authorities at national, regional, local or other level has evolved with time and it has gone through major revisions.⁷⁴ The latest framework regulations not only confirm the importance of the partnership principle but they have strengthened it further in accordance with the multi-level governance approach conceptualizing partnership as '*close cooperation*' among *a) competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities; (b) economic and social partners; and (c) bodies representing civil society, including environmental partners, nongovernmental organisations, and bodies responsible for promoting equality and non-discrimination... in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes.*⁷⁵ Thus, Partnership today means not simply consultation but close cooperation of all the key stakeholders of regional development (the national government along with regional, local self-government, social partners, civil society and special interest groups) in all of the stages of the policy cycle (programming, management, implementation, monitoring, control and evaluation).

To assure a comprehensive and evidence-based analysis of the Albanian regional development framework in the context of EU accession we combine desk and field research. Desk research is necessary to evaluate the national legal and institutional framework and to have a comprehensive literature review of cohesion policies in the case of previous candidate countries from Central Europe. Field research, through interviews and consultations with public authorities, independent experts and other stakeholders in Albania and other countries from Europe provided us empirical data for analysis and good practices for recommendations. The comparative approach with other similar countries' experiences (e.g. the case of Slovakia) provides contextual and concrete lessons to be learned during and after pre-accession.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The idea behind partnership principle, expressed in EU regulations, remains the close cooperation among public authorities, private and not-for-profit stakeholders, with each party acting as a partner in the preparation,

74 For a review of the partnership principle evolution see: Bauer, M.W. (2001) "The EU 'Partnership Principle' Revisited: A Critical Appraisal of its Integrationist Potential as a Governance Device Interconnecting Multiple Administrative Arenas, in Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Rechter der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn, 2001/13. Also: Polverari, L. & Michie, R. (2009) "New Partnership Dynamics in a Changing Cohesion Policy Context", IQ-Net Thematic Paper 25(2), Glasgow, p.1-2

75 See Article 5, Partnership and multi-level governance. COM 615 final/2, 2011: 33-34.

implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the operational programmes. It reflects the notion of multi-level governance referring to the complex vertical and horizontal relations between actors organized at various territorial levels from public, private and voluntary spheres. In the contexts of the candidate countries,⁷⁶ partnership requires a) all parties affected in one way or another by the EU policy to be actively involved, and b) EU funds to be administered by actors from different organizations working together aiming at better and effective allocation and implementation of IPA EU funds.

Thus, partnership principle is a prerequisite and should be applied at all stages of the development policy cycle. For many, the partnership principle connects several different actors and creates networks among different public and private entities in all the stages of public policy cycle.⁷⁷ Partnership is expected to penetrate all stages of the funds' implementation cycle: planning and programming, operational management and evaluation, and monitoring (Demidov 2011: 6). For other scholars, partnership is not equally applied throughout all policy stages depending on domestic conditions. In the member-state countries, partnership will depend on the phase of the cohesion policy and if actors share responsibility for policy-making; for example in Sweden, local actors are actively involved in drafting development programs whereas in Germany and Belgium, Länders/Regions have a direct role in the national policy-making process and in the territorial planning, compare to the French traditional centralized system (Marks 1996: 417). In the candidate countries, there are no clear criteria or indication for obligatory involvement and active participation. Confusion concerns the role of the stakeholders with regards to involvement in all stages of policy cycle. With regards to the programming and implementation of the Structural Funds, a number of Regional Development Councils or Agencies at sub-regional level (i.e. below NUTS level II) have been set-up without establishing the capacity to effectively manage programmes at regional level.⁷⁸

So the debate in the literature has emphasized that implementation by the member states or candidate countries is more important than the degree of institutionalization of partnership principles in EU regulations. The cases from the previous potential member-state countries have shown that most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries did not really comply with the partnership principle. The ineffectiveness of candidate countries' internal conditions made Commission relax their requirement/position on the partnership principle so to ensure that funds were absorbed on time even if they were to be managed centrally by the national ministries giving just an observing role to non state actors.⁷⁹

In spite of the very historically-related problems such as centralization heritage and lack of traditions in regionalism or lack of time and experience in multi-level governance, the application of the partnership principle faced difficulties because of the weakness on both, the state's side as well as the partners' side. The state failed to act as an entrepreneur whereas non-state partners were unable to fulfil their roles and articulate their interests,

76 For an application of the multi-level governance notion into the cohesion policy of the countries of Southeast Europe See: Bache, I (2010) "Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid in Southeast Europe, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10(1): 1-12.

77 Đulabić, V. & Manojlović, R. (2011) "Administrative Aspects of Regional and Cohesion Policy in Croatia: In Search of a Better Coordination of Parallel Processes", Croatian and Comparative Public Administration 11(4): 1060.

78 Preparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries, Twinners Seminar, Brussels 15 and 16 March 2001, Synthesis Paper

79 See Marcou, G., ed. 2002. Regionalization for development and accession to the European Union: A comparative perspective, local government and public service reform initiative, Open Society Institute, Budapest

provide expected input such as expertise, knowledge, advice etc. Furthermore, the central (and regional or local) public administrations were unwilling to engage in consultations with stakeholder partners when elaborating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating regional development programmes; while on the other side, the potential partners lack the necessary information, the capacity to play the role of a competent partner in the whole process of national/regional development⁸⁰.

With time and especially after accession, gradual progress has been made. Public administration of the new member-states from CEE countries open up and involve the different partners into all phases of EU cohesion policy implementation. Yet, even though partners start to participated in partnerships, their role was limited in terms of influencing the policy process because the national governments acted as 'gatekeepers' firmly in control of sub-national actors.⁸¹

Countries like Latvia, Poland or Slovenia are often portrayed as successful in the use of the partnership instrument. One of the best examples for a genuine implementation of the partnership principle could be found in Slovenia where the central public administration gave appropriate attention to coordination and establishment of a very transparent structure for regular consultation with socio-economic and regional partners; whereas in other countries like Slovakia and Hungary, the central government was unwilling to give strong responsibility or decision-making power to new and inexperienced regional institutions.⁸² Yet, accounts of partnerships principle across the CEE countries at best was rather formalistic and it was not effectively practised to conform either to EU's or Partners' expectations (Batory and Cartwright 2011).

Thus, the implementation of partnership needs to look at who and how partners are involved, reflecting on the legal and institutional framework, their capacities and coordination as well as their role in the policy-making process.

4. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK RELATED TO PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE

The partnership principle is mentioned in several Albanian official documents⁸³ Clearly, there has been little progress with regard to approximation of the regional policy and legal framework with EU standards and funding requirements. And, what is more important, the partnership principle of cooperation among participating public, private and NGO actors to achieve common objectives is described very briefly, vaguely and not being implemented.

The principle of partnership is generally stated in the CSRD referring simply as *cooperation between stakeholders (public, private and NGO actors) to work together to achieve shared objectives*.⁸⁴ Without clearly stating in what level, -

80 Dezséri, K & Vida, K (2004) "New Modes of Governance in the EU Structural and Cohesion Policy and the Case of the New Member States", NEVTGOV - New Modes of Governance, WP 01/D48, p.16-18.

81 Bailey, D. & De Propriis, L. (2002) "EU structural funds, regional capabilities and enlargement: Towards multi-level governance?" Journal of European Integration 24: 303-24.

82 Dezséri, K. (2005) "New modes of governance and the EU structural and cohesion policy in Slovenia" Mimeo. And, Bassa, Z. (2005) "New modes of governance and the EU structural and cohesion policy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia". Mimeo.

83 For the legal and policy framework see Introduction Paragraph 2.

84 Crosscutting Strategy Regional Development, Final Draft. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy. September 2007, p.6

horizontal level of cooperation between line ministries or/and vertical level of cooperation among national, regional and local entities and actors; and in what phases, - preparation, implementation, monitoring and/or evaluation of operational programmes, - this cooperation is expected.

The infrastructure of this policy framework although had also been elaborated, including a *National Partnership Council for Regional Development* and a *National Agency for Regional Development at national level* and *Qark Development Councils* and *Qark Development Agencies at regional level*, - bears its own concerns. First of all, although the above mentioned structures are stated in the CSRD, yet they are not justified as necessary.⁸⁵ The current partnership institutional structures are: i) very repetitive⁸⁶ or much more a hierarchical 'control' to sub-actors thus discouraging partners affected by the policy; ii) a heavy load requiring a number of implementing or coordinating bodies as well as committee-based which are neither necessary for regional policy nor a pre-requisite for receiving and better implementing of EU IPA funding;⁸⁷ iii) only a *consultative* body thus not in line with CSRD conceptualization of partnership as *cooperation*.

The CSRD strategy recognizes that an effective development partnership between the central and regional levels was never established.⁸⁸ The SCF (Strategic Coherence Framework) evaluating key elements of the implementation of coordination and partnership arrangements points more on coordination across the public administration whereas cooperation between the public administration and wider society is simply a dialogue to make authorities inform and understand current local realities.⁸⁹ Regions (qarks) lack clear political mandate and legal/financial instruments in regional development. Thus, partners' involvement and their role depend on the degree of decentralization by enabling national, regional and local actors to make a collaborative well defined tasks and responsibilities in order to maximize partnership. No reference is made to the Strategy for Decentralization (July 2008)⁹⁰ which remains an important document on the administrative sub-division and system of local and regional governance.

In general, a number of initiatives (consultations with social partners, several analyses, policy papers) have been taken by international (UNDP), government and NGOs on the policy options for revising the regional development policy framework in Albania. The consensus among all international, national and local stakeholders call for a revised policy, legal and institutional framework that will approximate the domestic regional development framework to EU cohesion policy requirements and practices, allowing gradual convergence of the domestic regional policy (CSRD and Draft Law RD) and instruments (Regional Development Fund) with EU cohesion policy and instrument for pre-accession assistance - IPA Component III, instead of developing parallel institutions and programs for regional development, yet allowing co-financing regional projects by the government or other international donors.⁹¹ The convergence of domestic regional policy with EU cohesion policy does not exclude or replace national development

85 McClements, C. (2010) "Cross-cutting strategy for regional development Albania", Review. Unpublished, p.11.

86 There are two partnership councils (the National Partnership Council for Regional Development and the County Partnership Councils) aiming at bringing together the same range of actors, - government ministries, county and local government, the social partners and civil society. For more see appendix

87 McClements, C. (2010) "Cross-cutting strategy for regional development Albania", Review. Unpublished, p.26.

88 Regional Development Crosscutting Strategy, Final Draft. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, September 2007, p.20.

89 Strategic Coherence Framework, Third Draft, Ministry of European Integration, Tirana 2011. p.58.


90 The first regional development strategy adopted in November 2007 was part of the government longer-term decentralization reform. Thus, decentralization and regional development are both cross-cutting issues and need to go hand-in-hand.

91 See ISD-UNDP (2010) "Working for Regional Development", Newsletter 2, December, p.7; Strategic Coherence Framework, Third Draft, Ministry of European Integration, Tirana 2011. p.48.

priorities. Given that EU cohesion policy is based also on the “additionality principle” saying that the EU funds does not replace but are an addition to national regional policy funds (co-financing). Furthermore, convergence with EU cohesion policy and financial requirements does not requires additional separate structures in terms of ministerial units and competencies but rather call line ministries to direct their activities towards efficient use of EU funds⁹²

However, having legal and structural partnership is only an asset, not a guarantee for partnership principle to be applied. Drawing from the qualitative date of a recent study, partners’ perception on cooperation among each-other is still very low. As per our qualitative calculations (see appendix), based on the qualitative date of ISP-UNDP (2011), on average partnership is assessed at best at *medium* level of cooperation.

Table 1: Self-assessment of Partnership-Cooperation among Partners



Source: own calculation. Data from UNDP-ISD Project Institutional Assessment, 2011. See table 3 appendix

The literature on CEE countries had argued that implementation of the partnership principle *only partially* depends on structural and institutional macro-factors such as institutional arrangements around interest intermediation and cohesion policy implementation; other important insights regards the policy content of the structural funds allocation and the missing properties of non-state partners (Demidov 2011: 8).

5. ACTORS’ CAPACITY AND THEIR COORDINATION RELATED TO PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE

The regional development framework, in general address only the institutional and policy issues, yet other more substantial issues are important. The main expression of partnership to date has been manifested in the capacity of the partners involved and their coordination. At the state level, administrative capacities and inter-ministerial

On a detailed analysis of both convergence or parallel broad policy options see Gjipali 2010. On the specific phases and detailed measures to be taken for (full) convergence of domestic regional development framework with EU cohesion policy and IPA and structural funds (2010-2020) see Girejko & Boeckhout 2010.

92 Preparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries Twinners Seminar Brussels 15 and 16 March 2001, Synthesis Paper, p.3

coordination is a pre-requisite. In addition to capacities and coordination at central state level, partners capacities and their coordination is also needed. Here, partners leading the process are country-contextual; municipalities tend to dominate partnership in cases with strong municipal government (e.g. Scandinavia, Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy) whereas in cases of weaker municipal government (e.g. UK, Ireland, rural municipalities in many countries), other NGOs and private associations play a very important role.

It is important to achieve efficient coordination among and within different bodies at the central, regional and local level (horizontal coordination) as well as the coordination between different levels of authority (vertical coordination).

A. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES

The CSRD acknowledges that although plans for regional development had been prepared, an efficient partnership is missing among regional and central level, thus strengthening the capacities of the regions remains a priority.⁹³ In Albania multi-level development coordination between the national, regional and local levels is *mostly absent* with limited qarks' participation in national planning processes and strategic planning (Girejko 2011: 69).

A prerequisite for the absorption of EU pre-accession funds is the administrative and human capacity in regional and local public administration of the accession countries. The main challenges with regard to administrative capacity are the available personnel in the most important institutions responsible for managing and implementing IPA component III and their adequate knowledge, experience and background. Public administrative capacity was a problem observed in the entire candidate CEE countries reflected to candidate countries' absorption capacities. Slovakia, e.g. faced serious lack of human resource dealing with Cohesion Policy thus the Slovak government reacted by launching intensive recruitment programmes in all relevant ministries and set aside additional financial resources to increase salaries of employees working with the EU agenda in order to prevent staff levels fluctuating although it was difficult to recruit staff with adequate knowledge, experience and background or to train them in a short period of time.⁹⁴

With regards to 'qark' public administration, the main challenges are: i) limited management competences resulting mainly from vague defined functional split of competences between central and local level; ii) limitation on financial resources to enhance qarks' role as project promoter or implementer; iii) absence of experience in strategic planning; iv) limited project management capacity; v) perception as coordinator and facilitator at ad-hoc projects rather than owners of the development agenda (Girejko 2011: 68-69).

Among other factors for achieving successful and functional partnership, the major factor regards i) time and support that Councils of Regional Partnership should be able to set common working norms and values; ii) further capacity building of the partners through trainings and technical assistance.⁹⁵

93 Crosscutting Strategy Regional Development, Final Draft. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy. September 2007, Draft – Final, p.20

94 Benc, V. (2003) "Readiness of the Slovak Republic for EU regional policy", Conference Almanac- Readiness of Candidate Countries for EU Regional Policy, Slovak Foreign Policy Association SFPA, p.191

95 See: Crosscutting Strategy Regional Development, Final Draft. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy. September 2007, Draft – Final, p.26

B. PARTNERS' CAPACITY

In order for the implementation of the regional policy to be effective, civil society subjects as well as representatives of various interest groups in the area need to take part. This is particularly important in cases where capacities in local level are weak.

With regards to civic capacity building, the NGO sector is better prepared in comparison with public administrative capacity development. Besides the better position of the NGOs capacities, still there are limited numbers of NGOs capable to participate in the process of strategy development making consultations and cooperation between 'qarks' and regional NGOs rather sporadic (Girejko 2011: 64). Ideas of wider participation, partnerships and coordination are mostly unexploited. This is not only due to limited ability of public administration to engage with third sector and build effective and wide partnerships but also due to civic sector low level of collaboration with public entities in joint programs.

Including the non-governmental actors is important for the regional development process because regional actors are more familiar with local issues, possess greater expertise in the field and directly monitor the actions implemented. Furthermore, inclusion of the NGOs as partners, ensure transparency of decision making and prevent corruption and miss-use of EU funds. The case in Slovakia is a best practice where in order to ensure transparent administration of the EU funds the Slovak NGO sector established an independent team for monitoring EU funds.⁹⁶ The limited ability of public entities to involve NGOs and other non state actors, coupled with low NGO involvement in joint programs constitutes an important missed opportunity of effective partnership. Thus what is needed is to further develop NGO as well as private sector capacities related to regional issues and facilitate effective their partnerships with public entities.

C. WELL-COORDINATION

In addition to actors' capacities, what is essentially needed is the well coordination of all aspects of the process among all stakeholders involved, starting from the simple exchange of information to the share of responsibilities and tasks. Lack of coordination and shared strategy among stakeholders makes partnership principle and synergies impossible resulting into different and unwanted policy outcome. For example, lack of coordination and isolated vertical and horizontal communications lead to many missed opportunities with respect to strategic planning and waste of resources both in financial and capacity use terms.⁹⁷ Factors influencing well-coordination are the lack of reciprocal confidence and interest, political competition among regions and national tendencies of control over regional administrative units. UNDP-ISD survey show that Qarks rate cooperation with the main group of stakeholders as *moderate*, were the highest rates of cooperation is with donors and international partners because this type of partnership is seen as a relief to some of qarks' administrative burden through assistance to outsource necessary capacities in writing projects and prepare strategies (Girejko 2011: 60-61). It is

96 Reference to Knezevic, I. (2011) "Absorption Capacity of Serbia for Use of EU Funds: Practical Lessons from Slovakia", in Cox, A. & Holt, E. (eds.) Slovak - Serbian EU Enlargement Fund. Pontis Foundation, p.13

97 Girejko, R. (ed.) (2011) "Albania – Regional Development Capacities on The Ground: An institutional assessment study", Integrated Support for Decentralization Project, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), December, Tirana, p.14

important to notice, that the usefulness and well-functioning of such forums depends on the active investment that each of the actors makes in seeking to understand each other, work together and learn from and with each other⁹⁸.

Regional policy and EU financial cohesion component are not adequately connected, which had led to, or is a result of institutional fragmentation and weak administrative coordination between central administrative bodies formally in charge of these policy areas. In order to enhance coordination, the strategic coordinator should be placed at a high level of the central government (state secretary, ministry or directorate); with political power to effectively coordinate at least four key line ministries and administrative capacity of coordinating sectoral strategies and budgetary resources but with no direct involvement in implementation of IPA.⁹⁹ Practically this could be the ministry of finance (not Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy as it is actually in the strategy) as in the case of small CEE states, where the overall responsibility for the Structural Funds/co-ordination of programming and implementation has been under the Ministry of Finance (Estonia, Lithuania) or Ministry of Economy (Slovenia) whereas the overall responsibility for the Pre-accession Instruments/co-ordination has been again Ministry of Finance (Czech Republic, Estonia) or rather Government office (Slovenia, Slovakia).¹⁰⁰ During the programming period, line ministries must improve inter-sector cooperation with each other while retaining close cooperation with relevant stakeholders at regional and local level.

5. PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION RELATED TO PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE

Partnership can be either strongly centralized (limited partnership) within government (line ministries and governments agencies) or diffused within all stakeholders depending on their resources and capacities.¹⁰¹ The partnership principle is linked to the principle of *subsidiarity* which implies that decisions should be made at the level most competent to carry them out, within the context of a broader cooperative network which pools resources and experiences.¹⁰² An accurate assessment of the partnership principle needs to look carefully at the stages of the policy-making process and identify where partners are best to be involved. Although the partnership practice among and within vertical-administrative and/or horizontal-societal is inter-related at each policy stage (programming, decision, implementation and evaluation) and difficult to be disentangle¹⁰³ we still need to clearly identify the main strengths and responsibilities each partner has to have in the overall process. With regards to Regional Development approach experts suggests that all major development efforts on a

98 McClements, C. (nodate) "Understanding Regional Development", p.3.

99 McClements, C., Boeckhout, S. & Girejko, R. (2010) "Policy Assessment Report on IPA 3 Structures for Albania", 28 January 2010 (draft).

100 For more see "Preparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries" Twinners Seminar Brussels 15 and 16 March 2001 Synthesis Paper, p.11.

101 Brunazzo, M. (2007) "The partnership principle in European Cohesion Policy: Toward a new research agenda?", CINEFOGO-Conference Partnership – Keystone of New Governance, January 29/30, Münster, Academy Franz-Hitze-Haus, p.10.

102 European Commission (no date) Partnership in Cohesion Policy: European Social Fund support to social partners in the 2007-2013 period, p.6.

103 Bauer, M. W. (2001) "The EU 'Partnership Principle' Revisited: A Critical Appraisal of its Integrationist Potential as a Governance Device Interconnecting Multiple Administrative Arenas", Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn, 2001/13, p.4

regional territory should be planned on national or NUTS II basis or at least be coordinated by the central level of state public authorities while working actively with actors and institutions from the region to undertake and implement them at regional level.¹⁰⁴ Such division of responsibilities distinguishes entities that develop, manage and monitor the programs (at national level) with consultation and ideas from regional and local actors from those that actually implement and benefit from specific development programs (regional and local level).

Planning and programming of large projects at local level as experienced by previous candidate countries showed to be incomplete and very technical, not suitable for EU IPA and structural funds. Thus its best keep them coordinated at national level with active involvement of regional, local and NGOs actors. This will relieve Albania's overloaded administrative staff required for tackling all stages of the development policy process, provide alternative experience and qualified partners to effectively implement programs, and on the other hand makes local actors actively involved into the policy making process and implementation of programs tailored to their local needs. Thus, facilitating and strengthening national government role on negotiation process with EU commission, proposing programs (setting goals, selecting target areas, and allocating funds to different areas) that are well designed and conform EU requirements.

The public administration increasingly is inviting NGO's representatives to express their opinions upon programming and planning although this has remain only a formality without much influence on shaping policy outcomes. The most preferred type of NGOs involvement into regional development is participation in the course of project implementation,¹⁰⁵ e.g. partnership initiatives with citizens and NGOs, especially in the implementation of the Elbasan social development plan, were important.

The EU financial aid regulations allow for several options, ranging from a highly centralised to a very much decentralised model, thus the choice should be to adopt the most country appropriate model that would substantially shorten the programming period and secure coherence as well as efficient and effective implementation.¹⁰⁶

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional policy is a very complex issue and could not be pin down to some simple suggestions. However, at the stage where Albania is, both in setting the regional framework and in preparation for EU accession, it is clear that two particular dimensions of the 'partnership principle' are to be taken into account: the institutionalization of participation as well as the enhancement of the partners' capacities and coordination.

104 McClements, C. (nodate) "Understanding Regional Development", p.1

105 In the questioners ask to NGOs, the ISD-UNDP 2011 assessment besides the findings that participation through project implementation is the NGOs' preferred type of involvement, they find also that the majority of organizations consider it very important to directly participate in programs monitoring and evaluation (see Girejko 2011: 116). In our judgments, their wish to participate in the monitoring and evaluation process may be due to the luck of trust to government institutions and agencies of evaluation/monitoring.

106 See Preparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate Countries, Twinners Seminar, Brussels 15 and 16 March 2001, Synthesis Paper

1. In reviewing of the policy and institutional framework we notice that despite continuous efforts of drafting a regional policy framework a common consensus on the conception and direction of the regional policy is yet to come. Still, the regional development framework requires substantial policy reformulation as well as institutional modifications to gradually converge domestic regional policy/institutions with EU cohesion policy and IPA requirements at least over the medium term. Policy and institutional reforms should lead to approximation of existing financial instruments (RDF) and future ones (IPA3). The proposed IPA 2014-2020 resembles the already implemented Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (2007-2013), still there are substantial changes that are to be seen if they will be fundamental or secondary.¹⁰⁷ Preparing some kind of regional development concept requires the establishment of the necessary legislative basis and complete institutional infrastructure for designing and implementing regional policy measures. Moreover, EU's structural financial aid carried out through IPA components are themselves quite a complex and complicated mechanism, which requires an extensive knowledge of their structure and functioning which usually has been misunderstood.

2. Practical implementation of the institutionalized partnership principle will require partners' capacities and well-coordination. Weak administrative capacities and lack of inter-stakeholders coordination will result into non-suitable projects and less absorption of EU funds. Thus, further capacity building of the partners through trainings and technical assistance is needed for setting up good basis of future successful and functional partnership. The Slovak example of intensive recruitment programmes in all relevant ministries and the increasing salaries of employees working with EU agenda is a good practice to recruit and maintain qualified and adequate staff. Yet, In Albania there is still potential risk of staff fluctuation turnover mainly for political reasons. Thus empowering the nongovernmental actors is crucial. The best model where civil society can contribute most is to be involved in the entire process from planning through monitoring up to evaluation of assistance thus ensuring a transparent administration of EU funds. Limited organization skill or expertise of the actors involved will be overcome only if partnership principles will start to be put in practice, creating an occasion and practical example of learning by doing, where actors and partners involved in the process learn from each other.

3. Regional development is a very complex and multi-level policy, thus its success will depend not only on enhancing partnership between governmental and non-governmental partners but also on clear division of responsibilities. The central government should be responsible for making concrete actions related to design and negotiation of operational programmes and securing financing from EU while municipalities, NGOs and other regional and local partners should be consulted during the planning phase and actively involved in the implementation of planned actions. The clear division of duties and responsibilities should be stated in the legal and policy framework as well as enhanced through practical partnership practices. The legal framework is necessary, in particular in CEE countries, to secure partnership, but not sufficiently will derive to active involvement in partnership. Some pre-involvement through enhanced dialogue and consultations are needed so to reinforce the culture of partnership through 'learning by doing'. Although, the capacities of regional authorities and NGOs are better compare to state authorities, the conditions for participation are rather

107 See ISD-UNDP (2012) "IPA 2014-2020: A view in the future", Newsletter 7, March, p.1

unfavourable. There are no clear criteria or indication for involvement and active participation of regional and non-governmental actors, although the need for clear division of responsibilities and authority among levels has been mentioned in the draft strategy of decentralization.¹⁰⁸

CONCLUSION

The models of partnership process, with reference to the *degree of formalization*, can vary from the *rule-based* form of maximum formality (partnership principle is strongly and clearly ruled decision-making process) to the *trust-based* form of maximum informality (partnership principle means consultation and informal agreements based on sharing values, aims and understandings).¹⁰⁹ The model to be adopted will depend on the countries' specificities and needs. It is rational for public actors, given the limited capacity of Albania, to seek and encourage cooperation with non-governmental actors and to share or shift the burden by pooling resources and delegating implementation tasks. In turn, NGOs and other private actors could exchange their resources and expertise for influence on policies and projects which would significantly affect them as well as make the process more transparent, efficient, participatory and legitimate. Yet, having formalized partnership is only an asset, not a guarantee for the partnership principle to be applied. For example, with regard to partnership principle, qarks although have made *considerable progress* in making use of consultation mechanisms in preparation of strategies and projects, still they remain more formal than participatory consultations (Girejko 2011: 62). What is needed is regular interaction among public, non-governmental and private stakeholder that will generate trust and foster real partnership.

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¹⁰⁸ See Decentralization Strategy, July 2008, p. 45.

¹⁰⁹ Brunazzo, M. (2007) "The partnership principle in European Cohesion Policy: Toward a new research agenda?", CINEFOGO-Conference Partnership – Keystone of New Governance, January 29/30, Münster, Academy Franz-Hitze-Haus, p.10

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ANNEXES


1. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK RELATED TO PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE

Partnership Principle: Cooperation between stakeholders (public, private and NGO actors) to work together to achieve shared objectives.

Partnership Structures, consultative functions:

- At National level: **National Partnership Council for Regional Development:** a national level advisory body composed of the representatives of the public (central state administration, counties, municipalities and communes), private and civil sectors and will be established in accordance with the Law on Regional Development. It is established for the purpose of providing advice related to the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the Regional Development Cross-Cutting Strategy, coordinating various subjects and participating in regional development planning. The secretariat function for the NPCRD is provided by the METE.
- The NPCRD is a national-level advisory body composed of the representatives of the public (central state administration, county councils, municipalities and communes), private and civil sectors and will be established in accordance with the Law on Regional Development.
- At Regional/sub-national level: **County Partnership Council:** An advisory and consultative committee at county level whose membership will be drawn from: All relevant state bodies working at county level: County, municipality and commune government; Social partners and business and trade unions at county level; Civil society organisations (i.e. NGOs); representatives of central government. The County Partnership Council (CPC) is a county level advisory body composed of the representatives of the public (county councils, municipalities and communes from the territory of the county, and central state administration bodies dealing with development-related issues in the territory of the county), private and civil sectors and established for the purpose of providing advice with respect to the preparation and implementation of regional development policy at the county level (including documents prepared at county-level for the programming of Albania's use of EU support programmes for regional development), achieving consensus amongst the various interested parties and participating in the development planning of the county.

Figure 1: Partners Relations



Source: Regional Development Crosscutting Strategy, Final Draft, September 2007, METE Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, p.4-6.

The Albanian partnership structures and institutional set-up for implementing development projects are **consultative** in both the national and regional level. The institutional framework for regional development include i) the National Council of partnership for Regional Development (Këshilli Kombëtar i Partneritetit për Zhvillimin Rajonal), who include central, regional and local government as well as social partners and civil society with the aim to provide advice related to the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the Crosscutting strategy of regional development through coordination of different actors and planning; ii) Council of Regional Partnership (Këshillat e Partneritetit të Qarqeve) including a number of partners from public, civil and private sector but only at regional level.¹¹⁰ The aim of the council of regional partnership is to provide advice¹¹¹ and consensus among different interesting actors in regional development planning.

2. EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE

Table 2: Partners Self-Perception on Interactions and Partnerships

... Cooperation with...	Level of cooperation Responders nr or %	High/ Good	Medium/ Satisfied	Low/ Poor	It does not exist/ Without interaction
Qark	Ministries	2	6	4	0
	Other qarks	1	6	4	1
	Municipalities	5	6	1	0
	NGOs	4	7	1	0
Municipalities/ communes	Ministries	36	35	24	5
	Qarks	32	38	24	6
	Other Municipalities	8	32	30	31
	NGOs	22	32	28	18
NGOs	Ministries	4	3	5	3
	Qarks	4	7	2	2
	Municipalities	6	6	2	1
	Other NGOs	4	10	1	0

Source: UNDP-ISD Project Institutional Assessment, 2011, Figure 25, p.61; Figure 40, p.96; Figure 59, p. 130

110 For more see: Crosscutting Strategy Regional Development, Final Draft. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy. September 2007, Draft – Final, p.39

111 Especially advice with regards to EU supported programs for regional development.

Table 3: Qualitative evaluation of Partnership

Responders from-towards	Good	%	Satisfied	%	Poor	%	Without interaction	%	Average
NGO-Central Administration	1	26.67	0.67	20	0.33	33.33	0	20	0.51
NGO-Qark Administration	1	26.67	0.67	46.67	0.33	13.33	0	13.33	0.62
NGO-Municipality Administration	1	40	0.67	40	0.33	13.33	0	6.67	0.71
NGO -other NGO	1	26.67	0.67	66.67	0.33	6.67	0	0	0.74
Qark-Central Administration	1	15.38	0.67	46.15	0.33	30.77	0	0	0.61
Qark-other qark	1	7.69	0.67	46.15	0.33	30.77	0	7.69	0.53
Qark-municipalities	1	38.46	0.67	46.15	0.33	7.69	0	0	0.78
Qark-NGOs	1	30.77	0.67	53.85	0.33	7.69	0	0	0.75
Municipality-Central Administration	1	36	0.67	35	0.33	24	0	5	0.67
Municipality-Qark	1	32	0.67	38	0.33	24	0	6	0.65
Municipality-other Municipality	1	8	0.67	32	0.33	30	0	31	0.39
Municipality-NGOs	1	22	0.67	32	0.33	28	0	18	0.53

Source: Own Calculation. Based on table 2 we calculate the average of the evaluation as the average of the % of responder per qualitative scale (1-good; 0.67-satisfied; 0.33-poor; 0-without interaction)

Author: Dorian Jano – European Movement Albania
E-mail: dorian.jano@gmail.com

REVIEW

The paper is well-prepared, from methodological part the design of the paper reflects the main objective. Author is dealing from the theoretical part to empirical analysis of current cohesion policy in the EU, the Albania's involvement in the individual programmes and projects, the problems connected with the multi-level system of governance in the area of the policy implementation. I strongly appreciate using of the relevant and latest sources, using of tables for better orientation in the text, and strictly and clearly stated 3 main recommendations for Albania. I recommend the paper for publishing and presentation as the example of good practice.

JUDr. PhDr. Lucia Mokrá, PhD.

PRICE TO PAY: PUBLIC POLICY IN SLOVAK DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE¹¹²

Balázs Jarábik

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that special attention should be devoted to the ODA in the field of public policy¹¹³, an added value aspect of Slovakia's experience. It looks at Slovakia's transitional experience abroad examines the extent to which Slovak ODA focuses on public policy, lists some major achievements (a few of which have never been recorded), looks at the track record of Slovak development aid actors, and offers conclusions and recommendations.

KEYWORDS

Public policy, development aid, Slovakia, civil society, European neighbourhood

INTRODUCTION

Due to its difficult transition path in the 90s, Slovakia has had some clear advantages that could be effectively utilised in its efforts to exchange experience within the development assistance framework. Throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, Slovakia accumulated some of its most significant experience with transition: communist past; the Velvet Revolution of Czechoslovakia in 1989; peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993; fight for the character of the new Slovak state (still ongoing); peaceful democratic transition through elections in 1998; Euro-Atlantic integration in 2004; challenges faced as member of the EU and NATO since integration.

1. SLOVAKIA'S DIFFICULT TRANSITIONS: ASSET IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Slovakia's hands-on and in-depth experience of transition and long-term Western support were key factors for the immediate Slovak engagement in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Europe, especially when considering the

112 The authors would like to express their gratitude for the extensive peer review from Pavol Demeš, Jana Kobzová, Katka Kováčová, Miriam Lexmann, Milan Nič, Attila Szép, Karla Wursterová and others who wish to remain anonymous. All errors should be attributed to the author only.

113 The term public policy refers to projects dealing with support for strengthening the capacity to reform or improve government policies by monitoring, analysing, formulating, evaluating and providing alternative policies, and engaging with societies in order to achieve reforms.

size and political and financial weight of the country. Since the 1998 elections in Slovakia,¹¹⁴ election experience of a number of NGOs has been in demand such as surveys by the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Memo 98 media watchdog, Občianske Oko election monitoring watchdog, the "Rock the Vote" campaign by the Pontis Foundation and civic campaign assistance by the Hlava 98 association. The monitoring of elections and media from Slovakia has been recognised by others,¹¹⁵ although most of this was developed with Western donor support (especially from the US).

Slovak think tanks and policy groups have played a vital role in aiding reforms, utilising public opinion polls in transition (Institute for Public Affairs), economic reform, tax reform (INEKO¹¹⁶), public finances (Ministry of Finance of Slovakia 117), privatisation (Hayek Foundation¹¹⁸), regional development (MESA 10), public administration reform (NISPAcee,¹¹⁹ MESA 10), healthcare (Health Policy Institute), the fight against corruption (Fair Play Alliance and Transparency International), EU approximation and related legislative changes (human rights groups, Kalligram Foundation, Konzervatívny inštitút), and civil society development (Pontis Foundation, Ekopolis, Citizens in Action). The reform path kicked off in 1999 with a government audit carried out largely by young experts from outside of the government.

Another important feature and added value aspect of Slovak and regional NGOs is their practical experience of Euro-Atlantic integration. CEE NGOs often have an understanding of their neighbouring civic counterparts and the situation on the ground plus they have the ability to motivate, encourage and coach their civic partners. This ability is crucial when it comes to assistance for civic education development and campaigning in both regions. In this field the Slovak assistance was not only built on its own experience of campaigns (which were mainly prepared by Hlava 98, such as "Rock the Vote", "It matters to us 2002") but also the NATO campaign or the permanent civic efforts to strengthen support for the EU integration and processes.

Another important dimension of Slovak NGOs is the ability to work with their government agencies from a more powerful position, i.e. as a partner. This is what makes them more powerful vis-à-vis influencing Slovak foreign policy as well as the EU policies. It should also be noted that there is strong public support for these activities. According to the first targeted public opinion poll in 2005, 73% of the Slovak public supported democracy assistance activities abroad, naming Belarus as number one priority.¹²⁰ Although this support and the desired

114 For a comprehensive summary of the OK 98 see Bútorá, Martin, "OK 98: A campaign of Slovak NGOs for free and fair elections", in Forbrig, Joerg and Demeš, Pavol, *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe* (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2007).

115 See Petrova, Tsveta, *The new role of Central and Eastern Europe in international democracy support*, (Carnegie Endowment, June 2011), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/06/new-role-of-central-and-eastern-europe-in-international-democracy-support/3h7x>, p 17

116 See INEKO paper about the results of Slovak tax reform, http://www.ineko.sk/reformy2003/menu_dane_paper_golias.pdf

117 See, <http://publicfinance.undp.sk/en/show/15BE0D39-F203-1EE9-B8791C0083C407F7>

118 A case study on Slovak experience in privatisation, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/37503380_Privatization_in_a_Transition_Economy_Lessons_Learnt_from_the_Slovakian_Experience

119 Two manuals were developed by NISPAcee. A selected Slovak experience in public administration was prepared for Montenegro (<http://www.nispa.org/files/publications/Manual-EN.pdf>), another one about managing local investment for Georgia (http://www.nispa.org/publication_details.php?p_id=176&pg=7).

120 Belarus was named by 69% of the respondents followed by Russia (67%) and Cuba (60%). The survey was carried out by the Markant Agency for SME daily on May 18th-19th, 2005. See, "Pomahat zahraničiu? Ludia su za" (SME, May 21st 2005), <http://www.>

focus have gradually decreased, in 2009, 44% of the population wanted to increase the level of development aid, despite the economic crisis.¹²¹

2. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EXPERIENCE: CIVIC LEAD, GOVERNMENT'S FOLLOW UP

After 1998 Slovakia was thrown into the international limelight as a result of its assistance of Slobodan Milosevic's opposition in Yugoslavia.¹²² In fact, a number of Slovak activists gained experience with the large Slovak contingent involved in the OSCE Elections Supervision Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 and 1998.¹²³ Many of these young people from Slovakia were motivated to establish and work on civic projects targeting the 1998 elections and have remained committed to civic work ever since. The so-called "Bratislava process"¹²⁴ started at an international conference in Bratislava in 1999. The conference hosted various Serbian political and civic groups, and was aided by Eduard Kukan, who was the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as UN special envoy to the Balkans at the time.

Given Serbia's transition experience has been similar to Slovakia's in its difficulties some Slovak projects have provided a tailored made and timely focus after the change. This was time of launching SlovakAid and a number of donors provided funding on a small scale to keep Slovak NGOs in the Balkans.¹²⁵ But even at the peak of Bratislava-Belgrade Fund¹²⁶ most important projects were pioneered and spearheaded via cooperation of the largest players. The EU Convent in 2006, implemented by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) and the European Movement of Serbia and funded by SlovakAid,¹²⁷ was undoubtedly among the greatest achievements in this regard. Later, an even more successful Convent was organised in Montenegro. Others tried to focus on regional activity; the Pontis Foundation attracted funding from the Japanese Sasakawa Foundation to achieve this,¹²⁸ while People in Need became one of the most active regional NGOs in Kosovo. Nevertheless, other successful projects similar to the EU Convent also converged toward public policy, such as the Slovak Balkan Public Policy Fund.¹²⁹ This, as well as the more significant European Fund for the Balkans,¹³⁰ was inspired by the Belarus Public Policy Fund, the first of its kind,

sme.sk/c/2227006/pomahat-zahraniciu-ludia-su-za.html.

121 "So zvýšením príspevku Slovenska na rozvojovú pomoc by súhlasilo 44% respondentov", Press release, October 20th, 2009, Pontis Foundation, <http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/14435>

122 It is worth noting that the Slovak NGOs had been motivated by their Romanian counterparts and many initiatives for the elections were taken from similar Romanian experience from 1996.

123 Interview with Marek Kapusta, coordinator of the Slovak elections supervision contingent. The Slovak contingent was supported by the US Embassy in Bratislava.

124 About the Bratislava process see Steps in the Different Directions (EWI, 2000), <http://ewi30.ideascale.com/a/dtd/Steps-in-Different-Directions-2000/113358-12904> or http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-26005986_ITM

125 Especially Canadian CIDA, but also US and other European donors (such as ADA).

126 More information about this fund established under the early days of Slovak ODA, [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/SVK/00056491/Slovak_Trust_Fund_2008-2010_\(project_document\).pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/SVK/00056491/Slovak_Trust_Fund_2008-2010_(project_document).pdf)

127 See, <http://www.eukonvent.org/pages/2007/mission.htm>

128 See project summary, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000015652/Project_Summary_Pontis_DemNet_EN.pdf

129 See, <http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/en/index.php?s-cv-contentID=17500&s-search-query=public&s-cv-assign=link>

130 <http://balkanfund.org/>

established in 2006.¹³¹ The latest example from the viewpoint of institutional heritage is the assistance that the organisers of the GLOBSEC conference (the Slovak Atlantic Commission with the support of SlovakAid) provided to the Belgrade Security Forum.¹³²

The civic campaigns relating to the elections – the so-called “Get Out The Vote” campaigns - were the crucial early focus of Slovak assistance. First in 1999 Croatian GOTV campaigns was consulted, after the Pontis Foundation became active in Yugoslavia and Belarus. In 2005 Pontis established the Slovakia-Belarus Task Force,¹³³ which led to the development of the “For Freedom” campaign. During the elections the campaign turned into the movement of Alexander Milinkevich, who later became the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize winner.

At the same time the rather disastrous performance of the government which followed the Orange Revolution indicated that “revolution” does not necessarily lead to democratic governance.¹³⁴ The challenge was how to assist civil society to find a niche to return to and influence mainstream society. The first response was the combined cultural identity and a civic education campaign called “Budzma!”.¹³⁵ Since its launch in September 2008, it has become one of the best-known civic campaigns with the ability to integrate in the long term.¹³⁶ In Ukraine, the same approach brought about the “New Citizen”¹³⁷ campaign before the 2010 presidential elections, as well as the “Chesno”¹³⁸ campaign in 2012. In both cases, these civic campaigns have brought greater integrity, inclusiveness and professional vigour into the previous black and white (or zero-sum) character of civil society approaches.¹³⁹

Sectoral exchanges provided yet another useful framework to offer the “transition experience”. The most visible results, especially regarding institutional “heritage” has been certainly connected to the public policy field. The establishment of the Belarus Institute for Strategic Studies by the country’s most renowned public intellectuals, as well as the Belarus Public Policy Fund to support young analysts and evidence-based research are among key institutions. The first civic lobby group from the East, of Belarusian immigrants, led to the establishment of the Office

131 First announcement of the Fund, http://www.belinstitute.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119%3Anone&catid=38%3A2010-02-05-08-39-01&Itemid=35&lang=en, current webpage here <http://bppf.eu/en>.

132 See, [https://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CACD708CB9D56FC2C125763500336AEF_EN&TV=Y&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MINISTERSTVOJDRK-7XHUD9=8&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/\(vw_ByID\)/ID_E2F2D2D24310A52BC1257A83002AF4CF](https://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CACD708CB9D56FC2C125763500336AEF_EN&TV=Y&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MINISTERSTVOJDRK-7XHUD9=8&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/(vw_ByID)/ID_E2F2D2D24310A52BC1257A83002AF4CF)

133 The first publicly available policy paper of the Task Force, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000014898/Analysis%20-%20Who%20is%20who%20at%20Belarus%20Civil%20Society.pdf. The Task Force brought well experienced Slovak pollsters from the Institute for Public Affairs to their Belarus counterparts. This assistance has been important in finding topics that could accelerate change in Belarus. See key polling memo, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000014925/Pontis_IVO%20Polling%20Memo_Feb%2022%202006x.pdf.

134 See Fukuyama, Francis, *The Origin of Political Order* (London: Profile Books, 2011), p 21

135 See about the start of this process in one of the participants unofficially diary, http://www.shooty.sk/bla-bla/dennicek/2007-12-07.html?page_id=3697

136 See campaign website, <http://www.budzma.org>

137 More information: <http://newcitizen.org.ua/en>. A case study about the New Citizen can be found at, http://uniter.org.ua/data/block/uniter_mid-term_evaluation_complete_report.pdf starting from p. 46

138 More information, <http://www.chesno.org/>

139 See Lutsevich, Orysia, *How to finish a revolution* (London: Chatham House, 2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.pdf, p. 13

for Democratic Belarus.¹⁴⁰ These mirror similar achievements (EU Convent, Balkans Fund for Public Policy, Belgrade Security Forum) in the Balkans, which are also related to public policy.

The advantage that Slovak development assistance can have on public policy can be seen in the various projects to assist Ukraine's ambition for NATO membership. Similar to the successful Slovak NATO campaign in Slovakia,¹⁴¹ where relevant ministries worked hand-in-hand with NGOs,¹⁴² the Slovak NGO project by IVO, SPPA and CENA¹⁴³ was coupled with the activities of the Slovak Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine as the NATO focal point.¹⁴⁴ One of the latest projects with regional significance is the "price of the state"¹⁴⁵ by the Institute for Economic and Social Studies.¹⁴⁶

One of the reasons for there being no knowledge about this assistance is that most of the support came from US donors, with only a small part coming from SlovakAid. However, project trends over the past five years show a notable shift in priorities toward topics of public policy and transition (for example, the list of projects supported by SlovakAid¹⁴⁷). From 2004 to 2009, 17.6% of all ODA projects focused on institution building and strengthening civil society. Throughout these six years, 54 projects in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries dealt with public policy.¹⁴⁸ During the past five years, there have been notable achievements, such as qualitative changes in ministerial staff's expert capacities. For example, the national ODA program has been steadily improving since about 2010. There have been clear sectoral priorities from 2011 when the number of priority countries was reduced.¹⁴⁹ There was a special national program adopted for "global education" from 2012 to 2016 and the government concluded important bilateral agreements where Slovak assistance has been involved (Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Afghanistan, Kenya). In 2011, the MFA even managed to increase Slovakia's ODA contribution,¹⁵⁰ no mean feat during a time of crisis. Importantly, the Slovak MFA has become much more active in the past few years, not only supporting but also initiating projects relating to public policy. Among the most important (and perhaps most unusual) projects are the first ever grant for modernization of the Moldovan Public

140 See, www.democraticbelarus.eu

141 See, <http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/14000/1/>

142 Public support for Slovakia's membership in NATO increased from 48 % in summer 2000 to 62 % in summer 2002 also due to an effective partnership between the state administration and CSOs. Working group PRENAME, dealing with public diplomacy, cooperated with tens of various NGOs in communicating with the Slovak public on the entry to NATO. Source: e-mail interview with an MFA official engaged into the campaign.

143 See, <http://www.ivo.sk/5393/en/projects/assistance-to-ukraine-in-increasing-public-awareness-about-nato-slovakia%E2%80%99s-experience-ii>

144 As a result, the Slovak Ambassador to Ukraine Urban Rusnák was recognised as the fourth most influential Ambassador in Ukraine in 2008 at the Glavred's regular rank of diplomats, <http://photo.ukrinform.ua/eng/current/photo.php?id=181677>

145 See, <http://priceofthestate.org/>

146 See, <http://www.iness.sk/>

147 In 2010 out of 42 projects there were 12 that could be classified as relating to public policy. 2011 saw nine public policy projects out of the total number of 41 projects.

148 See, "Bilaterálne projekty slovenskej rozvojovej spolupráce v rokoch 2004 – 2009", <http://www.mvro.sk/sk/e-kniznica/category/1-dokumenty>

149 See, <http://aidwatch.concordeurope.org/countries/project/slovakia/>

150 In 2007 the Slovak ODA was EUR 54,8m or 9,093% of the GDP, in 2010 EUR 55,6m or 0,085% of GDP, while in 2011 it was EUR 61,9m or 0,091% of the GDP.

Broadcaster,¹⁵¹ the common project of the Slovak Ministry of Finance and UNDP to reform Moldova's public finances¹⁵² and, after the Arab Spring, the Tunisia Task Force.¹⁵³ Regarding the absence of the EU, talking about the importance of transition experience should be especially notable, although this also speaks about the lack of capacity (both fundraising and especially engagement) of Slovak NGOs.¹⁵⁴

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Slovakia's transitional experience has a strong potential and appeal – partly as it has not been acquired cheaply. The price of this experience was the country's delayed transition. Due to Vladimir Mečiar era of democratic shortcomings Slovakia faced delays in its EU and NATO integration process. Yet, following the fall of Mečiar's government, the country caught up and completed the Euro-Atlantic integration process in an astonishingly short period of time. Today, Slovakia continues to build on its image of being a successful transition country thanks to being the only state in the Visegrad 4 to have joined the Eurozone.

The most successful Slovak development projects – those that leave a lasting impression and demonstrate a clear heritage – are connected to technical assistance that uses transition experience to influence public policies as well as to aid civic education and civic campaigns. The comparative advantage for public policy projects is their low financial requirement, when compared to big infrastructural projects or those implemented by business communities the disadvantage is that they are less visible and quantifiable.

The foundation of achievements was the combination of a) Slovakia's wider transition expertise being better utilised and communicated by Slovak actors in the field, both governmental and NGOs; b) Slovak or international knowledge and understanding of the societies in the target countries and partnerships with relevant local actors; c) donor coordination in order to ensure funding for institutional support; d) harnessing local resources where applicable; e) thinking locally i.e. expanding focus beyond political centres to encompass regions as well; f) ensuring the support and participation of relevant Slovak government agencies.

Before the democratic changes in Yugoslavia, Slovakia's focuses in the Balkans included monitoring of elections and media; mentoring and consultation of key policy groups; aiding adoption or implementation of certain policies, in the form of laws, in target countries; and strengthening the competencies of CSOs, especially civic

151 See, [https://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CACD708CB9D56CF2C125763500336AEF_EN&TV=Y&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MINISTERSTVOJDRK-7XHUD9=53&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/\(vw_ByID\)/ID_044A1C1AB8BD2819C125771F004FE013](https://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CACD708CB9D56CF2C125763500336AEF_EN&TV=Y&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MINISTERSTVOJDRK-7XHUD9=53&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/(vw_ByID)/ID_044A1C1AB8BD2819C125771F004FE013)

152 See, <http://publicfinance.undp.sk/en/>

153 The strongest component of the projects in Tunisia is the transfer of Slovak experience from the democratic transition; exchange of best practices and lessons learned. The Task Force is an initiative of the Community of Democracies, an international network of 130 democratic countries. PDCS, Občianske oko and the Pontis Foundation have been present in Tunisia since beginning of SK ODA for Tunisia. Slovakia participated in the first round of implemented projects.

154 This could be explained by the lack of capacity, and will, of these civic actors to go through the cumbersome EU funding mechanisms. Despite some positive changes (see Shapovalova and Youngs), the EU still prefers consultation companies or large NGOs. See more about this at Szent-Ivanyi, Balazs, The EU's support for democratic governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: the role of transition experience from the New Member States.

education and campaigning. Through a number of more sector focused projects, Slovakia has continued to assist the region through the various phases of its European integration that has started after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The Western Balkans and especially Serbia was referred to as the “domain” of Slovakia,¹⁵⁵ mostly due to Bratislava’s political choice of Serbia as a focus country in the region. Slovak development assistance was driven by NGOs with US donors funds¹⁵⁶.

In Eastern Europe, it was Belarus that became the most visible example of successful Slovak transition assistance. This was mainly due to the recognized sector-based approach taken by Slovak NGOs, and especially their focus on assisting the local expert community.¹⁵⁷ Some of the finest NGOs today were in fact established with assistance from Slovakia. Belarus also highlights a good example of cooperation and public diplomacy efforts between the newly developing SlovakAid and both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs. The key to the success of these projects was the ability of the Slovak NGOs to engage and integrate various stakeholders, both in Belarus and in Slovakia, as well as the international donor community.¹⁵⁸

Slovak NGOs played a pioneering role in the success of Slovakia’s reform and transition, and then increasing the country’s reformist image abroad. However, today it is the NGOs that seem to have fallen behind, while the government now appears readier to invest and looks for more effective forms of cooperation. The necessary symbiosis between NGOs and the state is hindered by a project-based mentality which prevails inside government agencies as well as among Slovak NGOs, the latter often preferring to work alone in their target countries rather than in partnership with the state. Although a greater share of their funding comes from Slovak government sources than it did ten years ago, this seems to contribute to lack of real coordination between Slovak actors, and the insufficient civic overseeing of government policies and funding.

Unless relevant Slovak actors put more focus (and resources) into innovative approaches, greater coordination at home as well as with relevant actors in the field (local actors and international community), the achievements and Slovakia’s added value in transitional experience will largely remain unused in future work. That would be an unnecessary price to pay.

155 Kukharczyk, Jacek and Lowitt, Jeff, eds., *Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement* (Prague: PASOS, 2008)

156 Especially the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its various implementation agencies (including Freedom House and later Pact) as well as the German Marshall Fund of the US. In the latter, Pavol Demes, a Slovak activist, played an important role in transitional exchange projects.

157 An early assessment of the expert community by the Pontis Foundation, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000014901/Assessment%20Brief_Analytical%20Centers%20and%20Think%20Tanks%20in%20Belarus_October%202005.pdf

158 Pontis’ work on public policy projects can be analysed in the archive assessment reports, sectoral analysis as well as regular surveys, <http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/en/12602>.

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Author: Balázs Jarábik – Central European Policy Institute, Pact

E-mail: jarbal@gmail.com

REVIEW

The paper is well and clearly written, with respect to formal criteria. The author develops his arguments in a logical way and supports his statements by conveniently chosen specific examples and citations. The aim of the paper, although it isn't explicitly stated in the text, has been fulfilled.

Ing. Katarína Cséfalvayová, PhD.

EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AS A POLITICAL TOOL FOR SOLIDARITY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Cezary Kościelniak

ABSTRACT

The main aim of the article is to present the civic and democratic roles the higher education in developing countries. Universities in the Western world and especially in the European Union play an important role to improve not only the relation between economic development and knowledge, but also the civic society. In the first part of the article is to be described the relation between solidarity, equality and higher education. In the second part it will be considering the future roles of Central European countries – members of UE – and its universities in creating the solidarity and fight against inequality in developing countries. This is the role of promotion democratic discourses in young generations, dialogue and nonviolent cohabitation, last not least the raising of the awareness of civic rights and public duties. This is a main achievement of the higher education system in post-transformation countries. Last but not least the paper is the designing of the future international higher education policy targeted to the Southern countries (in area of Southern Partnership) and that is related to their current problems. The article ends with recommendations for the policy makers in that area.

KEY WORDS

Higher education policy, solidarity and Southern Partnership

INTRODUCTION

In Spring 2013, the European Commission decided that future projects targeted to higher education (mainly ERASUMS Mundus) will be open to the countries of the Southern Partnership (See: Education and Training 2013). Undoubtedly it is a milestone in the policy of the European Union to the members of the Southern Partnership. It could be also a new starting point of the aid policy targeted to these countries. This triggers serious consequences like the beginning of the prioritization of the higher education policy and also the challenge for increasing the meanings of global education. The article focuses on the role of the universities in their civic duties, which are a part of global education. It shows how both issues: higher education and global education are combined and how the tools of higher education policy can boost the global education. The other task of the article is to show the draft of the future political activities in that area, which is now under construction.

1. THE CIVIC ROLES OF THE UNIVERSITIES:

Should universities be involved in issues like a promotion of solidarity, or changing the unequal World? For many people around the globe involved in many organizations and programs a question like this could be seen as being bizarre, or maybe offensive. But in fact after the “entrepreneurial turn” in the sixties, universities are much more involved in competition, serving to industry and commercialization of knowledge. The understanding of the “entrepreneurial turn” comes from the famous book written by Clark Kerr *The Uses of the University* (1963/1995). Kerr labeled it as a “workable compromise” between the external world and the academic world:

“Peace within the students body, the faculty, the trustees. [...] Peace between internal environment of the academic community and the external society that surrounds and sometimes almost engulfs it” (p. 28).

Soon after, that “workable compromise” deeply changed the nature of Western universities which begun to carry out their duties as business companies. The phenomena of “academic capitalism” defined by Jennifer Washburn (2005) as a “Corporation U” changed the sphere of patents and industrial uses, but also the curricula, missions, and the duties of the universities. As Christopher Newfield said: the universities became unpublic (Newfield use it in title of his book: *Unmaking Public University* see: Newfield 2007). One of the first impressions of that phenomenon is proliferation of the new terms and adjectives of the universities: “entrepreneurial university”, “adaptive university”, “academic capitalism” (Clark 1998). The utilitarian, entrepreneurial trend deeply changed the social roles of the universities and disconnects them from public duties and ethical obligations. The capitalization of knowledge triggers the competitive narrow market of knowledge, and marginalized modern ideas of the knowledge institutions from the based concepts like solidarity. The capitalized knowledge was often identified with the “real world” or “touch with reality”. Unlike the perspectives underlined the ethical duties are seen as “detachment from reality”. Recent crisis brought the wave of the hesitation of the “entrepreneurial university”. However, the significant disconnection the universities from the ethical duties was the fact.

Actually *ancienne regime* lost their monopoly, and new perspectives have been emerging. Some of them are related to the environmental mission of the universities (Adomssent, Otte 2013), other with new ethical obligations of knowledge (Sławek 2012, Kwiek 2006), and redefinition of the public sphere in higher education (Newfield 2007). Higher education seems to be involved in the important civic activities, includes the solidarity.

One should notice that in Europe the important role of the reconstruction of the university as “solidarity institutions” played in the process of the European Union since 2004, after the first wave of accession of new members to the European Union. For sure this is one of the most important experiences also in higher education policy in post transformation countries, like Poland or the Slovak Republic. The accession brought several programs mainly ERASMUS Socrates and Marie Curie, which allows for millions of students from Central Europe to move and study abroad. Now the internationalization of higher education is often taken for granted, but its impact is absolutely crucial for next generations of European societies. It implied mutual changes of institutional attitudes that became familiar with new academic cultures and more sensitive to students from poorer parts of Europe. It was an important fact, which helped to change the attitudes, and which could be helpful for the next stages of global education. Some of the students who were born in late communism time,

and could exchange personal experience of transformation and the shaping of the civil society with their peers in the West. For certain these changes were a background for the developing of the issues of global education in post communists' countries. Now, these countries should take an active – if not leading – role in promoting it for the countries of current transformation, e.g. by pick up that issues in Southern Partnership.

2. THE UNIVERSITIES AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

What kind of problems face on higher education policy in developing countries? Szirmai (2005) said that one of the most important problems is the gross enrolment ratio. For instance in Morocco, in 1960 the enrollment rate in tertiary education was 0,5% in 2000 9%. Turkey achieve in 1960 3% and in 2000 15%. According to UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, the average of developing countries was 3 % in 1960, and 19% in 2000. Comparing this data to the OECD countries, the average enrolment rate in higher education is more that 30%. (Source, see: Szirmai 2005, pp. 230-231). On one hand, Adam Szirmai optimistically concluded that “The educational gap between developing and rich countries has been unmistakably narrowed” (p. 231), and adds “despite of population growth”. On the other hand, the growth of social and civic problems, like a mentioned growth of population, devastated civil wars, religious intolerance, and decades of dictatorship regimes did not allow for the obtaining of the expected effect from higher education institutions.

International reports and surveys show that problems of education in developing countries were that: the lack of sufficient resources, the problem of quality, and the mismatch between learnt skills and the labor market. However, one of the most important problems is that the unequal access to education (see: Higher Education in Developing Countries 2000). Despite the plethora of state of the art studies, many countries suffer from unjust access to education (see: Sen 1998). Amartya Sen (a Nobel prize winner in economics) analyzed the problem of sex inequalities and described the disadvantage of women education. Szirmai (2005) also mention that this is still a serious problem mainly in Arab countries, where the women enrolment rate is much low, the same is with illiteracy: “female illiteracy in 1999 was almost double that of male illiteracy” (Szirmai 2005, p. 243). The next education inequality is related to ethnicity and religion. This is the case of Egypt, where Christians and Jews are less likely to participate in all levels of state education. Using the term of Michael Walzer (1985) from his book *Spheres of Justice*, in countries with one dominated ethnicity often monopolized the processes of education and use it as a tool for strengthen their social roles. This is the important point for global education. The idea of the education regardless the ethnic and gender, open for all citizens is grounded on the idea of the open society where nobody should be left behind in society.

Defining a civic mission of the universities, the following issues could be taken into consider. First, the higher education system provides an opportunity to learn about other cultures and values. Universities are places with a variety of attitudes, religions, beliefs, and cultural backgrounds and are the schools of mutual cohabitation. That dialogue is often a “non-visible agenda”, but it plays an important role. Secondly, it is seen as a form of aid offered by higher education institutions for foreign students. Today, many programs are based not only on merit, but also on other factors like place of the origin, which help to create a framework of more equality. Thirdly, civic missions means that universities could be involved in some value oriented projects, like a sustainability, or creating the peacefully cohabitation in multicultural ethnic group or focus on increasing the civil rights. Universities are not to be underestimated: universities provide not only knowledge but also demonstrate in practice the experience of well-organized social structures.

Last but not least are the important issues related to culture? This is the challenge of how to encourage the countries in the Southern Partnership to pay more attention to education systems. It is not only a problem of finance but also that of culture and history. According to Busemeyer and Nikoali (2011), the level of the financing of education is rooted in culture. What is more, the authors mention that spendings on higher education is related to the religion cultural heritage. For example, higher education policy in Protestant countries (like a UK, or Scandinavia) is better equipment than in countries with Catholic traditions. It might to be said that the education systems in member countries of the Southern Partnership have the weakest cultural background for the increasing of the educational policy. Similarly, the issues of rights, inequality and other global education have been dealt with less institutional attention. However some authors (like A. Szirmai (2005), or Yifu Lin., J., Pleskovic B., (2007) underlined the priorities of "skill education" and technology before humanistic and theoretical scholarship. Sure, in countries experiencing malnutrition, the agriculture skills are crucial for resolving basic social problems. However, the lack of civil rights and lack of basic freedom very often keep the policy of unfair distribution of the goods and technological improvements. The only way of sustainable development is to carry it out together: equal-policy with increasing of democratic standards, with technological and economic development.

Of these few listed issues, only the most important could be a part of the theoretical design of involving universities into the global education and international assistance program in the fight against inequality and other global challenges.

Martha Nussbaum mentions in *Cultivating Humanity the cultural role* of universities. This role is defined as a communication between different cultures, beyond the historical clashes and actual biases. "Inclusive humanities" means increased perspective, where different – mainly exploited and underrepresented nations or countries – could be a part of a common world. Nussbaum underlined the role of the knowledge, which has been bringing the new views not only for right but active participation in decision-making and the progress of the regions.

3. THE EXPERIENCE OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FUTURE IMPACT TO SOUTHERN PARTNERSHIP

The higher education policy could be a useful tool for the Southern Partnership. It could shape not only one of the most important long-term results like a knowledge production, but also improving the social and democratic standards. One of the most influential experiences of European transition countries is the international educational investments. Looking at the examples, first from Hungary, where a Central European University is located. The second example is in Georgia with few small, international universities, like the Caucasus University in Tbilisi, which plays an important regional role and serves as an example for the creation of higher standards. Holding up the example of Georgia, international universities are places where critical thinking, and open discussion could happen, because of international faculty and curricula. The international education institutions provide a platform for the safe deliberation and have a strong contribution in formation of democratic elites. The same was in ninety's with Central European University. There are all sufficient reasons for creating similar educational initiatives with financing contribution of the governments.

The governmental aid programs (mainly from USA and Germany) were indirectly targeted towards higher education, mainly in the field of social science and humanities. One of the most important examples was the Batory Foundation, which after the collapse of communism in Poland supports the large project of the translation of the fundamental books, which are used as a handbook of democratic education. Other indirect impacts are that of the implementation of the pattern for public debate. The civic mission of the universities also includes the implementation of the processes of deliberation (like various forms of the public debates), so these are a socially and spatially reasonable way of rooting the public debate on the walls of the universities. Philip Altbach (2006) noticed that in developing countries – especially in Africa – universities are identified as a source of political rebellion, what in many cases is true. However, the foreign support could boost the democratic change.

The important tool of partnership in higher education is to increase the numbers of international student bodies. According to the OECD, the enrollment rate of international students in post-transformation countries (I mean the members of the UE) is less than the old members of the UE. The slight number of international students is one of the main obstacles in partnership policy, both cultural and political. Cultural, because according to Nussbaum, higher education institutions have a lack of human resources for improving their policy in global issues. Political, due to the negative attitude of the lack of any political action in that area. In other words, it's a vicious circle, no resources and action cause no needs and political will for changing it.

The influential experience of Central European Countries, especially Poland, was solidarity. Solidarity was both, social pro-democratic movements and the inclusive philosophy of the social action. Solidarity does not mean a mercy, but the cooperation with people in worse conditions for the common political aim. Knowledge institutions are prone to operate within the ethical constraints of solidarity and they can create the standards of solidarity suited to the local environment. A meaningful example is that of the policy of fellowship. It should be the ethical driver in the creation of the new meanings of the Southern Partnership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The final part of the paper includes the recommendations. The main aim of any partnership should be increasing the tools and forms of the offered support. However, it is always limited and connected to the financial issues. For countries with a developing economy like Slovakia, which has a state still far from wellbeing compared to the "old EU members" countries – could be hard to fulfill that demand. It is not only a matter of finance, but also convincing the public opinion. This is why the formulation of recommendations should be sensitive to the real economic standards of Central European countries. Any demands and expectations should be limited to the real opportunities and it should take into consideration the *Realpolitik* of each country.

The first recommendation is to prioritize higher education policy in government agenda. The average GDP expenditure transferred to that aim in OECD countries is thereabout 1,5%. It has an impact to the other branches of economy and development. **The financial prioritizing of the higher education policy is *conditio sine qua non* of the increasing any assistance in that area for development countries.**

The second recommendation **is to increase the number of scholarships and inter-institutional agreements with selected universities from developing countries.** The European Union gives new possibilities by increasing

the number of ERASMUS and other programs. Again, looking at the level of internationalization of the CCE countries, it is the weakest point, which could be easily achieved at little expense.

The third counsel is related to the national information policy. **Politicians must convince the citizen that increasing the aid is an important part of national policy. This argument is based not only on the financial matter, but also ethical and that foreign support policy is a part of public duty of any democratic country.** The consensus and acceptance of this is commonplace in the majority of OECD countries, but all postcommunist countries still suffer from the less fostered public opinion to the provision of foreign aids.

Last but not least is the important part of successful policy at that area of **awareness of stakeholders from higher education institutions. Its mean that these institutions have to be commitment in programs both in teaching curricula and research agendas directed to the issue of the global education.** This challenge is possible to achieve in short period, that universities can explore global education much more visible by using inter-university network research and cooperating with public agendas and NGOs. Student's education is essential for promoting the idea of global education, but also eliciting the interest of that of, a new generation of scholars.

The article was supported by grant of National Center of Science, project number: 2011/01/D/HS1/01752,,Dynamika publicznych zobowiązań współczesnego uniwersytetu w kontekście religii oraz społeczeństwa wielokulturowego

Dr Cez Koscielniak, tenure at Department of Social Science in Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. Between 2012–2013 an expert and member of the think-tank to the President of the Republic of Poland "Idea's Lab". His research includes higher education policy, sustainable development. Recent edited book (with J. Makowski): *Freedom, Equality, University* (2012).

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Author: Cezary Kościelniak – Department of Social Science in Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland

E-mail: cezkos@amu.edu.pl

RECENZIA

Posudzovaný text je logicky koncipovaným príspevkom na presadenie myšlienky podporiť vo vysokoškolskom vzdelávaní v stredovýchodnej Európe myšlienku solidarity, občianskej angažovanosti a demokratického vývoja v rozvojových krajinách. Autor neostáva iba na úrovni všeobecných konštatovaní, ale svoje tvrdenia podopiera celým radom konkrétnych empirických dát a odkazov na analýzy a štatistické údaje v širšom medzinárodnom kontexte, ktoré jasne dokazujú ako sa menila situácia v danom regióne. Uvádza konkrétne príklady, neostáva iba v rovine verbálnych deklarácií. Hoci sa neraz vracia k všeobecne známym limitom a bariéram v daných procesoch, pokúša sa jasne identifikovať možnosti ich prekonania a ponúka odporúčania pre prax. Príspevok zodpovedá základným akademickým štandardom, je v ňom celý rad odkazov a citácií z relatívne širokého spektra medzinárodnej produkcie.

prof. PhDr. Silvia Miháliková, PhD.

DEMOCRACY SUPPORT IN EU'S EXTERNAL ACTION

– A PARADIGM SHIFT?¹⁵⁹

Miriam Lexmann

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to address the questions of democracy support in the context of EU's external action. In doing so, the paper reviews major changes of the EU's external policy in light of its structural change and the seeming shift, from technical development assistance to democracy support as the main tool to build respect for human rights and freedoms, appreciation to rule of law, just and good governance and prosperity. The primary focus is given to the change in the EU's neighbourhood policy.

KEY WORDS

EU Aid, EU external action, development, democracy support, civil society

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It was only after the successful enlargements of 2004 and 2007 that the European Union became fully aware of its potential as a global player with a responsibility for defending human rights and assisting democracy, peace, stability and overall prosperity. Yet after successful rounds of enlargement, further results become more difficult to achieve and more elusive in nature.

Consequently a more differentiated and broader policy approach to external action is being put in place by bringing human rights and civil society into the centre of change. New instruments for direct support of the civil society in its action for democratic governance and equitable development provide for greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs. Furthermore, stronger 'democratic conditionality' in aid giving was put in place on a horizontal level of EU's external action by the "more for more" and "mutual accountability" principles.

The EU has done a great deal of work in order to successfully respond to the growing challenges of its external action, but the answer is just yet mainly on paper. It must work out a plan to bring the paradigm shift into practise

¹⁵⁹ The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions of Nick Crosby (Independent Consultant on EU Affairs), my thanks also goes to Andrea Cox (Pontis) for her extensive peer review.

and thus saturate the ambition of a global player with substantial change in development approach that would be more 'results' than 'stability' oriented.

1. THE ROLE OF EU IN BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

The EU has to be credited for its relatively quick adaptation to its new role as a major democracy player and centre of development after the biggest global geopolitical change since WWII – the fall of the Iron curtain. Offering strongest incentive for democratic transformation so far – the EU membership - it has encouraged a relatively speedy transition of the CEE¹⁶⁰ countries who started their pro-democratic journey in the early 90s and were ready for membership a bit more than a dozen years later. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007, which represented a quantum leap in the struggle to create a “whole and free” Europe,¹⁶¹ concluded the most successful story of EU's external action thus far.

The more complex problems of the new target regions and the EU's 'enlargement fatigue' in a combination with its current economic setback cause difficulties for the EU to reassert its aims in the neighbourhood. Thus despite 22 years of experience as a global player in fostering transition and supporting democracy, the task ahead for the EU in its neighbourhood is currently more difficult and complex than it was before the first historic enlargement waves and certainly more complex than it seemed after the series of colourful revolutions in the East and the recent uprising in the Arab world.

After eight¹⁶² years of the EU presence in its neighbourhood the East is still oscillating between EU values and deeply rooted Soviet behavioural patterns. In the south the hope of the Arab Spring was hijacked by real politics of outsized geopolitical interests.

The fact that the EU is so far unable to reach a single Association Agreement¹⁶³ with one of the six members of the Eastern Partnership (EaP)¹⁶⁴ countries suggests a decrease in the effectiveness of the EU's pro-change engagement in its neighbourhood. Ukraine, which did not differ greatly from Poland¹⁶⁵ in 1989, and was a “dear neighbour” with a lot of EU prospects after the Orange revolution, seems to have left its pro-democratic and pro-EU course. The most successful case Moldova is among other problems facing extensive territorial integrity challenges, which puts signing of an AA at risk.

160 Central and Eastern Europe

161 Svante Cornell, 'The New Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU', CES, 2009

162 Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 or 4 years since the more political instrument, the Eastern Partnership

163 Today, few weeks before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (November 2013) it is still not clear whether an AA with Moldova and Ukraine will be signed.

164 Eastern Partnership (henceforward EaP)

165 Svante Cornell, 'The New Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU', CES, 2009

The belief in the “transition paradigm” - mainly spread among the Western EU Members - seems to be the reason behind the fundamental misunderstanding of the region’s political developments and caused setting of inappropriate tools for the neighbourhood. It assumed, in a simplified way, that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy.¹⁶⁶ As this proved to be correct in CEE countries it has led to first misunderstandings of the situation in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, where the socialist state system was replaced by other forms of semi-authoritarianism¹⁶⁷ and lately similar causality was experienced after the Arab Spring.

In order to reassert its presence in the neighbourhood and re-gain their leaders and public for democratic transformation, the EU must first work out a clear vision of what it wants to achieve in these countries or what kind of relationship it envisages, contrary to the situation before the first two enlargement waves to the East – where both sides were clear that EU membership is the final goal.

Further to that, the EU must change the ways of engagement and fine-tune instruments targeting at it’s neighbourhood adequately to the different starting point and geopolitical challenges these countries are facing. It involves better analyse of the different instruments and policies and their relation with the EU aims in the individual countries. As a result more differentiated offers and stronger incentives must be put in place. Using instruments tailored for different political and cultural situations hinders efficiency or completely prevents results.

The key principles and founding values of the EU’s external action as outlined in the Treaties are respect for human dignity and freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.¹⁶⁸ In other words the EU’s modus operandi is to build reconciliation through shared values and legal and democratic order. Although these values are interlinked, not each of the EU instruments promotes every one of them to the same degree. The most efficient way of democracy promotion is to tackle equally all three sectors of the state: i) the state institutions at every level of the polity; ii) the civic sector and ii) the private sector. Until recently, the EU’s support has taken the more traditional approach to democracy building aiming only or mainly at the state institutions in order to encourage good, efficient, transparent and hence democratic governance and by providing technical assistance for economic transformation.

Put differently, democracy assistance is neither solely the narrow support of ‘free and fair elections’ nor the mere establishment of functioning state institutions and legal systems. It involves the establishment of political checks and balances, independent courts and media and above all building free and responsible citizenry and a just society. It means creating a democratic spirit within democratic people.

Until now, the EU has not fully agreed a ‘working definition’ of democracy assistance. Neither has it come up with a precise categorization of the components sustaining democracy building and its measures, though many European actors and scholars have called for it.¹⁶⁹ Within the wide variety of approaches towards democracy assistance

166 Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, *Journal of Democracy*, vol 13/1, 2002

167 Svante Cornell, ‘The New Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU’, CES, 2009

168 Articles 2, 6, 8 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF>

169 For example at meetings in the Hague, during the Dutch EU Presidency (2004); at the Wilton Park conference in the UK (2007); at the International IDEA meeting in Sweden (2008); at regular network meetings of the Human Rights and Democracy Network

advocated by the various non-state actors, the Czech EU Presidency developed a strong underlying support for a Consensus on Democracy¹⁷⁰ at the conference: 'Building Consensus about EU Policies on Democracy Support'¹⁷¹.

2. OPTING FOR STRONGER DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITY

As already mentioned, apart from internal failures and following hindsight, a number of external political shocks revealed weaknesses in the EU assistance framework. The war in Georgia; the ongoing impasse with Belarus; faltering democratization in Ukraine prompted the Union to re-think its approach. Above all, the Arab Spring revealed that for too long EU's priority in the South has not been democratic agenda, but rather support of regimes guaranteeing stability. For this reasons, the EU had failed to bring sufficient political development to its relationships in its neighbourhood and to meet challenges in a more complex international environment for democracy and human rights. It had declined fundamentally to reassess its democracy support in either qualitative or quantitative terms.¹⁷² Heavily state-centred EU support had nothing at hand to offer nascent democratic forces in its neighbourhood or elsewhere in the world. While aiming to strength the 'democratic reward' in increasing budgets for democracy support, the EU nevertheless had resisted the establishment of firmer democracy-related conditions for aid allocation. As a result some of the most generous European aid increases have gone to authoritarian or semi-autocratic governments.¹⁷³ The fact that European aid channelled to authoritarian states does not always guarantee democratic development raised the interest of and scrutiny by the European Parliament (EP).¹⁷⁴

Stronger 'democratic conditionality' in aid giving and a shift from economic development support to direct support for democratic institutions was not only a rightly addressed EU answer to the changing neighbourhood, but also clear demanded from those, who finance it all – the EU citizens. A Eurobarometer poll revealed that a large majority of EU population (84%) expressed their belief that the EU should require developing countries to follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.¹⁷⁵

Although there is no doubt that economic development instruments and direct budget support do in a long run have a major impact on the societal transformation towards more democratic and transparent political entities, the direct support to civil society and human rights aggregates a multiple effect of those instruments and projects. So too does a vibrant and healthy private sector, whose adoption of corporate and social responsibilities make democratic system more effective and accountable. A multi-targeted democracy assistance going across a society including its three constitutional pillars – the governmental sector, the private sector and the civil society – builds legitimacy and 'ownership' of the 'change' across the society. The boom of the civic sector and its big share on the

(HRDN), the European Network of Political Foundations (EnoP) and the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in Brussels (2005-2009).

170 Report from the the Conference 'Building Consensus about EU Policies on Democracy Support', March 9 and 10, 2009, Prague

171 It brought together experts from the EU, state and non-state organisations to brainstorm about the possible contours of the European Consensus on Democracy and about possibilities for coordination improved in the European democracy assistance.

172 Richard Youngs, *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood?*, 2008, FRIDE

173 Richard Youngs, *Is European democracy promotion on the wane?*, CEPS Working Document No. 292/May 2008

174 European Parliament, *Report on EU external policies in favour of democratisation (2011/2032(INI))*, 16.6.2011

175 Special Eurobarometer 375, *Making the difference in the world: Europeans and the future of development aid*, 2011

transformation processes in the CEE countries also highlighted that a strong civic sector is inevitable for a successful reform processes.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, taking in account the ever stronger share of the private sector's impact on societies, the corporate social responsibility support emerged as relatively new and yet inevitable phenomenon in democracy building. Although so far there are very few references and tools that would support it in EU assistance.

Recognising civil society as an important player in building democracy and fostering human rights is changing the way in which the EU engages with countries outside its borders. The first sign of a more differentiated approach was the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) established in 2004. Bringing human rights and civil society into the centre of change, this instrument indicated a significant shift in EU democracy support. Although allowing the EU to support directly civil society organisations working in the field of human rights and democracy, the instrument has been focused mostly on addressing human rights issues, with the "democracy work" remaining somewhat secondary.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, the renewed EIDHR Strategy paper 2011-2013 offered little prospects of raising the priority of democracy support closer to the level of human rights' support.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, a technical approach to this programme prevails among Delegation officers, who tend to see it as a standard instrument rather than a political tool with the potential to support or promote democracy in countries ripe for change.¹⁷⁹

Better streamlining of democracy support within the EIDHR seems to be the Instrument's ongoing challenge. Even after its renewal for the upcoming new EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2014-2020) the European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP) called for a better balance between support to human rights activists and those engaged in shaping the political landscape.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore it highlighted that in the light of the Arab Spring and recent developments in the Eastern Neighbourhood there is a strong demand for flexible mechanisms regarding access as well as implementation of EU funding. ENoP therefore welcomed the proposal made in paragraph 15 of the EIDHR draft regulation that in most difficult situations 'the Union should be able to respond in a flexible and timely manner by means of ad hoc grants' and emphasised that especially in situations and countries of crisis the direct award of grants is of crucial importance. It also stressed that in order to ensure a speedy reaction in the above mentioned situations it is important that the budget line dedicated to flexible tools be increased.¹⁸¹ On the other hand this specific methods e.g. funding of non-registered entities, ad hoc measures or funding in cash, are not widely used mainly due to the lack of established practices and guidance from Brussels.¹⁸²

In order to complement the EU in its endeavour to reach small pro-democracy sparks and engage more with the political part of the civil society, the European Endowment for Democracy was established. Its aspiration is to act as a complement to EU financial tools (mainly to the EIDHR and the EU Civil Society Facility, or the Non-State Actors

176 The new Member States, with their transition experience, close cultural, political and societal relations and years long engagement in the neighbourhood's civil society, possess a valuable contribution to an EU's successful response to this challenge. The EU just must become fully aware of its forte and find ways how to utilise it better.

177 Ekaterina Bogdanova, Carlos Hernandez, Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovitt: A new beginning? Democracy support in EU external relations under the Lisbon Treaty, PASOS, 2010

178 Vera Rihackova, Walking the tightrope of democracy aid The long and winding road towards 'flexible', well-targeted EU funding for democracy and human rights, 2010, PASOS

179 Ibid.

180 <http://www.european-network-of-political-foundations.eu/cms/layout/set/print/News/ENoP-comments-on-EIDHR-proposal>

181 Ibid.

182 Rihackova

and Local Authorities programme (NSA-LA)), which provide only for a limited scope of action in situations of radical political change. Being established as an autonomous private foundation it was granted more flexibility in how and to whom it provides support.

The new attempt to mainstream democracy promotion and human rights within the overall EU's external action became even more apparent in the Council of the European Union's conclusions of 17 November 2009. After more than a year of debates led by the Czech and the Swedish Presidencies and supported by EU Member States, the Council approved a set of conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development and the Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations, including an Agenda for Action¹⁸³. It represented the first attempt to establish a clear framework for action for EU institutions and member-states in a policy field that has traditionally operated in a rather scattered and uncoordinated manner.¹⁸⁴ While acknowledging the multidimensional, complex and long-term nature of democracy-building processes, the Council in its document emphasized the need for increased coherence, complementarity and co-ordination throughout the full range of actions and among different actors, as well as thematic and geographical instruments at the country level and at headquarters level.¹⁸⁵

Moreover it stipulates that EU democracy support should include a special focus on the role of elected representatives and political parties¹⁸⁶ and institutions, independent media and civil society. The EU support should also take into account the full electoral cycle and not focus on ad hoc electoral support only¹⁸⁷.

It has to be underlined that this turn in the EU's external policy was set in a larger context of architectural restructuring, as the Council conclusions were approved only a few days before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and the creation of an EU diplomatic service - European External Action Service¹⁸⁸ that followed.

The establishment of the European External Action Service and the office of High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy¹⁸⁹ allowed for a broader, more political approach to the EU's external activities. It offered the opportunity to better incorporate political priorities into external policies with inevitably a more sensitive approach to country specific needs. As a result a greater harmonisation between financial assistance and political instruments (e.g. Eastern Partnership, Euronest, EaP CS Forum, EaP Business Forum, AA, DCFTA) can be reached.

Within this context, the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative: "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood"¹⁹⁰ highlighted the need for greater flexibility and more tailored responses

183 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf

184 Ekaterina Bogdanova, Carlos Hernandez, Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovitt: A new beginning? Democracy support in EU external relations under the Lisbon Treaty, PASOS, 2010

185 European Council: Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations, 17 November 2009

186 The European Commission has recently commissioned a study on EU support to political parties in the framework of strengthening the EU's broader democracy support.

187 Agenda for Action

188 Henceforward EEAS

189 Henceforward High Representative

190 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0303:FIN:en:PDF>

in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and demands for reform. Along with economic and social assistance, the support for deep and sustainable democracy and partnership with societies were highlighted throughout the document adopted on 25 May 2011.

The paradigm shift in favour of more direct democracy building engagement, which was thus far only complementary to economic and social aid, was noticeable also in the European Parliament's Report on EU external policies in favour of democratisation of 16 June 2011¹⁹¹. It called for combining the two approaches to promoting democracy, namely the development approach, which focuses on socio-economic progress for all and pro-poor growth, and the political approach, which supports political pluralism, parliamentary democracy and respect for the rule of law, human rights and basic freedoms and for functioning civil society.¹⁹² The EP in its report also acknowledges that the full potential of EU's pro-democracy incentives has not been exploited because of lack of consensus through the EU on the importance of promoting democracy and respect for human rights as opposed to other priorities, whereas in theory there is no structural or legal impediment to the coordinated use of the external financing instruments to support democratisation.

The wider shift towards a more differentiated and politically sensitive application of policy is dominant also in the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review, which lead into a 'Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument'¹⁹³(ENI) – the new instrument, which will replace the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to accompany the EU's policy towards its neighbours in the MFF 2014-2020.

In this document the EU has for the first time introduced conditionality to its external assistance. The "more for more" principle, the importance of mutual accountability between the EU and its partners and the need for partnerships not only with governments but also with civil society (e.g. NGOs, businesses, academia, media, unions and religious groups) are defined as key principles of the renewed Neighbourhood Policy in the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on 'Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy'¹⁹⁴. It provides for a much higher level of differentiation among partners, in line with their commitment to the jointly agreed values and objectives, being subject of the financial conditionality. In this context partner countries are invited to develop their own links to the EU according to their own aspirations, needs and capacities. Financial incentives for the most ambitious reformers are an important aspect of the new approach. As a policy-driven Instrument, the future ENI should reflect this key principle, especially for programming and allocating support to the partners.¹⁹⁵

The adoption of the 'EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy'¹⁹⁶ was a step forward in the realm of human rights, though, despite the title, not in democracy support. The Action Plan provided

191 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+ A7-2011-0231 + 0 + DOC + PDF+V0//EN>

192 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0231&language=EN>

193 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2011_prop_eu_neighbourhood_instrument_reg_en.pdf

194 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/delivering_new_enp_en.pdf

195 Ibid.

196 Council of the European Union, 25 June 2012 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131173.pdf

detailed steps in a clear timeline with the aim to foster human rights in its external action. Only section III. 6 of the document contain explicit proposals related to democracy support. A space for positive development may be left as the EEAS and the Commission are charged by early 2014 to develop joint comprehensive democracy support plans and programs for third countries where the EU is actively engaged in democracy support, based on the outcome of a pilot exercise.¹⁹⁷

If democracy promotion priorities versus human rights represent one challenge for the EU external action, then democracy promotion versus economic aid embodies the other. Although there is a palpable shift from promoting democracy through economic aid, to boosting growth and human development through democracy support, the EU's strategic documents do not provide a holistic outline defining the role of the two approaches and the way they complement each other in the EU external action. The European Commission's Communication on 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change'¹⁹⁸ on the one hand underlines the general trend to store up its support for democracy and good governance abroad, but on the other unveils the need for an overall framework for the EU's external action and lack of a clear definition of democracy assistance. While underlining the importance of human rights and democracy support (highlighting the cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities) in development work, the Communication does not define the relationship between the different, traditional financial and economic development methods and support of human rights and democracy; nor does it define their mutual influence on each-other and their joint impact on the defined development aims.

The lack of significant reform in the Eastern neighbourhood and the lack of ready instruments in place to support the desired changes after the Arab Spring prompted the EU to understand that engagement with societies is as important as cooperation with governments and can provide continuity in times when the government is not delivering or refuses pro-democracy reforms. The EU began to recognise that the capacity of civil society has to be nurtured in a more consistent manner at every stage of the EU policy-making process.¹⁹⁹ This led to the establishment of the Civil Society Facility²⁰⁰ as part of the EU's efforts to empower civil society in democratic governance and equitable development.

Increasingly and more recently, greater assistance to non-state actors or civil society was evident in the new re-
definition of various EU instruments and of the core principles of external action. The first systematic overview of the goals and means of EU's engagement with civil society was provided by the European Commission's Communication on 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations.'²⁰¹ The document has outlined a more strategic approach in EU engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs) in terms of building democracy and pursuing human rights and the rule of law. It also recognised the role of the non-state actors in political, cultural, social and economic development and highlighted its oversight role. The document further stressed the emerging role of the private sector in the field of social services

197 The pilot exercise explored new and revised working modalities in order to deepen the EU's ability to support democratic developments, and to develop a methodology to implement the Agenda for Action. The pilot was so far implemented in 9 out of 12 identified countries: Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, Lebanon, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia and Solomon Islands; and the Central African Republic, Moldova and Philippines have not yet participated. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=JOIN:2012:0028:FIN:EN:PDF>

198 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf

199 Bogdanova, Hernandez, Kucharczyk, Lowitt

200 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-638_en.htm

201 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF>

and highlights the role of civil society in promoting and monitoring e.g. corporate social responsibility, public private partnership and fair trade.

However the successful implementation of this valuable Communication will face challenges. It was the last to be drawn up, though the most complex, in the recent re-definitions of EU external instruments and priorities for the next MFF 14-20 and so to make its contribution felt across all areas of EU external action will require strong efforts as most of the instruments and policies were outlined before and without necessary critical look at the outgoing MFF (2007-2013) in which the EU comprehensive and complementary assistance was not sufficiently addressed when it comes to instruments, modalities and programming of aid.²⁰²

The proportion between geographic programs and thematic programs reveals that the majority of EU external assistance depends on governmental consent of the target countries.²⁰³ Between 2007 and 2013 the EU has spent 11.181 billion through its ENPI but only 1.104 billion for EIDHR; 1.6 billion for Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development and 71.7 million for Civil Society Facility, while the former indicates money spent only in the EU Neighbourhood, the latter sums cover thematic programs in all countries (except of the Civil Society Facility Instrument that was developed for the EU Neighbourhood only). These numbers direct to a question -how effective can the change be, if the key to it – EU financial support – is given to the hands of governments, who in most of the target countries, represent the obstacle to any pro-democratic processes.

They also reveal that the paradigm shift is so far mainly only on paper as the EU Institutions were unable to reflect it in budgetary allocations within the outgoing MFF. The new circle (2014-2020) though will depict the depth of the change.²⁰⁴ Only a balanced investment into the pro-reform commitments of the government and its civil society oversight can lead to an effective assistance.

For this reason the EU should streamline its aid modalities better; pay greater heed to the ways supporting legal and political climate for civil society oversight; involve civil society in designing and implementing its policies and aid programmes; rectify the death of dialogue and cooperation between NGOs and governmental bodies; and devise its own monitoring and evaluation tools to assess the state of civil society in the target countries.²⁰⁵ This will certainly serve not only the EU development goals but above all streamline its political aspirations in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU's external policy has undergone an acknowledged shift from development to democracy support or rather thought democracy assistance to development. As a result there was a plethora of programmes and policies

202 Andrea Ostheimer de Sosa, International Conference: '10 Years of Slovak Aid: A Vision of Development Cooperation for a Changing World', Bratislava, 16-17 October 2013

203 The assistance withing the Geographic instruments is provided with an assent of the recipient's government. Thematic instruments provide financial support directly to civil society.

204 In the time when this paper was written the agreement on the different budget lines of the MFF (2014-2020) was not yet reached.

205 Natalia Shapovalova, Richard Youngs, EU democracy in the Eastern neighbourhood: a turn to civil society?, 2012, FRIDE

introduced in the EU systems that have bearing upon democracy assistance. Stronger emphasis is put on human rights and civil society, while the support of the latter is recently streamlined through various instruments and aid schemes. The importance of targeting specific issues in one country or regions is prioritized before projects that are global in scope. The 'more for more' and 'mutual accountability' principles provide for more comprehensive approach and greater complementarity of the different aid modalities. Moreover it creates ground for a tailor made approach within the EU strategic framework for its engagement in the neighbourhood and thus unites EU development aims with its political aspirations abroad.

However, this historic paradigm shift was pursued while the conceptualisation of democracy and the means to achieve it remained vague.²⁰⁶ To this day, there is neither a consensus within the EU about the concept of democracy support nor about its practical delivery. The various documents do not define how human rights, governance, civil society and socio-economic development relate to democratisation²⁰⁷ and to each other. Without clear conceptualisations of how these objectives are interlinked and under which conditions they could be synergistically promoted, the concept of so-called 'democracy support policies' risks being diluted or even contradicted.²⁰⁸ Moreover without adequate budgetary support and Instruments bearing new democracy assistance features within the upcoming MFF (2014-2020), better cohesion between development and political aims and deeper understanding of civil society nuances among the EU civil servants, the paradigm shift will remain only on paper.

Author: Miriam Lexmann, International Republican Institute

E-mail: miriam.lexmann@gmail.com

REVIEW

Study deals with the current issue of the design of the EU's external action. It provides deep analyses of the instruments developed in the last decades from technical development to democracy support. Author applies regional, institutional as well as conceptual approach to describe various tools of programmes and policies in order to reach more effective address of human rights and civil society issues within the EU's neighbourhood environment. The questions highlighted by the study are the need to interlink each of the sociopolitical elements related to democratisation, adequate budgetary support within the next multi annual financial framework, deeper understanding of civil society nuances by the EU civil servant and better streamlining of the aid modalities to reach the flexibility and time efficacy. Paper brings valuable multidisciplinary insight to the conceptual and operational elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instruments which is useful for both the academics as well as practitioners in the field.

Ing. Mikuláš Černota, PhD.

206 Anne Wetzel, Jan Orbie, The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search for the plot, CEPS Policy brief No 281, 13 September 2012

207 Ibid.

208 Ibid.

PLACE AND ROLE OF V4 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITHIN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY?²⁰⁹

Simon Lightfoot and Balazs Szent-Ivanyi

ABSTRACT

This paper examines to what extent the V4 have been able to exert influence over the EU's development policy. It examines one area in which the V4 states claim a comparative advantage (transition experience), one area that reflects their key foreign policy priority (the Eastern neighbourhood) and one that reflects the traditional EU donors policy preferences (the European Development Fund (EDF)) to see whether almost 10 years of EU membership have led to changes in EU policy. It argues that we can see changes in EU policy as a result of V4 states actions, although only in conjunction with other member states. It concludes by arguing that if the V4 want to exert greater influence they need to ensure they construct a more strategic vision for development policy, but also that the EU needs to ensure it harnesses the strengths of the V4 states in a meaningful way.

KEYWORDS

V4, development cooperation, transition experience, eu development policy

INTRODUCTION

The Visegrád Four countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) grouping is seen as one mechanism by which the 4 countries of the group try and influence EU policies and agendas. In the last decade the V4 have emerged as development actors in their own right. This paper examines the place and role of the states within EU development policy. It provides an overview of current levels of aid expenditure in the 4 states, the policy priorities and challenges. In particular, it examines the role of the V4 states in EU development policy considering the new financial framework. Top of Form. The last 10 years have seen the V4 countries emerge as new aid donors (see Bucar et al 2007 for a fuller discussion). All four states have a legacy of development aid under Communism, although this

209 This research was carried out as part of a Marie Curie IEF INTDEPNEW, whose support is acknowledged with thanks. The article builds and expands upon blog posts available here <http://neweudonors.wordpress.com> and an interview for the IDS blog- <http://www.globalisationanddevelopment.com/2013/03/the-visegrad-4-emerging-development.html?sref=fb>. Useful resources about V4 aid can be found here: <http://www.v4aid.eu/index.php?lang=en>

aid has many differences to aid norms today (Szent-Ivanyi and Tetanyi, 2008). Their journey to donorship was clearly influenced by a variety of factors, especially in relation to the EU acquis (see Lightfoot, 2010). Now they are more established (the Czech republic joined the DAC in May 2013 and Slovakia is likely to join before the end of the 2013), it is time to review to what extent these states are able to influence the agenda of the EU in this large and political relevant area of EU expenditure.

Before we examine this topic in more detail, it is worth first highlighting what form V4 aid takes. Typically aid spending makes up 0.08-0.15% of their gross national incomes on aid, which is very far from both the EU target of 0.33% for the new member states and the 0.7% that the UK plans to achieve next year. A remarkably high part of their ODA goes to the EU. The bulk of the remaining budget are bilateral programmes whereas only a marginal part goes to non-EU multilateral institutions. Aid is typically in the form of small stand alone projects, implemented by national NGOs. While there is no official data, the overwhelming majority of aid is tied. Project values of a few 10,000 dollars are not rare. Aid is mainly concentrated in the neighbouring countries, i.e. the Western Balkans and the Post-Soviet region. CEE aid is highly donor driven and relies to a large extent on technical assistance (see CPM, 2012 for a current snapshot of aid related information or Horky and Lightfoot, 2012 for an academic overview). The current financial has impacted many of these countries severely. Hungary's bilateral aid budget for example has been reduced by as much as 70% (see Szent-Ivanyi, 2012).

Table One: Aid disbursements in million dollars and as a percentage of gross national income in the V4 countries, 2002-2012

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Czech Republic	158.3	166.2	194.1	216.7	209.5	244.8	225.7	243.7	250.4	240.0
	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12
Hungary	32.13	91.12	125.3	190.15	108.92	102.27	123.86	121.92	139.73	129.3
	0.03	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.10*
Poland	44.99	175.22	263.77	361.44	378.51	332.64	411.55	396.02	416.91	468.51
	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	..
Slovakia	29.94	46.4	87.98	79.18	79.51	92.73	76.9	78.65	86.02	83.03
	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09*

Source: OECD (2013), and estimates of national governments (*). Absolute figures are in constant 2011 dollars.

Bilateral ODA is important because it is a 'direct tool of foreign politics, draws on Slovak experience, deepens relations with developing countries and effectively helps Slovak subjects to entrench in developing countries' (in Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009). According to the EU Code of Conduct, the direction of the bilateral aid, whilst up to the member state, should be used to support EU priority states and areas. This can create contradictions with EU policy firmly focused (rhetorically at least) on poverty reduction, whilst this type of statement is typical for the V4 states (and other donors to be fair): 'We are firmly interested in our geopolitical space' (in Vittek and Lightfoot, 2009).

The V4 states represent a unique face of donorship, which Szent-Ivanyi has called “premature donorship” (Szent-Ivanyi and Tetenyi, 2013, p. 25). CEE development policies have changed little in the past decade, with the possible exception of the Czech Republic. They seem to be stuck in this “low key” state without really moving forward. Essentially all of these countries are doing development policies with little domestic support for or even awareness of it. This is very different than doing development policy in the UK or Sweden, where there is clear social support for it and an active constituency. There is a clear perception among people in the CEE countries that they are poor and are in need of aid themselves. Due to this, politicians are reluctant to talk about foreign aid in fear of electoral backlash, and when they do, they frame it in a way to emphasize the immediate material benefits of giving aid for their countries, like increasing exports. Therefore, there is no political will to take development policy beyond the current set up, which you may argue is the bare minimum. The lack of social support and political will for development implies that the CEE countries became aid donors before they were quite ready for it, thus the term premature donorship.

1. INFLUENCE OVER THE EU?

Copsey and Pomorska (2012) argue that new member states may never have the influence of the older member states. However, they highlight that the new members are as keen as older members to ensure EU policies reflect the foreign policy priorities. There are also elements by which the new donors bring added value which the CEE countries bring to the donor community. CEE countries claim that they have amassed a large body of experience in reforming policies and institutions during their transition process, and would like to use this expertise in promoting democracy in their partners (see non-paper, 2011 for the official line, Horky, 2012 for a critique). In the Western Balkans for example, Slovakia sees its expertise in the region as bringing ‘added value’ at the European level (Haughton and Malova 2007). Specialising more on transition experience and democracy promotion could be real niche for these new donors, especially since they could do democracy promotion in a much more credible way than large powers like the US. The V4 group itself stressed that ‘V4 countries have a common interest in ensuring that the potential of new Member States and their transition experience is recognized in the EU’s development cooperation’. Dangerfield (2008, p. 653) argues that V4 states find common ground on the “Wider Europe–Neighbourhood” policy and the EU strategy toward the Western Balkans. Indeed Slovakia ‘feels well placed to advise, persuade and galvanise actors involved in the enlargement process in countries that have experienced complicated processes of democratisation and state-building.’ (Haughton and Malova 2007). Dangerfield argues that big political questions such as relations with Russia are problematic, cooperation over lower level practical dimensions of EU Eastern policy should be easier. He concludes by arguing that this affords ‘the V4 countries an opportunity to bring their expertise and experience, as well as interests, to bear on this EU policy sphere’ (Dangerfield, 2008, p. 655). A brief examination of Slovakia’s top ODA priorities for the 2009-13 period show the focus on strengthening of stability and good governance in regions and countries that are among the priority areas of Slovakia’s concern, including in terms of Slovakia’s economic interests.

2. TRANSITION EXPERIENCE

All V4 countries have made the transfer of this experience an integral part of their international development policies, especially towards the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU. The EU is putting increasing emphasis on promoting democratic governance in all its partners, but there is stronger focus on the Neighbourhood. Having

stable, democratic, well-governed and prosperous countries close by is a vital security interest for the EU, thus it is no surprise that the community has made issues like 'strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law', 'ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of expression' or improving the investment climate, 'through predictable legislation and by the fight against corruption' priority areas of action in relation to neighbouring countries. Slovakia have been very active in assisting the democratic transition in Tunisia, the Czech Republic is supporting the opposition in places like Cuba and Myanmar, and Hungarian NGOs are active in helping the development of civil society in Serbia and Bosnia. Although it is not clear whether the experience of Slovakia has in privatisation for example, can be relevant in, say, Kazakhstan, it is clear that there is a need for knowledge on many transition issues in many developing countries, and the CEE donors are ready to provide this.

Does the EU make use of V4 transition experience to enrich this policy? Clearly, the EU puts rhetorical emphasis on transition experience, as evidenced by point 33 in the **European Consensus on Development**, the creation of the **European Transition Compendium (ETC)**, or the 2013 **Council Conclusions on Supporting Transition Societies**. But how does this play out in practice? One way of looking at this is how much the reform priorities of the EU in the Neighbours are aligned with the transition experience the V4 countries have to offer. Looking at the ETC, which is a database of new member state transition experience, and the EU's reform priorities, as embodied in documents like **Neighbourhood policy action plans**, or the **association agreement with the Ukraine** seem well aligned. Based on this, on a project level, state and non-state actors in the V4 countries do seem to have the specific expertise that is needed for democratic governance reforms in the Eastern Neighbours. There is however a clear downside. When it comes to the actual implementation of EU-financed democratic governance projects thus far, the participation of actors from the V4 countries, is rather low. Between 2007 and 2010, out of 649 EU financed projects which included the aim of democracy promotion in the Eastern Neighbours, only 16 were implemented by actors from the V4 (see Szent-Ivanyi, forthcoming).

3. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

So do the factors identified above reflect policy changes in the EU? There is evidence to suggest that these countries have used their access to EU policies and instruments to enhance their influence in the Eastern neighbourhood (Dangerfield, 2009). In line with intra-extra foreign policy, the new MS have consistently attempted to ensure that the EU's Eastern neighbour countries would benefit from EU aid programmes. The Polish-Swedish initiative to establish the Eastern Partnership can be seen as an example of a new member state trying to shape EU foreign policy. The Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative, which envisages a multinational forum between the EU-27 and neighbouring states Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This partnership is now a reality with the Commission promoting an agenda that includes new comprehensive free trade agreements, a gradual integration of the EU economy and easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation (European Commission 2008).

The focus on EU-Africa relations was seen to some new MS as needing to be balanced by a greater focus on the Eastern neighbors (see Lightfoot, 2010). As such the accession of the Central and Eastern European member states has reinforced two closely related trends in EU development policies, namely a diversion of attention from former colonies in Africa towards Europe's neighbourhood, and a growing engagement with the nexus between

development aid on the one hand and foreign and security policy on the other hand (see Orbie and Lightfoot, forthcoming).

A. THE EDF

The link to Africa is visible in the European Development Fund, which the V4 states became eligible to pay in 2011. The EDF sits outside the formal EU *acquis* and provides development assistance to the ACP states. There is some evidence that this grouping is not seen by V4 states as relevant (the grouping comprises mainly former colonies of France, Belgium and the UK) (see Lightfoot, 2008). However, it seems clear that the V4 states lack the capacity or the will to challenge the status quo in this area, except perhaps to call for greater transparency in how the EDF money is spent (see Krylova et al, 2012). Instead, they are working with other member states to ensure other EU development cooperation instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument or Development Cooperation Instrument remain visible. It is also clear in their focus on the Eastern Partnership (see Dangerfield, 2009). Kopsinsky (2012) highlights that the V4 have formally agreed to gradually shift the focus of their development policy and aid allocation to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Yet, contrary to their official rhetoric, African countries continue to find low priority in aid policies (see Drązkiewicz-Grodzicka, 2013 for an interesting case study of Polish Aid).

B. WHAT RESTRICTS THE V4 STATES?

While it is the Council that makes the final and formal decision on the EU's development *acquis*, it is the Council Working Group on Development (CODEV) that makes the actual decisions in the broad majority of the cases. CODEV is composed of specialized diplomats from member state permanent representations, and basically prepares the development-related agenda of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and thus ultimately the Council. CODEV meets at least once a week, and many of the member state diplomats (especially in case of smaller states) also represent their countries in the Council's ACP working group, thus interaction frequency between them is high. Low policy staff numbers at MFAs simply cannot react to all the issues discussed in CODEV and in many cases they think it is unnecessary to do so, as no national interest is at stake. Also, large EU-15 member states can afford to have a separate diplomat for every Council working group, while the CODEV representative of smaller NMS like Slovakia typically has other tasks as well. The issue of rotation of diplomats creates problems for institutional memory.

There is also the issue of public support for increased aid spending in light of the current economic crisis (see Eurobarometer 2011 for a detailed analysis). There is hardly any cooperation among the V4 governments on development away from Brussels, save perhaps an informal mechanism to consult on development issues debated in the EU Council. This may be changing with for example, the Directors of Development Cooperation Departments in the MFAs of the Visegrad Group (V4) met in Warsaw on 23-24 October. They discussed transformation experience sharing, the EU's current development agenda, Global Partnership, post-2015 development policy and ways to broaden V4 cooperation. The EU-12 group has held informal meetings as a group (see Gavás and Maxwell, 2011). Finally there is the question of money. Aid budgets are often set on a yearly basis and therefore vulnerable to cuts. Annual budgeting makes planning and project financing difficult.

4. THE FUTURE AND THE EU BUDGET

The debates around the future of the EU budget highlighted general divisions within the V4 group, in part related to differing levels of economic development and attitudes to EU integration (see Kalan et al, 2012). We therefore saw the Czech Republic call for a decrease in the proposed amount of the overall budget for 2014-2020, whilst the other 3 V4 states supported the Commission's proposed budget (see Kilnes and Sherriff, 2012). These divisions are reflected in the future of any developing relationship between the 4 states around development policy, with one big issue being different trajectories. As noted the the Czech Republic has now become a full member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This may weaken any fledging cohesion of the group. Among the new donors in CEE, Poland is the only other country that would qualify for membership at the moment. The formal membership criteria of the DAC is that a country must spend at least 0.2% of its GNI on aid, or at least 100 million dollars on foreign aid. This means that Slovakia do not qualify yet. Hungary fails to qualify on an informal criteria, namely that all accession countries must have the OECD do a special review on their development policy.

The differing trajectories were evident to an extent in the discussions around the EU budget and aid, although on issues such as support for the Eastern Partnership and non Budgetisation of the EDF unity remained. Poland expressed a position that EU-12 states should contribute to the EDF 11 at the same rate as EDF 10, which in practice means contributing lower amounts (Kilnes and Sherriff, 2012, p. 7). The debates highlight the fact that the V4 states are not going to try and change the EU's development policy head on, rather they are working to ensure the policies reflect better their priorities and ability to contribute.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

According to Szent-Ivanyi (2012), the Visegrád donors seem to behave in a similar fashion to the donors that the literature has labeled 'egoistic', at least when it comes to their aid allocation. The four countries mainly support recipients in relation to which they have political, security and economic interests, as countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS region are the most important recipients. The reduction of global poverty is clearly not a consideration. While this observed aid allocation is in line with the political and economic interests of the four donor countries, the question arises how much it is due to strategic decisions. It is plausible for example that the Visegrád countries only choose recipients from their 'neighborhood' for reasons of convenience. Providing large scale foreign aid to extremely poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or other far away developing regions would be much more costly, and the experience of the four emerging donors in those areas is also much less. A further explanation may be that the four donors have some kind of perceived or actual comparative advantage compared to other donors in the Western Balkan and CIS regions.

Kugiel concluded that more cooperation between the V4 donors 'could help to both improve national systems and open the way for joint V4 initiatives in foreign aid'. He outlines four particular areas—aid financing, aid transparency (see also Brough, 2011), transition experience and division of labour—offer the greatest scope for improvement and require immediate action (Kugiel, 2011). However, none of these can work without a clearly defined strategic vision for a distinctive V4 development policy. As Toro et al (2013) argue 'when the V4 puts its mind to it, it can have success...the degree of success varies at times and is contingent on the V4 ensuring that it follows up on that initial

success. Diminishing resources make the need to prioritize and develop a more strategic approach even more pressing. This strategic approach could result from a better adoption of current EU development policy, especially in relation to increasing the effectiveness of development policies. There are forces at play which may probably change this, however slowly. Being members of the EU has exposed these countries to a global dimension of policy making, and they may now feel that they have a say in shaping the EU's external policies towards regions and countries with which they might not even have contacts with otherwise. The CEE countries should not think of themselves anymore as small or medium sized countries with only regional aspirations, but as members of a globally important community. With this global reach should come global responsibility as well, and thus should have an impact on development policies.

However, this is not all one way. If the EU truly thinks V4 transition experience is valuable, stronger efforts should be made to include these countries in project implementation. V4 governments must also do their share in increasing the capacities of national actors to compete for the EU's international development funds. If transition experience is truly a comparative advantage of the V4 donors, then it should figure highly in any public debate legitimizing the future direction of V4 development aid.

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Authors: Dr. Simon Lightfoot and Dr. Balazs Szent-Ivanyi – University of Leeds and Corvinus University
E-mail: S.J.Lightfoot@leeds.ac.uk

REVIEW

In the paper „Place and role of V4 development cooperation within EU development policy?“ the authors examine to what extent the Visegrád Four countries (V4) have been able to exert influence over the EU's development policy.

The authors provide an overview about the experience of V4 in development policy with a special regard to the ability of these states to influence the EU agenda in this field. The authors describe and also in a critical way explain the attitude and practice of V4 to support mainly their interests in a geopolitical space. The paper includes an useful evaluation on an issue, whether on one side the EU does really make use of V4 special comparative advantage (transition experience) in practice and on the other hand what are the grounds for a restrictive ability of V4 to influence the EU agenda.

With reference to many sources the authors formulate their conclusions and recommendations that are based on an objective evaluation of relevant facts.

CONCLUSION: *The paper provides in a comprehensible way an excellent and objective overview about the current and future V4 development cooperation within the EU.*

JUDr. Alexandra Strážnická, PhD., LL.M.

NEW EU DONORS AND THE WESTERN BALKANS: SHARING KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

Dmitry Mariyasin

ABSTRACT

The paper looks at the rationale, lessons learnt and the practical examples of how the new EU donors – countries that joined the EU in or after 2004– support the development agenda of the transition countries in the Western Balkans. While the development agenda of the region on the path to EU accession remains large and diverse, peer-to-peer learning can often be a very effective mechanism to build capacity in the area of environmental management, public accountability, public finance management, social inclusion and rights of the vulnerable groups – all crucial elements of the EU accession agenda for the Western Balkans. The various mechanisms include knowledge forums, study tours, direct consulting, including those facilitated via longer term programmatic frameworks in partnership with international organizations, e.g. UNDP. Going forward, the new EU donors could improve the impact of their knowledge sharing through better definitions of what constitutes transition experience; establishing clear feedback loop with partner countries; involving non-state actors more systematically; and coordinating their assistance between them and with other donor countries.

KEY WORDS

Western Balkans, EU donors, UNDP

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the experience of several new EU Donors²¹⁰ in sharing transition-related knowledge and experience and specific experiences of their support to the Western Balkans. Not a scientific research piece, the paper rather tries to summarize what UNDP has learnt over the years of partnering with new EU Member States and with the transition countries of the Western Balkans.

The paper will begin by outlining some of the remaining development challenges of the Western Balkans, then it will talk about the role the new EU donors can play as donors and providers of knowledge and expertise, highlighting several concrete examples, primarily based on UNDP's cooperation with the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania and Czech Republic.

210 In this paper defined as the Member States of the European Union that have joined in or after 2004.

1. INTRODUCTION - THE REMAINING DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

The Western Balkans region – on its path to European integration – is faced with a number of complex development challenges. Among them are five fundamental challenges that the countries of the region need to overcome, as noted in a recent UNDP intervention²¹¹ at the European Commission's Conference on the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2014-2020 in January 2013:

The first challenge is economic performance. In several countries GDP remains below 2008 levels; in those countries where growth has been more positive, it is often jobless growth, with unemployment rates hitting 4 to 5 times the EU average in some countries. These economic realities further hinder more rapid progress and reforms.

The second challenge is the rule of law and the fight against corruption. While many countries have made significant progress, the Acquis requirements from Chapters 23 and 24 remain great challenges. Access to justice; stronger capacities of the rule of law institutions, and their independence; stronger public procurement and transparent public administration – all remain high on the agenda of the region.

The third challenge is social exclusion. A 2011 UNDP regional human development report²¹² analysed the factors that increase a person's chance of being affected by social exclusion. The report highlights that in Southeastern Europe several groups are particularly at risk: women; youth; Roma and other minorities; persons with disabilities; persons displaced by conflict; and those living in small towns or remote rural areas.

The fourth issue is related to the above; rural and regional development. Here the important bottleneck lies in the capacity of local and regional authorities to prepare and implement development plans that are integrated, through a multi-sectorial approach, based on sufficient and accurate data, with participation of citizens and with adequate budgets.

The fifth challenge is energy efficiency, access and the development of renewable energy. In the Western Balkans, the energy intensity is up to two and a half times higher than the average for the OECD countries in Europe. At the same time, one out of every six people in the region suffers from fuel poverty that impact on their lifestyle, prosperity, and health. Last but not least, countries in the region predominantly rely on one source of energy, either coal or hydropower, and otherwise depend on imported gas and oil.

All in all, this is a transformation and development agenda very similar to what the new Member States of the European Union faced in the 1990s. Their experience of managing the transition and overcoming many of the same challenges on the way to EU accession is recent, is relatively well documented and still is in the heads and hearts of the current and retired civil servants, NGO leaders and researchers.

211 tatement by Ms. Cihan Sultanoğlu, UNDP Regional Director for Europe and the CIS, at the EU Conference on the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 2014-2020, UNDP, 25 January 2013

212 Beyond Transition. Towards Inclusive Societies. UNDP Regional Human Development Report for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2011

2. THE ROLE OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES

In this context, most of the new EU donors have made sharing of transition experience a landmark of their development cooperation (in the European context often referred to as “East-East cooperation”).

A. WHY SHARE KNOWLEDGE?

Effectively using knowledge and experience focused cooperation is especially relevant for countries that have recently undergone transitions, and who often position themselves beyond the traditional donor/recipient or North/South divide. Their governments, civil society and academia are a valuable source of recent and often replicable knowledge that can make a difference for achieving development goals globally.

This strong regional trend also reflects changes in the global development cooperation landscape, where sharing of knowledge and experience is gaining prominence both from a recipient and provider point of view. Countries, from all income levels, want to learn from the practical experiences of their peers: the pitfalls to avoid and the practices to adopt. Practitioners want to be connected to each other, across countries, across regions. It stems from a belief that development solutions work best when they are designed in interaction with peers and partners who have gone through, or are going through, similar problems, facing similar constraints.

B. WHAT ARE THE MECHANISMS?

Examples of such cooperation are numerous, and so are the forms: twinning programs, trainings, fellowships, expert exchange schemes, capacity building programs, triangular cooperation projects, etc.²¹³, implemented both via bi-lateral or multilateral channels. Some countries have also decided to invest in permanent structures to facilitate knowledge sharing – Knowledge Hubs – often centering on a specific theme or targeting a particular group of countries. Another, more supply-driven example of structured knowledge sharing is the European Transition Compendium (ETC), collecting best-practices of Central European and Eastern European countries in their (recent) policy reforms.

Some of the interesting bi-lateral assistance mechanisms include (this list is far from exhaustive):

- Czech Republic’s special Transition Promotion Unit housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and focused on supporting transformation to democracy in particular countries;
- Poland’s Solidarity Fund that is both an NGO and a governmental institution supporting free media, citizen empowerment, CSO development and solidarity.
- Slovenia’s Center of Excellence in Finance operates based on quasi-governmental model and systematically supports financial management reforms in the Western Balkans.
- Bulgaria’s Balkan Agency for Sustainable Development focuses on the Balkans as well as Moldova and Ukraine covering such thematic areas as education and human rights.
- Slovak Republic’s CETIR (Centre for Transfer of Experience from Integration and Reforms) focusing on targeted knowledge sharing in the field of social work and labor law, waste management, judiciary and prosecution, the reform of state administration, etc.

²¹³ Sharing knowledge and transition experience for development: Mapping of selected new European donors. December 2012 (Report commissioned by UNDP and prepared by MESA-10, CRPE and CPM).

3. EXAMPLES OF SHARING KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE WESTERN BALKANS

In addition to bi-lateral programs mentioned above, several new EU donors have been partnering with international organizations to facilitate effective knowledge sharing.

Below we highlight several examples of knowledge and experience sharing efforts of the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania and Czech Republic with the Western Balkans, facilitated by UNDP. Without aiming at an exhaustive or detailed account, these examples serve as illustrations of the thematic areas and mechanisms used by the new EU donors.

The *Slovak Republic* has provided extensive support to reforms and EU integration processes to the Western Balkans since the very beginning of the Slovak official development assistance. Part of this support has been provided via the Slovak UNDP Trust Fund²¹⁴, whereby UNDP Country Offices (and the Regional Center in Bratislava) have been facilitating direct face-to-face learning between governments and civil societies. This included the transfer of Slovak knowhow from the transition period, support of reform process and intensification of EU integration process (main areas: public finance management, reform of public administration, security, education and social system, public policy development, etc.), as well as support of civil society and dialogue between governments and civil society.

The topics were diverse²¹⁵. Regional development and managing EU Structural Funds was one, whereby thirteen officials from central and local government in Albania visited Slovakia in 2010 to learn about the Slovak experience with regional development and use of pre-accession assistance. They were also provided with specific advice on a draft law on regional development, and EU-funding instruments and resources for regional development.

Further, in the area of environment, there was a knowledge exchange on management and environmental protection of karst fields and peatlands. In 2009, representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina - 15 in total – participated on one-week study tour focused on public participation and stakeholder involvement into restoration and management of wetlands and peatlands. Several examples of trans boundary cooperation and successful projects in Slovakia were presented. As part of another project funded by the Slovak UNDP Trust Fund, environmental management and remediation of mining sites was a theme that brought 16 participants from the Western Balkans to the Slovak Republic.

On Roma issues, in 2009, ten Roma municipal coordinators from Serbia visited Slovakia and met with organizations addressing Roma issues in various regions of the country, which shared both good and bad practices used in Slovakia related to housing, health, education and employment of Roma.

There have also been multiple cases of direct technical assistance, consulting services provided directly by Slovak experts and other forms of learning, which UNDP has supported in close cooperation with Slovak government institutions, NGOs, universities, private sector companies (in fact, for each of the above knowledge exchanges there was a specific implementing partner on the Slovak side).

214 See Section “Slovak UNDP Trust Fund” at <http://europeandcis.undp.org/ourwork/partnerships/>

215 While similar knowledge exchanges have been going on since 2004, here and below only a set of recent ones is mentioned, mostly from 2009-2012.

An example of a longer-term programmatic approach to knowledge and experience sharing by the Slovak Republic is a multi-year project *Public Finance for Development: Strengthening Public Finance Capacities in the Western Balkans and Commonwealth of Independent States*²¹⁶, which was positively assessed by the OECD-DAC Special Review²¹⁷. The project of the Slovak Ministry of Finance, implemented in cooperation with UNDP, started in mid-2009 with a budget of 1 million USD and is still ongoing, with several replenishments. The objective of the program is to enhance sound and effective Public Finance Management by raising awareness, developing analytical capacities and sharing good practices with regard to reforms implemented in Slovakia and elsewhere. The program focuses on few priority countries (currently Montenegro and Republic of Moldova); the countries were carefully selected by matching the demand for assistance with the supply of available Slovakian capacity in the respective PFM areas of assistance. The activities within the program include technical advisory services to partner institutions in selected countries, small grant research schemes, contribution to costs of participation in conferences, professional exchange schemes, joint research, stand-alone lectures on public finance, and trainings.

For *Hungary*, Western Balkans is among the top priorities for development cooperation, and very recently UNDP has been proud to support a set of knowledge sharing activities on Roma inclusion, funded via the UNDP Hungary Trust Fund (a joint project of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNDP and HUN-IDA²¹⁸, which was operational from 2004 till 2013).

A programme package focusing on Roma inclusion and social cohesion (reflecting the Roma Integration Framework Strategy) was prepared in close cooperation with the Hungarian Ministry of Human Resources and UNDP country offices in target countries. Two study tours for participants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo²¹⁹ were organized in March and May 2013. Study visits included in-depth consultations and meetings, visits to relevant project sites and enabled the participants to familiarize themselves with the most significant national programs (including policy and strategies) and related projects. In May 2013, Hungarian Roma inclusion specialists visited Serbia in order to share knowledge with their Serbian colleagues. This programme was special in comparison to previous activities. It has grown into mutual learning and further cooperation on cross-border projects with Serbia has been initiated.

Romania is more active in the eastern part of the Balkan region, and has used other forms of supporting knowledge transfer that are worth highlighting. The Black Sea NGO Forum²²⁰ - that has reached this year its 6th edition. It is a knowledge sharing platform (supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian NGDO Platform (FOND) and UNDP among other partners). The Black Sea NGO Forum contributes to strengthening the dialogue and cooperation among NGOs in the Black Sea region by consolidating their capacity to influence national and regional development policies. Sustainability of its results can be proved by the number and caliber of projects that were generated by the Forum and the policy impact these projects have had at the national and regional level (at least 19 regional projects and 18 bilateral projects can be documented as being generated by the Forum). For example, one success story is Child Pact, the Regional Coalition for Child Protection in the Wider Black Sea Area. This regional initiative was crystallized in 2011 at the 4th edition of the Forum, when a

216 See Section on "Public Finance for Development" at <https://www.finance.gov.sk/en/>

217 DAC Special Review of the Slovak Republic. 2011

218 Hungarian International Development Assistance Non-profit Co. <http://en.hunida.hu/>

219 Here and later in the text referred to in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

220 ee: <http://www.fondromania.org/eng/pagini/3-1.php>

special panel was convened by World Vision to discuss the state of child protection reforms in the region and the status of the national coalitions. One of the panel's results was the decision of creating the Child Pact to address common challenges and to raise a common voice in relation to the EU, the regional bodies, international donors and other regional stakeholders.

Czech Republic is also systematically supporting the reform and transformation agenda in the Western Balkans. One important area where Czech Republic possesses strong expertise is in environmental protection and monitoring. For example, the Green House Gases Inventory in Kosovo (2011-2014 is a project of the UNDP Czech Trust Fund²²¹), allowing the Kosovo side to build expertise in GHG monitoring through targeted trainings, capacity building activities on the basis of Czech and international experience. The project has included a feasibility study analyzing the requirements for the preparation of the greenhouse gas inventory, and then produced a manual summarizing the inventory management system and designed and created a database of greenhouse gas emissions for all relevant areas, e.g. energy, agriculture, forestry, etc. The project also included the organization of several workshops on the methods used in the calculation of the greenhouse gas emissions for the local experts in Kosovo.

More generally, Czech Republic, which ranked first in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index²²² (mapping successful transformation processes to democracy and market economy in 2012), has allocated significant resources, including via the UNDP Czech Trust Fund to support knowledge sharing with the Western Balkans countries. Among others, this support has enabled Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to strengthen their national systems to prevent HIV; Montenegro – to start working on a more efficient state audit institution; and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – to construct its first efficient kindergarten.

These examples illustrate that knowledge and experience sharing programs funded by new EU donors can support important transformation efforts in the Western Balkans. In our view, important factors of success include rooting these efforts in a longer term programmatic perspective (which is achieved, inter alia, through partnerships with UNDP Country Offices); in strong partnerships with the NGOs and academia in the new EU donor countries, and in the partner countries; and finally the mutually beneficial nature of peer-to-peer exchange, in a way making these exchanges more similar to South-South (called East-East) cooperation than aid.

But could more be done?

CONCLUSION - could it work better?

In November 2012, the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank Institute, with the support of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organized in Prague a technical seminar "Sharing knowledge and transition experience for development: the view of New European Donors".

²²¹ See Section "Czech UNDP Trust Fund" at <http://europeandcis.undp.org/ourwork/partnerships/>

²²² See: <http://www.bti-project.de/>

The seminar, which brought together over fifty government officials, NGO representatives and researchers, took stock of the existing and potential channels of sharing the transition experience used by the new EU donors.

Importantly, the seminar has also helped identify ways to improve the impact of the transition knowledge and experience sharing of the new EU donors. Below they are presented in brief, based on the technical seminar's Summary Note²²³.

One area is the need for *clearer definitions, including what the transition experience actually entails*, why it's important and how it contributes to the European Neighborhood agenda. Related to this is the issue of raising the profile of Transition experience in EU Development Cooperation, which has already started to happen with the recent moves by the Member States and the EU communications. An important element is also codification of expertise, especially given the retirement of many of the reform practitioners of the 1990s.

Another area is creating *better feedback loops* about assistance in the form of knowledge sharing. This entails both formal monitoring and evaluations, but also a more systematic, "as-we-go" feedback from beneficiary countries and learning from failures. This is especially important so that the transition knowledge and experience sharing avoids the "cookie cutter" approach of so many of other aid programs, and actually has national priorities of the recipient country at heart. This will be especially important now that many of the knowledge and experience sharing programs enter a new stage in their activities.

A third dimension that requires attention is the *engagement of non-state actors*: the civil society and the private sector. NGOs are heavily involved already in transition experience sharing (mostly as contractor of the government). Yet, a healthy sense of competitiveness is needed, and so is the better ability of NGOs from new EU donors to access larger EU funding. The private sector is still hardly involved in the development cooperation of new EU donors more broadly, and specifically in the knowledge sharing programs.

Finally, the new EU donors agree that more sharing and learning between them is necessary, and so is an *increased coordination and cooperation*. This is especially important as the recent analysis commissioned by UNDP²²⁴ has shown that many of the new EU donors have very similar thematic (especially transition to democracy; fiscal reforms; civil society development; agriculture) and geographic (with Moldova, Georgia and Kosovo standing out as targets for assistance in the region) priorities. Coordination is about more exchanges of information but also about possibilities for joint programming, joint evaluations and joint applications for larger European funding to promote the sharing of transition related experience.

223 Summary Note of the Technical Seminar "Sharing knowledge and transition experience for development: the view of New European Donors". December 2012.

224 Sharing knowledge and transition experience for development: Mapping of selected new European donors. December 2012 (Report commissioned by UNDP and prepared by MESA-10, CRPE and CPM).

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Author: Dmitry Mariyasin, Team Leader, New Partnerships and Emerging Donors, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Center for Europe and the CIS, Bratislava, Slovakia

E-mail: dmitri.mariassin@undp.org

REVIEW

As the author states, the purpose of the paper „New EU donors and the Western Balkans: sharing knowledge and experience for development“ is to discuss the experience of several new EU Donors in sharing transition-related knowledge and experience and specific experiences of their support to the Western Balkans. Not a scientific research piece, the paper rather tries to summarize what UNDP has learnt over the years of partnering with new EU Member States and with the transition countries of the Western Balkans.

The paper is divided into four parts including theoretical background as well as practical examples. The conclusion reflects some recommendations for possible better cooperation in this field.

JUDr. Alexandra Strážnická, PhD., LL.M.

ROZVOJOVÉ VZDELÁVANIE AKO OBOJSMERNÝ PROCES

Dušan Ondrušek

ABSTRAKT

Koncepčný materiál „Príprava pracovníkov vysielaných v programoch rozvojovej a humanitárnej pomoci“, ktorý PDCS za pomoci pracovnej skupiny pripravilo pre Slovak Aid, pomenoval štyri menej rozvinuté okruhy kompetencií, ktoré by si – na rozdiel od tradične stavaných programov prípravy rozvojových pracovníkov - zaslúžili väčšiu pozornosť. Zdôraznil tiež, že určité kompetencie si možno osvojiť len z praktickými postupmi v niečom netradičnej prípravy budúcich rozvojových pracovníkov. V príspevku opisujeme pozitívne skúsenosti s netradičnými formátmi práce so študentmi v tomto smere. Opisujeme východiská programov: „Študentské simulačné soboty“, „Filmsemináre“ a „Čítame spolu“.

KLÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ:

rozvojové vzdelávanie- kompetencie- metódy v príprave študentov- simulácie- filmsemináre

ÚVOD

Nedávno som zažil smutno-smiešnu situáciu, ktorá symbolicky vypovedá o vnímaní rozvojovej spolupráce v slovenskej verejnosti. Známa slovenská rozvojová neziskovka pripravila seminár, v ktorom predstavila postupy a doterajšie výsledky svojich dlhodobých programov v Afganistane. Asi päťdesiatka ľudí obkolesila prezentujúcich a popri čaji a drobných afganských pochúťkach sledovala fotografie, krátky film a diskusiu slovenskej koordinátorky programov a jej dvoch mladších kolegov. Opisovali, ako sa už roky podieľajú na programoch vzdelávania afganských žien, na poľnohospodárskom projekte a na projekte rozvoja komunít vo vybraných provinciách. Podľa výzoru a spôsobu vyjadrovania sa zdalo, že akcia zaujala skôr menej konformnú časť mládeže, ľudí, ktorých oslovuje potreba skúšať niečo nové, poznávať vzdialené kultúry a nebáť sa ťažkostí. Zdalo sa, že obecenstvo je naladené počúvať, niečo sa dozvedieť a vyjadriť rešpekt mladým ľuďom, ktorí priniesli informáciu zložitej práci i radosti a o ženách v burkách. Snažili sa opísať podmienky práce vo vzdialenej krajine ako ťažké, ale zvládnuteľné, hovorili o striedaní radosti, utrpenia, o nekonečných pokusoch o obnovu a posun vpred. Prijemná diskusia sa ale po niekoľkých minútach začala točiť iným smerom.

Do diskusie sa prihlásila staršia pani, s tým, že chce podotknúť len jednu vec. Nasledovala záplava súvetí, z ktorých nebolo celkom jasné, či ide o vyjasňujúce otázky, tvrdenia alebo oponovanie. Jej súvetia sa kopili bez jasnej pointy a otázka či výpoveď prakticky bez nádychu znela asi takto: „... viete to je veľmi pekné, že tu rozprávate týmto mladým ľuďom, ale treba povedať aj "bė"... a však vy ste ešte mladá, neviete všetko o živote... tak by bolo dobré vedieť, že kto to platí, kto má záujem, aby naivní mladí ľudia, tam v tej krajine, ktorá je... a to si povedzme- aj tá teroristická

hrozba- však to je pekné, že vy im pomáhate pestovať med, ale je to skutočná pomoc, oproti tomu, čo všetko by bolo treba robiť, oveľa zásadnejšie sú problémy... a Slovensko je príliš malý hráč, a ten Šoroš, však vieme, vy nie, lebo ste mladá, ale spýtajte sa... a tiež by ste mohli povedať, či za tú činnosť tam, ste platení, lebo nerozumiem, prečo ľudia by išli bez peňazí, a aké sú tie záujmy o ktorých sa nehovorí, ako vy viete, že to čo robíte, čo sa snažíte, je to čo tí ľudia tam najviac potrebujú, lebo aj na Slovensku žijú ľudia v chudobe a to nik nechce vidieť, ani sa o tom nehovorí, neviem aké vy máte vzdelanie, alebo čo vás oprávňuje tam ísť, keď na Slovensku je toľko problémov..." Prezentujúca - skúsená rozvojová pracovníčka sa snažila túto zatrpknuto znejúcu pani zastaviť. Porozumieť, o čom mala byť otázka a slušne odpovedať na niektoré z tvrdení tejto návštevníčky. Hlavne skúsila zdôrazniť, že rozvojoví pracovníci sú v Afganistane na základe vlastného rozhodnutia, dobrovoľne, aj keď sú platení z programu organizácie, ktorá získava granty na základe transparentného a komplikovaného procesu otvorenej súťaže, aj z prostriedkov Slovak Aid, teda v zásade od slovenských daňových poplatníkov. Začala vysvetľovať, že miestne programy v Afganistane si nevymýšľajú a nenanucujú miestnym, ale sú súčasťou dlhodobějších programov a vychádzajú z analýz potrieb... Skôr než stihla dopovedať, staršia pani bez nádychu zopakovala podobnú sériu súvetí bez otáznika a potom sa, skôr než by si vypočula odpoveď, zdvihla a mrmľajúc opustila seminár.

1. OBOJSMERNÝ PROCES

Samotná situácia by nestála za zmienku, ak by necharakterizovala zásadný hodnotový stret a postoj, ktorý vidíme u mnohých ľudí na Slovensku. Väčšina ľudí na Slovensku teoreticky chápe, že chudobným treba pomáhať, deklaruje humanistické alebo charitatívne hodnoty. Ale pri strete s priamymi prejavmi konkrétnych krokov rozvojovej práce a pri potrebe uvažovať globálnejšie, ostáva zmätená. Prečo sa informácia o podobe reálnej pomoci v nejakej vzdialenej krajine stretáva u časti ľudí s toľkou nervozitou, spochybňovaním a niekedy až agresivitou? Prečo je rozšírené etatistické očakávanie, že "postarať sa má štát, nie ja? Prečo sa v takýchto diskusiách vynára potreba utvrdiť sa, že peniaze na filantropiu sú masovo zneužívané, prečo sa autentická snaha o dobrovoľnú či len symbolicky platenú prácu interpretuje ako nejaká konšpiračná forma skrytej agendy? Podpora rozvojového úsilia je na Slovensku podľa opakovaných výskumov z rokov 2009 a 2012 u slovenských občanov mierne horšia než je európsky priemer, ale rozdiely nie sú dramatické. 58 % Slovákov (a 44 % respondentov z EÚ) nemá žiadne znalosti o tom, akým spôsobom ich krajiny pomáhajú v rozvojových krajinách a 44 % Slovákov (v porovnaní s 54 % euroobčanov) tieto znalosti má (prieskum EB 77.4, 2012).

Možno je jedným z možných vysvetlení spochybňovania potreby rozvojovej pomoci a neporozumenia motivácii dobrovoľných či profesionálnych pracovníkov pôsobiacich v tejto oblasti fakt, že svojím konaním predstavujú výzvu pre pasívnych a do svojho sveta uzavretých občanov. Prijatá predstava, že sa nejakí mladí ľudia zmysluplne angažujú vo svete, ktorý je plný zvykov a kultúry inej než tá "naša", môže byť náročné. Uvažovať o svete, ktorý je mnohými ľuďmi vnímaný ako cudzí a teda ohrozujúci a nepriateľský, je pre veľa tradične vychovaných Slovákov ťažké. Aby si uchovali sebaúctu a nezažívali kognitívnu disonanciu, musia znehodnotiť, nivelizovať takéto úsilia, spochybniť životné štýly a motiváciu tých, ktorí sa o vonkajší svet úprimne zaujímajú. Paniku môžu spôsobovať hodnoty, ktoré sú vnímané ako výzva a preto radšej interpretované tak, že mladí ľudia, ktorí sa vydávajú do rozvojového sveta, znehodnocujú istoty ich doterajších životov. Preto býva informácia, že sa niekto pokúša vykročiť z uzavretého sveta "slovenskej malosti" pre časť ľudí tak znepokojujúca, preto vyvoláva tak silné emócie.

Ukazuje sa, že okrem vzdelávacej prípravy rozvojových pracovníkov a vzdelávania cieľovej populácie, kde Slovensko realizuje rozvojové a humanitárne projekty sa oveľa väčšia pozornosť má venovať bežnej slovenskej populácii. Tento typ vzdelávania svoje ciele nedosiahne mediálnou osvetou, či občasnými kampaňami. Zmenené trochu citlivejšie postoje a porozumenie globálnej zodpovednosti sa dosahuje až po rokoch (a možno desaťročiach) otvárania sa svetu, zodpovedného správania sa vrcholových politických a morálnych autorít, ktorí môžu fungovať ako rolový model a tiež na základe celospoločenského diskurzu, dlhodobých diskusií a programov na všetkých úrovniach školského vzdelávania a mimoškolských programov.

V tomto zmysle sa ukazuje sa, že rozvojové vzdelávanie je obojsmerný proces, pomocou a spoluprácou navonok, mimo fyzické a kultúrne hranice Slovenska, vzdelávame aj sami seba. Slovensko si tak môže osvojiť citlivejší a globálne zodpovednejší postoj ku svetu.

2. KĽÚČOVÉ ZANEDBÁVANÉ KOMPETENCIE V ROZVOJOVEJ PRÍPRAVE

Pred tromi rokmi sme sa na základe ročnej série diskusií pracovnej skupiny zostavenej z odborníkov neziskových rozvojových organizácií pokúsili pomenovať, ktoré z dôležitých oblastí prípravy pracovníkov vysielaných na rozvojové misie, sú nedostatočne rozvinuté, napriek tomu, že prax poukazuje na ich potrebu. Výstupom tohto projektu bol koncepčný materiál „Príprava pracovníkov vysielaných v programoch rozvojovej a humanitárnej pomoci. (PDCS, Slovak Aid, Bratislava 2010, 55s.)

Konštatovali sme, že rozsah a druh prípravy ľudí, vysielaných na rozvojové misie sa rôzni od krátkodobého zaškolenia, konzultácií, odovzdávania informácií od skúsenejších kolegov, cez absolvovanie špecializačných kurzov ako napr. odborný tropický kurz pre lekárov, oboznámenie s kontextom krajiny, jej zdravotnými či bezpečnostnými rizikami až po dlhodobejšiu a vopred štruktúrovanú prípravu pozostávajúcu zo série školení, tréningov, konzultácií a prípadne supervízie.

Po dlhých diskusiách došlo v pracovnej skupine k všeobecnej zhode, že žiadny akokoľvek sofistikovaný program nemôže byť univerzálny a nemôže mať ambíciu pripraviť rozvojových a humanitárnych pracovníkov a pracovníčky na všetky aspekty kompetencií, ktoré budú potrebovať vo svojej praxi. Navyše proces prípravy má podobu celoživotného vzdelávania a celoživotného profesionálneho rastu, takže okrem prípravy, ktorá predchádza pôsobenie pracovníka v zahraničnej misii, sú potrebné aj iné podoby jeho ďalšej profesionálnej podpory v podobe koučovania, supervízie a intervízie a tiež samoštúdia a členstva v neformálnych samo-organizovaných spoločenstvách, ktoré združujú záujemcov o ďalší profesionálny rast napríklad v podobe „komunit praxe“ (*communities of practice*). Napriek potrebe špecializovaného vzdelávania a špecializovanej prípravy existuje zhoda na tom, že potrebné kompetencie možno deliť na úrovne (minimálne a nadstavbové) a že povedľa špecifických kompetencií existujú aj univerzálne kompetencie, ktoré majú „prierezový“ charakter, t.j. ich kultivovanie je potrebné pre všetkých rozvojových a humanitárnych pracovníkov a pracovníčky bez ohľadu na charakter ich činnosti a región, v ktorom budú pôsobiť.

Výsledkom tejto analýzy bolo aj pomenovanie štyroch najdôležitejších okruhov prierezových kompetencií, ktoré v súčasnej príprave často nebyvajú dostatočne pokryté. Vznikol aj návrh osnov pre tréningové programy zamerané na ich rozvoj. Štyri menej rozvinuté okruhy kompetencií, ktoré by si – na rozdiel od tradične stavaných programov prípravy rozvojových pracovníkov – zaslúžili väčšiu pozornosť boli:

- A. Citlivosť na kontexty v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci.** Koncepty rozvojovej a humanitárnej pomoci, rola pracovníkov, osobná disponovanosť na prácu, mapovanie situácie a plánovanie intervencie, evaluácia rozvojových/humanitárnych intervencií, etické dilemy v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci a pod.
- B. Medzikultúrna citlivosť a medzikultúrna komunikácia v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci.** Konflikt kultúr v rozvojovej práci, prevencia a riešenie kultúrnych konfliktov, medzikultúrna citlivosť v projektoch na základe príkladov skúseností s prícoi s menšinami a väčšinami v zahraničí a na Slovensku a pod.
- C. Citlivosť na konflikty v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci.** Aspekty analýzy konfliktov, analýzy kontextu a dopadov pomoci na konflikt, dizajn alternatív voči nevhodným intervenciám v projektoch, prístup *“Do no Harm”*, a pod.
- D. Otázky bezpečnosti a zdravia v rozvojovej práci.** Vyhodnocovanie rizika, bezpečnostné prístupy, kultúrne a situačné povedomie o mieste pôsobenia, bezpečné správanie a reagovanie na bezpečnostné incidenty, zdravotná príprava pre výjazdom, zdravie a hygiena v teréne, psychohygiena, vyrovnávanie sa so stresom a pod.

Je zjavné, že veľkú časť týchto tematických okruhov si nemožno osvojiť teoretickými prednáškami. Ich osvojenie si vyžaduje čo najväčšiu prax, kultivovanie skúseností a participatívne, interaktívne učenie sa prostredníctvom praxe, modelovania, praktického skúšania a rozvíjania zručností. Stojíme pred mimoriadne náročnou úlohou – ako si napríklad osvojiť nasledovné zručnosti (uvádzame príklad takých, kde je prax a interaktívne osvojovanie si úplne zásadné) :

- Vysporiadanie sa s kultúrnou diverzitou v práci s menšinami alebo projektovými partnermi (konceptia 6 štádií kultúrnej citlivosti Milтона Benetta)
- Kultúrne citlivé intervencie a intervencie do konfliktov, ktoré sú etnicky alebo kultúrne sýtené, také, ktoré v rozvojovej práci vznikajú na základe hodnotových odlišností a odlišných sociálnych noriem, prípadne také, kde je prítomné priame, štruktúrne a kultúrne násilie (konceptia J. Galtunga)
- Ako pracovať s prístupmi občianskej diplomacie (third track / civic diplomacy), ako praktizovať vyjednávanie, mediáciu a zmierovanie v projektoch rozvojovej pomoci
- Identifikovanie rozdeľujúcich a spájajúcich faktorov (miestne kapacity pre mier) a analýza dopadov konfliktov cez presuny zdrojov a cez implicitné etické odkazy v rámci prístupu Do No Harm (podľa M.B. Anderson)
- Nástroje a metódy rozvojovej pomoci (napr. priama rozpočtová podpora pôžičky, grantová podpora, vysielanie ľudí, presuny zdrojov, vzdelávanie atď.)
- Reflexia vlastných stereotypov a ako s nimi narábať
- Rodové aspekty v praxi rozvojových/humanitárnych pracovníkov a pracovníčok
- Možné roly rozvojových pracovníkov : líder/vykonávateľ, poradca, vzdelávateľ, tretostranný procesový expert (napr. facilitátor). Možnosti a limity pôsobenia v role „vonkajšieho aktéra“
- Etické dilemy v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci

To sú samozrejme len ilustračné príklady. Oblasť, špecifických zručností, ktoré si vyžadujú praktické učenie je veľké množstvo. Ale je to možné – chceme sa podeliť s menej tradičnými prístupmi, ktoré považujeme za účinné.

3. TRI NETRADIČNÉ SPÔSOBY PRÍPRAVY MLADÝCH PROFESIONÁLOV PRE ROZVOJOVÚ PRÁCU (ODPORÚČANIA)

Niekoľko posledných rokov pracujeme v PDCS vo zvýšenej miere s prípravou mladých ľudí pre rozvojovú prácu. Veľmi výrazne pracujeme s mladými profesionálmi – študentmi VŠ, doktorandmi a začínajúcimi profesionálmi pred alebo tesne po ich prvej misii v zahraničí. Rozhodli sme sa experimentovať nie len s obsahmi tejto prípravy ale aj s netradičnými formami dlhodobej prípravy v tomto smere. Sme radi, že sa môžeme podeliť s úspešnou skúsenosťou troch takýchto netradičných prístupov : skúsenosťami z projektov: „Študentské simulačné soboty“, „Filmsemináre“ a „Čítame spolu“. Každý z nich stručne opíšeme.

A. ŠTUDENSKÉ SIMULAČNÉ SOBOTY

Tento projekt realizujeme už tretí rok, každý rok sa doň pridáva ďalšia cca 25-členná skupina vysokoškolákov, doktorandov a mladých profesionálov so záujmom o rozvojovú problematiku, ktorí majú ambíciu aktívne sa realizovať v rozvojovej a humanitárnej práci, alebo v riešení komunitných či verejných konfliktov. V prvý rok projektu sme sa stretli s enormným záujmom študentov, namiesto plánovaných 20 ľudí sa na ňom zúčastnilo takmer 50 študentov. Ďalší rok skupina absolventov tohto cyklu pokračuje v simuláciách a workshopoch, prehlbuje si zručnosti a navyše už aj sama pripravuje program pre skupinu začiatočníkov. Workshopy prebiehajú raz mesačne – niektorú v sobotu. Každý workshop spočíva z teoretického úvodu a pozretia si kratších filmov k špecifickej problematike, nasleduje oboznámenie sa s kontextom konfliktu a v ďalšej časti dňa sa vždy uskutoční iná 4-5 hodinová rolová hra. Ide o praktickú simuláciu, v ktorej si účastníci na základe prehľadného a analýzy reálneho konfliktu z nejakého regiónu v špecifickom kultúrnom kontexte, prakticky skúšajú ako postupovať. Účastníci prehrávajú situácie oblečení (aspoň náznakovo) v kostýmoch príslušnej krajiny a prehrávanej roly, typickej pre nejakú skupinu. Zvyšok času v ten deň je venovaný hodnoteniu a spätnej väzbe (evaluácii). Príprava na workshop prebieha aj pred samotným dňom – študenti vždy cca 10 dní pred samotným workshopom dostanú mailom základný balíček na čítanie a prípravu opisujúci situáciu aj teoretické prístupy aplikované na špecifický konflikt alebo rozvojovú dilemu v praxi.

Po absolvovaní série workshopov začínajú účastníci disponovať základnými poznatkami a zručnosťami. (ARIA, bilaterálne vyjednávanie, mnohostranné vyjednávanie, zapojenie žien do riešenia konfliktov) a zručnosťami, ktoré zvýšia ich možnosti jednak práce v oblasti riešenia konfliktov alebo iných rozvojových výziev. V procese týchto praktických simulácií sa učia ako riadiť a facilitovať konflikt – či už dvojstranný alebo viacstranný. Každý z účastníkov si minimálne na jednom workshope vyskúša úlohu mediátora. Role zainteresovaných ich pripraví na rôzne situácie, ktoré sa v konflikte môžu vyskytnúť. Účastníci z pokročilej skupiny na konci disponujú rozšíreným balíkom zručností, ktorý im umožní aktívne sa uchádzať o prácu v oblasti rozvojovej spolupráce tak doma, ako aj v zahraničí.

Simulácie, ktorými účastníci kurzov prešli sa týkali napríklad takýchto okruhov: Izrael/Palestína (prístup na Chrámový horu), Libéria (povojnový a náboženský konflikt), Cyprus (mnohostranné vyjednávacie tímy a práca s politickými stranami), Nepál (neregulované vyjednávania s predstaviteľmi komunít), Gruzínsko/Abcházsko (a práca s IDPs), práca v rámci Rómskej osady apod.

Expertnú úroveň workshopov zabezpečili externí a interní pracovníci PDCS so osobnou skúsenosťou s rozvojovou prácou a mierovými riešením konfliktov, priamymi pracovnými skúsenosťami v analyzovaných krajinách/regiónoch. Situáciu v preberanej krajine účastníkom približujú priamo ľudia z tej krajiny – najčastejšie pomocou rozhovoru cez

skype, ako aj experti, ktorí tam pôsobili. V doterajších skúsenostiach sa veľmi osvedčila hravá metóda kombinovaná s osvojením si lokálnych mien, improvizovaným lokálnym ošatením, pozeraním tematických krátkych filmov a provizórnym občerstvením v duchu región (napr. mäťový čaj zo severnej Afriky, „burek“ z Palestíny, čaj „masala“ z Nepálu, a podobne). Tieto pomôcky vedú k hlbšiemu sa vžitiu účastníkov do rolí a k živšej diskusii.

Niekoľko dní pred workshopom (cca týždeň) dostanú účastníci elektronicky základné prehľadové materiály popisujúce daný región, konflikt, realie, spolu s úvodom do príslušného teoretického prístupu, na ktorý sa účastníci zamerajú v počas príslušného workshopu. Tieto informácie sú určené na zoznámenie sa s problematikou a zvýšia úroveň používaných argumentov v diskusiách. Počas samotnej simulácie účastníci dostávajú inštrukcie k simulácii a opis rolí (cca 20s. ďalšieho špecifického textu.)

Účastníci simulačných sobôt mimoriadne oceňujú vzdelávaciu a zážitkovú formu prenikania do problematiky, výber hostí z príslušnej krajiny a možnosť späťnej väzby k svojmu správaniu v roli. Počas posledných rokov funguje aj veľmi aktívna polo- uzavretá facebooková skupina, kde si títo účastníci vymieňajú materiály a intenzívne diskutujú aj v medzičase stretnutí.

B. FILMSEMINÁRE

Vizuálna kultúra, odovzdávanie informácií obrazom je jednoznačný trend generácie Y ako aj najmladšej generácie GenNet. Obrazy, ikonografika a filmy majú oveľa väčšiu silu a rozšírenosť, než tradičné formy učenia. Rozhodli sme sa rešpektovať tento jav. Tak vznikol nápad učiť sa o rozvoji a diskutovať aj pomocou filmových dokumentov.

Filmsemináre sa stali tradíciou PDCS, veríme, že najväčší ošoh a poznatkový zisk prináša pozeranie dokumentárnych filmov, ktoré je sprevádzané cieľenou diskusiou a výmenou názorov. V pravidelných intervaloch umožňujeme záujemcom o problematiku rozvojovej pomoci, riešenia konfliktov a interkultúrny dialóg, aby sme si počas jedného poobedia príp. večera v študijnej projekcii pozreli – spravidla 3-4 dokumenty na spoločnú tému (napr. Čo sa deje v Sýrii?, On-line aktivizmus, Meniaca sa rola žien v rozvojovej práci, Migranti z Afriky apod.) Po každom dokumente nasleduje diskusia prítomných a niekedy aj analýza ako je možné postupovať v situácii, ktorá je zobrazená v dokumente. Zvlášť hodnotné sú momenty, keď sa premietania a diskusie zúčastnia aj ľudia z krajiny alebo regiónu, ktorý je zobrazený vo filme, príp. niekto z autorov alebo tvorcov dokumentu. Malá skupina účastníkov umožňuje typ a kvalitu diskusie, ktorá nie vždy je možná napríklad pri veľkých projekciách v rámci festivalov.

Mimoriadne efektívny učebný efekt má táto aktivita aj pre študenta, ktorý vyberá tému stretnutia, konkrétne filmy, a pripraví si vstupné slovo a moderovanie diskusie k vybraným filmom.

C. ČÍTAME SPOLU

Projekt „Čítame spolu“ je aktivita PDCS zameraná na stretávanie sa spoločné čítanie a diskusie polootvorenej skupiny záujemcov o problematiku transformácie konfliktov, medzi-kultúrneho porozumenia a peacebuildingu.

Od roku 2012 sa 10-20 členná skupina rôznorodých ľudí, ktorých spája zvedavosť, záujem poznávať, nesebeckosť a schopnosť uvažovať o prečítanom stretáva raz mesačne na 2 hodiny. Na každom stretnutí sa skupina venuje jednej knihe - tej, ktorá sa po predchádzajúcej dohode číta v ten mesiac. Na stretnutí každý z prihlásených asi na 5 min porozpráva o myšlienke, ktorá ho zaujala v kapitole z čítanej knihy, ktorú si vopred vybral a prečítal. Po tomto referovaní nasleduje spoločná asi hodinová diskusia „čítajúcich“ a ostatných prítomných o myšlienkach a súvisiacich s knihou.

Mesiac pred týmto stretnutím si záujemcovia na uzavretej webovej stránke pozrú ponuku kapitol, vyberú kapitolu z knihy toho mesiaca a zaviazu sa, že o nej prídu poreferovať (prístup ku knihe zabezpečí PDCS). Zloženie aktuálnej skupiny „čitateľov“ a „diskutujúcich“ sa v každý štvrtok mierne mení (podľa záujmu o knihu a časových možností účastníkov). Po niekoľkých stretnutiach sa vytvorila širšia skupina asi 40 záujemcov o občasnú účasť a skupina 5-6 „nadšených čitateľov“, ktorí nevynechajú ani jedno stretnutie.

Skupina tak ročne prečíta a prediskutuje 12 kníh a hlavné myšlienky z prečítaných kníh sú občas zachytené aj na stránke facebookovej skupiny, takže sa k nim dostanú aj záujemcovia, ktorí sa nemohli zúčastniť na čítaní. O výbere kníh na čítanie z tematickej ponuky projektu „Čítame spolu“ rozhoduje samotná skupina. Takto sa spoločne čítali a diskutovali napríklad knižky „Free expression is no offence“ (ed. Lisa Appignanesi), keďže aj v súvislosti s demonštráciami proti filmu „Nevinnosť muslimov“ je v spoločnosti potrebná diskusia o potrebe či hraniciach slobody vyjadrenia. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (Paul Collier), *Mírotvorkyne* : jedenáct portrétů žen z celosvětového mírového hnutí (Ute Scheub) , *When Talk Works: Profiles of Mediators* (ed. Deborah Kolb and associates), *Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies* (Ed.: Tristan Anne Borer) a ďalšie. Spoločné čítanie nie len rozvíja poznávanie a záujem, ale je aj vysoko motivačný spôsob, ktorý vedie ľudí k zdieľaniu, učeniu sa ako deliberovať a konštruktívne s rešpektom k iným názorom diskutovať aj o citlivejších témach a ko sa učiť počúvať druhých- všetko to čo rozvojoví pracovníci potrebujú ako soľ.

ZÁVER

Tri spomenuté prístupy z našej praxe nie sú všeliakom a pochopiteľne nestačia. Ale vnímame ich ako malé úspešné kroky k scitlivovaniu budúcich rozvojových pracovníkov vo svete , ktorý potrebuje schopnosť vyrovnávať sa ambiguitou, odolnosť a hodnotové zázemie, o ktorom treba opakovane uvažovať.

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Kol.: Príprava pracovníkov vysielaných v programoch rozvojovej a humanitárnej pomoci. PDCS, Slovak Aid, Bratislava 2010 (Podkladové texty k diskusii pripravili Juraj Jančovič, Dária Pecháčková, Ján Mihálik, Dušan Ondrušek, Zuzana Polačková a Milan Zbořil na základe diskusií pracovnej skupiny.)

Autor: Dušan Ondrušek – prezident PDCS, Slovensko
E-mail: dusan@pdcS.sk

RECENZIA

Autor v svojom príspevku „Rozvojové vzdelávanie ako obojsmerný proces“ opisuje niektoré pozitívne skúsenosti s netradičnými formami práce so študentmi v oblasti rozvojovej pomoci. Poukazuje na potrebu venovať vyššiu pozornosť niektorým kompetenciám v oblasti citlivosti. Najväčší prínos práce vidím v tom, že prináša praktické skúsenosti z niektorých netradičných projektov, akými sú študentské simulačné soboty, filmsemináre alebo čítame spolu.

Ing. Eva Jančíková, PhD.

STAV A PERSPEKTÍVY SLOVENSKEJ OFICIÁLNEJ ROZVOJOVEJ POMOCI V SRBSKEJ REPUBLIKE

**Jana Radakovič
Dragiša Mijačič**

ABSTRAKT

Tento článok opisuje históriu vývoja bilaterálnych vzťahov medzi Slovenskom a Srbskom v kontexte pôsobenia slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci v období od Bratislavského procesu až po súčasnosť, neskôr prezentuje kritický pohľad na postupné znižovanie objemu slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci v Srbsku.

Otázka znie, či pre Srbsko udelenie štatútu kandidátskej krajiny na členstvo v EÚ má byť signálom k zníženiu objemu finančných prostriedkov slovenskej rozvojovej pomoci, alebo je to šanca pre významnú intervenciu SAMRS v oblasti poskytovania technickej podpory v negociačnom procese Srbskej republiky s EÚ? Taktiež je otázkou či stiahnutie slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci je v súlade s cieľmi zahraničnej politiky Vlády Slovenskej republiky.

V rámci článku sme sa pokúsili dať odpoveď na niektoré z uvedených otázok, pričom z pohľadu Srbska ako recipienta slovenskej ODA chceme poukázať na oblasti, v ktorých slovenská oficiálna rozvojová pomoc má komparatívne výhody v porovnaní s inými bilaterálnymi donormi v Srbsku.

KLÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ

Oficiálna rozvojová pomoc, efektívnosť pomoci, mimovládne organizácie, zahraničná politika, európske integrácie

ZOZNAM SKRATIEK

ODA	Official development assistance/ Oficiálna rozvojová pomoc
SAMRS	Slovenská agentúra pre medzinárodnú rozvojovú spoluprácu
EÚ	Európska únia
SEIO	Úrad pre európsku integráciu Vlády Srbskej republiky
OECD	Organizácia pre hospodársku spoluprácu a rozvoj
DACU	Jednotka pre koordináciu rozvojovej pomoci
ISDACON	Medzirezortná pracovná skupina pre koordináciu humanitárnej a rozvojovej pomoci
IPA	Instrument for pre-accession assistance/ Nástroj predstupovej pomoci
SIDA	Švédská medzinárodná rozvojová agentúra

CIDA	Kanadská medzinárodná rozvojová agentúra
ADA	Rakúska rozvojová agentúra
NPORP SR	Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky
MZVaEZ SR	Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí a európskych záležitostí Slovenskej republiky
MSP	Malé a stredné podniky

ÚVOD

1. HISTÓRIA SLOVENSKEJ ROZVOJOVEJ POMOCI V SRBSKU V OBDOBÍ ROKOV OD 2003 DO 2012

Koncom roku 2000, po rokoch izolácie, nefunkčného hospodárstva, zruinovanej infraštruktúry a zbedačeného obyvateľstva, medzinárodné spoločenstvo začalo výraznejšie poskytovať podporu a pomoc Srbskej republike. V prvých rokoch donorská pomoc bola usmernená najmä na uspokojovanie základných potrieb krajiny, na humanitárnu pomoc, zaplatenie dlhov voči postihnutému obyvateľstvu, na podporu dovozu elektrickej energie, na obnovu energetického systému v krajine, na obstarávanie nedostatkových liekov; cieľom bolo podporiť srbskú vládu, aby sa dosiahla celková obnova sociálneho a ekonomického života v krajine.²²⁵ V období od roku 2000 do 2011, oficiálna rozvojová pomoc v Srbsku predstavovala viac ako 8 miliárd eur.²²⁶ Skoršie analýzy naznačujú, že v období rokov od 2007 do 2011 oficiálna rozvojová pomoc Srbsku predstavovala približne 4,2 miliárd eur, z ktorých 1,8 miliardy eur je pridelených vo forme grantov a 2,4 miliardy eur vo forme v úverov. V tomto období bolo realizovaných 1432 projektov, z ktorých 1346 išlo na granty a 86 na pôžičky.

Európska únia je najväčším aktérom v poskytovaní finančnej pomoci Srbsku. V období rokov 2000 až 2011, EÚ vyčlenila pre Srbsko 6,5 miliardy eur, z ktorých bolo realizovaných 4,6 mld eur, resp. 70,8%.²²⁷ Popri Európskej únii, významnými aktérmi sú rozvojové agentúry krajín Nemecka (GIZ), USA (USAID), Číny, Talianska, Švédskeho kráľovstva (SIDA), Nórskeho kráľovstva, Slovenskej republiky (SAMRS), Kanady (CIDA), Španielskeho kráľovstva, Českej republiky, ale aj medzinárodné finančné inštitúcie (EIB, EBRD i Svetová Banka).

V tomto kontexte, spolupráca medzi Slovenskom a Srbskom sa rozbehla už v júli 2000 pri spustení tzv. Bratislavského procesu - programu pre demokratickú Juhosláviu, ktorý prispel k naštartovaniu demokratických zmien vo vtedajšej Juhoslovenskej zväzovej republike.

Táto spolupráca sa zintenzívňuje na zasadnutí donorov v novembri 2003 v Bruseli. Slovenská republika predstavila strategický plán „Stratégiu pomoci pre Srbsko a Čiernu Horu“, ktorý definoval priority ODA. Strategické dokumenty “Strednodobá stratégia oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky pre obdobie rokov 2003 - 2008”, neskôr

225 http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/publikacije/deset_godina_razvojne_pomoci.pdf

226 Ćurkovic, V. i Mijačić, D. (2012) ²Impact Assessment of EU Financial Assistance to the Republic of Serbia: Time for Change², dostupné na: http://lokalnirazvoj.org/upload/Report/Document/2013_05/INTER_Impact_Assessment_of_EU_Financial_Assistance_in_Serbia_ENG.pdf, posledná návšteva: 13. september 2013

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“Strednodobá stratégia oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky pre obdobie rokov 2009 - 2013”, Národné programy rozvojovej pomoci na obdobie rokov 2003 až 2013, finančné memorandum, ktoré definuje konkrétne podmienky a výšku pridelených finančných prostriedkov na každý rok, predstavujú právny rámec bilaterálnej rozvojovej spolupráce medzi Slovenskom a Srbskom.

Podľa údajov SAMRS, v období rokov od 2003 do 2012 na území Srbska bolo realizovaných 104 projektov vo výške 13. 286.104, 38 € a 118 mikrograntov (do 5.000,00 €) vo výške 1.828.259,10 €.

Slovenská bilaterálna rozvojová spolupráca v Srbsku v číslach²²⁸

Rok	Počet projektov	Schválená dotácia ODA (u €)	Počet schválených mikrograntov	Schválená dotácia ODA na mikrogranty (u €)
2004 – 2006	65	7.292.000,00	12	1.489.000,00
2007	10	1.979.000,00		
2008	14	1.853.000,00	12	49.653,00
2009	11	1.718.000,00	20	60.993,00
2010	1	160.662,78	29	131.100,58
2011	1	95.105,60	23	
2012	2	188.336,00	22	97.512,52
celkom	104	13.286.104,38	118	1.828.259,10

V roku 2009, bolo v Srbsku schválených 11 projektov vo výške 1,718 miliónov eur, z toho sa 5 projektov vzťahovalo na oblasť infraštruktúry, 2 projekty sa realizovali v oblasti budovania občianskej spoločnosti, pomoc pri integrácii srbských subjektov do medzinárodných organizácií bola udelená pre 3 projekty a 1 projekt bol realizovaný v oblasti podpory a rozvoja podnikania. V roku 2010 bol schválený len jeden projekt vo výške 247.192,00 eur a pokrýval oblasť infraštruktúry, konkrétne energiu z obnoviteľných zdrojov – solárne kolektory. V roku 2011, Srbsku bol odsúhlasený len jeden projekt vo výške 95.105,60 eur v oblasti euroatlantických integrácii a bezpečnosti v Juhovýchodnej Európe. A na záver, rok 2012 bol o niečo úspešnejší s 2 projektmi v celkovej výške 188.336,00 ktoré sa vzťahovali na budovanie trhového hospodárstva a rozvoj demokratických inštitúcií.

Slovensko sa členstvom v EÚ (2004) a v OECD (2000) automaticky stalo súčasťou spoločného európskeho systému medzinárodnej rozvojovej pomoci rešpektujúc smernice OECD v oblasti koordinácie donorskej pomoci. Donorská pomoc Slovenskej republiky Srbsku je v súlade s OECD procedúrami s ohľadom na skutočnosť, že sa Srbsko

228 Výročná správa SAMRS za uvedené obdobie, http://www.mzv.sk/sk/ministerstvo/publikacie_a_vyrocnne_spravy-vyrocnne_spravy bez_ujadov za_rok_2007_a_2011_ku_ktorym_sme_nemali_pristup

nachádza na zozname výboru pre rozvojovú pomoc ODA, konkrétne v kategórii stredne rozvinutých krajín, spolu s Čiernou Horou, Bosnou a Hercegovinou.²²⁹

2. MECHANIZMY KOORDINÁCIE MEDZINÁRODNEJ ROZVOJOVEJ SPOLUPRÁCE NA ÚROVNI SRBSKEJ REPUBLIKY

V ranných fázach plánovania a realizácie oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci pre Srbskú republiku iniciatíva bola na strane donorov. Projekty, iniciatívy a mechanizmy pre koordináciu ich aktivít vo veľkej miere vychádzali z návrhov donorov. Bolo to tak aj v prípade slovenskej bilaterálnej rozvojovej pomoci.

Vláda Srbskej republiky od samotného začiatku pracovala na zavedení mechanizmov pre plánovanie a koordinované programovanie zahraničnej rozvojovej pomoci. S týmto cieľom je v novembri 2000 založená *Jednotka pre koordináciu rozvojovej pomoci* (Development and Aid Co-ordination Unit – DACU) v rámci Ministerstva pre ekonomické vzťahy so zahraničím RS s cieľom zviditeľniť národné priority v úzkej spolupráci s partnermi v oblasti oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci. Od mája 2007 do júla 2010 bola DACU pod ingerenciou Ministerstva financií, a v roku 2010 táto Jednotka prechádza do kompetencie Úradu pre európsku integráciu vlády Republiky Srbska, ktorá v rámci Úradu pôsobí ako Sektor pre plánovanie, programovanie, monitorovanie a podávanie správ o fondoch EÚ a rozvojovej pomoci.²³⁰

Uznesením Vlády Srbskej republiky v septembri 2003 založená je medzirezortná pracovná skupina pre koordináciu humanitárnej a rozvojovej pomoci ISDACON (Inter Sector Development and Aid Co-ordination Network). Cieľom tejto siete je uľahčiť komunikáciu a výmenu informácií o rozvojovej a medzinárodnej pomoci v rámci verejnej správy. ISDACON sieť predstavujú zástupcovia všetkých relevantných ministerstiev s kompetenciou a právomocami aktívne programovať, koordinovať, riadiť a monitorovať realizáciu medzinárodnej pomoci v rámci svojich sektorov. Okrem ISDACON siete, v roku 2004 rozbíha sa aj informačný systém ISDACON ako riadiaci nástroj pre zlepšenie plánovania a monitorovania medzinárodnej pomoci.²³¹

S cieľom zlepšiť účinnosť a efektívnosť medzinárodnej rozvojovej pomoci, vláda Srbskej republiky pripravila a schválila dva strednodobé dokumenty pre plánovanie, ktoré definujú priority pre oblasť medzinárodnej pomoci. V roku 2001 schválila dokument s názvom „Reformný program v Srbsku - požiadavky na medzinárodnú finančnú pomoc“, a v roku 2003 schválila dokument s názvom „Srbsko v pohybe - o tri roky neskôr“. Od roku 2007, strategické priority pre oblasť medzinárodnej pomoci sú stanovené v trojročnom plánovacom dokumente s názvom „Potreby Srbskej republiky pre medzinárodnú pomoc“, ktorý sa každoročne reviduje zahŕňajúc aktivity celého jedného

229 DAC List of ODA Receipts, dostupný na: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/DAC%20List%20used%20for%202012%20and%202013%20flows.pdf>, posledná návšteva: 12. september 2013

230 SEIO (2011) „Deset godina razvojne pomoći Republici Srbiji“, dostupné na: http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/publikacije/deset_godina_razvojne_pomoci.pdf, posledná návšteva: 12. september 2013. g.

231 Informačný systém ISDACON je možné nájsť na internet adrese <http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Evropa/PublicSite/index.aspx>, posledná návšteva: 12. septembar 2013.g.

roku.²³² V súčasnosti sa pracuje na novom dokumente, ktorý zdefiniuje nové potreby Srbskej republiky pre oficiálnu rozvojovú pomoc od 2014.

Harmonizácia strategických dokumentov týkajúcich sa oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci medzi Slovenskom ako donorom a Srbskom ako recipientom prebieha v súlade s Parížskou deklaráciou, ktorú donori a prijímatelia ODA prijali na Fóre o účinnosti pomoci, ktoré sa konalo v Paríži, v marci 2005. Srbský „Úrad pre európske integrácie“ venuje značnú pozornosť tomu, aby stratégie a priority Srbskej republiky boli maximálne zosúladené s programovými dokumentmi Európskej únie, multilaterálnych a bilaterálnych donorov aktívne pôsobiach na území Srbska. Za týmto účelom, Úrad pre európske integrácie organizuje pravidelné stretnutia s predstaviteľmi všetkých donorských krajín, vrátane Slovenskej republiky.

3. VÝZVY SLOVENSKEJ OFICIÁLNEJ ROZVOJOVEJ POMOCI V SRBSKU

A. ZNÍŽENIE OBJEMU SLOVENSKEJ ROZVOJOVEJ POMOCI SRBSKEJ REPUBLIKE

Objem slovenskej ODA Srbsku sa znižuje. „Strednodobá stratégia oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky pre obdobie 2009 - 2013“ definuje Srbsko ako jednu z troch programových krajín spolu s Afganistanom a Keňou.

Podľa výročných správ SAMRS za obdobie rokov 2009 - 2012, informácie o počte odsúhlasených projektov a rozsahu finančných prostriedkov schválených na ich prefinancovanie poukazujú na značné disproporcie čo sa týka jednotlivých programových krajín. Trend pomoci Srbsku sa od roku 2009 výrazne znižuje pričom v rovnakom období objem pomoci pre Keňu sa zvyšuje.

Distribúcia slovenskej ODA v programových krajinách (2009-2012)

Krajina	2009		2010		2011		2012	
	Počet projektov	€	Počet projektov	€	Počet projektov	€	Počet projektov	€
Afganistan	4	570.487	2	479.849	3	796.316	3	547.775
Keňa	5	680.480	6	1.162.000	6	1.425.000	5	1.114.000
Srbsko	11	1.718.000	1	247.192	1	95.106	2	188.336

Zdroj: Údaje z výročných správ SAMRS za uvedené obdobie

V Národnom programe oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR na rok 2011 Srbsko pozíciu programovej krajiny stráca aj napriek tomu, že potreba podporiť túto krajinu v procese reforiem je stále veľmi aktuálna. Srbská republika je týmto zaradená do skupiny krajín s ktorými budúca spolupráca má prebiehať formou technickej pomoci čo je nakoniec uvedené aj v Národnom programe slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci pre rok 2013.

B. VPLYV MIMOVLÁDNEHO SEKTORU NA SLOVENSKÚ ODA V SRBSKU

Vplyv mimovládnych organizácií na vnútropolitické dianie a s tým súvisiace demokratické zmeny na Slovensku v jednom historickom období je nepopierateľný. Mimovládny sektor, ktorý sa aktívne zapája do procesu slovenskej ODA, je organizovaný prostredníctvom siete s názvom "Platforma mimovládnych rozvojových organizácií." Memorandum o porozumení medzi Ministerstvom zahraničných vecí SR a Platformou bol podpísaný v roku 2010 a obsahuje ustanovenia na zapojenie sa mimovládnych organizácií do procesu definovania strategických a programových dokumentov a výberu projektov, ktoré sa majú financovať v rámci SAMRS. Okrem toho, mimovládne organizácie sú zapojené do implementácie projektov, ktoré odčerpávajú viac ako 50% celkovej slovenskej ODA. Toto percento je podstatne vyššie, než je priemer krajín OECD, ktorý sa v roku 2009 pohyboval okolo 20%.²³³

Situácia vyzerá tak, že čím viac sa mimovládne organizácie angažujú v procese slovenskej ODA, tým menší objem prostriedkov je určený pre Srbsko a menší je aj záujem o podporu adresovanú Srbskej republike. V Národnom programe oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR na rok 2009 v kruhoch mimovládnych organizácií je zdôraznená potreba, aby sa pristúpilo k uvoľneniu Srbska z programu bilaterálnej rozvojovej pomoci. Ako argument sa uvádza, že investície do komunálnej infraštruktúry v Srbsku sú irelevantné a ako také by nemali byť predmetom budúcej rozvojovej pomoci, keďže Srbsko má lepší prístup k pitnej vode ako Slovensko, ktoré sa v tomto kontexte nachádza na chvoste štátov EÚ. Ďalej sa uvádza, že projekty, ktoré boli v Srbsku podporené slovenskou ODA boli realizované v regiónoch, ktoré majú rovnakú, alebo dokonca lepšiu životnú úroveň aká je v niektorých rozvinutých regiónoch Slovenska. Napriek uvedeným pripomienkam, programový dokument uznáva, že pre hospodársky a sociálny rast tejto krajiny aj naďalej je potrebná podpora a odporúča, aby sa program pomoci zamerlal na menej rozvinuté časti Srbska.

Po udelení štatútu kandidátskej krajiny²³⁴, organizácie združené okolo Platformy využívajú ďalší argument v diskusii prečo Srbsku je potrebné znížiť objem podpory slovenskej ODA. Z tohto dôvodu nás neprekvapuje, že je Srbsko nakoniec vyradené zo zoznamu programových krajín v Národnom programe slovenskej ODA pre rok 2011. Absenciu Srbska na zozname programových krajín netreba chápať ako výlučne výsledok lobistických aktivít Platformy, avšak jej úlohu a vplyv v uvedenom procese netreba podceňovať.

Úloha mimovládnych organizácií pri určovaní zamerania oficiálnej slovenskej rozvojovej pomoci možno vnímať aj z pohľadu ich partikulárnych záujmov. Analýzou správ o činnosti Slovenskej agentúry pre medzinárodnú

233 OECD (2011) ²DAC Special Review of the Slovak Republic², p.7, dostupná na: <http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/49512222.pdf>, posledná návšteva: 12. september 2013. g. Medzi iným, táto správa zdôrazňuje fakt, že mimovládne organizácie na Slovensku sú príliš závislé od prostriedkov slovenskej ODA čím strácajú úlohu kontrolóra výkonnej moci. Popri tom, mimovládne organizácie často vystupujú v úlohe poskytovateľa služieb čo viac pripadá úlohe ziskovým organizáciám Preto sa v rámci uvedenej správy, navrhuje, aby sa aj súkromný sektor viacej zapájal, resp. mal väčšie možnosti zapojiť sa do realizácie slovenskej ODA.

234 1. marec 2012, Európska rada prijala rozhodnutie o pridelení Srbsku štatútu kandidátskej krajiny EÚ.

rozvojovú spoluprácu, analýzou každoročných výziev pre obdobie rokov 2008 – 2012 je možné si všimnúť, že slovenské mimovládne organizácie zamerané na krajiny ako sú Keňa a Afganistan sú najväčšími prijímateľmi slovenskej ODA.²³⁵ Okrem toho je udeľovanie grantov v rámci slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci sústredená na niekoľko mimovládnych organizácií. Podľa našej analýzy výročnej správy SAMRS za rok 2012 takmer 60% z celkového rozpočtu schváleného na rok 2012 pre projekty realizované v rámci slovenskej bilaterálnej ODA je rozdelených medzi štyri mimovládne organizácie.²³⁶

C. SLOVENSKÁ OFICIÁLNA ROZVOJOVÁ POMOC AKO NÁSTROJ ZAHRANIČNO-POLITICKÝCH CIEĽOV

Oficiálna rozvojová pomoc slúži predovšetkým ako rozšírený nástroj zahraničnej politiky krajiny. Avšak zo strategických a programových dokumentov slovenskej ODA nie je zrejماً korelácia medzi zahranično – politickými cieľmi Vlády Slovenskej republiky a financovaním slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci. Napríklad, objem slovenskej ODA sa výrazne zmenšil v momente, kedy sa Srbská republika stala kandidátskou krajinou EÚ. Na druhej strane, členstvo krajín západného Balkánu, zvlášť Srbska v Európskej únii je jednou z priorít slovenskej zahraničnej politiky. Z uvedeného dôvodu je potrebné konštatovať, že sa objavuje disproporcja, a síce, že zahranično-politické ciele MZVaEU SR nie sú reflektované pri programovaní rozpočtu slovenskej ODA pre krajiny západného Balkánu, a zvlášť pre Srbskú republiku.

Je dôležité zdôrazniť, že pozitívna skúsenosť v procese európskej integrácie a dobré bilaterálne vzťahy s jednotlivými krajinami západného Balkánu, najmä Srbska, dávajú Slovensku komparatívnu výhodu v porovnaní s ostatnými donormi pôsobiacimi v oblasti euroatlantickej integrácie. Z toho dôvodu považujeme za potrebné, aby Slovensko túto výhodu využilo, aby ciele slovenskej ODA boli stotožnené s cieľmi zahraničnej politiky a tým významne pomohli Srbskej republike v negociačnom procese s Európskou úniou.²³⁷

D. VÝZVY V OBLASTI EVALVÁCIE SLOVENSKEJ ODA V SRBSKU

Ako sme uviedli na začiatku článku, v období rokov od 2003 do 2012 na území Srbska bolo realizovaných 104 projektov vo výške 13. 286.104, 38 € a 118 mikro-grantov (do 5.000,00 €) vo výške 1.828.259,10 €, čo radí Srbsko

235 Na príklad, v grantových výzvach od 2008 do 2012, mimovládna organizácia „Človek v ohrození“ získala prostriedky na realizáciu 21 projektov v celkovej výške 2,27 mil eur, res. vo výzve na rok 2012 organizácii bolo schválených 5 projektov v celkovej výške cca 660.000€, v 2011 schválené sú 3 projekty vo výške 536.000€, v 2010 3 projekty vo výške 478.000€, v 2009 dostáva 8 projektov vo výške cca 500.000€, a v 2008 schválené sú 2 projekty vo výške cca 96.000€. Uvedená organizácia sa špecializuje na pôsobenie v rozvojových krajinách akými sú Afganistan a Keňa.

236 SAMRS (2013) ³VÝROČNÁ SPRÁVA I 2012- Slovenská agentúra pre medzinárodnú rozvojovú spoluprácu², dostupna na: [http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_786E804423CEE647C1257B590040A2AD_SK/\\$File/Vyrocná_sprava_SAMRS_2012.pdf](http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_786E804423CEE647C1257B590040A2AD_SK/$File/Vyrocná_sprava_SAMRS_2012.pdf), poslenja poseta: 12. september 2013. g.

237 Podobný záver sa nachádza aj v správe OECD, v ktorej sa uvádza, že slovenská ODA sa musí viac zamerať na témy a oblasti, v ktorých má väčšiu komparatívnu výhodu v porovnaní s inými donormi. OECD (2011) ³DAC Special Review of the Slovak Republic², p.7

medzi krajiny s najvyšším objemom slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci. Aj napriek týmto kvantifikovaným údajom, zatiaľ neexistuje oficiálny dokument, ktorý by kvalitatívne posúdil efektivitu a účinnosť slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Srbsku.

Postupy pre sledovanie a vyhodnocovanie slovenskej ODA boli stanovené v 2008²³⁸, ale vzhľadom k obmedzenému rozpočtu s ich realizáciou sa začína až v roku 2011. To znamená až po 8 rokoch činnosti slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci, zavádza sa systém sledovania a vyhodnocovania projektov, ktoré boli za uvedené obdobie realizované a prefinancované v rámci Bratislava Belehrad Fondu a neskôr SlovakAid fondu.

Medzičasom je realizované ad hoc hodnotenie, resp. evalvácia štyroch projektov realizovaných v Srbsku v období rokov 2009 až 2011. Tu je na mieste otázka kvality výberu hodnotených projektov²³⁹, ako aj obdobie²⁴⁰ v ktorom uvedené štyri projekty boli realizované. Ďalšou otázkou je problém týkajúci sa výšky kontrahovanej zmluvy za uvedenú evalváciu s ohľadom na skutočnosť, že výška € 451.812,00 pre hodnotenie štyroch projektov výrazne prevyšuje trhovú cenu pre tento typ služby.²⁴¹

S cieľom čo najefektívnejšie využiť a nadviazať na dosiahnuté výsledky Srbsku, bude dôležité urobiť detailnú evalváciu slovenskej ODA v Srbsku v súlade s kritériami DAC OECD. Vzhľadom na to, že Srbsko je jedným z prvých recipientov slovenskej ODA, uvedené hodnotenie, ako príklad dobrej praxe, bude najpotrebnejšie v prvom rade pre SAMRS, čím sa prispeje ku kvalitnejšej distribúcii slovenskej ODA v iných rozvojových krajinách.

4. ZÁVER A ODPORÚČANIA

A. JE NAOZAJ ČAS, ABY SA SLOVENSKÁ ODA STIAHLA Z PÔSOBNIA V SRBSKU?

Slovenská rozvojová pomoc hrá dôležitú úlohu v procese tranzície, demokratizácie a modernizácie spoločnosti v Srbsku. Slovensko svoju pomoc Srbsku zahájilo ešte v roku 2000, kedy podporilo zmenu režimu v bývalej Juhoslávii v rámci tzv. Bratislavského procesu – programu pre demokratickú Juhosláviu. Bratislavský proces je priekopníkom slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci a prvým úspešným prenosom slovenských skúseností a know-how v procese demokratizácie spoločnosti v jednej krajine ktorá prechádza tranzíciou. To potvrdzuje aj niekdajšia srbská politická elita, ktorá opakovane zdôrazňovala význam Slovenska v procese politických zmien v Srbsku

238 Ormalm, Chris et al, Methods and Procedures Manual on Monitoring & Evaluation of the Slovak Official Development Assistance, IPM, April 2008.

239 Vybrané sú 4 projekty z oblasti podpory eu integrácie, a integrácie do medzinárodných organizácií. Ide o oblasť, v ktorej sa pomerne ťažko hodnotia efekty dosiahnutých výsledkov vzhľadom na proces eu integrácia, ktorý je dlhodobý (na rozdiel od napr. projektov zameraných na rozvoj infraštruktúry, ktorých výsledky sú hmatateľnejšie).

240 Evalvácia hodnotila projekty, ktoré boli realizované v období od rokov 2009 -2011 kedy slovenská ODA v Srbsku už bola na ústupe, pričom sa nehodnotili projekty z predchádzajúceho obdobia, kedy úroveň slovenskej ODA v Srbsku bola neporovnateľne vyššia. .

241 Pre ilustráciu, evalvácia efektivity a účinnosti celkovej rozvojovej pomoci Srbsku podľa sektorov, v celkovej výške 4,6 milijardi € pričom bolo za to realizovaných 1.400 projektov stála cca 130.000 €.

Naštartovaním slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci v roku 2003 Srbsko sa stalo jednou z prioritných krajín slovenskej ODA a recipientom fondov Bratislava – Belehrad a neskôr SlovakAid.

V období rokov od 2003 do 2012 na území Srbska bolo realizovaných 104 projektov vo výške 13.286.104,38 € a 118 mikro-grantov (do 5.000,00 €) vo výške 1.828.259,10 €.

V roku 2011, Srbská republika stráca status programovej krajiny čo viedlo k výraznému zníženiu objemu slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci.

Strata pozície Srbska ako programovej krajiny korešpondovala s momentom, kedy Srbsko získalo štatút kandidátskej krajiny EÚ. Avšak, efekt a účinok slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci môže byť výrazne vyšší, ak sa zvýši objem technickej pomoci Srbsku v negociačnom procese s EÚ, v ktorej Slovensko má komparatívnu výhodu v porovnaní s ostatnými bilaterálnymi donormi.

Znižovanie účasti slovenskej ODA v Srbsku negatívne pôsobí na Srbsko i Slovensko, ktoré donedávna vďaka komparatívnym výhodám malo silnú pozíciu v rámci donorskej komunity v Srbsku. Okrem toho, „phase out stratégia“ nie je výhodná ani pre slovenskú zahraničnú politiku, ktorá neprispieva, skôr naopak oslabuje pozície a vplyv Slovenska na politicko-ekonomický vývoj Srbska ako kľúčového hráča a lídra v Juhovýchodnej Európe. Táto skutočnosť otvára priestor pre nových aktérov rozvojovej pomoci, ktorí na takúto možnosť čakajú.

A na záver niekoľko odporúčaní:

- **Slovenská ODA v oblasti EÚ integrácie** – vzhľadom na nový status Srbska ako kandidátskej krajiny pre členstvo v EÚ, srbskej verejnej správe je potrebná pomoc pri príprave riadenia finančných prostriedkov EÚ, ktoré sa majú v porovnaní s dneškom zdesaťnásobiť, takže každá efektívna intervencia a prenos skúsenosti v procese rozvoja systému decentralizovaného riadenia EÚ fondov je a bude potrebná;
- **Slovenská ODA v oblasti posilnenia ekonomickej spolupráce** - vzhľadom na posilnené kompetencie MZVaEZ SR v oblasti ekonomickej diplomacie účinnejšie koordinovať presadzovanie obchodno-ekonomických záujmov Slovenska v zahraničí a pritom efektívne využívať limitované možnosti štátneho rozpočtu, program slovenskej ODA ako nástroja ekonomickej diplomacie by mohol byť zaujímavým riešením;
- **Slovenská ODA v službách krajine príjemcu** - v tomto kontexte je potrebné zlepšiť systém monitorovania a hodnotenia, sprístupniť výsledky hodnotenia, zabezpečiť väčšiu otvorenosť a prístup fondu slovenskej ODA mimovládny organizáciám, ktoré zatiaľ túto možnosť nemali, zväčšiť podiel aplikantov z vládneho a podnikateľského sektora a zabezpečiť partnerstvo medzi slovenskou a srbskou stranou aj vo finančnom čerpaní pomoci;
- **Slovenská ODA v Srbsku** – aj napriek snahám vyradiť Srbsko z programu slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci, sme presvedčení, že Slovensko ako donor na mape medzinárodnej rozvojovej pomoci Srbska patrí, pričom Slovensko by svoju rozvojovú pomoc malo skôr chápať ako **tzv. soft power slovenskej zahraničnej politiky**. Donorské krajiny ako Česko, Poľsko, Švédsko a iné túto stratégiu už úspešne využívajú.

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Autori: Jana Radaković a Dragiša Mijačić – Institute for Territorial Economic Development (InTER), Srbsko

Email: janaradakovic@yahoo.com

REVIEW

The text is well structured from the beginning. It document covering the development aid of Serbia in Slovak context with critical outlook forward and specially in history. The authors bring the list of different strategies and documents on behalf of the ODA, but do not explained they role in- depth, which is due to the length of the text understandable. It is strong critical inside into the Slovak ODA, which is always welcome. The text also serves as a analysis of the Slovak – Serbia relationship in this context and explain supported projects. The document also brings recommendation at the end very However, the work may serve as some good two way start for the discussion of insiders, receivers or interested NGO´s of Slovak ODA.

Mgr. Andrea Figulová, PhD.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVAKIA IN THE BALKANS IS VERY IMPORTANT

Bashkim Rrahmani
Majlinda Belegu

ABSTRACT

The objective of the paper is enumeration and explanation of the main causes that led to the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. It will describe the role of the International Community during the process of independence and the role and the positioning of the Republic of Slovakia, especially after the declaration of independence regarding Kosovo. The paper will give arguments that go in favor of recognition and it will stress the crucial role that the Republic of Slovakia may play in the process of final solution of the crisis in the Balkans especially in the context of the ongoing process of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo being developed under the patronage of EU. Conclusions/recommendations are directed toward development approaches that could be taken into the consideration for implementation in the Balkans.

KEY WORDS

Kosovo, Republic of Slovakia, independence, negotiations, recognition

INTRODUCTION

Kosovo is a new independent state in the Balkans that derived from the process of dissolution of the former federation of Yugoslavia. It was one of the eight federal units and one of the seven units that became independent states from the former Yugoslav federation. A lot is written about the place and the position Kosovo had historically within the Yugoslavia whether it be Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom or Yugoslavia after the II World War and it is obviously there are still needs for independent studies about Kosovo and the relationships it had with Yugoslavia/Serbia. This is not the aim of this paper, even though the paper will cover some elements of the existing relationships within the Yugoslav federation and especially those formulated and formalized by the 1974 Constitution. On the other hand the paper stresses out the process of Kosovo independence and its rightfulness, a process that was finished on February 17, 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence and a process that has raised broad discussion within the international community. The international community was split regarding the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, whereas a unanimous view was taken when condemning the repressive measures and repression made by the Serbian regime against Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians. In the process of declaration and the

recognition of Kosovo independence, we see classic, modern and postmodern approaches within the international community regarding new states or self determination of people and the secession of states. In this regard Kosovo notes a new advanced form of international politics – episodes that serves as a resource of a new international order and not its dissolution²⁴² and that Kosovo informs about a new post modern constitutional international system that is still in the process of its establishment.²⁴³ Before going further with the declaration and the recognition of Kosovo let's see the composition of the Yugoslav federation before the process of dissolution.

1. FEDERATION BASED ON 1974 CONSTITUTION

The SFRY Constitution, article 2, stipulated that the federation was comprised of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. On the basis of the SFRY Constitution the federation consisted of eight federal units: six republics and two autonomous provinces. Organizational structures of provinces were equivalent to that of a republic: both possessed the same bodies. A short look at the 1974 is needed and one can see articles of the Constitution showing that the status of provinces was equal to the status of republic.²⁴⁴

Tendencies of domination and centralized federation on one side and tendencies for a decentralized and more democratized federation or confederation, on the other side led to a situation that couldn't stand for a long period of time. Tendencies of Serbian nationalism to dominate the constitutional system, especially after 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo and measures taken against Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians, made the other federal units create defending strategies for themselves. The Serbian tendencies for domination became more apparent and stronger especially when Milosevic became the leader of Communist Party of Serbia. After a visit in Kosovo in 1987 Milosevic made it clear that he would continue with his doctrine of changes in the federation as he noted later "constitutionally or non constitutionally. . ."²⁴⁵ In actual fact there were no real intentions for democratic changes led by Milosevic whereas "these initiated changes" led to the dissolution of the federation.

2. DISSOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

In addition to what was mentioned above, we can mention several other factors that had the dissolution impact, as enumerated below:

- Unconstitutional ruining of political subjectivity of autonomous provinces with the amendments in the Serbia Constitution (March 23, 1990) – this was characterized as the occupation of a federal unit from the other federal unit (Serbia occupied both: Kosovo and Vojvodina). This was obviously done under the state of emergency

242 Weller Marc, Shtetesia e kontestuar: Administrimi nderkombetar i luftes se Kosoves per pavaresi, Koha 2011, p.35

243 Weller Marc, Shtetesia e kontestuar: Administrimi nderkombetar i luftes se Kosoves per pavaresi, Koha 2011, p.36

244 For more see articles: 398-402, 244, 271, 291, 294, 321, 398-402, of the 1974 Constitution and amendments No.4, 36, 40, 41.

245 See his speech given in front of a massive group of Serbs in Fushe Kosove in June 28, 1989, 600 Anniversary of Kosovo Battle, a battle won by Turks in 1389 against anti ottoman alliance.

measures and breaching also Federal Constitution, Paragraph 2 of Article 5 that stated: "A republic's territory cannot be altered without the consent of that republic, and the territory of an autonomous province without the consent of that autonomous province. Amendments were imposed and there was no consent by Kosovo.

- Serbia adopted various laws by which the application of federal laws was suspended. Later on, other republics in order to re position their positions adopted similar laws to be implemented within their territories. Republics begin to replace federal competencies.
- Failure of negotiations between the federal leadership and the leadership of republics to redesign the Yugoslav federation. The negotiations were unconstitutional because they excluded some federal units to take part in the process of negotiations. (Kosovo and Vojvodina were excluded);
- The breach out of war in Slovenia (brief conflict in 1991), Croatia (1991-95) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95) and Kosovo (1998-99);
- Secession and the international recognition of four republics that became independent states;
- Creation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that constitutionally finished the dissolution of Yugoslav federation (later on this creation as well failed since Montenegro declared its independence and Serbia, as well).

The nonconsensual process of dissolution of the federation actualized the issue of realization of the right for self determination of nations living in Yugoslavia. Most nations/entities paid very high price for realizing the right for self determination. Thus most of them past through a war that for some was a short one whereas for some it was longer. The war started in Slovenia when the Yugoslav army dominated by Serbia attacked Slovenia and it ended after 78 days with NATO attacks during the Kosovo war. The Hague Tribunal is still dealing with the various types of crimes that occurred during the war in the territories of former Yugoslavia. The International Community was active in various ways since the very beginning of the process of dissolution but it did not manage to prevent the conflict and the war. Almost all types of activities and services were undertaken and offered to the parties by the International Community and the military intervention could not be avoided. It in fact was crucial in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Negotiations, conferences, shuttle diplomacy, etc., in most cases were refused by Serbia even though there were obstructions time after time by the other parties of the conflict. From September 07, 1991 conference led by Lord Carrington up to Comprehensive Proposal (Ahtisaari) efforts for solutions failed in most cases due to either Serbia refusal or obstruction. Kosovo in some important international efforts was excluded from the process even though the request for participation was submitted continually.

3. SERBIA AND KOSOVO IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS

Republic of Serbia using the dominant position in the federation tried to legalize acts and activities undertaken and developed against the majority population in Kosovo. On one hand, Serbia adopted laws trying to legitimize the abolition of Kosovo subjectivity and on the other hand, Serbia by these discriminatory laws intended to legitimize and legalize oppression and drastic measures undertaken against the majority population in Kosovo.

Under these circumstances, Albanians became second hand citizens excluded completely from the system. Thus a parallel system of the entire life in Kosovo was established. The Kosovo platform tried to position Kosovo into the negotiations within Yugoslavia and in all types of international activities about the future of the federation. If not neglected their requests were at least not taken into consideration at the desired level. Kosovo leaders were not invited in the meetings held between leaders of 6 Yugoslav republics and they were not invited in the international

conferences. Serbian regime on one side after changing its Constitution (March 1989) and after amending it a day only after declaring the state of emergency brought to a situation of deterioration of the status of Kosovo. This led to the adoption of new Serbia Constitution in 1990 by which the status of provinces were abolished and the relationships in the federation changed formally and essentially. Very quickly after this, Serbia Parliament adopted The Law on the Actions of Republic Authorities under the State of Emergency (June 26, 1990) proclaiming a state of emergency. By this law, Serbia was granted authorities to use the coercive measures in order to suspend the self management rights of workers in companies and institutions, the rights of socio-political communities (their assemblies and administrative bodies) and even the jurisdiction of courts²⁴⁶. Serbia's unconstitutional measures were so deep that they even dissolved the Kosovo Assemble and Government.

Nonetheless, the Kosovo Assemble didn't accept the Serbian decision for dissolution of the Assemble and it started to undertake decisions to reposition Kosovo in the process of federation solution/dissolution. There were several acts to be considered as constitutional and political resources based on which the Republic of Kosovo was born. Constitutionalist and professor Dr.Arsim Bajrami gives the following acts in this regard:

- Constitutional Declaration (July 03,1990);
- Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (September 07,1990);
- Referendum for Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state (September 26-27, 1991);
- Resolution of Kosovo Parliament (October 19,1991);
- Constitutional amendments in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (October 19,1991)
- Multiparty free elections for the Parliament of Kosovo held in May 24, 1992.

The dissolution of Kosovo autonomy caused widespread public reaction (demonstrations and protests) in Kosovo. Whereas when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, Kosovo Albanian leadership and its institutions (these institutions were treated by Serbia as illegal) finally concluded that the Yugoslavia as it was based on 1974 Constitution could not exist as it was established and therefore took the direction of independence of Kosovo that actually was completely supported by the majority population in Kosovo. Kosovo entered into Yugoslav federation, but Kosovo intended to be a part of independent Serbia outside of the framework of the SFRY²⁴⁷.

Under these (non)constitutional and (il)legal circumstances Serbia undertook various discriminatory acts and activities against Kosovo Albanian where every Albania could be an object of treatment by Serbian police and military forces. Arrests, interrogations, beatings, trials, expelling from jobs, closing schools, killings, and segregation became a phenomenon and the daily reality. Oppression time after time was more intensive whereas at the end of 1998 and early 1999 made finally the International Community decide for and joint action against Serbian forces, results of which are in general known: it has been estimated that, by June 09, 1999 over 90% of the Kosovo Albanian population - over 1.45 million people – were forcibly displaced. In the period 1998-1999, numerous UN and other international agencies expressed dismay at the atrocities being committed by Serbia in Kosovo and demanded that they cease immediately. It should be noted that these mass expulsions of Albanian civilians from their homes in Kosovo, involving the threat of force and the actual use of force (including artillery bombardment and arson), began long before the start of NATO military action in March 1999. Figures compiled by the UNCHR showed that

246 Written comments of the Republic of Slovenia on another written statements, July 17 2009 submitted to International Court of Justice,pg.20

247 Written contribution of the Republic of Kosovo, submitted to the International Court of Justice, April 17,2009,pg.54

by August 1998, there were 260,000 internally displaced people within Kosovo and 200,000 refugees outside Kosovo; again, the UNHCR noted that between 150,000 and 200,000 new refugees were driven from their homes between the beginning of January 1999 and in mid-March 1999.²⁴⁸ The Serbian forces during the NATO intervention intensified attacks against the Albanian population trying doing an ethnic cleansing (through so called burned land) and it is known at almost a million of people became refugees in neighboring countries and some other countries of the world. The war ended with the withdrawal of Serbian military forces leaving behind thousands and thousands of killed, wounded, raped, material devastation and ruin, taking with them very big number of innocent people as prisoners (they were put in different Serbian prisons), leaving behind a large number of missing people, etc. It is obvious that if NATO hadn't intervened so quickly we could have written even more about the terrible consequences and dramas. NATO intervention ended with an agreement known as the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) signed in Kumanovo between KFOR and Serbian Government (June 09,1999) and made UN Security Council adopt the Resolution 1244 (June 10,1999) by which the doors for international administration of Kosovo were opened and by which in Kosovo begins new era having UNMIK set up its functions of promoting democracy, rule of law, human rights, multi-ethnic relations, and institution building and having it established to fulfill its mission based on 4 pillars. Up to this date, there are many written papers, many studies developed and there was the development of many political, academic, diplomatic debates about whether the Resolution 1244 gave the right of Kosovo to obtain independence and due to the fact that the author(s) of these papers are limited on space this issue is not going into enough detail for accurate analysis and interpretation. When analyzing the content of the Resolution, extensive interpretation of the resolution and inclusion of the circumstances in which it was adopted are needed, as well as recognition of the other facts which preceded the resolution. Only then can a more objective interpretation can be drawn.

4. KOSOVO DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RECOGNITION

The cited source "Written Comments of the Republic of Slovenia on other Written Statements", will be used to find out the arguments about why Kosovo is a *sui generis* case.

"In (the) case of Kosovo it must be taken into account that Kosovo is a *sui generis* case due to unique circumstance which led to the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. These circumstances are status of Autonomous Province of Kosovo in the former SFRY, the later gross and systematic human rights violations, humanitarian catastrophe, the rejection of the Rambouillet. According to the UN Security Council Chapter VII resolutions, the 9 year presence of the international administration, the lack of agreement of the key actors to assure a certain level of autonomy and of the status of the province, and the responsibility of the international community for peace and stability in the region".

The cited above cited paragraph is taken completely because it is considered to be very neutral. On the other hand, Slovenia was part of the former federation and thus familiar and close to the entire process.

Politicians, diplomats, scholars, etc., (especially those that question the independence) when writing or debating about the issue of the declaration of Kosovo independence often use the expression 'unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence'. But through going deeper into the process it is easily to find out that this indeed is not very

248 Written contribution of the Republic of Kosovo, submitted to the International Court of Justice, April 17,2009, pg. 60-61

unilateral declaration. There were several important facts that led to it and there were several limitations negotiated before declaring this independence.

Before the declaration of independence there are a few crucial moments that are considered to have led to the defining of the process of Kosovo's final status. Standards for Kosovo that were requested and expressed by the UN Secretary General in the speech of April 24, 2002 in front of the Security Council. Michael Steiner (Special Representative of the Secretary General) was asked to measure the progress in Kosovo in the fields of: rule of law, function of democratic institutions, economy, freedom of movement, return of displaced persons, refugees and contribution in the regional stability. By the signals for establishing the road toward final status were given to the Provisional Institutions of Kosovo and to UNMIK. A document named "Standards for Kosovo" and this document was signed with the introduction part by which it was shown that the process of status will not refer the 1244 resolution.

UN Secretary General appointed Kai Eide as a special envoy to evaluate the comprehensive situation in Kosovo. The Kai Eide report opened the ways for further steps toward Kosovo status. The Contact Group (a special mechanism that played a special role regarding the final status of Kosovo) based on this report came up with a set of 10 principles to be taken into further into consideration.²⁴⁹

The Kai Eide report opened the door for Vienna negotiations that started in February 20, 2006. The special envoy of the UN for these negotiations was Marti Ahtisaari. A series of meetings were held in Vienna about decentralization, cultural heritage, the rights of communities and the economy. The negotiations were important because they exactly finalized the defining of the final status process. Thus from this "The Comprehensive Proposal for solving the final status" presented by the UN envoy or as it later was called "Ahtisaari Plan" that in fact presented the form of the Kosovo status. The plan or proposal was submitted to both sides of negotiations Kosovo and Serbia on March 02, 2007. On the other hand on March 26, 2007 the UN Secretary General sent to the Security Council the final version of the proposal on the final status of Kosovo that consisted that the only solution was independence of Kosovo that for a determined period of time should be internationally supervised. Draft resolutions about the Ahtisaari Plan were not presented for voting in the Security Council because of the potential veto by Russia. The G-8 in June 2007 made an effort of unblocking the situation asking (proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy) for 120 days more for additional negotiation. Contact Group supported the initiative for additional talks and nominated a troika of negotiators: Frank Wisner (USA), Wolfgang Ischinger (UE) and Alexandar Botsan-Harchenko (Russia). These additional efforts didn't bring results because both sides remained in their previous positions. The Kosovo Parliament previous to these talks and additional efforts in April 2007 had approved a Declaration on determining the Kosovo Status giving support to the Ahtisaari Plan whereas Serbian Parliament rejected the document.

This short description of events that led to the Kosovo Declaration of Independence shows that declaration was not completely unilateral. Declaration and its purpose in the first paragraph express the will of the people of Kosovo to attain independence and to declare an independent state. The declaration underlines specific circumstances that independence was inevitable. The preamble recalled that "Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation"²⁵⁰. The declaration expresses the will of the people and is in accordance with the recommendations of the UN special envoy Martti

249 See more Contact Group at <http://www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf>

250 See preambular paragraph, Annex 1

Ahtisaari – this means that the declaration of independence is proclaimed under the context of international coordination and commitment to fulfill all international obligations. The commitment and the obligations to fulfill all international obligations are integral parts of the Kosovo Constitution adopted a few months after the independence declaration.

As it was noted, Kosovo Declaration of Independence in some parts of the International Community was accepted with doubts that were derived from: fear that the International Law is violated; this was going to be a precedent for some other entities that aspire independence; that Kosovo had no right to constitute its own state, etc. Nonetheless immediately after the declaration Kosovo gained international recognition from the most powerful states from the West and the process of recognition is an ongoing process.

Debate of whether the independence was right or not can be expected and some of these arguments are mentioned below and will have an impact on the changes toward more recognition of the Kosovo independence. Regarding recognition we can note two perceptions whether it be declaratory or constitutive. According to Malcolm Shaw, the actual practice leads to a middle position between these two perceptions. And, the same author goes with: "In many instances, the new entity or government will be insecure and it is in this context that recognition plays a vital role. In any event, and particularly where the facts are unclear and open to different interpretations, recognition by a state will amount to a declaration by that state of how it understands the situation, and such an evaluation will be bidding upon it"²⁵¹.

In cases arguing about the lack of representation from one side and the continual repression on the other side, then we have to deal with that the comprises the "remedial self determination"²⁵².

European Commission with its conclusions regarding Kosovo has left EU member states to decide based on their national practices and based on the international law for their reports with Kosovo.

There are several reasons however that can be reviewed before the decision on recognition or non recognition of Kosovo statehood, and they are expressed below:

- Kosovo is recognized by 23 UE member states and 100 states of the world;
- There are no similarities between Kosovo and other entities in the world that may aspire independence and thus Kosovo cannot be in no forms a precedent. Kosovo is a sui generis case;
- It is not expected that states that have already recognized the independence of Kosovo will change their opinion to that of rejection;
- Non recognition doesn't help the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and doesn't contribute to a process of peace and democracy in the Balkans;
- Non recognition keeps the region in a standstill position;
- International Court of Justice didn't find the Kosovo declaration of independence to be violate the International Law;
- Kosovo has shown the commitment to fulfill all international obligations;

²⁵¹ See more about recognition of states, Malcolm N.Shaw, International Law, Fifth edition, Cambridge pg:368-408

²⁵² Weller Marc, Shtetesia e kontestuar: Administrimi nderkombetar i luftes se Kosoves per pavaresi,Koha 2011,p.441

- Kosovo is recognized from most of former units of former Yugoslav federation (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia);
- Kosovo is a member of IMF and the World Bank;
- No decision for rejecting Kosovo Declaration of Independence is taken from Security Council;

5. THE ROLE OF SLOVAKIA IN THE DEVELOPMENTS AND ITS CONTRIBUTION: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Slovakia's engagement in the Balkans was very positive and it was very positive in Kosovo as well. Slovak diplomats were active and successful with the initiatives and activities in the entire Balkan developments. Slovak diplomats enjoy a very good reputation in the Balkans and their names are well-known. Slovakia, since early international engagement was a part of the international community in Kosovo. After the war it has been active in all international mechanisms in Kosovo (KFOR, EULEX, OSCE, etc). The Slovak soldiers (members of KFOR) situated near Podujevo were hosted and accepted very well from the local Albanian population and their reputation was excellent. The same opinion could be heard by soldiers that served in Kosovo as well. Civil Society is to be ranked at the top for the contribution it gave to the development of civil society in Kosovo. Slovak civil society organizations gave a tremendous contribution in the development of civil society in Kosovo. They were and are actively having a continual impact on the development of civil society organizations in Kosovo. Slovak NGOs among the other forms were direct partners in implementing big projects funded by development agencies as USAID²⁵³. Many Kosovo NGOs visited Slovakia during the post war period and they learnt and achieved many results of long term importance. These projects in most cases serve as samples of good projects implemented in Kosovo and in the region as well, because there were also regional/cross border projects implemented led or facilitated by Slovak NGOs.

One of the priorities of Foreign Slovak politics is the Western Balkans and the integration of the Balkan states. In this respect, the intensification of the cooperation between Slovakia and Kosovo contributes directly to the mentioned Slovak foreign priorities. It is important to include and incorporate Kosovo into Slovak priorities and this would have a direct impact on the entire process of integration of the Western Balkans and thus will create long term sustainability. Kosovo inclusion could be of various forms: political engagement of Slovak diplomats offering bona fides services by which Serbian Kosovo dialogue (developed by EU) can take a much speedy process. This is because Slovak politicians and diplomats enjoy a great reputation and are listened to in the region. They also have a good knowledge for both societies and politic orientations.

It would be of great importance to incorporate Kosovo and its civil society into the objectives of Slovak Aid where Kosovo NGOs could be direct partners of Slovak organizations. Establishing direct links between universities could be also one good channel for support, especially in the curriculums for EU integrations. Support for business initiatives would be crucial whereas links between both written and electronic media can be good tools to help

²⁵³ The author of the paper was director of The Foundation for Democratic Initiatives (FDI) the main implementing project "Kosovo NGO Advocacy Project" whereas its mentor organization was Ekopolis Foundation from Banska Bystrica. The tracks of this projects are visible everywhere in Kosovo and merit belongs at the highest level to Ekopolis and Slovak organizations that hosted and trained Kosovo NGOs or came and gave conducted trainings in Kosovo. The role of Pontis, People in Peril, Partners Slovakia, and many other organizations has always been important and crucial for further developments of Kosovo Civil Society. Based on these types of projects nowadays there are seen different partnerships between Slovak and Kosovo NGOs.

positive development in the region. Exchange and study visits and programs may be also something worthwhile supporting whereas dialogue between youth in the region facilitated by Slovak NGOs can produce important outcomes. Projects to stimulate cross border activities may also be very productive especially projects including youth from Serbia and Kosovo.

Representatives of Slovak Civil Society as: Pavol Demeš, Boris Strečanský, Ján Surotchak, Marek Kapusta, Lenka Surotchak and many others are people that are known well in Kosovo and in Serbia and their engagement could be crucial when developing and undertaking initiatives to support integration and development of the Balkans.

The fact that the Republic of Slovakia didn't recognize Kosovo is not an obstacle for developing and undertaking acts and activities that lead towards integrations of the Balkans.

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Author: Bashkim Rrahmani - Lecturer at the University "Haxhi Zeka" Peja and the NGO activist, Kosovo
Co-author: Majlinda Belegu - Lecturer at the University "Haxhi Zeka" Peja, Kosovo
E-mail: bashkimrrah@yahoo.com

REVIEW

The paper's main objective was to explain the main causes that led to the declaration of Kosovo's independence, the role of international community and the position of the Slovakia in the whole system of stabilising and developing of Kosovo after declaration. However the objective was ambitious, the author(s) focuses mainly on the first part – explanation of the historical and political circumstances which lead to the declaration of independence as well as the description of the state of art in that crucial times. The role of international community was little bit in defensive and the position of the Slovak republic in developing of the Balkan region was described (not analysed) only in last two pages. I suppose the development of arguments used in the last paragraphs, like the role of individuals, enthusiasm and experiences of the Slovak NGO's may improve the level of the paper and contribute to fulfilment of the primary objective.

JUDr. PhDr. Lucia Mokrá, PhD.

THE ROLE OF POLISH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE POLISH MODEL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

ABSTRACT

Polish development aid policy has become a very important tool in supporting the implementation of goals of public diplomacy. Entering the area of development aid, Polish NGOs have become a major player in shaping national and international public opinion in this regard. Their volunteers, social activists and experts have been building the image of Poland, both in Poland and abroad, as a country actively involved in helping developing countries. NGOs conduct development projects, and organize international volunteering, but they also deliver projects in the field of global education among Polish society and they cooperate with media in the field of promoting development aid. It is worth considering the creation of a Polish model of public diplomacy with inclusion of development aid into it. Then, the division between internal and external dimensions of public diplomacy in the field of development aid should be taken into account. Additional to this, to build a positive image of Poland in the field of development aid, by using public diplomacy as a tool of soft power, it is necessary to develop and improve MFA-NGOs cooperation.

KEYWORDS

NGOs-MFA cooperation, Polish development aid, public diplomacy, Polish national brand

INTRODUCTION

“Aid activities have become one of the most important elements of Polish foreign policy. They are mainly used to support priority countries, but they also contribute to the strengthening of the Polish position in the international arena” – as pointed out in the summary of Polish development cooperation in 2007, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski.²⁵⁴ The second element, mentioned by the Minister, has recently gained more and more importance, having been given the title ‘public diplomacy’, which is an increasingly popular concept in international relations. Professor Beata Ociepka, who mentions NGOs as non-state players in public diplomacy, defines ‘public diplomacy’ as a “bilateral political dialogue form of international communication,

254 R. Sikorski, Wstęp do Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport 2007, MSZ, Warszawa 2008, s.7

addressed to an audience abroad, realized through media and some direct channels"²⁵⁵ Nowadays it is quite difficult to define an 'audience abroad'. The movement of people and global access to information gives that expression a completely different meaning. That leads me to the idea that public diplomacy has its internal and external dimensions. And, significantly, the internal dimension of public diplomacy has become as important as its external dimension.

Public diplomacy in the context of development aid and NGOs working in this area has begun to appear more often in the Polish reality, among politicians, scientists, and people associated with NGOs. As we can read in the MFA official publication from 2012: "While contributing to strengthening the image of Poland as a country that has reached economic and political success as a result of systemic transformation, development policy is an important tool to support the objectives of public diplomacy."²⁵⁶ The same is with the perception of the role of NGOs. As noted by Krzysztof Stanowski, President of the Solidarity Fund PL: "Development policy becomes every year a more and more important part of foreign policy, and cooperation with non-governmental organizations - an increasingly important component of public diplomacy."²⁵⁷

What is the role of NGOs, working in development aid, in public diplomacy? Surely they create the international communication system and some international confidence, more than any other international players.

One thing is that NGOs are, or at least should be, independent and apolitical.²⁵⁸ They also exist for people and their surroundings, and this they should serve.²⁵⁹ Moreover, as Małgorzata Załuska rightly observes, "in a civil society non-governmental organizations are the "connective tissue" of the system, they act as an intermediary between the citizen and the state."²⁶⁰ Marta Hereźniak, researcher of national branding topics, claims that the role of NGOs is very important for one more reason. "Activities in the area of public diplomacy will be received by the target groups to be more reliable if they are not identified as government"²⁶¹. In her opinion, the task of government is to promote the initiatives of non-governmental organizations (for example, financial, substantive), as well as providing them with materials related to building the brand.

Moreover NGOs have been working in the field of development aid "advocacy" against the Polish government and they have been leading an active information and media policy, which has a direct impact on the image of the socio-political scene, and this not only in Poland, but also internationally (please see below). By acting in this way, they control lobbying, promotion and mediation functions. More often than not they cooperate and come together as organizations affiliated to one association (Grupa Zagranica is a very well-known platform of Polish

255 B. Ociepka (red.), *Dyplomacja publiczna*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008, s.12

256 *Dyplomacja publiczna 2012*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa 2013, s.27

257 *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2010*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa, 2011, s.3

258 this term was an interesting element in discussion during an international conference in Warsaw "Key challenges of humanitarian aid and development cooperation in the 21st century", 7-8.12.2012, "How to improve humanitarian aid remaining impartial and neutral?" - asked Entho Gospodinov (European Commission) according to NGOs humanitarian activity; own materials from the conference;

259 B. Iwankiewicz-Rak, *Public relations w instytucjach publicznych i organizacjach pozarządowych*, [w:] J. Ołędzki, D. Tworzydło, *Public relations. Znaczenie społeczne i kierunki rozwoju*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2007, s.98

260 M. Załuska *Spoleczne uwarunkowania angazowania się w działalność organizacji pozarządowych*, [w:] J. Boczoń, M. Załuska, *Organizacje pozarządowe w społeczeństwie obywatelskim*, Biblioteka Pracownika Socjalnego, Katowice 1998, s.97

261 M. Hereźniak, *Marka narodowa*, Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2011, s.109

NGOs, engaged in development cooperation), thus increasing their opportunities to reach different audiences and increase influence on the government side of things.

My latest interviews suggest that NGOs prefer to be seen as actors who help and teach others to believe that it is worth organizing support for developing countries, rather than treating them as actors that work on the image of Poland, although they don't deny doing it 'automatically' and 'from the assumption'. "We raise awareness among volunteers that what they are doing has a result in the country's image, it is - one way or another, somehow - received in Europe. But it is not a priority in itself, such as, for example, work for equal opportunities".²⁶²

1. EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN DEVELOPMENT AID

Anyway the fact is that Polish NGOs are important operators in development aid. My analysis shows that NGOs realize that between 40 and 60% of all projects are funded annually by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in bilateral development aid, which puts them in first place, not only in terms of activity in this area, but also in terms of their impact on the social attitudes among international public opinion. Moreover, there were over 200 NGOs that took part in delivering the Polish development aid system between 2004 and 2012. They conducted their projects in a wide variety of subjects, like children's education, mobilization of women, as well as the construction of sanitary networks, training of paramedics, and the creation of tourist farms. Polish experts, social activists and volunteers go to different places in the world to help. One of the first questions they can expect (like all of us when travelling abroad) is: 'where are you from?'. When they hear 'From Poland', they see Poland through the prism of these people. This particularly happens in those places where people from Europe don't go so often.

It is important to note that the financial terms of participation of NGOs in the whole Polish development aid system, is not huge. For example, in 2012, official Polish development aid amounted to 1 billion 423 million PLN. 75% of that amount was transferred within a multilateral framework, 25% - a bilateral framework. 1/5 of 25%, which gives us 17%, (37million PLN), was transferred by NGO projects.²⁶³ But MFA, which coordinates the Polish development aid system, is not the only institution that supports NGOs. Organizations can receive financial support from different sources, and - what I can notice according to the Polish reality - more often they have been in established cooperation with the private sector.²⁶⁴

2. INTERNAL DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN DEVELOPMENT AID

Polish NGOs provide projects in the field of global education among Polish society, which is also mostly funded by the Polish government. "The purpose of global education is to explain the global interdependence, reasons

262 Jeśli wolontariat w pomocy rozwojowej, to tylko ekspercki, NGO.pl, 09.07.2013, <http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosci/893106.html>

263 MFA data, 10.09.2013, from my interview with Jan Hofmokl from Department of Development Aid

264 for example Polish Humanitarian Action in cooperation with a company Ciepło Systemowe, organized in 2012 campaign "Christmas without borders" - they collected money for wells and water intakes in Southern Sudan and Somalia, http://www.pah.org.pl/o-pah/173/dobre_praktyki, 10.09.2013

for problems of the modern world and the challenges connected with them.²⁶⁵ Amongst more than two hundred projects, delivered by NGOs from 2004 to 2012 in the field of global education, there were many examples of how to show the reality of living in developing countries. There were, for instance, teacher training, photographic exhibitions, workshops for children, and youth board games. What can be noted is that most of the projects related to raising awareness of the Global South, and far fewer to countries of the Eastern Partnership. This is important in relation to the idea of how Poland wants to be seen and promoted in the international community.

Referring to the research carried out every year (from 2004) among Polish society on behalf of the MFA, we can see that the vast majority of Poles support development aid. For example, in 2012, for the question: "whether you think that Poland should or shouldn't support the development of less developed countries?", 77% of the respondents answered that Poland should do it.²⁶⁶ What was surprising in the results of these researchers is that a fairly high level of support for development aid is incompatible with the knowledge of the Poles on development aid. It was as at the level of less than 30% (and decreased when compared to previous years).²⁶⁷

As Robert Cialdini would probably say, it may be connected with our "deep-rooted sense of yielding to authority".²⁶⁸ And according to Polish reality it may be true. Janina Ochojska, the president of the Polish Humanitarian Action, is very well-known among Polish people as a person heavily involved in helping others. She can be trusted, which is the most important thing in both development aid and public diplomacy. She has been working on her image (and the foundation she represents as well) for over twenty years. And she may not like this idea, but she combines the elements that many public relations specialists give as a recipe for social success.²⁶⁹ Ochojska is reasonably famous. She is recognized, not only for talking about what she has been doing, but also for working with great commitment (a view of a woman moving on crutches in the farthest corners of the world inspires the respect of many Poles). She is true, she speaks honestly and directly. When talking about development aid, she tells of people, about their living in developing countries. But that's not all. When needed she can play in the popular TV series (she appeared in "M is for love" to promote the PHA activity), when she thinks it is necessary, she can invite the Polish president to a conference organized by the PHA and she can be pretty sure that the President will come.²⁷⁰ She is effective, people do not only believe in what she says, but they also support financially any initiative of the PHA.

Apart from the global education projects, NGOs have different ideas how to inform Polish society about developing countries. They conduct social campaigns, especially fundraising campaigns which combine two elements. On one hand they increase the level of public awareness of - generally speaking - development aid. On the other hand they are used to collecting funds for a particular initiative. For example, The Polish Humanitarian

265 Edukacja globalna w programie polskiej współpracy rozwojowej, MSZ, Warszawa 2009, s.3

266 Polacy o pomocy rozwojowej. Wyniki badania TNS Polka dla MSZ, TNS Polska, Warszawa 2012, s.8

267 s.14

268 R. Cialdini, Wywieranie wpływu na ludzi, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne Gdańsk 1998, s.195

269 Edward Pendray presents nine principles of image building for the people, "the more you know, the more you love", "change up", "speak the language of action", "do not stop in good works", "true as olive oil, always comes on top", "support your money with your heart", "you can like a cake, but the fish are caught on worms", "the people are most interested in neighbor's live", "watch out for floating bar", by T.Gobal-Klas, PR czyli promocja reputacji, Business Press Sp. z o.o., Warszawa 1998, s.89

270 The President Bronisław Komorowski took part in an international conference in Warsaw "Key challenges of humanitarian aid and development cooperation in the 21st century", 7-8.12.2012;

Action organized campaign called: "A bike for Africa", The Malopolskie Educational Association - "Tractor for Kenya" and The Education for Democracy Foundation - "Tajik cow" and "Turn in Tajikistan". To be successful in their actions, NGOs quite often ask famous and popular people in Poland to take part in their activities.²⁷¹ It is also connected with the role of authority as I mentioned above.

3. MFA-NGOs COOPERATION

Development aid has become an increasingly important element of Polish foreign policy. At the same time the interdependence of NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in delivering the Polish development aid system encourages them to work together. They need each other to be successful in development aid, and then in public diplomacy.

NGOs need some government support to realize their ideas in how to help other countries and societies, the government need NGOs to achieve the goals set in the strategy of the Polish aid. There are also countries (like Belarus), where the reach of help in the building of democratic structures (which Poland is said to have pioneered in the east of the European continent), is possible largely through NGOs. They have experts, social activists and volunteers that can provide such difficult topics. But the government is the one that has Solidarity Fund PL, through which it can financially and substantively support NGOs.²⁷²

There are certain steps that demonstrate the professionalism of the cooperation of the third sector and the government. One of them is the adoption of "The principles of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and social partners' cooperation in development cooperation."²⁷³ The other is "The agreement on the promotion of the development of global education in Poland", signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Grupa Zagranica.²⁷⁴ An undoubted success was also the adoption in 2011 by the Polish government of a long-awaited law on development aid.²⁷⁵

There are more elements that may positively affect the level of NGOs-MFA cooperation. During my interview with Marcin Wojtalk from the Institute of Global Responsibility, he pointed out at least four. It is NGOs participation in the work of the Development Cooperation Policy Council²⁷⁶, their participation in public consultations, working within the Grupa Zagranica and some informal meetings.

271 see: <http://www.prezentybezpodula.pl>, http://www.kampaniespoleczne.pl/kampanie,1557,ile_kosztuje_zycie_w_sudanie, http://www.pah.org.pl/nasze-dzialania/19/4612/apel_o_pomoc_dla_ofiar_wojny_w_syrii

272 Solidarity Fund PL was established in 2001. Then, in 2005 it suspended its activities. In 2011, according to growing participation of Poland in development cooperation and democracy support, it was decided to reconstruct foundation; see: www.solidarityfound.pl

273 http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Zasady_wspolpracy_z_partnernami_spolecznymi,1454.html, 10.09.2013

274 <http://www.zagranica.org.pl/dzialania/rozwoj-edukacji-globalnej-w-polsce/podpisano-porozumienie-na-rzecz-rozwoju-edukacji>

275 https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Ustawa_o_wspolpracy_rozwojowej,1128.html

276 DPCP is an advisory and consultative body functioning alongside the Minister of Foreign Affairs, see: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Development_Cooperation_Policy_Council,1466.html

Those elements can give one result - the awareness that they all play to one goal, even if the reason why they participate in the game may be a little bit different at the beginning. One can be sure - in order to ensure social support for development aid, a wide-ranging information campaign is necessary. It was already marked in "Polish strategy for development aid" in 2003. As we can read there "Relevant government institution will, in cooperation with the non-public sector, work on popularizing information about the needs of developing countries, countries in transition, and about Polish efforts to satisfy them. A special role in promoting its activities in the field of foreign aid will be played by civil society institutions, particularly by non-governmental organizations".²⁷⁷

All the aspects I pointed out finally have an impact on public diplomacy. The promotion of development aid gives greater social awareness. This awareness enabled an increase in the participation of Poles in the Polish development aid system, both through financial support and direct participation in projects. By taking part in development aid projects, Polish experts, social activists and volunteers, whether they wanted to do it or not, worked on the image of Poland.

It is different when Poles give some financial support to Polish NGOs to realize their projects abroad. But in this way they can be perceived as an empathetic society in relation to developing countries. It is also significant for the image of our country.

In both cases it is very important for society to get feedback, I mean to show them that what they (or their government and/or NGOs) did was useful and appreciated. It builds a social satisfaction and a sense of being a citizen of a responsible country. To accomplish this 'feedback' which is necessary to operate a professional media policy.

4. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The majority of Polish NGOs, working in development aid, adopted a code "How to talk about most of the world", prepared by the Institute of Global Responsibility²⁷⁸. It was a response to "a real need for ethical principles to inform about the global South, around which, unfortunately, it has accumulated a lot of negative stereotypes".²⁷⁹ This guide, which contains eight principles according to which the countries of the global South should be reported fairly and with respect, is just a recommendation. It says that the idea is not to spread stereotype, not to create sensation, because - according to the authors - this won't have any influence on increasing public understanding of the realities of development processes. On the contrary - it may harm them. "Excitation of strong emotions can catch the attention of consumers, but does not entail a real and long-term commitment."²⁸⁰

277 "Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju", 21.10.2003, s.18

278 see: <http://www.igo.org.pl>

279 D. Gadzinowska, G. Lipska, K. Kochanowicz, M. Wojtalik, Jak mówić o większości świata, Instytut Globalnej Odpowiedzialności, Warszawa 2008, s. 3

280 D. Gadzinowska, G. Lipska, K. Kochanowicz, M. Wojtalik, s.6

In a study of the idea of corporate disclosure in the world it is stressed that in times of global information infrastructure, "the media (...) should take care of both: a more active promotion of the established rules of economic governance and effectively fulfill their educational and informational functions of the public developed countries and developing countries."²⁸¹ Do they do it? Let's say: sometimes.

The problem of Polish media participation in promoting development aid was mentioned in an interview with Krzysztof Stanowski, the then Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was representing Poland at the European Development Days 2010, which took place in Brussels. When asked about the role of the media in promoting Polish development, he stressed that - unfortunately - the media prefer to report on war than on places where there is no conflict and the people are relatively happy.²⁸² That's why it is difficult to generate media interest.

5. HOW SHOULD WE DELIVER INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENT AID?

There are some NGOs in the world that have an idea how to draw the attention of richer parts of the world to what is happening in the poorer parts and - at the same time - to get some media interest. They lead controversial campaigns.

Such was, for example, the campaign "Dirty Water" in 2010, in which the mother feeds the baby with dirty water after washing dishes. Another campaign, organized by UNICEF, called "Journey" shows a girl who is leaving the room for a drink of water. When she is in the hall, she can see pictures of drought, dead animals, and hear the sounds of war. The pictures are everywhere - on the doors and walls. She's terrified. Finally, she goes to the kitchen and can fill a glass with tap water. In the background one can hear a voice-over: "There are children who go through this to get a glass of water. What do you go through?"²⁸³ A few years ago, the UN agency - the World Food Program - prepared a campaign, fairly drastic in the transmission, called "Do not let the economic crisis divide the world". In the posters one could see human skeletons (e.g. child-feeding mother) and slogans: "Sorry kids, but first we need to feed our economy" and "Think global, starve local!"²⁸⁴

This is not a general trend among Polish NGOs. For now, this may be related to the fact that development cooperation is a fairly new phenomenon in the Polish reality, especially in the social reality. Even more so, one should be aware of three matters:

One is to develop media-NGO cooperation, by using the experience and knowledge of Polish experts, social activists and volunteers. We all need that, because as noted by Andrzej Brzeziecki from the newspaper "Tygodnik Powszechny": "Non-governmental organizations in times of impoverishment and tabloidization of media have become indispensable prosthesis, without which it Polish journalism would be lame."²⁸⁵

281 J. Ołędzki, *Komunikowanie w świecie*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa, 2001, s.152

282 <http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Europejskie,Dni,Rozwoju,2010,1084.html>

283 <http://casanova.com/tvall/unicef-journey/>, 10.09.2013

284 <http://www.ads-ngo.com/2011/05/19/dont-let-the-economic-crisis-divide-the-world-wfp/>, 10.09.2013

285 A. Brzeziecki, *Niezbędna proteza*, "Tygodnik Powszechny", 28.07.2013, nr 30, s. 34

The second thing is to work on the image of NGOs. Why? "Taking care of image of the organization is one of the priority tasks. It's not about winning customers and money (though sometimes too). The goals are much more ambitious and a good policy of image may affect the success of a particular initiative."²⁸⁶

The last point is to invest in public awareness of developing countries and responsibility for the course of the world. As Janina Ochojska said - awareness of Polish society is changing and more and more Poles are ready to help those who find themselves in a difficult situation, whether as a result of wars and disasters. "This stems from the fact that Poles know more and more, although it is still not enough. Therefore, it is necessary to build public awareness, because it is our capital."²⁸⁷

It is this capital that is needed in both development aid and in public diplomacy. This capital translates into tangible results. One of them is the international position of the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Poland wants to be seen as a promoter of the idea that only maintaining the link between development and democracy can bring success in development aid. It was confirmed in my interview with Krzysztof Stanowski, the president of Solidarity Fund. According to Beata Ociepka²⁸⁸, the Polish-Swedish concept of Eastern Partnership, which also is being realized by development aid, is a good example of how Poland may apply 'soft power' and use its main tool - public diplomacy - to promote democracy among eastern neighbours. It may give us a name for being a leader, which would be an answer to our expectations: "Activity in relation to the eastern direction of UE's foreign policy should remain the Polish speciality."²⁸⁹ Without a doubt this is the concept of how Poland can strengthen its position in international relations. This was also pointed out by Patryk Kugiel: "Linking democracy and development together effectively might indeed be Polish."²⁹⁰ But the truth is that Poland won't reach it without the participation of citizens, even if they don't know yet what the term 'soft power' means.²⁹¹

Still, the question is, "What is the proportion between development aid and public diplomacy in the context of being successful in foreign policy?" Is development aid only a kind of 'niche' in building the image of Poland, as some authors suggest? If so, how it is going to be, taking into account Polish declarations about increasing funding for development aid?²⁹² As many researchers say, 'public diplomacy' shouldn't be identified with public relations

286 Emilia Kotnis-Górka, Mateusz Wysocki, Organizacje pozarządowe. Zarządzanie, kreowanie wizerunku i współpraca z mediami w III sektorze, HELION, Gliwice 2011, s.81

287 own materials from the PHA conference in Warsaw, 7-8.12.2012

288 B. Ociepka, Miękką siłą i dyplomacja publiczna Polski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2013, s.121

289 Information about the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland in 2008, Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016/expose2/expose_2008/?printMode=true

290 P.Kugiel, Polish development cooperation. A turning point. PISM Policy Paper 2011, nr 13, s.6

291 referring to Joseph S. Nye, a pioneer in defining 'soft power', soft power is the force of attraction and 'seduction', it is used in international relations instead of or together with the 'hard power', see: J.S.Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York 2004

292 in May 2005, Poland declared an increase to 2010 development assistance to 0.17% of GDP, and by 2015 is to try to determine this ratio increased to 0.33% of GDP, more information: Polska pomoc rozwojowa. Niezależne badanie organizacji pozarządowych, Grupa Zagranica, Warszawa 2007, s.12

or marketing. It should be defined with trust. But for many people I talked to and for some researchers²⁹³, there are some connections between public diplomacy and PR, propaganda or international marketing. That is why they are against the idea that development aid should be included in public diplomacy. As always, everyone has his point of view. But is there anything wrong in public relations or social marketing if their goals are to educate and improve development aid? No, there is not, as "The need for help is certainly a moral impulse."²⁹⁴

As we can notice there are many correlations between development aid, civil society and public diplomacy. To see that they are useful, not only for Poland and its image as an effective state, but also for the world, we need at least two matters: a good international communication system and some international confidence. To get it, all partners, like public and non-public institutions, should commit themselves to working on the professionalization, improvement and clarity of cooperation among themselves, and the same as with media. That is also their role to teach the international society what 'development cooperation' is and why it is so important to share the responsibility for the direction of the world. More knowledge can bring us more effectiveness.

Development aid needs public diplomacy in the context of challenges that the European Union has to face. What is more important: to give money or the possibility to develop? To give a fish or a fishing rod? If both, what should be the proportion and who should decide about it? Around the world there are people who have more and those who have less, and the gap between them has been widening. The role for social diplomacy is to show that those who have more don't want to become colonists, as it is sometimes suggested by developing countries. That's the task for NGOs – to convince the people that the developed countries want to cooperate, not to implement imperialism. To do it, it's necessary to invest in 'human potential' and try to prepare people to be self-sufficient. At the same time, a huge challenge for the European Union is economic crisis, which affects its members. In that case, it is going to be more difficult to share the money between richer and poorer, having social support for that. And then public diplomacy can be very helpful.

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293 see: J. L'Etang Public Relations and Diplomacy in a Globalized World: An Issue of Public Communication, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 2009 53(4) 607-626. p.3

294 A. Leszczyński, Janka w poszukiwaniu Boga sprawiedliwego, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15-16.12.2012, s.21

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Author: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska, University of Wrocław, Poland
E-mail: Katarzyna.zalas-kaminska@uni.wroc.pl

REVIEW

The author brings interesting and very ambitious title - The role of the Polish non-governmental organizations in the development aid and the Polish model of public diplomacy. She has a clear idea and research question to share with the reader. The author asks valuable questions in the context of development aid and public diplomacy. There is a little of everything –case study of political development in Poland, criticism of polish MFA towards the role of the NGO's etc and on the development of a public diplomacy at the MFA. Public diplomacy as a new phenomenon in the international relations and may possibly open new debate on the connection of these two titles of the conference. Recommendations of the author at the end should serve for opening a debate not only on polish side, but in comparison with other countries, for example V4 countries as closest allies in the region.

Mgr. Andrea Figulová, PhD.

SHARING TRANSITION EXPERIENCE OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Karla Wursterová

ABSTRACT

Following their accession to the European Union the Visegrad Group (V4) countries decided to forward their specific transformation and integration experience to the countries of the immediate neighborhood in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The experience would lie predominantly in adopting and consolidating democratic values, building the institutions of multi-party democracy and market economy, and embarking upon the road leading to closer integration and ultimate accession to the EU. The International Visegrad Fund has been a primary instrument in implementing this policy of assistance and transfer of V4 experience. "A great loss of mutual interest among our nations occurs and it is a known fact that we cannot fully know our present without understanding our past."²⁹⁵ Through the International Visegrad Fund we are trying, among other things, to support communication between V4 countries and our partners from Eastern Europe and Western Balkans as well as to enhance our common values.

KEY WORDS

Visegrad, V4, Eastern Partnership, Western Balkans, NGOs, communication, coordination, cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The Fund expanded its internal (inner-regional) activities to the countries of our Eastern and South Eastern neighborhood in 2004. Up until the beginning of 2013 the Fund had disbursed over €3.5 million supporting projects in the Eastern Partnership countries and nearly €1 million in funding of projects of the Western Balkans.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ Agreement on research in Open Society Archives, Speech of Minister Jan Kohout to Open Society Archives http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/events_and_issues/press_releases/x2010_05_07_agreement_on_research_in_open_society_archives.html

²⁹⁶ Broken down the EaP countries constitute ca. €4.5 million which is about 10% of all funds dispersed in the years 2000–2012 (with Ukraine's €2.2 million and Belarus's €1.2 million being the most successful). The Western Balkans were funded with ca. €1 million in the years 2004–2012 with Serbia's ca. €650,000 and Bosnia and Herzegovina's €150,000 as the two most successful funding countries.

As opposed to bilateral Official Development Assistance, the grant schemes of the International Visegrad Fund emphasize the importance of cooperation in a **multilateral framework**. This approach brings the added value of strengthening regional cooperation and promoting mutual understanding in an area often struggling to overcome a historical baggage of divisions. The declared principle of giving preference to projects involving organizations from many countries encourage the applicants to establish wide ranging cooperation cutting across multiple borders in the implementation of concrete project proposals. As a remarkable feature, some of the projects manage to bring together NGOs and think-tanks of countries with otherwise tense bilateral relationships.

The number of applications received for the various grant and mobility schemes of the Fund from the Eastern Partnership region is fast increasing. With the launch of the V4EaP Program, the Fund joined the list of those foreign donors whose commitment is essential to sustain the vitally important but chronically underfunded non-governmental sector in the EaP countries as well as in the Western Balkans. It will be also important to benefit from the presence of influential donors; important EU member states are changing their development strategies with an emphasis on regional dimension (SIDA/Sweden); in this regard the International Visegrad Fund shall use its added value and years of experience with regional cooperation.

1. VISEGRAD 4 EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

Both the launch of the V4EaP program in 2012 and targeting of the Visegrad+ grant vehicle entirely to the Western Balkan region caused the funding to both regions to grow significantly. The V4EaP program itself constitutes about 20% of the entire annual budget of the Fund—ca. €1.5 million.²⁹⁷ The Visegrad+ program has an annual budget of €400,000 entirely reserved for the Western Balkans. This sum is, however, supplemented by additional funding from the Visegrad Scholarship Program and from Small and Standard Grant programs which are all open to applicants from the Western Balkans.

Previous calls for proposals in the first year of the V4EaP Program have attracted 141 applicants. The interest is growing rapidly; the last call (Extended Standard Grants' deadline on December 17, 2012) has been the most successful with 64 eligible applications. Overall about 30% of all applications submitted by EaP lead partners have been selected for support. In the initial stage (Flagship and Standard Grants calls in June and September 2012), the number of applications from EaP organizations was on the lower side but subsequently the Fund's efforts to raise awareness of the program in the EaP countries led to a significant increase of interest. As a result EaP applicants as lead partners have been allocated ca. 40% of the available budget following the December 2012 call for proposals.

Ukrainian and Georgian organizations have been so far the most active participants in the V4EaP grant programs. There have been, however, fewer applications than expected from Belarus.

²⁹⁷ These figures do not include the foreign donors' contributions envisaged to be €1 million (Dutch government), SEK 1 million/ca. €110,000 (Swedish government), or the USAID's contribution of €200,000.

The V4EaP scholarship program in the first year attracted 237 applicants from all EaP countries. Most of the applicants come from Ukraine but strong interest is registered from Georgia and Armenia, as well. Similarly to the grant schemes, applicants from Belarus are relatively low in numbers. The available budgetary allocation is sufficient for awarding about 71 scholarships this year.

Under the V4EaP Visegrad University Studies Grant scheme, three universities (two from Ukraine and one from Georgia) have received support with the total amount of €29,000.

In general, in the implementation of Eastern Partnership Policy, three pillars must be respected. **Communication** (with all relevant stakeholders in Visegrad Four and Eastern Partnership countries; importance of fact finding missions in Eastern Partnership countries; avoid "office based policy", **coordination** (with all relevant stakeholders—donors, state administration, Non-Governmental Organizations, CSOs, academic sphere etc.), **cooperation** (to achieve more effective results and to have coherent development policy).

Carl Bildt is concerned about Eastern Partners and their economic situation in regard to the Russian market, as he states further in his speech in Stockholm in September 2013 "Moldovans, highly dependent on Russian gas, have been told that they might have to freeze this winter. All over the region, new export barriers have suddenly been raised for sweets, meat, milk and wine intended for the Russian market".²⁹⁸ In order to protect EaP countries, Minister Sikorski wants to ensure political support for the North-South gas transport corridor, so the Eastern Partnership countries don't depend on Russia as strongly.²⁹⁹ Karel Schwarzenberg and János Martonyi emphasize the need of the V4 countries to tightly cooperate with the U.S.³⁰⁰ to maintain the strong position as countries with rising stock in this continuing recession.

2. OTHER DONORS

The awareness of the V4EaP program is rapidly growing both in the EaP countries and among our international partners. The Dutch government has already committed €2.5 million to support the program and the Swedish government will soon announce a contribution of SEK 1 million. Negotiations have been launched to secure a contribution from the Swiss government, as well. Currently, two projects in the EaP area are being finalized and contracted which will have matching funding from the USAID.

298 BILDT, Carl, Speech at the conference "Perspectives on the Eastern Partnership in the context of the Vilnius Summit" <http://www.government.se/sb/d/7956/a/223299>

299 Poland's Dream <http://www.euinside.eu/en/analyses/polands-dream>

300 GLOBSEC: VISEGRAD MAKES US STRONGER, SAID LAJČÁK <http://www.globsec.org/globsec2013/highlights-news/globsec-visegrad-makes-us-stronger-said-lajcak/>

3. WESTERN BALKANS

Until 2012, Western Balkan applicants did not have specific grant vehicles within the Fund's programs. The Visegrad+ program—previously only targeting individual countries (such as Serbia or Belarus)—widened its scope to the entire Western Balkan region with the annual budget of €400,000. The first call for proposals publicized at the end of 2012 attracted a record number of nearly 70 applicants out of which 10 grant projects with total budget of €650,000 were selected for implementation in 2013 and 2014.³⁰¹

Štefan Füle comments on the subject of appreciating the cooperation between the Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans by saying that, “it needs all the political support, it needs us to take very seriously the concerns of the European citizens as well as concerns and wishes of the people in the candidate countries. It requires us to politically support this process on a daily basis and to take the lessons learnt from the previous waves of enlargements very seriously.”³⁰² On the other hand, Carl Bildt said in his speech from September 2013 in Stockholm that while promoting a new partnership between the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe we face growing outside pressure directed against closer cooperation between the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe.³⁰³

4. V4 MEETINGS

In the political sense, the Vilnius summit will be a crucial moment concerning the further perspectives of EaP policies (question of signing of association agreement and DCFTA with Ukraine and finalization of Association Agreement with Moldova and Georgia and further steps in confirming the DCFTA with these countries; which strategy to apply in the case of Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan), but it will have also practical implications.

EU and its Member States will review their policy towards the countries of EaP, also in the light of outcomes of the Vilnius summit.

The presence of the European Commission (DG DEVCO, DG Enlargement, EEAS) will be crucial, as an effective communication with relevant stakeholders is needed. It is evident that the European Commission and its representations in EaP countries have to be more visible and effective. But it is also the responsibility of the EU's member states as well as of other donors, which are providing development and technical assistance and which are present on the ground, to be more active.

More importantly, the EU/EC is changing its development strategy and policy in accordance with the new financial perspective, and intends to support consortia of bigger number of member states in the implementation of projects. In this regard the Visegrad Group will be undoubtedly an added value mainly for those, which have experience with regional cooperation (Nordic Council of Ministers, Council of Baltic Sea

301 The budget figure includes a €250,000 leftover from previous years; the budget for 2014 is envisaged to be €400,000.

302 FÜLE, Štefan, APPRECIATING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN VISEGRAD FOUR AND WESTERN BALKANS http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2013/10/20131031_2_en.htm

303 BILDT, Carl, Speech at the conference “Perspectives on the Eastern Partnership in the context of the Vilnius Summit” <http://www.government.se/sb/d/7956/a/223299>

States). Activities of the Polish Presidency in V4, namely that it organized the ministerial meeting of V4, Nordic and Baltic countries are positively evaluated. Concrete activities of the HU PRES to give more visibility and exposure to the activities of the Visegrad Group and the International Visegrad Fund in the Eastern Partnership area, are also appreciated.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“We don’t do defeatism. We don’t do sliding back. We do growth. By standing together we represent a shared powerful brand—we represent millions of Europeans who have not given up on Europe, who are determined to make Europe a success”, Radek Sikorski states.³⁰⁴ Miroslav Lajčák says “Visegrad is going strategic, we are more mature. Visegrad makes each of us individually and as a group stronger.”³⁰⁵

Projects supported by the Fund in the various granting schemes aim at transferring useful experience accumulated in V4 countries in the field of **sustainable development, public administration reform**, the administration of **“Euroregions”** and aspects of **Euro-Atlantic integration**. Cross-border cooperation and training of journalists are further topics being dealt with by the grantees. Another distinct set of projects is focusing on transfer of V4 experience on areas such as regional development, security sector reform, advocacy of EU integration policies and dealing with frozen conflicts.

Strengthening the civil society in the Western Balkan and EaP countries is particularly important in the current circumstances when pressure generated by societal actors inside the countries is required to revive the momentum for reforms and transition. Therefore, many projects focus on extending support to NGO capacity building, on facilitating the networking activities of civil organizations and on encouraging their local initiatives in order to strengthen their cooperation with local authorities and enhance their engagement with the public. Since foreign funding is an indispensable source of the sustainability and survival of the NGOs, some of the selected projects aim for assisting them to successfully apply for EU funding and to link up with international civil networks.

Although bilateral ODA offers great advantages, the fund rather utilizes the successful potential of multilateral regional cooperation, as well as multilateral ODA. Our experience has shown that this approach is advantageous for several reasons: It offers a unique “umbrella” for ODA where bilateral relations might be difficult, and it utilizes the unique multilateral experiences the V4 countries have shared in the fields of societal and economic transformation and regional cooperation. The two main pillars the Fund employs in their approach—the **grant schemes** and the individual **academic mobility**—together with the possibility to fund projects submitted

304 Poland’s Dream <http://www.euinside.eu/en/analyses/polands-dream>

305 Minister Lajčák gave an address at international conference in Batumi [http://www.foreign.gov.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_EN&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/\(vw_ByID\)/ID_0CC2E0D7B1B2C776C1257BA9001D6008](http://www.foreign.gov.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_EN&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/(vw_ByID)/ID_0CC2E0D7B1B2C776C1257BA9001D6008)

by **regional and local administrations** offers a great potential for both regions. The Fund's granting vehicles thus have a unique potential in targeting **civil society, individual citizens, and municipalities and regional governments** at the same time.

The IVF with its activities will continue its two-track approach by supporting civic initiatives expressed through the activities of civil society, NGOs, independent media, educational institutions, but also extending support to projects involving local and state administration.

Last but not least, the synergic effect of multilateral ODA offers significant added value in **preventing overlaps** of ODAs from other sides; in negotiating with other partners, the Fund has managed to align the support with other donors and managed to get significant **match funding**.

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Author: Karla Wursterová, Executive Director of International Visegrad Fund, Slovakia

E-mail: wursterova@visegradfund.sk

REVIEW

The agenda of the International Visegrad Fund to enhance collaboration of various stakeholders in this region (apart from the Visegrad countries, it is mainly the Eastern and South Eastern neighborhood) is the more valuable the more we consider how the region's actors have been dealing with mutual historical conflicts. The number of applications in IVF from EaP and the Western Balkans prove that these efforts find fertile ground in the still rather impoverished civil society institutions. This article further identifies several areas of the V4 transition experience, which may serve as inspiration for civil sector in the Western Balkans and the EaP countries. Such experience sharing and support is crucial, since as the article rightly states, "the pressure generated by societal actors inside the countries is required to revive the momentum for reforms and transition".

Mrg. Michal Cenker, PhD.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:



Božena Balúchová, Palacky Univerzity, Olomouc

Božena Baluchová is currently doing her postgradual study at Department of International Development Studies in Palacky University, Olomouc, Czech Republic (the research is focused on 'The need for linking media production and development issues'). Last eight months she was working as development field worker in Kenya (as a part of Slovak-Kenyan development project of Trnava University: 'Social and health care for malnourished children under 5 years and their mothers in the Kwale region'). She was responsible for community development activities – coordinating the nutrition centers, preparing the lectures for community health workers (IMAM, IYCF, ICT topic), the collection and the analysis of malnutrition-data, and media coverage. She has been working as development education trainer for several NGOs (focused on peer solidarity and climate justice). She is responsible for community and multimedia projects (as ethical journalist and documentary movie-maker of DocUnion NGO – covering stories from developing countries).



Majlinda Belegu, Public University "Haxhi Zeka" Peja Kosovo

Majlinda Belegu is the Vice-Dean of the Haxhi Zeka University in Peja (Kosovo) and an expert on Applied Sciences of Business and Business Law. She is an author of scientific articles on the Kosovar tax reform, the informal economy from the angle of legislative regulation in Kosovo, and the impact of legislation on tourism potential of Kosovo. In addition to this, in 2010, she reported on trafficking of human beings in Kosovo during the transition period. She is a graduate from the Iliria Royal University and a postgraduate from the European University of Tirana (both Albania).



Allan Bussard, Integra Foundation

Allan Bussard, a native of Canada, has worked in the area of small business and organizational development in Europe since 1975. Since 1991, he has lived in Bratislava, Slovakia. He is a founder of FBE Ltd, a leading Slovak consulting firm. In 1995, he co-founded the Integra Foundation, which is an agency focusing on poverty alleviation with operations in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. Integra focuses on enterprise solutions to poverty, with previous and present activities in the areas of microenterprise development for women at risk, social enterprise development for disadvantaged groups, Corporate Social Responsibility advocacy and training, Fair Trade and youth education and employment. He is a co-author of, "Corporate Social Responsibility: Overview of Basic Principles and Practices", which is an introduction of CSR to the Central European market. More recently, he has led the Integra Foundation in the development of education and economic development solutions to poverty in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. He pioneered the creation of the world's first fair trade macadamia nut value chain, based in Kenya, which gives

hundreds of farmers access to global markets. He also led the development of Central Europe's first fair trade coffee brand. Allan is based in Integra's head office in Bratislava.



Sandra Ceciarini, Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR)

Sandra Ceciarini is Director of PLATFORMA, the European platform of local and regional authorities for development cooperation. Until March 2013, she was Director of Citizenship and International Cooperation within the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). CEMR is the largest organisation of local and regional authorities in Europe, gathering 57 national associations of towns, municipalities and regions from 41 countries. It works to promote a united Europe that is based on local and regional self-government and democracy. Within CEMR, Sandra Ceciarini was particularly involved in the fields of

European citizenship and the participation of women in political life.

Since 2004, she has been notably involved in efforts to recognize the role of local and regional authorities in development cooperation. She has guided the process of structuring PLATFORMA, whose secretariat is hosted by the CEMR. PLATFORMA coordinates the voice of local and regional authorities in the field of development cooperation. It is supported by the European Commission.



Zuzana Fialová, Slovak NDGO Platform

She is a Sociology graduate from the Comenius University in Bratislava and a postgraduate from the Institute of Political Science at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. She specializes in international human rights and development-cooperation effectiveness. Between 1997-2003, she worked at the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation in Poland as a director of the programme on support of human rights and good governance in the countries of the Eastern Partnership. She intensively worked in Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, the South-Caucasus countries, as well as in Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. From 2004 till 2006,

she worked in north-east Afghanistan at first as a civil counsellor for the ISAF Province Reconstruction Team, later as a development worker of a German organization GTZ. She is an author of many publications about development cooperation and human rights. She currently works as an expert assistant at the Faculty of Healthcare and Social Work at the Trnava University. She at the same time, a programme coordinator for Afghanistan at the NGO People in Peril. She is a chairwoman of the Slovak NGDO Platform.



Juraj Jančovič, Trnava University

Juraj Jančovič is a lecturer at the Trnava University (Slovakia) and **is in charge of social and health care project for malnourished children in the Kwale region (Kenya).**

During 2006, he was a coordinator of health-care and social projects from Trnava University in Nairobi (Kenya) and South Sudan. In 2006 he also worked as a consultant during establishing a hospital in Buikwe (Uganda). In 2007 he worked as a coordinator of St. Kizito Streetboys Centre in Nairobi (Kenya). After that until June 2008, he was a coordinator of a project on recovery of a hospital in Rutovu (Burundi). More recently, from

May 2012 to September 2013, he was in charge of development activities of the Trnava University in Kenya. He is

also in charge of a volunteer programme focusing on capacity building in computer literacy in Kwale (Kenya). In 2012, he coordinated Training in effective development cooperation. He is a graduate from the Faculty of Health Care and Social Work at the Trnava University and postgraduate from the Department of Social Work at the St. Elizabeth University (Slovakia). He was awarded the "Trnava University Silver Medal" for exceptional performance on humanitarian and development projects in Africa in 2006.



Dorian Jano, European Movement Albania (EMA)

Dorian Jano (PhD) is currently a lecturer of European Studies at the Department of Governance, Politics and Communication, Marin Barleti University, Tirana. He has been a visiting fellow at the Institute for European Integration Europa-Kolleg Hamburg and at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Collegium Budapest. He received his PhD degree in Political Studies from the University of Milan. Dr. Jano has published several scholarly peer reviewed articles related to the issues of Western Balkans' democratization and integration into EU.



Balázs Jarábik, Pact, Central European Policy Institute

Balázs Jarábik was a civic activist in Slovakia in the nineties; from 1999 he worked with the Pontis Foundation on civil society development projects in the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He also consulted international organizations, governments and the European Parliament on issues connected to Central and Eastern Europe and has written extensively about the region. Working for a Pact, a US NGO in Kyiv, Ukraine over the past six years he has helped to develop and supervise the largest civil society support program in Eastern Europe. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Central

European Policy Institute (CEPI) in Bratislava and an Associate Fellow at FRIDE, a pan-European think tank based in Madrid and Brussels.



Cezary Kościelniak, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan

Dr. Cezary Koscielniak is a tenure at Department of Social Science in Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. His research focuses on the transformation of the knowledge institutions and the role of the universities in the development of the societies and regions. He served as an expert to the Chancellery of the President of Republic of Poland in areas of higher education policy, education for sustainable development, and religion in public life. In 2012 he edited the book Freedom, Equality, University.



Miriam Lexmann, International Republican Institute

Miriam Lexmann worked for the Council of Europe on civil society development programmes in the 1990's. After Slovakia joined the EU she served as the Permanent Representative of the Slovak Parliament to the EU. Following her occupation in the European Parliament she joined the International Republican Institute as the Head of its EU Office in Brussels.



Simon Lightfoot, University of Leeds

Dr. Simon Lightfoot is a Senior Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Leeds, UK. Before he came to Leeds in 2005, Simon worked at Liverpool John Moores University. His PhD was awarded in 2002 from Nottingham Trent University. He has been a visiting fellow at the National Europe Centre, Australian National University and the Corvinus University of Budapest. He is co-organiser of the EADI Working Group 'Development Aid of the Non-DAC Donors'. He has an interest in learning and teaching issues. In 2009 he won the Political Studies Association's Bernard Crick Prize for Outstanding Teaching and was awarded a full University Teaching Fellowship. In 2013 Simon won the prestigious award of National Teaching Fellow from the UK Higher Education Academy. He is co-editor of 'Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States' (with Ondrej Horký-Hluchán) and 'Teaching Politics and International Relations' (with Cathy Gormley-Heenan).



Dmitry Mariyasin, United Nations Development Programme, Bratislava (UNDP)

Dmitry Mariyasin is the Team Leader, New Partnerships and Emerging Donors in the UNDP's regional bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. He is leading a team in UNDP's Bratislava Regional Center that focuses on: New development donors and partners, innovation in official development assistance (ODA), South-south, east-east and triangular cooperation, network solutions for complex problems, policy dialogue within Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS) and G8/G20 formats.

Before his current post, Dmitry Mariyasin served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS at UNDP headquarters in New York (2008-2011); as UN Coordination Officer (2004-2008); and as Programme Support Manager at UN Office of Project Services (2002-2004) with UNDP in Moscow, Russian Federation.

Dmitry holds a PHD in Economics from the Moscow State University, a Masters in Public Administration degree from New York University, as well as a degree in public administration from the Moscow State University and in international economics from the Russian Foreign Trade Academy.



Dušan Ondrušek, PDCS

PhDr. Dušan Ondrušek, CSc. established the PDCS organization 20 years ago. The organization strives to provide the space for dialogue, disseminate knowledge and skills for alternative solutions of conflict resolution, especially with respect to community and public conflicts.

He initially worked as a psychologist; devoted to counselling, therapy, and altruism research. Since 1990, he focuses as a coach and consultant on the issues of corporate development, alternative conflict resolution, and nonviolent communication. As a coach and facilitator, he has led more than 1100 trainings in more than 40 countries.

He is the author and co-author of 11 books, e.g. the publication of "Textbook for NGOs" and "Conflict, Mediation, and Mediation Advise". He blogs about conflict transformation in many countries and about the clashes of diverse cultures.



Jana Radakovič, Institute for Territorial Economic Development, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia

Jana Radakovič had graduated from International Relations and Diplomacy of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the UMB in Banská Bystrica. She has finished her postgraduate studies in the area of History and International Relations at the University Institute for International Relations in Geneva. She currently finishes graduate studies at the UNECSO School for Business Studies of the University in Novi Sad. She is an author of a number of projects addressing the support of women in entrepreneurship, gender equality in the context of local economic development, and business incubation. She is a director of the NGO Women's Entrepreneurship Academy.



Bashkim Rrahmani, Public University "Haxhi Zeka" Peja Kosovo

Bashkim Rrahmani is an expert on Kosovo and a lecturer of EU and International Law. Before working at the Haxhi Zeka University and Universum College (both Kosovo), he was an Executive Director of the Foundation for Democratic Initiative (2001-2011), one of the most active civil society organizations in Kosovo. During 1994-2000, he acted as an Education as well as a Labour Inspector. Around this period he also regularly visited Washington as well as Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania in the position of Field Representative. Where he reported the political, economic and social situation of the three countries for the Kriebler Institute of the Free Congress Foundation. He is an author of a number of scientific publications, the latest being chapters on Kosovo in the Washington-based journal Nations in Transit. Since 2008, he is a national trainer of trainers in Acquis Communautaire and from 2011, a national certified & licensed mediator.



Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska, University of Wrocław

Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska - Master of Journalism and International Relations (University of Wrocław, Poland), educated also in Mediation (postgraduate studies at the University of Economics in Wrocław); now a PhD student in the Department of International Communication, Institute for International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Wrocław. Range of scientific interests: the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - NGOs cooperation in development aid in the context of public diplomacy; mediating role of NGOs. She is the author of publications on mediation, social campaigns and the role

of NGOs in building the image of the country. At the University she conducts students' classes on international negotiations. Professional experience in journalism and public relations; at present the owner of a company dealing with promotion and mediation.



Karla Wursterová, Executive Director of the International Visegrad Fund

Karla Wursterová is the Executive Director of the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the International Visegrad Fund is to promote development of closer cooperation among the Visegrad Group countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Ms. Wursterová has been the head of the fund since August 2012. She served as Second Secretary at the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Prague (2005–2009) and held the position of Director of the Department for Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid at the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009 – 2012). She graduated in Business

Management at the University of Economics in Bratislava and Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique in Paris.

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The conference was organized with support of the United Nations
Development Programme in Bratislava.



ISBN 978-80-971310-1-2



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