Development Ecosystems in V4: the New Role for Civil Society Organisations and Business Beyond 2015
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OPENING REMARKS
Dear State Secretary Burian, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Panelists and Guests:

On behalf of the Pontis Foundation it is my great honor to welcome you at the third Annual Conference on Democratization, Development and Cooperation. For those of you who were here last year, you might remember we were celebrating a very important milestone in a history of Slovak Aid – its first decade.

Paradoxically, within only a year the world around us, in our closest neighbourhood, has changed drastically.

Coming from an organization and country, that benefited and learned from other donor countries, as well as our own state building, that learned transitional lessons, became a member and donor of the EU, and also a DAC member country, we feel great responsibility to pay back what was given to us, but also to pay a little bit forward.

We also feel a great deal a responsibility towards the rest of our society to share information on what is happening not only in our closest neighbourhood, but also on the other side of the globe and especially how taxpayers money is being used to change other people’s lives.

And that is only one part of our motivation as organizers of this conference.

Our main objective is to bring together partners in development, from all sectors of a society and globe, and to create space for innovative ideas and new opportunities for the development agenda.

This year, we will pay special attention to a number of important topics, but let me just mention a few:

First, the Slovak Presidency of the Visegrad Four group: uniqueness of each of the countries’ ODA set-up and the strength and synergies found in joint projects.

Second, the efforts for greater effectiveness and coordination in order to properly plan and implement post-2015 successors to the MDGs.

Third, we are looking forward to discussion and examples of some best practices in the field of corporate social responsibility, the role companies and social enterprises play in development. The challenges of securing both profitability and sustainability and also contributing to building stronger, competitive and more inclusive markets in developing countries.
Similarly, we will look at innovation and how it can affect the potential of developing countries to generate economic growth, preserve peace and security and lead to the good governance.

Fourth, and a very important challenge is ensuring that the EU Plays an Active and Principled Role in Supporting Democracy, Freedom and Good Governance, and at the same time assessing the added value of new democracies in the process of formation and implementation of these EU policies

Fifth, the next year will be a milestone in development, a year when we will look back and assess successes and lessons learned but also a year when we will have to look forward and choose the best tools for sustainable development in the world.

The European year of development will be a special year which will allow politicians and practitioners to engage more intensively with the public and interact closely with beneficiaries for the purpose of effective and meaningful ODA spending

Dear Distinguished guests, allow me at the end to highlight those without whom the Conference would not be possible:

SlovakAid a MZV, specially the International Vysehrad Fond, The Ministry of Finance and the UNDP, Slovak NGDO Platform, the EU and its EU program Trialog, the Faculty of Social Science and Economy of the University of Comenius and the Faculty of International Relations of the Economic University.

Thanks for being here and enjoy the event.
Dear Ambassadors, dear guests, ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased that you have accepted the invitation to this conference, the third one in a row of conferences under the heading “Development and Democracy” that we have decided to organize every year. Right at the beginning, I want to thank the Pontis Foundation for organizational arrangements of the conference but more importantly, for the preparation of its interesting content.

Many of you remember the success of last year’s conference that gave us the opportunity to review the achievements of 10 years’ of the existence of Slovak official development assistance. It also outlined the future of the development cooperation policy of Slovakia including the challenges we must face. Although this year’s conference will be less celebratory (although one can always find a good reason to celebrate something.), I am convinced that the conference will stimulate important ideas and provocative inspirations for the future.

What are two key landmarks that will shape the development cooperation agenda in the coming months? First, it is the Presidency of Slovakia of V4, second is the formulation of new, sustainable development goals, both have an important impact on our development cooperation activities from a national and global point of view.

Starting with the V4 Presidency; this is an opportunity and at the same time a challenge for each country sitting in the driver’s seat of the Visegrad Group. In the field of development cooperation, we continue to hold regular coordination meetings in Brussels as well as at other international fora. Consultations on political issues are carried out at different working levels, however the implementation part, and I refer to activities in the field, in specific countries, still has the potential to be strengthened even further. The Western Balkans or Eastern Partnership countries seem to me obvious focus regions for V4 development cooperation, although I do not exclude any other country. These countries are eager to learn from V4 transformation and integration experience and we have a lot to offer them. Due to the current political environment, mainly in the Eastern Partnership, we should step up our efforts to help them prepare reform agenda but also assist them in making it happen.
Last week, I visited Ukraine together with my counterparts from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and we held intensive talks with Ukrainian governmental as well as non-governmental representatives. We have jointly defined several areas for cooperation and decided to provide Ukraine with tailor-made activities building on what the V4 countries are currently doing individually in Ukraine. A similar approach could be applied to other EaP countries, e.g. Moldova, or in the Western Balkans.

I believe that V4 countries should strive to reach greater synergy in their development cooperation activities and make them more harmonized. In this respect, I commend the work of the International Visegrad Fund which promotes V4 cooperation in the EU neighborhood countries. However, the Fund should not be the only avenue for the implementation of joint V4 projects. We should enhance contact among our development agencies and embassies based in partner countries, and come up with concrete project proposals. The Slovak V4 Presidency offers several opportunities to deliberate on mutual cooperation and to gain political support for activities, just to mention as an example, the meeting of the V4 Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Western Balkans later this month in Bratislava.

The second aspect that has an impact on the future development cooperation agenda is the formulation of new, sustainable development goals and a post-2015 development framework. Next year will be crucial in defining clear-cut content of SDGs including the means of implementation and relevant indicators. Compared to MDGs, new development goals will cover more sectors and will be truly universal, which means that all countries around the world will be required to consider them when crafting national policies, including development cooperation policy.

For over one year the UN has been working hard on drafting a synthesis report on SDGs and their financing that will be published next month. The report should be a good basis for moving ahead with intergovernmental consultations which have to overcome divergent opinions, interests and concerns. In the end, by the 2015 UN General Assembly at latest, a consensus will have to be reached. Till then, we have a chance to influence the substance of the post-2015 agenda that will result in new commitments to be accomplished at national as well as global level. Slovakia, which took an active part in the Intergovernmental Committee on Financing SDGs, will keep on engaging in this process. Together with other countries and stakeholders, we will endeavor to make this ambitious agenda as relevant as possible to development challenges of the current world.

Today’s conference will discuss both themes I have touched upon in my opening statement. I could have added more information on SlovakAid achievements since last year’s conference, however for the sake of time I will stop here and leave this topic to next panelists. I wish you fruitful discussions and hope to see you again next year when the conference will be organized as a part of activities of the European Year for Development 2015.
CONFERENCE NOTES
PLENARY SESSION 1
Enhanced Cooperation of the V4 countries: Coordination in development

Speakers:
- Peter Hulényi, Director of the Department of Humanitarian and Development Aid, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
- Ádám Zoltán Kovács, Deputy State Secretary for International Cooperation at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary
- Ivan Jukl, Director General of the Economic Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic
- Zuzanna Kierzkowska, Director of the Department of Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

In his evaluation of the challenges and perspectives of the past years, Peter Hulényi called development cooperation „a work in progress”. He considers V4 cooperation in ODA to be natural and perspective for the following reasons:
1. It overlaps in priority sectors and countries (Moldava, Eastern Africa, Asia)
2. The V4 countries all have a limited budget for ODA and therefore, more can be achieved together
3. The ODA systems in V4 countries are compatible and based on soft assistance

To comment on the state of play, at the beginning ODA was more focused on information exchange. Now, it has moved toward activities that are almost trilateral, not just in ODA, but also in humanitarian assistance, development education, etc.

For example, the first trilateral project was carried out in Moldava.

In March 2014, assistance in kind was delivered to the Ukraine in cooperation with Hungary, which was a lot more cost effective.

In the Czech Republic, Slovakia is working together on the evaluation of projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In 2015, during the European Year of Development, there will be common V4 projects in the pipeline.

In her comments on the technical assistance of the V4 countries, Zuzana Kierzkowska, the Director of the Department of Development Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, used the example of the Ukraine to demonstrate cooperation and coordination of the V4 countries.

The Ukraine is the priority of Polish Aid. They have been working closely with the Ukrainian government and civil society. They were approached by the Ukraine to help with self-government reforms and they have been collaborating with several ministries on this.

The Solidarity Fund PL has been funding several projects in the Ukraine to support 2 major subjects:
1. Local self-government and reform
2. Free media

They have also been assisting the government in fighting corruption and lots of bilateral activities have been carried out in this area.

There is a great need for humanitarian assistance. Zuzana mentioned the visit of V4 countries in the Ukraine which was of great importance in order to find out what can be done.

Zuzana emphasized the need of the V4 to speak with one voice to make sure that the countries are better heard. She mentioned that joining programmes in countries of common interests is beneficial for both the recipients and the donors because common initiatives which combine expertise and bring out like-mindedness can attract the funds of other donors.

She concluded that the added value of V4 cooperation is not in the quantity of projects, but in their quality.

Ivan Jukl, Director General of the Economic Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic commented on the division of the private sector in terms of its approach towards the developing countries.

On one hand, the private sector is exporting goods to developing countries. On the other hand, the other part of the private sector believes in investing in developing countries to teach them to produce themselves. Therefore, there is a conflict in these 2 approaches.

The least developed countries are unable to attract other funds besides ODA which is a problem which needs to be addressed and the focus should be on the quality of projects. Otherwise, these countries will never attract investors. The Czech Republic is trying to be more engaged in the process of assessing the objective needs of the countries to see if the selected sectors are the right ones.

For example, if their projects are focused on agriculture, how can they be addressing people living on the street?

They are engaged in discussions about industrial policies to attract more investors.

Ivan believes that the projects in which the private sector is working closely with NGOs can create more synergy. He emphasized the need to engage companies from the same sector in V4 for better efficiency of ODA.

Zoltan Kovács, the Deputy State Secretary for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Hungary commented on foreign trade as a significant part of international development cooperation. He mentioned the role of trade houses which is to enhance trade through diplomatic tools. A new concept in regular international development
cooperation was the creation of an agency for ODA (in this area, Hungary is behind other V4 countries).

He mentioned the following reasons for joint programming:
1. Limited budgets
2. Common objectives
3. Common experiences
4. Comparative advantages related to private sector
PLENARY SESSION 2
Sustainable Development Goals – From Quantity to Equality and Quality

Speakers:
- **Martin Heather**, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Policy and Coherence, European Commission
- **Jeroen Verheul**, Ambassador for Trade and Development of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
- **Ida McDonnell**, Policy Analyst at the Review and Evaluation Division, OECD

Moderator:
- **Ingrid Brocková**, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the OECD

The objective of the panel was to cover development and its discussion on the international scene as we are approaching the year 2015 where the agenda of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and post-2015 development framework dominates. This is a process led primary by the United Nations (UN), but all other international organizations have also been engaged in the process as well, specifically the European Union (EU) and the OECD. The panel was composed of representatives of the European Commission, OECD, and the important bilateral donor country, the Netherlands. The aim was to achieve more interactive debate structured in four clusters:
- **The Global Partnership**, as the new platform for preparing the post–2015 development framework and one of the suggested Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
- **From the MDGs to the SDGs** (lessons learned). The simplicity of the eight-point agenda is a key strength of the MDGs, but also a major weakness. Looking forward what approach should be taken (from quantity to equality and quality).
- **Sustainable Development Financing** OECD Development Cooperation Report 2014: Mobilizing Resources for Sustainable Development
- **Implications/Recommendations/Guidance for the V4 countries.**
In the first intervention, Ambassador Jeroen Verheul tackled the question whether the Global Partnership would be a viable “business model” and have a sufficient institutional framework, adequately inclusive, to move forward. He presented the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation as the platform to provide accountability and practical guidance needed by all partners to maximize the impact of their cooperation efforts. He summarized the concrete actions towards inclusive and sustainable development results, as i) progress achieved since Busan and inclusive development (ownership of development priorities by developing countries, focus on results, inclusive partnerships and development, transparency and accountability to each donor, supporting fragile and conflict-affected states in their transition to resilience); ii) domestic resources mobilization; iii) middle income countries; iv) south-south cooperation, triangular cooperation, and knowledge sharing; v) business as a partner in development. And he elaborated on working arrangements and the evolving role of the Global Partnership. He highlighted the outcome of the first High Level Meeting (on Ministerial level, April 16, 2014) of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, hosted by the Government of Mexico, co-organized by the OECD and the UNDP, with co-chairs Indonesia, UK, Nigeria, where 1500 attendees participated from over the 130 countries, representing governments, civil society, the private sector, parliamentary organizations and others. At the same time, he mentioned “the other” Global Partnership – as the 17. SDG – “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”, applicable for both developed and developing countries, which should be as he stated “the way forward”. The questions to be asked are how partnerships work and how to set up effective processes, and how to guarantee the performance monitoring of recipient and donor countries. Representatives of the OECD and the European Commission complemented the Ambassador by explaining the role their organizations would like to play in the international process. Ida McDonnell explained the role of the OECD in setting the monitoring framework in order to be able to measure the quality and quantity commitments of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), other donors and recipient countries. Martin Heather emphasized the importance of engagement of developed countries being accountable for their policies and developing countries to be able to contribute in their respective areas.

A Global partnership approach is the way forward to achieve the goals of the international community.

Martin Heather was the lead speaker in the second cluster: From the MDGs to the SDGs. He explained that although this has been a complex intergovernmental process led by the UN, the other international actors have been intensively engaged in the process as well, i.e. by providing a deep insight into the development agenda, technical expertise, broad range of experience and good practices. Reaching a broad consensus on the idea that ending poverty is an urgent global priority has been one of the most important achievements of the 20th century, however new trends not covered explicitly by the MDGs such as climate change or ageing population etc. need to be reflected in new set of goals. The UN Millennium Declaration embodied international agreement that globalisation should be a positive force for all. This was a commitment based on the ethical principles of solidarity, equality, dignity and respect for nature. Yet when the MDGs expire in 2015, the promises of the Millennium Declaration will remain unfulfilled. While the Millennium Declaration was highly meaningful as an international agreement, the MDGs took poverty to the public, they raised awareness and galvanised
political support for poverty eradication as the over-arching objective of international development. “The most progress”, Martin Heather said, “was achieved in the areas covered by the MDGs”. The eight goals – on income poverty and hunger, education, global diseases, maternal and child health, gender equality, environmental sustainability and global partnership – were highly effective in communicating the urgent need to improve the widespread and dehumanising conditions of poverty in the world. Ambassador Verheul confirmed that the MDGs were the cause of success of development within past 15 years as they were very instrumental and focused on the process.

The MDGs have come to be used as standards for evaluating progress or justifying the allocation of resources and effort. The simplicity of the eight-point agenda is a key strength of the MDGs, but also a major weakness.

However, Martin Heather emphasized that the eight goals left out many priorities that are particularly critical challenges today, notably: the employment and growth that create decent jobs; climate change and environmental sustainability; the instability of global markets; and equity and inclusion in development processes. They also exclude the critical concept of empowering people in order to achieve equitable development – a theme that is central to the Millennium Declaration vision. While many of the MDGs overlap with economic and social rights, they do not reflect certain core principles, such as the concern for the most vulnerable and the excluded, the principles of equality and participation, and the standard of universalism. The MDG targets and indicators narrowed the agenda further, for example by reducing gender equality and empowerment to equality for girls and boys in primary and secondary education. The second, and related, drawback has been the absence of strategy. Unlike other paradigms that drove shifts in thinking and policy – such as the basic needs concept of the 1970s, the liberalisation reforms in the 1980s or the human development approach of the 1990s – the MDGs did not have an accompanying policy approach. Ida McDonnell said, “It is therefore not surprising that while the MDGs raised awareness and support for development, they did not foster new and more effective strategies to achieve sustained economic growth and increase social equity and environmental sustainability”. Although the MDGs have been focused on results, the international community still faces challenges in ownership and accountability, in policy coherence for development and in managing of results. Global public good is essential and requires a global response. The international community must renew its effort and approaches if we are to realize the Millennium Declaration vision. This will require an agenda to address key contemporary challenges, such as rising inequality – which is both unjust and a threat to social peace – persistent unemployment, especially for young people; instability in world financial, food and energy markets; and environmentally unsustainable growth patterns. New policy approaches are needed that will ensure the achievement of a broad set of human objectives while at the same time responding to the key global challenges listed above.

One of the main outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, was the agreement by Member States to launch a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Rio+20 did not elaborate specific goals but stated that the SDGs should be limited in number, aspirational and easy to communicate. These goals should address all three dimensions of sustainable development
in a balanced way and be coherent with and integrated into the UN development agenda beyond 2015. The SDGs should reflect new times, i.e. a new geography of growth; new actors, new resources; greater interdependence; new geography of poverty; growing inequality; broader measures of development; country and context specific approaches and pressure for results. Ida McDonnell presented the OECD’s views on the post-2015 agenda with the ambition to formulate “Global, Holistic and Measurable Goals”: i) Global – moving beyond an exclusively developing country focus to take a global perspective; ii) Holistic – encompassing the poverty and human development agenda of the current MDGs as well as the SDGs. The result should be a single, comprehensive and coherent agenda with one set of global goals, measuring the quality of life, well-being, inequality in each dimension of life.; iii) Measurable and meaningful – driven by goals which are defined and can be measured by countries themselves. The OECD played a pivotal role in developing of the MDGs, and so would like to play a similar role in the process of developing the SDGs, using instruments such as PISA, Social Institutions and Gender Index, and others.

Ida McDonnell was the lead speaker in the third cluster Sustainable Development Financing, and used it as the opportunity to present the key messages of the Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, which was launched very recently by the OECD (www.oecd.org/dac/dcr2014.htm). It covers the questions such as how to better mobilise resources for sustainable development, keeping ODA focused in a shifting world, growing the development potential of other financial flows, putting foreign direct investment to work on development, institutional investors as the answer for long-term development financing, tax revenues as a motor for sustainable development, foundations as development partners, the changing role of the NGOs and civil society in financing sustainable development, what place should there be for remittances in the post 2015 framework, using financial instruments to mobilise private investment for development, creating an environment for investment and sustainable development, fighting corruption and illicit financial flows, supporting countries in growing their tax base, innovating finance development, enhancing the contribution of social business to sustainable development, finding synergies for environment and development finance, and others. Jeroen Verheul confirmed that the ODA remains important, but needs to be redefined and redirected to the LDCs and conflict countries. Few examples of private sector mobilisation, especially Corporate Social Responsibility examples, help ODA significantly. Martin Heather emphasized the need to strengthen public finance management to achieve sustainable domestic financing in the recipient countries.

Few examples of the private sector mobilisation, especially Corporate Social Responsibility examples, help ODA significantly.

The fourth round of interventions was focused on role and potential contribution of the V4 countries, from which three – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland became members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2013. Ida McDonnell confirmed that this has been viewed as the opportunity for these countries to be better aligned with the global agenda and at the same time as the opportunity to offer a contribution to discussions in the DAC sharing authentic experience from their political and economic transition. Jeroen Verheul added that these countries, however relatively new to the development agenda, have to strike to achieve the international commitments “0.7% target is to stay”. Martin Heather confirmed
that the V4 countries have and should continue with the practice having a coordinated voice in the European Union.

**These countries, however relatively new to the development agenda, have to strike to achieve the international commitments.**

The interventions from the audience tackled the questions related to the tax evasion, role of the new donors such as China, India, Brazil, links between development and democracy and an importance of good governance.
ROUNDTABLE A
V4 partners in development cooperation

Speakers:
• Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň, Head of the Research Department, Institute of International Relations in Prague, Czech Republic
• Zsuzsanna Végh, Research Assistant at the Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary
• Patryk Kugiel, Analyst at the International Economic Relations and Global Issues Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland
• Anne-Marie Callan, the Irish Ambassador to Slovakia

Moderator:
• Peter Brezáni, Slovak Foreign Policy Association

Peter Brezáni: How should V4 countries cooperate regarding development cooperation? Which assistance models could serve as inspiration for V4 countries? Should V4 countries focus on creating their own models of cooperation reflecting their specific expertise, or should they rather adhere to the models of more experienced Western donors? Does a culture of collaboration between the V4 countries regarding ODA exist?

Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň: What I have written is not an academic paper but rather a policy paper with recommendations based on Czech realities however the situation in other V4 countries may be similar. There has been a political shift in the Czech policy from solely human to political and civil rights. An example is the support of dissidents in Cuba or Myanmar. Today, I would like to state three points we should consider:
1. Rethinking our transition experience as a brand – In the Czech discussion we often say that our transition was about dissidents but we forget what happened after 1990. We had problems with political participation, unemployment, gender and poverty. Therefore, we need to rethink our very narrow discussion and broaden it to more inclusive rights, not
just human or civil rights. You cannot promote political rights without having social rights and vice versa. **(Czech human rights approach, branding)**

2. Rethinking transition experience in the light of political, economic and social rights, their linkages and our budget – We only have the very small means of 2 mil. Czech crowns to pass on for democracy and transition experience. Our transition experience is useable in the Balkans, we have a platform of judges in the Czech republic which cooperates and helps judges in Bosnia. The Czech NGOs enlarge the script of human rights. They use their experience to raise awareness of citizens for example in Bosnia and they focus not only on civil rights but also environmental rights, etc. Therefore, we can talk about a rights based approach instead of a solely human rights based approach. But in the Czech Republic, I could say that now we need two things – a more sustainable view of cooperation and increased focus on broader rights under our brand.

3. Leverage for policy coherence and branding – There is no strategy or cooperation between NGOs and the Government and progress is slow. We need a narrative to take on political actors in order to convince them we need more cooperation and coordination. Also, it would help if developmental cooperation and democracy assistance was under one umbrella. We also need to take on board the public.

**Zsuzsanna Végh:** I have taken a different approach and look at a case study focusing on the V4 export of transitional expertise in Moldova and Georgia. I chose the two countries because the development of the situation as well as the development of V4 policies there make them ideal recipients.

Georgia – after the revolution in 2003, the new Government declared European commitment. The country was interested in V4’s transition support. They were mostly interested in the experience linked to EU accession. At first, the V4 countries did not reach out to Georgia as they were too involved with their own EU accession at the time. Therefore, the V4 countries did not pay much attention to Georgia even though this was a perfect country for them to reach out to in terms of transition assistance. In 2008, because of the war between Russia and Georgia, the developmental and humanitarian aid to Georgia rapidly increased. But again here, it was not transitional assistance. Anyway, after 2008 Georgia managed to maintain a high level of discussion with the V4.

Moldova – There was a political shift in 2009 when the leadership changed. We could look back to 2005/2006 when the V4 countries started paying more attention to Moldova. Since 2003 Moldova has wanted to join the EU and the V4 gradually became more engaged. The creation of Eastern Partnership Policy resulted in more additional support from the V4 countries. However, it is hard to evaluate V4’s ODA to Moldova as their annual reports do not start from the beginning of their ODA. Different models started to develop in response to events in the East. Some donors were motivated by solidarity, some offered transitional experience but firstly focused on aspects demanding smaller funds.

I think that today the discourse about models is no longer valid, as the countries have already developed their models. Rather, we should focus on how to optimise what we already have.

**Patryk Kugiel:** Transfer of transition experience has been the main theme in V4 developmental cooperation, however a new chapter can be started by V4. In the Czech republic, I think we can already see a shift or redefinition away from human rights to broader rights. There
should be a change in policy – it should be more global and more driven by economics. I see three main reasons for change – firstly, the governments already think that economic interests are more important. Secondly, budgets will increase for developmental cooperation and there should be more support from businesses. Currently, businesses have little to say about human rights or democracy. Thirdly, EU countries have credibility problems as promoters. For example, in Hungary Orban praises Russia for its practices so it can hardly promote democracy elsewhere. Also, Poland has been condemned for the violation of human rights of an Arabian person, therefore there is mistrust from Arab countries. On an international level, I think that V4 will become more like traditional donors even though we promote ourselves as experts in democracy and human rights. However, there will be a transition of V4 to the topics of bigger donors like Germany, etc.

Regarding V4 in development cooperation, we share similarities but for a long time we were competitors. We should use our similarities and complexities to cooperate and complement each other. There is no time for searching for new models now. It is not a model but rather a direction to the big donors now. For inspiration we can look to the Nordic countries. The V4 fund should help in coordinating our policies and actions and in implementing them. For that, we need to expand the competences of the V4.

**Anne-Marie Callan:** It seems like the three papers really covered everything. I will comment on each.

**Czech Republic** – moved from transition experience to focus on human rights which is now expanded to broader rights. Context is indeed important – every country decides what they focus on based on what they are valued for. You cannot just drop a model, it depends on the context and who your partner is and what you can bring. There are dangers to non-coordination and first and foremost, you should focus on how to maximise the impact. It is important that you link your activities.

**Hungary** – We cannot be too romantic but should think of context and context specific aims. There should be more supporters integrating and complementing each other. You need an integrated strategy. What is important is how you do it. If you become more ambitious, you need to think about how much finance you have, so that you do not break your own potential. Partner countries need to lead the topics, not the donors deciding implementing them.

**Poland** – there is an issue with private businesses. You should support businesses in a recipient country, not a donor country. Anyway, also the traditional donors have credibility problems. I do not think that the time for models has passed. They can still be developed in the process, they can change or adjust. What is important is how you work and if your work is effective.

**COMMENTS SECTION:**

**Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň:** There is no need for a fifth donor to help us coordinate. The idea is a joint programming of V4. It is not a contradiction to focus on other kinds of rights. We were pushing so that human rights are included in MDGs but human rights quickly disappeared from the UN development discourse.

**Ida McDonnell** (as a viewer): It seems to me as if you are going through a crisis of identity. You need to strengthen the value and consider the money you have but you also need to think of
synergies that need to be there. When it comes to branding, it does not always need to be a transition you focus on. Why are you focusing on Africa? You need to be able to justify why you work in the countries you focus on. Why not Eastern Partnership? Australia can justify why they only work in the Pacific. Maybe it would be better if you only focus on neighbouring countries.

**Anne-Marie Callan:** If V4 does not do democratisation, then who will do it? You, the V4, have more comparative advantage than you think. But you need to focus and coordinate. And you need to focus on what you can bring and not only in terms of money.

**Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň:** The problem is our identification. We go to Africa because the EU is in Africa but we need to get that EU identity. In their yearbook, the Polish also include what has been done in development by the European Commission because the Commission uses Polish money for their activities. In the Czech Republic we still see it as Brussels doing that, we do not perceive it as our work.

**Patryk Kugiel:** Why should we be in Africa? Poland and Czechoslovakia were very active in Africa during the Cold War, for many years we provided scholarships to students from Africa, we have been present for decades. We have a moral obligation, we have historical links, economic as well as political interests. It is an opportunity to establish long term economic cooperation. Yes, there is an identity crisis in the V4. But we need to realise that transition is a very broad term and encompasses everything – education, agriculture, industry, etc. Transition itself is an empty label. We need to be asking ‘transition in what?’.

**Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň:** Transition is a cross-cutting issue.

**Anne-Marie Callan:** It is a cross-cutting issue. Now, V4 expertise can be very relevant to Ukraine. ‘Transition’ is a label but a relevant label. There should be a division of labour between V4 because now there is lots of duplication.

**Patryk Kugiel:** We need to look for our place in development cooperation.

**Anne-Marie Callan:** As ODA is increasing now, this is the time for you to decide, otherwise you will all go in different directions.

**Peter Brezání:** Strategy is central to focus and getting on track.

**CLOSING REMARKS:**

**Zsuzsanna Végh:** Coordination is important. We need to decide on a direction which can be built upon, including the geographical focus.

**Anne-Marie Callan:** Context is a strategic point. The partner country and what it wants to achieve should be in the lead. This decides what you can offer and what to focus on.

**Patryk Kugiel:** We need to think of the sectors to which we can contribute most effectively.
Peter Brezáni: If not joint programming, at least we should focus on coordination. All the speakers agreed to be more self-critical about the business model and approach to development cooperation. The debate lacked a discussion about impact or a recipient. The countries are still searching for their added value and have an unclear vision who to partner with. It seemed like the Czech Republic is afraid that by broadening the rights they focus on, they lose the brand.
Critical discussion of global education is very much needed since it has become an increasingly diverse issue in the past decade and is pursued by a variety of stakeholders. With growing engagement of national governments, different ministries and local authorities, the global education concept has become a challenge for contemporary national curricula. Holistic features of global education constitute a great barrier to the mechanistic and objectivist approach which dominates existing educational systems in the V4 countries. Let’s search for opportunities to reform national curricula which would prepare students for the complexities of an interconnected and interdependent world and empower them to create a world they wish to live in.

Helmuth Hartmeyer opened the first round of talks with a few fundamental questions. “What is the content of global education? Teaching about development cooperation? Teaching about creating a better world?”
“I have doubts about the idea that education would be capable of creating a better world”, he said. “Education could lead to better laws etc., but it is the duty of politicians to implement policies, not of teachers. Global education is more about the global transformation that we undergoing. How long can we sustain our economies with the concept of constant economic growth? How will we cope with changes that are taking place all over the world – depletion of fossil fuels, rising middle classes, etc.?

Global education goes beyond aid. Aid does not solve current global problems and challenges. The essence of global education is that everyone must start with one’s self. This does not solve global problems, but offers competences to solve them.

I don’t believe in logical frameworks, PISA measurements and evaluation measurements. Global education is mainly about solidarity.”

How did Austria manage to get people together to support development cooperation and global education?

“To unite NGOs, it was necessary to have an enemy and Austrian NGOs had that”, confirmed Helmuth Hartmeyer. “In the 90s we also realized that “DevEd” is not only about development. We created a Strategy Group including people from development NGOs and representatives of the government. The goal was to open development education to other sectors, outside development.”

How can academia contribute to a better understanding of GE?

According to Cezary Kościelniak, there has been an increase in the importance of different kinds of education. “There is a new type of awareness of the role of education. E.g. why should we protect nature? How and why should we deal with migrants?

This is an age of the homo autonomicus. Media and a feeling of self-governance are the two crucial factors that fuel the homo autonomicus. Through social media, people become creators and contributors to dreams; they are no longer only spectators. They ‘like’ and ‘share’ dreams; e.g. the case of Euromaidan or the Arab Spring.

Ukraine is a point in case of rising awareness of the desire for self-governance. Global education goes beyond post-colonial education and adds the notion of higher personal participation in education. This rising personal participation brings about a higher need for personal interaction. In consequence, people must deal with ethnic, cultural, national, historical clashes and narratives. Education of today should address these issues.

The successful (cultural) transformation of the V4 countries can help us to be more effective in development cooperation. Global education should be more embedded in the national education systems.”

Tereza Čajková shared the Czech experience in global education. “In relation to global education we no longer focus on the ‘what’, rather on the ‘how’. Despite the existence of the National Strategy for Global Development Education 2011-2015, there has been no systematic approach on a national level to support the development of global education at schools. There are insufficiencies and therefore there’s lot of potential for improvement.

In partnership with academics in the Czech Republic, we support academic tutors in incorporating a global dimension into courses where they teach students of pedagogy.
We are in contact with many practitioners from NGOs and teaching institutions. But in reality at schools we often see the reproduction of stereotypes and a lack of skills necessary to deal with current global complexities and uncertainties."

Who should be providing the support for NGOs and teachers?

The most far-reaching and systematic solution is via national training systems. NGOs can be partners in the creation of content, but their reach is limited, answered Tereza Čajková.

What is the position of the Slovak Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport?

Ivar Štaffa noted that all points of the Action Plan for 2014 within the National Strategy of Global Education in Slovakia for 2012 – 2016 are fulfilled.

“However we can’t measure the impact of global education nor the changes global education introduces in the curricula – the question then is whether there is a place for global education in the education system. Without a way to measure its impact, there is little sense in incorporating it into the national education system.”

Peter Ivanič from the Slovak Centre for Communication and Development responded that there are two ways to measure the impact of global education. The first is to measure according to the indicators that are formulated in the Action Plan. There are also measurements of the impact of global education that are now being tested in SK, e.g. by the Milan Šimečka Foundation.

When GE is not a must, why should the teachers teach GE?

Regarding measurement...“We do not have to be afraid of more questions than answers”, claimed Helmuth Hartmeyer. Measuring the qualitative impact is impossible.

There shouldn’t be additional global education subjects; Global education should be in the core of the curricula, like it is e.g. Finland. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy, though.

There is a danger of ideologization of education, noted Cezary Kościelniak. “How can we avoid the situation where global education is a source of new ideology, especially in the Central European countries? We shouldn’t force some new obligations on people. Universities should introduce Open Studies Centres for the general public and this should be the third role of universities (after education and research). Universities have huge potential in mediating and transferring ideas. They can be platforms for communicating new ideas in current changing societies with new global challenges, e.g. environmental issues (1 car per family, etc.). Universities are much better platforms for development education, because they are much freer than primary and secondary schools. They are the main players in raising awareness.”

The question is if university level isn’t already too late to start developing people’s ideas and opinions on global issues?

Juraj Jancovič from the People in Peril Association drew attention to the purpose of education. Why do we educate people? To prepare them for new jobs? To ‘create’ global active
citizens? This is the core question. The current education system in Slovakia is about preparation for a job. It is not about becoming a citizen that lives together with other citizens in a single society. The goal of education is to search further, ask more questions and live not as in island, but achieve global interconnection. The opposite of global education is frontal education where teachers stand in front of the students and talk and then leave after the lecture finishes.

Paulina Stachová from the Faculty of Management, Comenius University in Bratislava shared her experience. “This semester I asked students to answer questions instead of writing about a specific ‘topic’. This seems to be having a much better effect and students are more engaged.”

Juraj Jančovič explained. “My university students already arrive with the mind-set that they will receive study materials and ‘frontal education’. That’s why we need to start with global education much earlier, already in primary and secondary education.”

Cezary Kościelniak thinks the challenge is to bridge the gap between vocational training and critical thinking. “In vocational training that leads to specific professions, there is no need for critical thinking, as it produces professionals in specific fields. Similarly, consumers are no critical thinkers. However, general policy trends are only to push through vocational training. The current EU policies attest to this.”

Helmuth Hartmeyer agrees with this, although he is convinced we can’t let this happen. “This is one of the roles of the NGOs. Obviously, these policy plans are not working, since unemployment is rising. Furthermore, if a person changes job five times in their lifetime, how can you train a professional when they are 18, if in his 50s they will be doing something completely different?”

“Schools decrease our curiosity. The older we get, the less creative we are. Also, universities are becoming marketplaces for selling ECTS points and degrees after the Bologna Process. NGOs should help to create better schools and universities.”

Ivar Štaffa agrees there is a strong shift towards vocational training at the EU level. “However, vocational training will always be present, because we must constantly solve labour market disparities. I view this as a joint process –keeping the aspect of vocational training and introducing methods and principles of global education. Moreover, Slovakia must deal with the labour market – education mismatch, especially with our high unemployment rate.”

“Positive initiatives do not only come from the NGOs”, responded Tereza Čajková. “There are groups of students of economics (OIKOS) who comment on the content of their own curricula and propose new content based on their expectations for the future. Recently, in the Czech Republic teachers associations have been founded. Parents are becoming more interested in the content of the education process and curricula as well. They are becoming more involved and critical about their children’s education.”
Katarina Pazmanyiova Faculty of Philosophy, Comenius University in Bratislava thinks that things are changing for the better in Slovakia. She asked if there was one thing all speakers would say to a 10-year-old from the global education perspective, what it would be.

Juraj Jančovič does not understand global education as an ideology, because it does not give any answers. “It only creates new questions. Current education is mostly focused on knowledge, very little on skills, and never on attitudes.”

There are two approaches to global education, noted Peter Ivanič: action-based and system-based global education. The former is much more ideological, the latter is about offering skills and competencies.

Cezary Kościelniak confirms that one of the best performers in PISA are Polish students, and one of the worst were Swedish. “I don’t share the optimism about the possibility of having vocational and global education together. I don’t think vocational education leads to lower unemployment.”

Is there a way to obtain more specific GE in the Central European countries; especially in relation to the historical and cultural context of this region?

The most basic starting point for the whole GE should be human rights, says Helmuth Hartmeyer. “It is ok to take a stand as a teacher; in this sense ideology is necessary and permissible.”

“My answer to the 10-year old is: You are living in a world that we are shaping and that you will be shaping.”

Tereza Čajková closes with the idea, that Czechs are now discussing how to live a quality life and be responsible as citizens in the same time.

Cezary Kościelniak would answer to the question of a 10-year-old “acting needs understanding”.
After decades of development cooperation provision, the international community points out that development goals cannot be achieved only by increasing aid quantity and effectiveness of development policies. There are other policies of the EU and other donors that have a serious impact on developing countries in areas such as trade, energy, environment and climate change, agriculture, finance and migration. Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a legal obligation of the EU based on the Lisbon Treaty. The EU member states agreed on its implementation, however, the level of implementation differs in EU countries. This roundtable had a closer look at the discussion on PCD at the level of the V4 countries.

In Slovakia, policy coherence for development is stated in the law on official development assistance. Policy coherence for development is one of the 2 basic principles of the Mid-term Strategy of Development Cooperation of the Slovak Republic for 2014 – 2018. By 2016 a strategy on PCD should be adopted by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the
Slovak Republic. Based on the Review of Slovak Development Cooperation conducted by the OECD in 2011, a stronger focus on the PCD agenda in the Slovak development cooperation should be ensured.

Ingrid Brocková, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the OECD, opened the roundtable with an introduction to the PCD concept. Since the High Level Forum on development effectiveness in Busan in 2011, we can observe a change in the understanding of development assistance. The PCD concept is relevant for the international community. The OECD, together with the European Union, stresses the importance of Policy Coherence for Development also in the post-2015 global agenda that is being developed. The OECD recommends implementing PCD in a cycle consisting of three interconnected phases. Ingrid Brocková presented 3 building blocks to implement PCD. The first phase of setting and prioritizing objectives involves political commitment and policy statement which should be transformed into concrete plans and actions. She mentioned that good examples in this regard are the Netherlands and Sweden. In these two countries PCD has a central role in the government approach. The second phase, coordinating policy and implementation, intends to create synergy between policies in the development agenda. A maximum amount of synergy would resolve conflicts and cause minimum inconsistency. The Netherlands is one the countries performing very well in this regard. The third phase, monitoring, analyzing and reporting, consists of collecting information on the impact of policies and reporting to the parliament and the public. Some members of the DAC are weak in this regard. The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden can be mentioned as good examples. A complementary approach to PCD tries to include all sectoral policies of the OECD to focus on the development agenda.

Ambassador Ingrid Brocková set the concept of PCD into the broader context of Sustainable Development Goals that are being discussed on the international scene. After 2015 there will be new sources of financing development as new actors emerge. In this regard, she emphasised that it is important to go beyond the traditional ODA and involve other sectors. In the world inequalities are growing, we face climate change problems which will be at the core of the Conference of the Parties on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, migration is also an urgent issue. All these problems are hard to address without coherence. Ingrid Brocková expressed the potential of V4 countries to coordinate sectoral policies at regional level.

Although all the EU member states are signatories of the Lisbon Treaty that contains an article on PCD, the level of implementation of this commitment differs from country to country. Jan Bazyl, the Executive Director of the Polish Platform of NGDOs, Grupa Zagranica, introduced the situation in Poland. PCD is an obligation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Policy coherence for development is not mentioned directly in the law and is a relatively new concept in the Polish context. First of all, it is important to learn about it and raise awareness among other ministries. Jan Bazyl thinks there is a good potential to work on PCD. It will be crucial to move from debating PCD to the establishment of mechanisms and tools on how to implement it.

The Czech Republic was the first country from the EU 12 countries to join the OECD DAC (later followed by the Slovak Republic, Poland and Slovenia). The OECD states that over the last couple of years, the Czech Republic has transformed its development co-operation system to
make it more focused, more coherent and more effective. Katarína Šrámková, Policy Officer at FoRS, the Czech Forum for Development Cooperation, provided an insight into the Czech context. In the Czech Republic, the legal basis for PCD is rather weak. The Act on Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid does not mention PCD. In the Czech Republic there is a lack of political commitment and will. PCD is a multi-disciplinary issue and that is why it is important to raise attention of other ministries. PCD is mentioned in the Development Cooperation Strategy for 2010-2017 as one of the principles of development cooperation. The statute of the Council on Development Cooperation states that it should act as an inter-ministerial advisory body to the MFA which should ensure better co-ordination and coherence of development cooperation with other policies. As part of the inter-ministerial council there is a working group on PCD which is currently focused on agriculture. However, she concludes that the work is not strategic. In the Czech Republic, potential PCD topics are also climate change and climate finance. The Council on sustainable development which is a governmental body, the chair of which is the Czech Prime Minister, has been renewed. It involves ministries, NGOs and other actors. It works through 8 committees. When implementing PCD commitments, multistakeholders cooperation from different sectors is inevitable.

In the PCD study published earlier this year as part of the World Wise Europe project which focuses on PCD we can read that Hungary has not integrated development cooperation into its foreign policy strategy. Réka Balogh, Policy Officer at the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development, HAND, informed about a recent success in Hungary. In March 2014, Hungary adopted its first development cooperation strategy. It is a general document of 40 pages but does not outline specific objectives, timeframe or institutional background. In general there is a weak political commitment regarding PCD. Although formal mechanisms have been established to ensure coordination of all ministries in relation to development, there is no such mechanism in relation to PCD. According to the new development cooperation strategy an inter-ministerial committee should be established in the near future to improve coordination first of all and the government sees it also as the next step to implement PCD. Similarly as is the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, Réka Balogh emphasised the need to raise awareness of PCD among other ministries.

Representatives of the Platforms presented the involvement of their organisations in the PCD. Réka Balogh explained the background of the Platform’s involvement in PCD. HAND started working on PCD thanks to the World-Wise Europe project funded by the EC. Among other countries, all the V4 countries’ Platforms are project partners. The non-governmental sector except for few organisations in Hungary lacks the capacity to work on PCD. PCD does not figure among the priorities of HAND’s members. The policies that Hungary could work on are in the area of biofuels and food security, trade, taxes and finance as well as migration. Réka Balogh stressed the importance of research on the impact of incoherent policies. The research should be conducted on policies at national and EU level. In Hungary, the Platform has just opened up to other NGOs, e.g. those working on biofuels and food security. The Platform cooperates with academics at the Central European University. In the policy labs the students take the topics of policy coherence and do research. The situation in the Czech Republic is similar stated Katarína Šrámková. Within the Platform there is no great capacity either, but there is a think-thank, Glopolis, working on PCD. The Platform has identified 3 working groups (SDGs, education and awareness raising). The organisations try to find a common narrative
on PCD. According to Jan Bazyl, in Poland one of the policies mostly discussed is climate policy. Poland is highly dependent on coal. NGOs are strong actors that advocate climate issues and raise awareness in both the media and within the general public. In Poland the environmental NGOs are most experienced in working together. There are some NGOs working on migration policies. In the area of trade and investment expertise could be found. Ambassador Ingrid Brocková noted that she considered PCD to be an intellectually challenging concept. Policy makers have a role to play in this regard and should advocate on PCD in their home countries to create awareness across governments. NGOs have a role to play in speaking with stakeholders and media. She drew attention to the fact that policy makers are those who should be able to sell PCD at a national level.

The speakers of the roundtable discussed the experience of the V4 countries during the EU Presidency. Slovakia is the only one of the V4 countries that has not held the EU presidency yet. Recently, the importance of PCD has been stressed in the European Parliament hearing of the new EU Commissioner on Development, Neven Mimica as well as the future High Representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. Slovakia is in the process preparing for the EU Presidency in 2016. Ingrid Brocková said that the role of the country which holds presidency is mostly one of facilitator of the process. Three countries, known as the Trio, prepare for the Presidency together. The Netherlands who will be the predecessor to Slovakia has the development agenda as a priority. We can anticipate what topics will resonate in the international arena. The year 2016 will be the first year after the Sustainable Development Goals will have been adopted and PCD is a very relevant topic. It will however depend on discussions at a national level. Réka Balogh shared the experience of Hungary during the EU Presidency. PCD was among the priorities, but it was not successful. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manage to engage other ministries in the discussion and Hungarian NGOs followed the priorities of the government. She considers the cooperation of the civil society with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an asset. In 2017, the EU work programme on PCD will come to an end, so PCD will probably be on the agenda, she concluded. Related to the EU Presidency, Zuzanna Kierzkowska from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that it is important to think ahead and link the priorities of the government and the NGOs. During the Presidency, the priorities are set for the entire EU, so it is important to think outside of the national focus. Jan Bazyl expressed his perception that there is too much focus on the Presidency. During the Polish Presidency, the Polish Platform Grupa Zagranica did not have special aims in terms of advocacy. They organized various events to become stronger internally. Life after the Presidency continues, he said. He would recommend talking more with the MFA and with parliamentarians during the Presidency. Iulia Socea from TRIALOG stated a recent example from the Lithuanian Presidency. As one of the priorities was food security, the Lithuanian platform tried to prepare its members on the topic by organizing seminars related to food security. It is important to ensure that there is capacity to work on specific priority issues.

Ingrid Brocková stated that V4 countries are in a position to be more engaged at the discussion on PCD at the OECD level. However, so far there has not been any specific interest. The OECD tries to have a more coherent approach. The development agenda is incorporated into every department of the OECD. All pillars have a development component in their agenda. This should happen on a national level, too. She said that more awareness on PCD needs to be created among the ministries at a national level. If there is no political commitment on
a national level, the international one can be followed. It is crucial to have champions in the
government to pursue the agenda. It is a process where it is important to use every option to
engage the country on EU and OECD level. International organizations could have a strong
advocacy role on a national level.

The discussion at the roundtable touched upon the involvement of the private sector in
development cooperation. Katarína Šrámková said that the Czech Platform FoRS has been
leading an internal discussion on the private sector. The private sector is not homogenous.
It is important to differentiate between multinational enterprises, small and medium enter-
prises, etc. It is important to stress that the private sector should be involved in development
cooperation in accordance with the development effectiveness principles – as the other ac-
tors should. Cooperation with the private sector can bring new technologies, knowledge and
know-how. However, open dialogue on the involvement of the private sector should be led at
a national level. For instance, a new development cooperation instrument – Programme for
development-economic partnership (known as Business to Business) was introduced in 2013
in the Czech development cooperation, which should support private sector involvement in
the Czech development cooperation. So far, a few companies are interested. That is why new
tools should be developed. Jan Bazyl said that in Poland there is a tendency to mix private sec-
tor and development cooperation. There should be however different approaches to the topic.
He agrees that there is a lot of potential in the involvement of the private sector, but there is
also a lot of doubt when it comes to land grabbing and avoiding taxes in developing countries.
Réka Balogh said that the involvement of private sector in development cooperation was a re-
search topic of one policy lab of the CEU in Hungary. A memorandum of understanding was
also signed between the line ministries, the predecessor of the Hungarian Trade Promotion
Agency and HAND for the promotion of the private sector involvement but there’s no follow-
up of this initiative. Though the government intends to do a lot in this field it seemingly does
not have a clear-cut strategy on how to involve the private sector in development cooperation
or at least it is not known to NGOs. NGOs also warn about the risk that development coop-
eration can be perceived as a tool to achieve export and investment goals of the companies.
Ingrid Brocková agrees that the private sector is an important player and that here is room
for greater engagement. CSR is a good example of how to connect the development agenda
with business. In Slovakia a platform to work with the private sector has been established.
The government has a lot of expectations, but there is the question of capacity, as the private
sector should not rely on ODA funds.

The roundtable was concluded by discussing the possibilities of involving other actors in
PCD implementation. The speakers agreed that the embassies in developing countries can
play a role in identifying incoherent policies at the ground. However, there is a question of
limited capacity.
Roundtable D
Effective tools for civic participation to engage in public policy in the Western Balkans

Speakers:
- Marko Aksentijević, Program Director, Mikroart, Serbia
- Tamara Resavska, Project Coordinator at Metamorphosis Foundation, Macedonia
- Kaltrina Pajaziti, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice

Moderator:
- Ilina Nesik, Project and Communication Manager, Balkan Civil Society Development Network,

The panellists in the round table each presented their examples of support of civic engagement in their countries, notably through public policy intervention.

Tamara Resavska

Metamorphosis is a Macedonian Foundation for Internet and Society active in the field of good governance (transparency and freedom of speech), human rights, social innovations and environment.

TR presented a policy paper elaborated by Metamorphosis on the use of Macedonian government websites as tools for transparency, accountability and e-participation and their role in increasing open governance. The practical research was conducted from December 2013 to May 2014, through the examination of over 230 websites run by government bodies and institutions, and through structured interviews with experts.

The research findings indicate that the gov.mk websites lack public data, particularly in the area of fiscal transparency and accountability, and that there is also a lack of mechanisms that allow citizen e-participation and inclusion in the decision making process.
A brief overview of selected results:

- 60% of the citizens of Macedonia have access to the internet and over 50% of citizens are social media users.
- Gov.mk websites are still mostly used as ID cards of the institutions, and other traditional methods, such as press releases are used for communication with citizens.
- In 63% of the cases, general contact e-mails are available, and only 1/3 of cases have forms or detailed contact.
- 1/3 of the registered web domains don’t function properly, and over 1/2 of reviewed websites are not punctually updated.

Transparency and Accountability

1/3 of the websites have a section on free access to public information, more than 3/4 have no published work program or fiscal information, nor privacy policies for internet use.

E-Participation

There is very little inclusion, consultation or interaction with experts and very little public awareness around e-governance. Communication is mostly one-way and the opportunities for two-way interaction are generally limited to e-mail and telephone. Only two websites enable public discussion about changes in legislation and public policies and are rarely used because the citizens are uninformed or demotivated due to previous experiences with such processes, in which their opinion was not taken into consideration.

The majority of websites are neither optimized for use by people with disabilities, nor do they meet the W3C standards.

How are you planning to work with the research?

Metamorphosis organized a presentation of the results. The presentation was attended by a number of officials from state institutions.

What was the response of the institutions?

The rankings of websites were published for each criteria, and this seems to be a strong motivating factor.

The development of these systems depends on the political will of the Government and the officials from the subordinate institutions. Development must be based on standards that place the citizen and his needs at the centre of the system and simultaneously promote the principles of e-inclusion and protection of human rights in the digital sphere.

Is there a legislative framework for e-participation in Macedonia?

The Republic of Macedonia has an existing legal framework governing civic e-participation, but it is necessary to implement it consistently, and to raise awareness of citizens and institutions of the existing opportunities, and of the importance of using new media – in this case websites as tools for transparency, accountability, and e-participation.
Marko Aksetijevic

Mikro Art focuses on democratization of urban development and urban resource management. It has strong contacts with similar groups, initiatives, more activist and smaller organizations. Experience shows that most of the urban plans changed mainly due to private investment and institutions are only responsive, when the public voice has been raised. Therefore most active groups in Serbia only manage to succeed with proposals through public pressure.

The most visible lacunae in public activism in the sphere of urban planning in Serbia relate to non-existent precedents, or established proceedings in influencing public decisions, and every single case means starting from zero, looking for lawyers/experts, understanding the legal framework, etc...

This is why Mikroart ventured from being a group of activists in the area of the public policy, inspired by the example from abroad (e.g. Croatia).

Main problems:
• Citizens are not duly and timely informed. They are only consulted once final drafts are ready
• There is a lack of understanding of the consequences of urban planning as such, a lack of understanding of what it means in practice.
• No genuine consultations with citizens take place – if they happen, it is more on a technical rather than systemic/program level. Most of the consultations are ad hoc and a merely pro-forma exercise.

What would be the main suggestion, main necessity to be addressed in the area of urban planning and participation?
The main issue is access to information in all stages of planning, and fora for consultation, expression of objection, etc...

Is there legislation in relation to urban planning in Serbia?
The final draft law on planning will be in Parliament in November 2014. It will then be possible to evaluate it as such, but also, the questions on its implementation remain open.

Kaltrina Pajaziti

Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice – Pristina has been operating since 2011 and its first projects focused on research and data collection on issues such as:
• Mobbing in the workplace
• Selling and use of drugs without medical prescription
• Traffic violations

With the rise of radicalism in the Balkans and the increasing number of youth joining ISIS and radical terrorist groups, the Institute started focus to a great extent on issues related to incarceration and radicalization.

The reason for this is that the prisons in Kosovo are considered to be a breeding ground for extremism.

Following the creation of the state of Kosovo, it has experienced an unprecedented and uncontrolled influx of foreign funding, mainly from the Middle East, which among other
goals, is also used for financing extremist groups. Recruitment usually takes place through gatherings labelled as religious. Although research proves that the reasons for joining radical groups can be and are varied, in combination with high unemployment and a perception of limited opportunities for career and life standard development, the young male population is quite susceptible.

The solution lies in the implementation of a “correction system” in the true meaning of the word.

In the previous period: a UNDP programme was implemented for de-radicalization. Imams used to preach to inmates on the meaning of the Koran and non-violence. Currently there are no such services available and radicalization is deepening.

Different strategies are needed to tackle the radicalism issue in a Kosovo context. Especially as regards the dualism between the Muslim population and western orientation. There is a huge opportunity in this area. General public awareness is needed to prevent radicalization and extremism. CSOs could play an important role in this particular area, both religious and the secular, as they are probably best suited for the job and have close contact with their constituencies.

What happens with Kosovars who join extremist group upon their return to Kosovo?

There is no legislation dealing with this issue. Fighting abroad, and especially involvement in the actions of radical groups is not being followed up. People are not being prosecuted, because legislation to prosecute in these cases is missing.

*Question: what do you think is the most effective way to prevent radicalization?*

As I mentioned previously, I think a concentrated effort of religious leaders in explaining the consequences of radical movement and its contradiction with religious teachings is essential. Also, working with the families of the youth, as often they support the decisions of their children without completely understanding what is happening.
ROUNDTABLE E

CSR and economic development

Speakers:
• Melissa Whellams, Avanzar Consulting
• Melina Heinrich, Donor Committee for Enterprise Development
• Gunther Schall, Austrian Development Agency

Moderator:
• Michal Kišša, Business Leaders Forum/Pontis Foundation

Michal Kišša: CSR in Slovakia is focused internally – there are not many companies investing abroad – how can we motivate Slovak companies to focus on CSR when investing abroad?

Melissa Whellams: How can the mining industry contribute to sustainable development through CSR programmes? What factors can contribute to the improvement of the situation? Companies can contribute to sustainable development of communities in developing countries, but should be focused on capacity building among these communities and not focus solely on philanthropic contributions. There should be greater focus on long-term contribution. Investment opportunities – engagement of women is also very important in the stage of identifying problems that need to be addressed, which creates other forms of livelihood for people. It is important to partner with local NGOs or public institutions and establish what the region has as its priority and then focus on those previously set priorities.

Melina Heinrich: CSR needs to be as close to the core business as possible to ensure long-term contribution and involvement. Challenge: intellectual property rights – companies are not that willing to share their know-how regarding CSR projects.

Gunther Schall: The private sector is seen as a partner in development cooperation. The operation of Austrian companies in developing countries is a part of Austrian development cooperation.
Main points:
• Not only a business case for companies but also contribution to the development of local communities
• Discussion platform for companies – this year they are discussing impact measurement
• The agency learns from companies how to deal with the impact assessment
• Interests of all sides need to be realised in the project
• Necessary to improve the training system in the whole partner country – possibly leading to spill-over from the company to the whole sector – sometimes companies involve the whole sector – e.g. qualification of construction workers in Moldova (managed by Strabag)
• Supply chain of Austrian companies – local communities benefit from production that is carried out locally

Michal Kňšša: Do you need to approach companies or do they contact you themselves?

Gunther Schall: The Agency is engaged in dialogue with companies so we are recognised as a partner

Michele Bologna, Slovenské elektrárne: What are the specific tools required for cooperation with companies?

Gunther Schall: Deep knowledge of a companies’ interests and characteristics of effective development assistance is needed. What matters is cooperation between people from the company and people from the agency

What are the risks companies face when working in developing countries?

Melissa Whellams: Risk – not engaging with local communities. Companies as a result don’t know what their needs are. There are also other issues: human rights, land rights, resettlement, stability of the supply chain, reputational risks etc.

Michal Kňšša: Has CSR helped companies to start business in other countries?

Melissa Whellams: What helps is engagement with state representatives and local people – open and transparent communication

Slavomíra Urbanová, Business Leaders Forum/Pontis Foundation: Regarding the risks of disrupting a company’s supply chain, what do you recommend as the best approach? Auditing by independent organisations or a more personal approach aiming at building more personal relations?

Melissa Whellams: Dealing with requirements from suppliers – this differs whether you cooperate with one supplier for several years or your suppliers change twice a year – like in apparel business, you then do not have the capacity to build more personal relationships and invest into the training of suppliers and to discuss the reasons behind certain requirements
**Gunther Schall**: What can help are alliances with other companies – not dealing with the company as such – apparel companies for example have such a common initiative.

**Michele Bologna**: How can we create shared values with a real business case? /not part of PR and promotion

**Gunther Schall**: Not many people in companies care about the impact of CSR activities – to change that internal communication is needed on all levels – from managers to the lowest levels of employees
- The key is to accept that there are common interests in the field – some people believe that companies do not care for the communities – when this is the perception you can’t reach agreement and it is not possible to find a common language
- It is important to understand each other – there are many things in common
- A company needs to have ownership of its CSR activities – you cannot dictate to the companies what to do – this also applies to the need for ownership of the developing projects in developing countries
- Showcasing successful company examples of can motivate others
  Profiling of the company activities in national media

**Melissa Whellams**: CSR also brings cost reduction/ savings in the long-term
CSR is a long-term optimisation of profit – the problem is that companies are operating on a quarterly (Q) basis – boards look at the Q results.

**Does this mean that only large companies can afford CSR?**

**Gunther Schall**: Not at all. Smaller companies are sometimes more responsible and have stronger commitment thanks to the personal relations with employees. There is no need for global ‘stakeholdership’ – therefore they do not need global publicity.
- A Brazilian mining company – drilling in Mozambique – they approached the mining university in Austria for help on how to carry-out their work in a more sustainable way.
  Many negative things came up – bad reputation
- The risk of bad reputation for the agency.

**Melissa Whellams**: One company can be doing a great job in one country and completely mess up in another, maybe also different operation stages are being performed in different countries. They are not necessarily a bad company. They might also have been involved in problematic projects. Should they be blacklisted for mistakes they have made for the rest of the life?

**Melina Heinrich**: Bad practice example is generally not shared.

**Michal Kišša**: Can companies investing in developing countries destroy the local markets?

**Melina Heinrich**: This can happen when research is not carried out at the beginning of the project.
**Gunther Schall:** It is very common problem. You cannot work with a company without disturbing markets. The aim is the systematic change in markets – it can destructive as well.

**Michal Kišša:** Are there complains about job creation in other countries and not in the home country?

**Gunther Schall:** Some jobs can be in jeopardy but good jobs can be secured and more good jobs can be created.

**Ivan Lukas, Czech Development Agency:** What are the short-term/mid-term results of CSR?

**Gunther Schall:** Reputation. The important thing is impact assessment – regular monitoring of results – there needs to be an allocation of responsibilities of what to monitor – what is the company’s responsibility and what the donor monitors/ or even the communities.

**Beáta Hlavčáková:** Resource scarcity – what is being advised to companies?

**Gunther Schall:** regular training carried out by environmental specialists to identify what the risks regarding resources issues could be – this is done in relevant projects.

**Melissa Whellams:** the mining industry is dealing with water scarcity, it’s a biodiversity sensitive sector.

  Biodiversity offsetting programmes – this is a slightly controversial way to deal with the problem.

**What can be the added value of cooperation between NGOs and companies, when it comes to CSR business activities in developing countries?**

**Gunther Schall:** deepening cooperation of the agency with NGOs – they reach out to companies as a funding partner – stress what value can be added to the company by cooperation with NGO.

**Melissa Whellams:** mining companies do assessment of the environmental and social impacts of their operations – once they are identified they need to figure out how to mitigate expected negative impacts – this leads to cooperation with local organisations.

• One way to promote development in Global South is upskilling of small businesses/ local producers so they can become suppliers to bigger companies
• NGOs can help to promote B2B cooperation – just as a moderator/ monitoring
• Joint ventures between a company in the home country and a company from a partner country

**Michal Kišša:** What is the project you are most proud of?

**Melina Heinrich:** internal market systems – in Africa fertilisers were sold first of all in huge packages that were not affordable for local farmers. Then they changed their attitude and changed to smaller packages.
**Gunther Schall:** Egypt – strong ownership from the local side, strong personal commitment of the company owner who was able to persuade an Austrian company to stay on board even during a time of crisis. Local ownership and local personalities are very important.

**Melissa Whellams:** water monitoring project, other communities came to test their water because they had the suspicion there was something wrong with it. After testing this proved true, now there is discussion with the municipality to fund the entire thing and are looking for other sources – the community also understands that they themselves are contributing to the pollution of water.
Democracy Assistance: How to ensure that the EU plays a more active and principled role in supporting democracy, freedom and human rights in a changing geopolitical climate

Speakers:
- Jerzy Pomianowski, European Endowment for Democracy in Brussels
- Indre Bulavaite-Andrejeve, Swedish International Liberal Centre, Vilnius Office
- Laima Liucija Andrikiené, Former Member of the European Parliament
- Salome Samadashvili, Former Head of Georgia’s Mission to the EU

Moderator:
- Miriam Lexmann, International Republican Institute

Miriam Lexmann offered a short introduction to the topic of the roundtable. She opened the floor with two important questions. What is the role of the EU in democracy assistance to neighbouring countries? How do foreign policy and democracy support lines intersect and how we can ensure that their effect is not contradictory? In practice they often envisage approaches based on different priorities and there is a considerable gap between democracy support and foreign policy as a tool for satisfying a state’s security and economic needs.

Laima Andrikiené looked into the role of the EP in democracy support. She mentioned that although the EP is not granted competences in Common EU Foreign Policy, it plays an important budgetary role and has an ultimate voice in all international trade agreement negotiations including DCFTA with Ukraine. Unfortunately the EU lacks a common vision of foreign policy and therefore was unable to act proactively in the case of recent developments in Ukraine. The first move was always made by Russia and EU was left to react. Andrikiané
emphasized that the relations between Ukraine and the EU should be based on shared values, not short-term pragmatic interests as is the case today.

Jerzy Pomianowski elaborated further on the previously mentioned point that national interests and security concerns have a crucial impact on foreign policy formation in its all aspects. For this reason democracy support also has also become part of the geopolitical game. Ukraine may serve as an example of where short-term stability or security concerns work as an excuse to forget our principles – nobody seriously requires Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine for these reasons. There is a similar situation in Egypt and other parts of the world and the EU still lacks much reflection on this. Mr. Pomianowski therefore called upon the EU to have a proactive, preventive attitude. One key strategy in this respect is to shift EU aid from a state-centred approach towards support for civil society. The EU applies a “more for more“ policy with concerned governments but should do the same with NGOs and civil society. It would be desirable to intensify funding for NGOs even when the whole atmosphere in a target country is hostile. EU funding should be primarily focused on: free media, NGOs and civil society empowerment and international involvement. Mr. Pomianowski admitted that this strategy is not without challenges including the main question: who actually represents the civil society in the respective countries? Dialogue with society in the countries concerned should therefore be led not only through civil society organisations but all channels should be explored in this complex process.

Salome Samadashvili focused on the notion of civil society and to what extent it can become an agent of change. Building civil society in EaP countries is a big challenge, particularly because of the Soviet heritage. For this reason there is a considerable gap between the government and the civil society. In Ukraine, people trust NGOs the most from all other EaP countries, which is mainly the result of Maidan, but for example church authorities have a much higher authority than NGOs as surveys show. If we want to make EU aid successful, it should focus on issues, which are close to people’s needs and priorities and thus strengthens the codetermination of a civil society.

Indre Bulavaite-Andrejeve highlighted that democracy support should have an inclusive and integrative approach, and should include political parties too. She offered a few examples of good practice: i) support to political parties (regional and national cooperation between political parties and donors and NGOs); ii) democracy assistance instead of democracy aid which also includes a bottom-up approach and better cooperation with local partners; iii) education and information for donors about the developments in the countries concerned; why is the assistance needed and what are the results. Local ownership was highlighted as the common denominator for all positive examples.

Speakers in the discussion touched on several interesting topics. One of them was the definition of civil society. Whom does civil society actually represent? Can it be the engine of change if its leaders are not elected? Salome Samadashvili mentioned that in EaP countries a culture of everyday involvement in public life is almost non-existent, which is mainly a result of the still prevalent homo-sovieticus mentality. Representation of NGOs in these countries is therefore very questionable. There is a similar situation is Egypt, where civil society lacks structure and organisation. Mrs. Andrikienė said that the ability of a civil society to be
self-organised is a key factor distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful stories – it represent a tipping-point for success. The EU should have a proactive attitude and help civil society financially and through good practice sharing and training.

A further interesting point was European perspective as a mobilizing factor, while the clear pro-enlargement message was a divisive line between speakers. Some argued that even though the membership perspective for Ukraine is not clear at the moment it can be compared to the experience of CEE countries in 90s. They also did not have an exact schedule for accession to the EU but had vision and hope which played a crucial role in society mobilization. Others argued that reluctant rhetoric of the EU leaders hindered by the rising far-right in EU Member States is contra-productive on both levels, internationally as well as internally. The debate further focused on the definition of democracy and democracy support. The concept of democracy is a very complex one and is certainly not limited to the existence of an elected government or leader. Consequently, democracy support is also a complex concept. As Jerzy Pomianowski emphasized, democracy cannot be exported, it can only be supported. The role of people’s will in political transition is crucial and the main moving force. There is no democracy without civil society and free media. That is why EU aid should not focus primarily on democratic elections in its programmes designed for democracy support. Miriam Lexmann stressed that the EU in this regard failed to deliver efficient support to Ukraine, as most of the aid was state-centred and very little support was given to the civil society, while no official EU support was provided to the pro-democratic political parties or individual leaders. When we talk about support to political parties it mainly includes education and training, and experts and advisors. There is a great pool of expertise when working with political parties in countries where democracy is lacking, gathered within various organisations, primarily the German, Dutch and Swedish political foundations as well as US organisations working with political parties worldwide. Participants of this panel agreed that the EU should increase its support of political parties and leaders and first include them among recipients of the aid for civil society; and second through developing special programmes on the level of European political parties and political foundations. Party to party support would not only bring the desired affiliation but is also a way to put concerns of neighbouring countries on the EU agenda.
THE INTERNATIONAL VISEGRAD FUND
ROUNDTABLE G
V4 and Eastern Partnership: What small scale assistance can give to small countries?

Speakers:
• Karla Wursterová, Executive Director, International Visegrad Fund
• Vladislav Kulminski, Political Adviser to the Prime Minister, Government of the Republic of Moldova
• Krzysztof Stanowski, Executive Director, Solidarity Fund, Poland
• Eka Tkeshelashvili, President, Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies

Moderator:
• Balázs Jarábik, PACT

Balázs Jarábik raised the discussion question: What can the small countries do?

Krysztof Stanowski:
• V4 countries, as small countries could use the idea of transitional experience, that has 3 aspects:
  • V4 success stories (possible to transition governments, NGOs, etc.)
  • V4 countries know questions that other countries should ask – as they have had a similar political background the last 50 years, V4 countries have already gone through the transformation the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP) have to go through
  • V4 countries are used to working in transitional societies and with communities in transition
  • The V4 countries have had so many success stories because of the existence of strong political will.
• There is a need to find the way of recognizing all the V4 countries (not only Poland as the “big” country):
  • small countries must be flexible/respond quickly
  • Poland needs the assistance of other V4 countries
  • used to European Endowment of Democracy – advantage of V4
  • joint action of all V4 countries in urgent need (e.g. PL: Ukraine – medical assistance, assistance for media, working with people on future reforms – Poland launched expert need within 1 month – assistance to develop society; PL+Canada: refinancing program for the partnership, implementation of local government reform (training) and other actions of Poland – such actions should be also done by coalition of V4 countries)

• The advantage of small assistance (assistance provided by V5 countries): mostly it is expertise assistance, which is very often required, flexibility

**Karla Wusterová** gave the general introduction of structure and operation of the International Visegrad Fund:

**IVF functions in 3 pillars:**
- I. grants and scholarships
- II. mobility program
- III. civil servants mobility program

**Problems and achievements:**
• Donors are tired of the projects – there is a need to go directly to recipient countries and search for ideas
• communication: need for communication with grantees during the whole project implementation, not only before signing the agreement and need for monitoring in order to shape the projects to fulfill the real needs and possibilities of society and grantee
• how to communicate with public – need to communicate publically to address any problems
• need to support the students in need,
• need to work with regions / e.g. students or IDPs from Crimea,
• in connection with the projects aimed on IDPs: let’s use projects from Georgia as an example of successful ventures
• IVF needs bigger involvement of embassies in recipients’ countries
• IVF hosted over 25 civil servants from Ukraine within the framework of the civil servants mobility program and will now host civil servants from Georgia
• V4 know how for export: SK-energy efficiency, decentralization, Czech – education

**Challenges:**
• Prepare the **assessment why Poland is good at fundraising and other countries are not so good?** (Poland is very good at fundraising)
• **How to profit from the EU presidency?**
• **How to deal with communication influenced by propaganda in Russia? How could EU communication strategy in Russia be used?**
Balázs Jarábik: Georgia has changed from being a recipient to a contributing country and has made tremendous progress, it’s a real success story. What is the relationship of Georgia with the V4?

Eka Tkeshelashvili:
- Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have many similarities:
  - common aim – be part of Europe (the large majority of the population is in favor of EU integration)
  - all 3 countries have a lot in common even though they have slightly different ideas of how to get there

- How is the relationship between Georgia and the V4?
  - The V4 support Georgia and have a very good understanding of their challenges, political nuances, deficiencies and difficulties.
  - This enables them to tailor the assistance of V4 in order to help Georgia be a holistic part of Europe.

- Georgia needs assistance to be aimed at:
  - building societal and governmental capacities for the accession process and negotiation capacities for EU. They need to be prudent and capable to manage the resources
  - managerial capacities aimed at capable economy (supporting industry, services and trade)
  - support of the politicians who bring the real change and not populists

- Georgia is facing the problem of „brain escape“

Vladislav Kulminski:
- Moldova appreciates the benefits of the small projects implemented by V4 countries aimed directly at small communities, which have brought increased diversity

- Moldova itself seems like an accession country, so to fulfill the “roadmap” they would appreciate if assistance was aimed at:

- **Institutional reform and development:**
  - How can we ensure continuity during a time of government change? (For example- Moldova looks at Belarus and wonders what will happen institutions once Lukasenko isn’t in power? Moldova doesn’t want to face the same problem); the idea is to bring experts to MD to help with sectorial reform – the V4 could be a lead in this mission

- **Communication:** sensitive public communication on the need for EU integration aimed specifically at different minorities (many people in Moldova feel an affiliation to Russia, so direct communication can be understood as pressurizing and might have the opposite effect, not to use propaganda aimed at criticism of Russia, but COMMUNICATION)

Georgia and Moldova have declared their aim to join the EU. What are your expectations from donors?
Eka Tkeshelashvili:
• Institutional development and reforms, calibration of reforms—they receive the best support from CEE and Baltic countries; the reform will require a long time to tailor and implement—Georgia is learning a lot from reform processes in previously mentioned countries
• The process of reform enforcement cannot be too horizontally inclusive, but there is a need to properly engage and inform the beneficiaries—need for proper public communication

Vladislav Kulminski:
• Moldova is now facing a very important election that will determine if the country will become a “real country” or “a country in the middle” (between EU and Russia). The stakeholders face the challenge of building the concept of “we”—citizenship

Expectations from donors:
• support institutional reform and development
• support of minorities—including them in society and showing what is good for them

Krysztof Stanowski
• He mentioned the need for long-term cooperation, not one-time support. Supporting twin cities is an example of an effective tool. He also mentioned the need to empower people and regions.

What is your opinion of the role of civil society?

Eka Tkeshelashvili
• Civil society has a crucial role in shaping the governance of the country. Most of the people in NGOs were once in government. The problem was that they were not inclusive enough, they did not ask a broader range of stakeholders for their support.
• There is a need to support civil society in building strong CS to be able to have influence on the operation of the state.

Vladislav Kulminski:
• Moldova needs to support the diversity of the NGOs, support of grass-root NGOs and grass root ideas. Some NGOs are too institutionalized, so it is difficult to call them NGOs. The V4 countries projects are very much aimed at grassroots NGOs, which is an advantage and added value in the support from these countries.

Comments from representative of EU delegation to the situation in Moldova:
• V4 stories are very motivating for Moldovans
• the communication between civil society and local government is missing
• the involvement of civil society in the decision making processes is missing
The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic Roundtable H
Innovations for Development

Speakers:
- Marko Tomicic, Senior Consultant for Delta Partnership, WYG Group in Nairobi
- Milica Begovic, Innovation Specialist, UNDP Regional Centre for Europe and the CIS
- Nana Tskikauri, Head of International Relations and Donor Coordination Division, Ministry of Justice of Georgia
- Ellen de Vreede, Partnership Officer at CGAP/World Bank Institute
- Marcin Piatkowski, World Bank
- Kumardev Chatterjee, Founder and President, European Young Innovators Forum, Innovation Luminary – Young Innovation Champion

Moderator:
- Kristína Mikulová, Head of Development Cooperation and International Financial Institutions, International Relations Section, Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic

Kristína Mikulová:
- many different definitions of Innovation, the overarching one of them was – “new solutions to old problems”
- discussion focused on 2 questions:
  1. How can we leverage innovation in development?
     - Innovation understood as something more complex than technology, E.g. Innovative financial instruments (crowdfunding), public sector innovation (procurement)...
  2. How can we apply innovative policies (like a new donor)?
     - E.g. unique knowledge of the SR in public finance management
     - Project with UNDP
     - How to increase outreach and impact?
Milica Begovic introduced a few recent successful examples of innovation used to solve local problems
- Detroit – 300,000 USD collected for water bills in 3 weeks
- Caithlin Rivers – web portal gathering relevant information and research on ebola
- Urgent Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia Accommodation
- Rio – an app for public transport

- 67% believe that development cooperation will change in the next 10 years
- How to learn to work with partners (innovators) that are not NGOs?
- Montenegro – an application for informal economy reporting, 50% of the fine goes to financing local initiatives

Kristína Mikulová mentioned a Slovak initiative by ESET on reporting corruption (the contrast between going through an NGO, which is the Slovak case, and using an app, which is the Montenegrin case)

2 important questions:
- “What’s the problem” ← → “what’s already being done?”
- Check if there are already some functioning solutions for existing problems
- Example of tour-guiding in Minsk for blind people

Ellen de Vreede talked about innovation at the World Bank:
- Delegation dealing with innovation
- Open Data Initiative – 4 years ago
- Mapping for Results – geo-location and geo-coding of projects
  - Doesn’t give solutions, but provides a general overview that precedes solutions
- Open Aid Partnership (Czech Republic and Estonia also involved)
- Open Contracting – E.g. extractive industries (EITI)
- Open Budgeting Tool – 45+ countries used, 10 of them made public
  - BOOST in Kenya
- Citizen feedback and engagement are important
- Scan → incube → implement
- Development Marketplace – competitive platform for small grants
  - Water ATMs in India
- information platforms

Kristína Mikulová raised questions for Donor Community:
- How can we identify innovations?

Milica Begovic – we ask //personal meetings with local people

Ellen de Vreede – Open Learning Campus for WB clients and staff, will be launched next year, MOOCs – 23,000 registered participants
- What about good ideas coming from the “developing world”?

Milica Begovic – we embrace them
Ellen de Vreede – e.g. MOOCs provide facilitation and inspiration

Nana Tsiklauri focused on Innovation in Public Sector and Governance
- Public Service Dev. Agency – semi-autonomous, under Ministry of Justice
  - Created in 2012
  - Citizen-centered approach
  - Technology-driven
  - Cooperation among citizens, State agencies and private organizations
  - Framework for tailored solutions
    - Prototype → Test → Scale
    - It’s cheap
    - The creation was mentored by a British organization
  - E.g. new ID application – firstly all necessary steps were monitored, then a user-friendly web-portal was created with all relevant information that addressed concerns previously mentioned by the public
  - Behavioral exits – from Nov 2014, redesign of SMS sent to parents that contain information in order to decrease <5y. mortality
  - Community Centres – public services (passport, ID application, etc.) provided on local level in villages
    - No need to travel to municipalities
  - Hybrid libraries – in mountainous villages
  - Teaching skills in order to increase employability
  - Linking people and vacancies
  - Resources and structure are in place
  - Innovation Management Department
    - E-governance for people with disabilities

Kristína Mikulová: How to “infect” people with innovative thinking?

Nana Tsiklauri: You have to start and have a senior reform champion

Marcin Piatkowski: How long has the program been running in Georgia? Have any assessments already been done, results been evaluated or methodology composed? If it proves successful it would be useful to spread it to other countries

Marko Tomicic:
- Innovation in Kenya
- Parafiscal elements like M-pesa payments by mobile phone without the requirement to have a bank account
- Mapping of slums (Kibera, Soweto) – where is the nearest doctor/hospital; for garbage collection groups
- Very strong young generation in Kenya – expected problems in the future, high youth and/or long-term unemployment
- Example of an innovative tool that is not very useful – BOOST (Budgeting tool by World Bank) – not used much in rural areas; importance of human-centered design
- Shift in development paradigm
• Altruism à working for money BUT aid has to make sense
• Consortium of Donors in East Africa
• Missing framework, log frame
• Risk assessment and management are important
• For instance when the Government is corrupt, you need to search for alternative ways of delivering funds (e.g. NGOs, other intermediaries)
• Relevant areas of focus for the donor community – governance, state capture, corruption
• Learn from research + work with partners (monitoring)

Marcin Piatkowski:
• local systemic macro – ideas
• Hopes, optimism vs. reality with few positive results
• Innovation Support Systems
  • What is essentially wrong?

1. Often we do not know where we are going — lack of direction and clearly set goals
   • “watering the whole garden” instead of focusing on the flourishing flowers / most promising areas; lack of targeted funding disbursement, which leaves little financing for the best ideas
2. Strategy is only a piece of paper if it is not implemented
   • Ideas approved ←→ implementation results
   • During implementation – spending money blindly, partly a result of the size of the budget of EU funds and low absorption capacity in Central and Eastern Europe
   • Not knowing the effects
   • Monitoring and evaluation is missing
   • Instead of always coming up with new strategies, try to pick up successful good global practices
3. Design thinking – little interaction with people and businesses; innovation is not demand-driven and market-oriented
   • “academics financing academics”
4. Business environment is weak and not entrepreneur-friendly
   • E.g. setting up a start-up takes 24 hours in Georgia, but 2 months in Malawi
5. Open up to the world – internationalization
   • Exchanging ideas at universities, following global trends

Kristína Mikulová: to sum up the discussion: there is a need for credibility
We need to:
1. identify the challenge
2. bring together people with ideas on how to solve it
3. monitor
4. find out what works and what does not
5. apply and keep re-evaluating and readjusting

Kumardev Chatterjee: suggests listing problems to which there are no solutions yet & bringing together young people with ideas
• In deploying M&E mechanisms – it’s important to have access to data from the critical mass while monitoring, otherwise data might be distorted
• Young innovators are missing at Innovation for Development Conferences
• The Innovation Agenda and Development Agenda do not overlap, though both could benefit from more interaction and matching between problems and solutions
• Who is an innovator? – not the person who has a problem (=common population) but a person who has an idea how to solve a problem, though people can help define challenges that need tackling
  • Structuring solution ←→ Innovation
ACADEMIC PAPERS
Božena Baluchová

Abstrakt:
MZVaEZ SR spustilo začiatkom roka 2012 program na vysielanie dobrovoľníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR. Nová modalita ODA sa zameriava na budovanie kapacít v rámci rozvojovej problematiky. V období od 20a12-13 sa do programu zapojilo 10 organizácií a do terénu bolo vyslaných 40 rozvojových dobrovoľníkov a dobrovoľníčok (31 žien a 9 mužov). Pre rok 2014 sa rozpočet i počet vyslaných dobrovoľníkov oproti minulému roku zdvojnásobil. Z pohľadu zainteresovaných strán, najmä vysielajúcich mimovládnych organizácií sa v tretom roku existencie programu pozornosť zameriava na prvé výsledky, výstupy dobrovoľníckej činnosti, ako aj na nové výzvy (ako: kritériá výberu a motivácia dobrovoľníkov, ponávratové aktivity v rámci globálneho vzdelávania, predodchodová orientácia vs tréning, fenomén voluntourismu atď.).

Klúčové slová: rozvojové dobrovoľníctvo, oficiálna rozvojová pomoc SR, manažment dobrovoľníkov, motivácia dobrovoľníkov, Slovensko

Abstract:
At the beginning of the year 2012 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic has started a program of sending volunteers and experts to developing countries as a part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The new modality of ODA focuses on capacity building in development issues. In the period from 2012-13 ten organizations were involved in this program and 40 developing volunteers were sent abroad (31 women and 9 men). For the year 2014, the budget and the number of volunteers will be doubled in comparison with previous year. From the perspective of stakeholders, particularly for Slovak “sending” non-governmental development organizations the attention will be focused on early results, outcomes of volunteering program, as well as new challenges (such as: selection and motivation of volunteers; post-arrival activities in the area of global education; pre-departure training vs orientation; a phenomenon of voluntourism etc.).

Keywords: development volunteering, official development assistance ODA, volunteers management, volunteers motivation, Slovakia
ÚVOD

Iniciatívu rozvojového dobrovoľníctva ako modalitu oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci využíva väčšina tradičných donorov, či už vo forme: vysielania mladých ľudí do 30 rokov za účelom získava- nia skúseností s rozvojovou problematikou, alebo formou vysielania expertov/iek nad 30 rokov, ktorí sú ochotní bez nároku na odmenu odovzdávať svoje skúsenosti lokálnym inštitúciám v rozvojových krajínach.

Na základe odporúčania Platformy MVRO z roku 2011 spustilo MZVaEZ SR začiatkom roku 2012 Program MZVaEZ SR na vysielanie dobrovoľníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR. Odborníci od 2012-13 bolo do programu zapojených 10 organizácií a do terénu bolo vyslaných 40 rozvojových dobrovoľníkov a dobrovoľníčok (31 žien a 9 mužov). Najviac dobrovolníckych projektov možno zaradiť do oblasti sociálneho rozvoja, sociálnej práce, zdravotnej starostlivosti a vzdelávania, pričom ide o poskytovanie služieb lokalnej komunite alebo sprostredkovanie know-how, odovzdávanie skúseností. Pre rok 2014 sa rozpočet i počet vyslaných dobrovoľníkov oproti minulému roku zdvojnásobil. Zároveň sa dostavujú prvé výsledky vyslaných dobrovoľníkov, najmä ich úspechy, verejné výstupy v rámci ponávratových aktivít (osobnostné napredovanie, využitie nadobudnutých skúseností a sieťovania v rámci organizácie, účasti na diskusióch o rozvoji a vzdelávacích podujatiach, všetká v rôznych súťažiach).

Cieľom tohto príspevku je (vzhľadom na treť rok existencie dobrovolníckeho programu MZVaEZ SR) zameriť sa na niektoré výsledky či výstupy dobrovolníckej činnosti, no predovšetkým na nové výzvy (kriteériá výberu a motivácia dobrovoľníkov, ponávratové aktivity v rámci globálneho vzdelávania, predodchodová orientácia vs tréning, fenomén volontourismu atď.) pre zainteresované strany, najmä vysielajúce mimovládne organizácie.

1. ROZVOJOVÉ DOBROVOĽNÍCTVO

Pod pojmom dobrovolníctvo možno chápať činnosť ľudí, pracujúcich v prospech iných osôb či pre konkrétny projekt bez finančnej pláce za poskytnutý čas a vykonanú službu. Hoci daný človek sa svoje dobrovoľníčenie nedostane hmatateľnú odmenu, získá omnoho viac – môže sa mu pozitívne zmeniť rebríček hodnôt aj plány do budúcnosti, získá sociálny kapitál (nové kontakty, partnerstvá, zručnosti). V zahraničí je bežnou praxou, že zamestnávatelia si vyberajú spomedzi uchádzačov na konkrétu pozíciu práve tých, ktorí sa venovali a venujú dobrovolníctvu. Výhody zapájania dobrovolníkov do jednotlivých aktivít sú súčasťou rozvojového plánu vysielajúcej i prijímajúcej organizácie: Dobrovolníci totiž šetria peniaze; prinášajú potrebne zručnosti; prinášajú novú energiu aj vzrušenie; naviac zvyšujú pocit spolupatričnosti: „community ownership”.

1 Odporúčania Platformy MVRO k vytvoreniu Národného mechanismu vysielania dobrovolníkov / dobrovolníčok v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej spolupráce“, 2011
2 Program MZVaEZ SR na vysielanie dobrovolníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR, 2012
3 BALUCHOVA, 2013, www.prohuman.sk
4 COMMUNITY TOOL BOX, 2013, http://ctb.ku.edu
1.1 Rozvojové dobrovoľníctvo vo svete

Podľa organizácie Voluntary Service Overseas (www.vsointernational.org) majú najväčší vplyv na zníženie chudoby a znevýhodnenia práve dobrovoľníci. VSO pôsobí v oblasti sprostredkovania dobrovoľníckych pobytxov už polstoročie po pričom veková hranica je od 18 do 75 rokov (dobravoľníčit môžu aj partnerské dvojice, rodiny, ľudia s postihnutím). Vo svete azda najviac známy program pre wysielanie dobrovoľníkov do krajín s nižšími príjmi, je program OSN: UN Volunteers (www.unv.org). Cieľ je jednoduchý: prispievať k šíreniu mieru a rozvoja po celom svete prostredníctvom dobrovoľníčkej služby (v rámci rozvojovej a humanitárnej pomoci, aj mierových akcií), aj v on-line podobe. Niet totiž pochyb o tom, že trvalo udržateľný rozvoj ako aj inklúzia, participácia, spolupatričnosť, solidarita či sociálna súdržnosť si vyžaduje zapojenie ľudí.5

Jedným z najnovších dobrovoľníckych programov je program EU Aid volunteers (http://www.aidvolunteers.org) z dielne Európskej komisie, ktorý práve završil svoju pilotnú fázu. Táto iniciatíva EK ponúka možnosť: vyjadriť solidaritu s ľuďmi, ktorí to najviac potrebujú; poskytnúť profesionálnu podporu ľuďom v núdzi vytrénovanými dobrovoľníkmi; prispieť v rámci lokálnych komunít a hostujúcich organizácií k budovaniu miestnych kapacít. Oddelenie EK pre humanitárnu pomoc a civilnú ochranu (ECHO) v rámci pripravy a wysielania dobrovoľníkov spolupracuje s organizáciami: Save the Children UK, francúzsky a nemecký Červený križ, France Volontaires, ADICE, ICCO. Od roku 2015 do roku 2020 bude vyšlých do rozvojových krajín viac ako 18 000 ľudí, ktorí svojou účasťou, skúsenosťou či expertízou prispejú k riešeniu humanitárnej krízy v mnohých krízových situáciách a častiach sveta.6

1.2 Rozvojové dobrovoľníctvo v SR

V období, keď sa váčsina (nielen) európskych krajín zmietala v hospodárskej kríze a medzinárodné vzťahy boli napäté v dôsledku občianskych vojen aj ozbrojených konfliktov (nielen) na africkom kontinente, Slovenská republika spustila program vysielania dobrovoľníkov do krajín globálneho Juhu – program budovania kapacít v oblasti globálneho rozvojového vzdelávania a rozvojovej spolupráce.

Na podnet Platformy mimovládnych rozvojových organizácií a jej členských organizácií začalo Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí a európskych záležitostí SR v roku 2012 financovať aktivity slovenských dobrovoľníkov a dobrovoľníčok v menej rozvinutých krajín v rámci Programu na wysielanie dobrovoľníkov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci. Tento má viac vyšpecifikovaný zámer, isté teritoriálne aj sektorové priority, aj špecifické kritériá/požiadavky na záujemcov o rozvojové dobrovoľníctvo a ich vysielajúce organizácie – v porovnaní s Európskou dobrovoľníckou službou (pre Európanov a Európanky do 30 rokov), ktorú finančne podporuje Európska komisia od konca minulého storočia.

Viac o jednotlivých fázach dobrovoľníckeho cyklu (rady pre dobrovoľníkov/čky: pred, počas aj po dobrovoľníckom pobytte, ale aj usmernenia pre vysielajúcu či prijímateľskú stranu dobrosviľníčie činnosti v cudzine) sa môžu zainteresované dozvedieť v príručke: Slovenský sprievodca rozvojovým dobrovoľníctvom, ktorú vydala Platforma MVRO v roku 2011 (k stiahnutiu na stránke: www.mvro.sk).

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5 UN Volunteers, 2004: Volunteering for development, www.unv.org


1.3 Pozitívne odozvy a úspechy dobrovolníctva v SR
Že je o dobrovoľníctvo (samozrejme, nielen to rozvojové) na Slovensku čoraz väčší záujem, dokázalo aj stodvadsať nominácií (teda ukážka tých najviac prínosných a zaujímavých aktivít) v dvanástich kategóriách v rámci ocenenia Dobrovoľník/dobrovojník za rok 2013, zorganizovaného organizáciou C.A.R.D.O. Minulý rok sa po prvý raz dodal v kategórii Rozvojový dobrovoľník (dobrovojník SlovakAid). Do úzkeho výberu nominovaných sa dostali traja muži (dodrovojníci SKCH, VŠ zdravotníctva a sociálnej práce sv. Alžbety a Trnavskej univerzity). Čenu získal Pavol Markovič, ktorý dobré naštartovanú kariéru vývojára virtuálnych nástrojov a pracovné povinnosti na 5 mesiacov odložil, aby mohol ako rozvojový dobrovojník Trnavskej univerzity učiť dospelých ľudí v Keni, komunitných zdravotníckych pracovníkov a pracovníčky z regiónu Kwale základy práce s počítačom. Zároveň sa svojou audiovizuálnou tvorbou snažil zvyšovať povedomie u ľudí v Keni i na Slovensku – o potrebe a význame slovensko-kenskej rozvojovej spolupráce. Nie náhodou Pavol Markovič zvíťazil aj vo fotosúťaži „Ľudské práva v rozvojovej spolupráci“, ktorú usporiadal a v októbru 2013 v rámci podujatia Rozvojový deň (10 rokov Slovak Aid) vyhodnotila Platforma MVRO.

2. MOTIVÁCIA PRE DOBROVOĽNÍCKU SLUŽBU
Dobrovojníci a dobrovojníčky vykonávajú svoju „prácu“ z mnohých pohnútok a dôvodov zadarmo. Môže ísť o získavanie vedomostí alebo rozvoj zručností, o túžbu niečo vrátiť spoločnosti (pretože cítia morálnu povinnosť), ako aj o nadväzovanie vzťahov. Noví dobrovojníci/čky nie sú bezradní či osamé mladí ľudia bez skúseností. Dobrovojníkmi sú komunitní lídri, partneri,

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7 Hodnotenie doterajšej implementácie Programu MZVaEZ SR na vysielanie dobrovojníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR, 2013
8 BALUCHOVÁ, 2013, www.prohuman.sk
9 COMPACT, 2001, www.thecompact.co.uk
manželia, rodičia, ktorí majú svoju profesionálnu prácu, sú vzdelaní, zaneprázdnení. Cítia však potrebu robiť niečo, čo vedie k spoločenskej zmene – kde môžu niečo zmeniť k lepšiemu.  

Najčastejšie motívy a očakávania dobrovoľníkov/chôk sú: pocit sebanaplnenia a zmyslu byznej obete (25 %), láskas k bližnému, dávanie a prijímanie milosrdenstva (29 %), pocit úžitočnosti a potrebnosti (15 %), vytváranie a prijímanie sociálnych kontaktov (12 %), získanie istých skúseností (8 %), citové a vedomostné obohatenie (7 %), možnosť vykonávať zmeny v spoločnosti (3 %), objavenie v sebe novej skrytej dimenzie (1 %).  

V rámci manažmentu dobrovoľníkov je dôležité poznať motívy dobrovoľníkov, lebo informácie o motivácií môže organizácia využiť pri hľadaní svojich potenciálnych dobrovoľníkov; a na základe poznania motivačných potrieb môže organizácia zabezpečiť účinné umiestnenie nových ľudí do aktivít, ktoré zodpovedajú ich potrebám. Poznanie motívov pomáha organizácií udržať spokojnosť ľudí, ako aj predchádzať konfliktom.  

Dobrovoľníci/chôky sa cítia najlepšie v prostredí, ktoré podporuje ich rast sebaúcty. Ak ich cinnosť zvyšuje úctu k sebe samým, pracovníci sa na ňu tešia, majú dobrý pocit. Ľudia s vysokým stupňom sebaúcty sú tí, ktorí si naplňajú súčasne tri motivačné potreby: potrebu spolupatričnosti, potrebu jedinečnosti, ale aj pocit moci. Pri vytváraní pocitu spolupatričnosti zohráva úlohu týchto päť faktorov: spoločný cieľ, spoločné hodnoty, vzájomný rešpekt, vzájomná dôvera a synergický efekt, získaný spojením silných stránok a potlačením slabých stránok ľudí, pracujúcich v tíme. Zmysel pre spolupatričnosť sa znásobuje spoločným získaním nových skúseností. Ak koordinátor/ka dobrovoľníkov či supervízor/ka v teréne bude trvať na neustáлом zlepšovaní sa, bude dobrovoľníkov podnecovať k tomu, aby skúšali nové spôsoby, ako sa veci dajú robiť; a ak sa to bude diať v rámci tímu – pocit spolupatričnosti sa bude zvyšovať.  

Pre koordinátov/ky dobrovoľníkov či supervízorov/ky je zároveň dôležité pri vstupných pohovoroch, ale aj neskôr pri pozorovaní a hodnotení vykonanej práce sledovanie, resp. odhalenie potenciálnych patologických motívov; súcit vedúci k degradácii klienta; služba prameniaca z pocitu povinnosti, morálneho záväzku; túžba obetovať sa, tzv. sebazničujúce typy; osobné neštastie, s ktorým si uchádajúci nevie dať rady a preto chce v dobrovoľníckej službe hľadať rovnováhu, kompenzáciu; túžba ovládať iných a uplatňovať svoj vplyv atď.  

3. VÝZVY PRE SLOVENSKÉ ROZVOJOVÉ DOBROVOĽNÍCTVO  

Z pohľadu zainteresovaných strán sa v tretom roku existencie Programu MZVaEZ SR na vysielanie dobrovolníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín pozornosť zameriava nielen na výsledky, úspechy či výstupy dobrovoľníčej činnosti, ale aj na výzvy (ktoré sú svojou formuláciou zároveň aj odporúčania), s ktorými sa musia vysielajúce organizácie identifikovať a zvoliť jasný prístup.

10 DRUCKER, 1992, s. 69  
11 MRÁČKOVÁ, 2009, s. 24  
12 MRÁČKOVÁ, 2009, s. 35  
13 UGRÓCZY, 2008, s. 33  
14 Mračková, 2009, s. 23
3.1 Uistiť sa v dôvodoch vysielania dobrovoľníkov a dobrovoľníčok

Kvalitná inštitúcia by mala mať v rámci efektívnej realizácie dobrovoľníckeho programu na zreteľi nasledujúce kroky (a zvolenú stratégiu): – mať dôvod pre vysielanie či hostovanie dobrovoľníkov; – zostaviť opis práce a rozvíjať náplň dobrovoľníckej činnosti, „práce“; – viest získanie dobrovoľníkov (cez nábor dobrovoľníkov, skríning potenciálnych dobrovoľníkov až po osobné a osobnostné pohovory); – prijímať zabezpečiť orientácia v organizácii, ako aj predvýjazdový tréning; – sprostredkovať supervíziu a podporu dobrovoľníkom; – počas pobytu, aj po návrate: snažiť sa udržať spoluprácu s dobrovoľníkom; – analyzovať pobyt, „prácu“ dobrovoľníka a objektívne hodnotiť dobrovoľníka; – získať spätnú väzbu (nepodcenitiť monitoring a evaluáciu dobrovoľníckej činnosti); – prejaviti uznanie za snahu či úspechy.

Personalný manažment (prevažne v neziskovom sektore) sa však často vyznačuje špecifickými znakmi, ktoré vychádajú z týchto skutočností: a.) diferenciácia v štruktúre pracovníkov – platení zamestnanci vs dobrovoľníci, civilní alebo komunitní pracovníci; b.) absencia odmien a takisto aj sankcií pri práci dobrovoľníkov/čok; c.) kumulovanie pracovných funkcí do jednej (absencia koordinátora dobrovoľníkov); d.) vplyv jedného výrazného, charizmatického vodcu na fungovanie celej organizácie.15

Treba sa z pozície všetkých zainteresovaných strán opätovne zamyslieť nad dôvodom vzniku dobrovoľníckeho programu MZVaEZ SR a jeho pôvodným cieľom: budovania kapacít v rámci rozvojovej problematiky a globálneho vzdelávania u nových ľudí zo SR (napr. absolventov rozvojových štúdií, misiologíie, tropického zdravotníctva, sociálnej práce atď.). Ak si budú vysielajúcej organizácii zamieňať dobrovoľnícky program s inou alternatívu financovania svojich profesionálnych terénnych pracovníkov/čok a naďalej budú vysieť do rozvojových krajín prácujúci ľudia v šak majú (pre svoj vek do 30 rokov) možnosť zakúsiť rozvojové práce aj cez iné programy, napríklad cez Európsku dobrovoľnícku službu, financovanú zo zdrojov Európskej komisie. Treba si preto uvedomiť, že v programe MZVaEZ SR nie je len o vysielaní „mladých ľudí za účelom získania osobných skúseností s rozvojovou problematikou“17, ale aj o vysielaní skúsených rozvojových pracovníkov/čok (pedagogických, technických, IT, zdravotníckych či sociálnych pracovníkov a pracovníčok), ktorí sú ochotní bez nároku na odmenu odovzdať svoje vedomosti a skúsenosti lokálnym komunitám či inštitúciám v rozvojových krajínach. Veková hranica vysielaných expertov a expertiek sa môže pokojne pohybovať v rozhraní 35-45 i viac rokov – takto ju treba špecifikovať aj v rámci inzerátov/získania záujemcov o dobrovolnícku službu. Netreba na túto vekovú skupinu vysielaných ľudí zabúdať (pri zadávaní, analýze, hodnotení a evaluácií ich práce, ale aj pri medializácii ich výsledkov).16

15 MAJDUCHOVÁ, 2009, s. 176
16 Hodnotenie doterajšej implementácie Programu MZVaEZ SR na vysielanie dobrovoľníkov a expertov do rozvojových krajín v rámci oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR, 2013
17 NEMCOVÁ, 2014, s. 17


3.3 Zabezpečiť vzdelávanie pred výjazdom na dobrovoľnícky pobyt

Pre úspešnosť vzdelávacieho systému je velmi dôležité vybrať správnu metódu vzdelávania. Metódy vzdelávania možno rozdeliť do dvoch skupín: a.) Metódy používané k vzdelávaniu na pracovisku, na konkrétном pracovnom mieste (napr. inštruktáž pri výkone práce, coaching, mentoring, konzultácie, asistovanie, poverovanie úlohou, rotácia práce); b.) Metódy používané k vzdelávaniu mimo pracoviska (prednáška spojená s diskusiou, demonštrovanie, prípadové štúdie, workshop, brainstorming, simulácia, hranie rolí, assessment centrá).20 Vzdelávanie dobrovoľníkov/čok, ako aj regulérnych zamestnancov je permanentný proces (občas slúži aj ako prevencia pred rutinou či vyhorením), v ktorom nastáva prispôsobovanie a zmena pracovného správania, úrovne vedomostí, zručností a motivácie, čo je druhodňové školenie pred výjazdom (z iniciatívy MZVaEZ SR, SAMRS). Účastníci/čky sa dozvedia v 5 moduloch komplexné informácie o rozvojovej spolupráci, princípoch a prioritách slovenskej ODA; o medzikultúrnej citlivosti a potrebných kompetenciách v kultúrne odlišnom prostredí, o udržateľnom rozvoji mesta; o bezpečnosti pri práci v teréne;21 ale aj o informovaní, princípoch zobrazenia rozvojovej problematicy v médiách.

Od roku 2014 prebieha v SR jednotná predvýjazdová príprava dobrovoľníkov/čok v podobe jednodňového školenia pred výjazdom (z iniciatívy MZVaEZ SR, SAMRS). Účastníci/čky sa dozvedia v 5 moduloch komplexné informácie o rozvojovej spolupráci, princípoch a prioritách slovenskej ODA; o medzikultúrnej citlivosti a potrebných kompetenciách v kultúrne odlišnom prostredí; o udržateľnom komunitnom rozvoji; o bezpečnosti pri práci v teréne;22 ale aj o informovaní, princípoch zobrazenia rozvojovej problematicy v médiách.

Popri monitoringu a evaluácii celého dobrovoľníckeho cyklu, treba zabúdať ani na evaluáciu tréningu, a samotného vzdelávacieho procesu (v rámci vysielajúcej a prijmajúcej

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18 NEMCOVÁ, 2014, s. 17
20 KOUBEK, 2004, s. 250-251
21 Kachaňáková, 2003, s. 120-121
22 NEMCOVÁ, 2014, s. 17
organizácie). Evaluácia vzdělávacieho procesu by mala prebiehať obojstranne – overením nadobudnutých vedomostí u budúcich dobrovoľníkov/čok (formou rozhovoru, focus groups, či testovania vedomostí: pred tréningom a po tréningu), zároveň odovzdaním spätnej väzby školiteľskému tímu (tvárové tvár, či písmom: anonymne).  

Často sa však zo strany vysielajúcej organizácie podceňuje alebo úplne vynecháva proces orientácie, ktorý by mal zabezpečiť riaditeľ organizácie či dobrovolnicky koordinátor/ka. Výhody štruktúrovaného „orientation program“ sú jasné: Prenos poznatkov; Zvýšenie dôvery v organizáciu; Zvýšenie nadšenia dobrovoľníka; Vyhnutie sa budúcim problémom. Orientácia v rámci vlastnej organizácie by mala obsahovať minimálne tieto zložky: štruktúra a opis programov, projektov organizácie (ako aj cieľovej skupiny, komunity, v rámci ktorej majú dobrovolníci/čky fungovať); očakávania od dobrovoľníkov/čok a náplň práce (ale aj benefity); vysvetlenie vnútornej politiky, pravidiel a postupov; postup hodnotenia; núdzové postupy, bezpečnostný manuál atď.  

3.4 Zabezpečiť supervíziu a udržať si dobrovolníka v organizácii

Aj napriek tomu, že dobrovolníci/čky nie sú na výplatnej listine vysielajúcej organizácie, majú istú zodpovednosť – je preto dôležité nezabúdať na potrebnú supervíziu a podporu zo strany vysielajúcej aj prijímającej organizácie. Spätá väzba, založená na faktoch (z analýzy zadanej „práce“, pozorovania dobrovoľnickej aktivity, kontroly časového harmonogramu a monitorovacích reportov, z hodnotenia dotazníka či osobného/online rozhovoru) a konštruktívne pripomienky supervízora/ky môžu napomôcť k osobnostnému rastu dobrovoľníka/čky a lepšiemu výkonu v hostovskej organizácii. Dobrovolnícká činnosť predsa len odráža aktivity organizácie ako celku. Preto je dôležité, aby si riaditeľ/ka organizácie, alebo presnejšie: poverený supervízor/ka či koordinátor/ka dobrovoľníkov (ak organizácia vo svojej organizačnej štruktúre a pracovnom tíme takého človeka má) udržiavať prehľad o tom, čo a ako ľudia, vyslaní v ich mene do komunit v rozvojovom svete, robia.  

Keď už daná organizácia vidí výsledky, realizované aktivity, splnené ciele a úspechy tešenie práce svojich dobrovoľníkov/čok – je dôležité si ich v organizácii udržať. Dôležité nie je len nekolokmesačná účasť na ponávratových aktivitách, ako: diskusie na školách, účasti v audiovizuálnych súťažiach a fotovýstavách, prezentácia zážitkov na verejných eventoch (festival Jeden svet, festival Pohoda, Rozvojový deň, Deň dobrovolníctva, Svetový deň migrantov a utečencov). Dôležité je dlhodobé, nekolíštečné zapájanie dobrovoľníkov/čok do aktivít vysielajúcej organizácie: príprava publikácií o konkrétnej misii; príprava manuálu vzdělávacích aktivít v rámci globálneho vzdelávania; príprava, mentoring a koučing nových dobrovoľníkov/čok. Uznanie prínosu, ocenenie či verejné podávanie ľudom za ich dobrovolnícku činnosť je takisto súčasťou stratégie, ako si možno dobrovoľníkov udržať.  

3.5 Vyhnúť sa fenoménu „voluntourism“

Niekedy sa dobrovolníctvo: „volunteering“ zamieňa s pojmom „voluntourism“. Do voluntourismu je takmer vždy zapojená skupina idealistickej a privilegovaných cestujúcich, ktorí majú výrazne odlišný socio-ekonomický status, ako tých, ktorým pomáhajú, či slúžia. Často vstupujú svojimi aktivitami do lokálnych komunít s malým alebo žiadnym povedomím či pochopením

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23 COMUNITY TOOL BOX, 2013, http://ctb.ku.edu
24 COMUNITY TOOL BOX, 2013, http://ctb.ku.edu
histórie, kultúry a spôsobu života miestnych ľudí. Všetko je zamerané len na potrebu znížovania chudoby. 26 Etika rôznych podôb voluntourizmu je rozoberaná v akademickom aj mimovládnom kruhu. Je nastolená otázka, či dovolenka v exotickej krajine pre jedincov, ktorí si to môžu finančne dovoliť, spôsobuje želané dobro vo rozvojových krajinách, alebo ešte viac prehlihubuje stereotypy o „spasiteľských komplexoch“ bohatších potomkov bývalých kolonizátorov z „bieleho kontinentu“. Akokoľvek obdivuhodný altruisticky takéto dobrovoľničie výzerá, problém s voluntourizmom bude naďalej spájaný s túžbou dobrovoľníka nadobudnúť novú skúsenosť vo novej/exotickej krajine, ktorá sa však nie vždy musí viazať na naplňanie skutočných potrieb prijímanej komunity.


**ZÁVER**

Úspech riadenia ľudských zdrojov (a teda aj manažment dobrovolníkov a dobrovoľníčok) je založený na flexibilite, profesionalite, komunikácii a etike vo vysielajúcej, ako aj v prijímanej organizácii. Zároveň by mal byť posilnený dostatočnou motiváciou vyslaných ľudí do rozvojových krajín. Mnoho riadiacich osobností jednotlivých mimovládnych organizácií podceňuje plánovanie ľudských zdrojov, teda proces zabezpečenia správnych dobrovolníkov a dobrovolníčok (które budú zodpovedné za efektívne plniť stanovené úlohy, zároveň reprezentovať danú organizáciu v zahraničí), ako aj ich pripravu na výjazd/misiu – čo je chyba.

Dobrovolníci a dobrovoľníčky neprinášajú do rozvojovej krajiny finančnú pomoc. Ich možnosti sú samy osebe obmedzené – pokiaľ ide o časový horizont pôsobenia a implementáciu aktivít, systémové riešenia problémov, prebratie zodpovednosti za konkrétne (komunitný) rozvoj a udržateľnosť aktivít v konkrétnej oblasti. Dôležitý je dôverhodný a „symbolický“ a sociálny kapitál dobrovolníkov/čok aj samotných organizácií, ktorý je hnečou silou aj reprezentáciou toho, ako prijímané komunity vnímajú sa (svoju pozíciu v rámci boja s globálnou chudobou) a ako ich budú vnínať ostatní. Dôležité je takisto ujasniť si strategiu prístupu k novým výzvam rozvojového dobrovolníctva, ktorým čelia aj slovenské vysielajúce organizácie.

Treba zároveň popri rozvojovom dobrovolníctve upozorňovať na príčiny rozdielov medzi rozvojovými a rozvinutými krajinami; treba venovať dostatočný čas, priestor a energiu na budovanie solidarity medzi rôznorodými spoločnosťami, založenej na vzájomnom rešpekti a porozumení. Lebo príčinu chudoby možno hľadať nielen v nespravodlivom globálnom ekonomickom poriadku, ale aj vo vnútri vlastnej krajiny. To, že mladí ľudia vystúpia do rozvojovej krajiny

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26 MOHAMUD, 2013, www.theguardian.com
27 BUČKO & SLÁVIKOVÁ, 2013, s. 296-7
a budú mať dobrý pocit z vykonanej dobrovoľníckej činnosti, môže a nemusí stačiť. Dôležité je, aby pochopili ich vlastnú (priamu alebo nepriamu) úlohu – v záujme: prispieť k naplneniu Miléniových rozvojových cieľov (MDGs a neskôr SDGs) a ukončiť globálnu chudobu.

POUŽITÁ LITERATÚRA


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Development as Freedom? What Sustainable Solutions Can Be Offered to Developing Countries by the EU and Slovakia

Zuzana Fialová

Abstract:
Democratization efforts have been linked to development cooperation, since the spread of belief in the Global North that it is democracy that brings progress and development. Historical experience, however, showed that they are more liberal values than democracy itself that are one of the conditions of well-being of peoples and societies. Instead of transferring the democratic institutions and imposing the democratic legislature, the development efforts should be oriented more on building capacities and facilitating the procedures of establishing participatory government according to local conditions. Spreading liberal democracy cannot be effective without eliminating the “energy trap” in which all democracies in the world found themselves. Without alternative sources of energy and changing the consumption model of politics and economy in the Global North, there will be no progress in combating global poverty.

Key words: democratization, liberal democracy, energy policy, consumption democracy

INTRODUCTION

Motto: “The 20th century demonstrated that states could not simply remake the world or abbreviate historical transformations. Nor can they easily effect social change by transferring institutions across borders”.28 Eric Hobsbawm

At this time of evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals, spreading violent conflict on European soil, and progressing global energy crises, the debate on the functions of democracy and fundamental freedoms is undeniably highly relevant, not only in Europe. The title of this article is inspired by a classic work of development literature by Amartya Sen who established human freedom as an unquestionable purpose of development. Recent historical experience in Iraq and Afghanistan made (not only American) writers skeptical towards “spreading democracy”29. This article aims at reviewing the generally agreed consensus of the

29 The term was frequently used by J. W. Bush when describing invasions to Afghanistan and especially Iraq.
Global North that spreading democracy is a good and effective tool to world stability and sustainable development. The views presented here that are not listed in resources, are based on the author’s 20 years experience with democratization and human rights development programs in Europe and Asia.

1. DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM

The format of this article does not allow deliberating around the definition of development itself. Unlike the mainstream view of economists like J. Sachs, (Sachs, Mellinger, & Gallup, 2008), which is represented mostly in crucial global financial institutions, a liberal thinker Amartya Sen sees development “… as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms, contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social modernization. … Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systemic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.” (Sen, 1999) According to his approach freedom is the ultimate value that is a crucial component of development that may lead to prosperity and well-being of individuals and societies. Such honor to the freedom of human individuals has been incorporated into policies when defining the Human Rights Based Approach by the UN. (UNDG-HRM, 2011) Undeniably, putting freedom into center of development efforts is more humanistic approach than that of J. Sachs. However, when praising freedom (as opposed to tyranny, which limits the ability of people to secure their own well-being), Sen underestimates the cultural values of nations and communities that are not based on individualism in the same way as Western culture. Solidarity, family cohesion, responsibility, compassion, sacrifice – all these may be as valuable in certain circumstances as freedom. Enforcing non-sensitive development models based on individualistic values may destroy the cultural environment of communities and bring secondary social problems. An example of this is the case of micro-credits in many projects around the world. (Bateman, 2010) Despite they are generally appreciated, micro-credit schemes promote competitiveness, which is disturbing social cohesion of communities. This leads to serious problems in the families of recipients. Often a non-sensitive preference of women as recipients can put them into difficult position as for their roles in the family and the community.

The definition of progress and development, which is the closest to the understanding of the author of this article, is that of Phil Vernon. The reason may be that his views are rooted deeply in practical work and knowledge of countries of Global South. He sees progress as “… a combination of interrelated and largely organic processes which between them lead to a fairer, safer, more democratic society in which prosperity is widely shared, people have the wherewithal to live a decent life, and differences are resolved without violence. … the factors and processes likely to contribute to this kind of development include an educated population with increasing confidence and voice, creativity and initiative; the application of the rule of law to an everwidening circle of people; increasing social mobility; a growing economy in which a growing share of the population participates; an increasingly dynamic civil society which brings together people across ethnic and other social divides in pursuit of common enterprise; increasing control of violence by increasingly accountable institutions of state; and the evolution of broadly
supported values and institutions which underpin all these factors and processes.” (Vernon, 2013) As presented, democracy and freedom are components of the definition, however, they are put into broader range of values that limit them and shape them. There is clear interrelation between chances for an individual on the one side and security of the social and natural environments on the other side. In Slovakia, there are also many critics of development as such claiming that all evils of poverty and insecurity will disappear when “the developed countries” start changing their trade, production, and environment policies and just stop providing aid. As every simplification, this theory has its shortcomings. First and foremost, there are enough examples of countries benefiting from development cooperation, including Slovakia in last 20 years. Then, it must be taken into account that one of the serious reasons for poverty is missing knowledge or insufficient skills, which was forgotten by generations during long-term conflicts, migration, repression, etc. Without necessary know-how (the discussion may go on what is exactly “necessary”) it is practically impossible to combat poverty, diseases, insecurity. In a globally interconnected world development means information, skills, and knowledge. Democracy and human freedom help a lot. However, critics of development are forgetting the banal fact that peace is not just lack of war and democracy is not just lack of tyranny. Contemporary Afghanistan and Bosnia are striking examples. Peace and democracy are less matter of institutions and more matters of culture and social processes. Institutions can be built relatively quickly (i.e. the present constitution of Afghanistan that was written in couple of weeks) but there is no guarantee that they will serve the well-being of people unless the culture of democracy and human rights is cultivated at the same time.

When taking democracy as a model worth following, one thinks of liberal democracy, which is characterized by constitutionalism, rule of law, respecting individual and political freedoms, and state governed by institutions elected by people, based on universal suffrage in regular elections where candidates or organizations compete. As E. Hobsbawm writes, although liberal democracy is often linked with capitalism, rights protection, rule of law, it is not democracy itself (as an institutional arrangement) that guarantees the well-being of people. (Hobsbawm, Globalizace, demokracie a terorizmus, 2009) For example, Columbia has one of the most stable democratic regimes in Latin America, however, the number of people murdered, displaced, or crippled in last 50 years reaches millions. There are many countries of former Soviet Union such as Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, or Tajikistan, where the institutional framework for democracy (free and universal elections) is guaranteed, though they do not fulfill the definition of a developed country as defined by P. Vernon. The experience shows that the liberal component is more important than the democratic one.

Why it is so that democracy, freedom and development are so often linked together? Probably because the deep philosophical root of all three is the same: It is respect towards human dignity. Human dignity is the very essence of fundamental rights and freedoms, protecting individuals from arbitrary interference into their physical or psychological integrity from the side of those in power. Democracy gives opportunity to people to get rid of a bad government peacefully. It also opens space for participation in public affairs, so individual becomes a subject instead of object of government. Development should pay respect human dignity as well. People, though, cannot claim their rights and enjoy participation when they are starving and dying from plagues or banal diseases. To make liberal democracy work, one needs a critical mass of people having their livelihoods independent from the state or big corporations, and having at least basic education. Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) is that no development can be made whilst ignoring the rights of people. One can add that...
without guaranteeing rights to property no democracy can work. Individual or communal property allows certain level of independence from the state, big donors, or global corporations, so these people can become democratic actors. For example in 2005, series of violent demonstrations and attacks on foreigners happened in Afghanistan after the news about a Guantanamo soldier flushing the Koran down a toilet was published. When mapping this violence, development NGOs could see a reverse correlation between the level of violence and number of functional schools and prosperous livelihoods, as well as completed small infrastructure projects in particular regions. The hypothesis was that in those areas where people felt at least moderate prosperity (in comparison with Taliban regime), where they had some property and livelihoods, and where they could reach information from various sources, there was little interest in rioting. On the contrary, the most violent situation was in big cities which had a number of impoverished male youths without education, employment, or prospects for family. People having “nothing to lose” are the most vulnerable and poor, but also they are the first objects of manipulation and propaganda of populist ideologies of all kinds. This is visible not only in Afghanistan, but also in present Ukraine, where dramatic poverty and total dependence of people on big state or corporate employers is one of the main obstacles of developing a democratic culture and rule of law.

2. IS IT REALLY LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WE NEED TO COMBAT POVERTY?

It is a great paradox of present times that we (the global North) are offering to developing countries a model of government that seems more than old-fashioned in relation to recent global challenges people in all continents are facing. Liberal democracy in a framework of national state is unable to cope with such global problems. Despite that, we consider its spreading to be a mean of solving them. (Hobsbawm, Globalizace, demokracie a terorizmus, 2009) To take just several examples: How much can a national state do with the problem of climate change? How many wars (would they be military invasions or humanitarian interventions) undertaken by democratic countries in last 20 years were started according to legal and democratic decisions of elected representatives of people in those countries? What can even the most powerful democratic state do with leaking of its deepest secrets? Whether it be security, environment, energy, or trade, more and more policies are decided on supranational level with involvement of non-democratic private actors (corporations, international financial institutions, etc.). That may be one of the reasons why citizens of rich states feel alienation from politics and from public affairs.

The crisis of liberal democracy is not only in its incapability to solve problems of the globe, but in most of the democratic governments´ loss of their legitimacy. The very character of relations between the nation state (politicians) and its citizens (electorate) is changing. Loyalty towards the state is diminishing. Paying taxes is the inevitable evil, readiness to sacrifice for a motherland is irrelevant because instead of draft army, professionals (often from private companies) fight for democratic nation states´ interests. It looks more and more embarrassing when professional soldiers are buried with state tributes though in fact they just suffered the “accident at work”. No humanitarian worker killed in conflict zones enjoys the same privileges, although the difference between the two is just that one is wearing a uniform. Both are just doing their work, having the risk of death almost in their job description. The appearance
of patriotism and sacrifice for motherland is important for politicians to nourish. However, the real relation between the state and its citizens is more similar to a supermarket and its clients. The politics in last 50 years in richest states has been reduced to (mostly broken) promises. Citizens expect the state to provide them with services and well-being. Times when British Prime Minister Churchill promised “blood, sweat, and tears” are forgotten by generations. Election campaigns in Europe concentrate on ensuring voters that through paying less tax the services will be better. The citizen has turned into a consumer and the psychology of advertisement is the same. Globalization, however, works in all directions. Observing elections in Kenya, Afghanistan, or Ukraine, it is obvious that advertisement techniques are the same and people react similarly to a big sale in shopping mall. The legitimate question is whether consumer democracy is the model that can guide our Southern partners out of poverty.

The above considerations bring us to the initial assumption that it is less democracy and more liberal values that the Global North may offer to the rest of the world as a driver for development. The experience in global development shows that respect to private and corporate property, rule of law, good conditions for small and medium enterprises, universal access to education, inclusiveness of the economic and social institutions and, last but not least, the procedures and culture of peaceful conflict resolution are a clue to development. Each of the listed components is present in Europe, North America, and Australia. How can they be transferred to countries in need? Is it possible at all?

3. DEMOCRACY IN AN ENERGY TRAP

E. Hosbawm was rather skeptical, saying that “spreading democracy is not the same as spreading the mobile technologies.” (Hobsbawm, Globalizace, demokracie a terorizmus, 2009) His point was that no institutions can be transferred without having a certain ground prepared in recipient countries or regions. Some cultural or institutional basis must be laid down to build on when starting “democratization”. This is unlike mobile technologies that can be transferred to a place with no technology, and even no literacy. In Afghanistan, access to mobile phones in 2014 is higher than literacy rate.30

The other, and probably biggest, controversy is that spreading democracy cannot be effective until it is underlined by a consistent foreign policy supporting democratic liberal regimes and condemning the ones that terrorize their people or the rest of the world. One reason is philosophical: if we believe in liberal values, then we protect them worldwide. Another reason, a more practical one, is that we cannot support democratization within a country while at the same time tolerating or even supporting its government that is undemocratic, illiberal, aggressive and imperialistic. Russia is a good example. Since the 1990s millions of dollars were invested into grassroots democratization, civil society development, human rights defenders’ training, etc. At the same time, the West was passively observing the tragic Second Chechnya War, which led to genocide of almost the whole nation.31 When 9/11 happened, the ChechENS

30 In 2014, reportedly 90% of the population have Access to the mobile communications. http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2014/01/01/90pc-afghans-get-access-telecom-services According to National Literacy Plan, the literacy rate in adult population is 34%. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/Afghanistan.pdf
(a Muslim nation originally fighting for more independence from the central government of Russia) were internationally forgotten since that day. Russia became a partner of the US and EU in “the war against terror”. (Horvitz & Catherwood, 2009) Participants of Globsec conference in Bratislava in spring 2014, when asked about illiberal and aggressive Russian politics, answered repeatedly: “The knowledge (information) was here, but we (the West) did not care before”. Why we did not care? The same conference, one of the most serious intellectual gatherings on global security in the world, brought an answer: Because we need Russian oil. This is one appearance of a democracy in energy trap. The low capacity of the EU and its member states to deal with the Ukrainian crisis rests in the fact that almost all of them are highly dependent on Russian oil/gas and Ukrainian tubes. Several European politicians admitted that the sanctions on Russia that would have been really effective were those that would hurt us (the EU members) above all. It is clear enough that consumption democracies in the EU were not able to impose them.

Energy trap has been described by many scholars. T. Friedman observing the state of freedom in Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and Nigeria in 1979-2006, formulated his “petro-policy law” saying that the higher the price of oil on the global market, the worse the state of freedom (freedom of press, independent and fair courts, free and fair elections, free and transparent political parties and associations, etc.) was in oil rich states. The reason is that the higher the price of oil, the less the oil magnates care about what the (liberal) world is saying. Besides, they have more resources on disposal to build up repression institutions, corrupt political opponents and pay for domestic support. (Friedman, 2010) P. Collier elaborates it even further when describing his famous “development traps”, which prevent poor countries from progress and development (conflict, landlocked with bad neighbors, bad government, and natural resources). (Collier, 2007) He shows that states rich in natural resources have the tendency to build an excessively large public sector that makes the government inefficient and too many citizens dependent on the state salaries. The government can bribe its citizens by low oil prices (see Mubarak’s Egypt or Yanukovich’s Ukraine). Besides, the badly governed states do not invest the income from oil into the economy with high added value and technological development, instead they build “white elephants” (huge stadiums, towers, hotels, skyscrapers, etc.) serving just the rich or adoring the regime. The poor remain poor, while the middle class often becomes poor as well. The case of Pahlavi’s Iran has been repeated not only throughout the Middle East in recent times.

The empirical truth (valid since the times of Magna Carta Libertatum in England) is that the government, which is dependent on income from taxes of its citizens, must keep some level of accountability. However great the danger of consumption democracy described above, the model is better than the government being nourished mostly by incomes from natural resources or international aid. Budgets supported by international aid can do the same bad service as the natural resources do for democracy and development. Supporting democratic institutions, while transferring huge amounts of aid in a form of budget support, is counterproductive for development. Afghanistan is a good example again. The exuberant public sector created after 2001, and fed by international aid resources, is inefficient and the most corrupted in the world. The state administration is not focused enough to effectively collect taxes from private subjects and individuals. Its main business is to blackmail international

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32 In the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International for 2013 is Afghanistan ranked on the last, 175th place together with North Korea and Somalia. See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results
organizations and their representatives to pay tributes to the state and bribes to the clerks at the same time. The relation of the public servants towards foreigners is that they consider them as an easy source of additional income. This is similar to situation in Nigeria (a perfect example of an oil rich state) as described by Juraj Mesík, a former World Bank worker. (Mesík, 2012). Similar examples can probably be found in each continent. Aid flowing into budgets leads to Collier’s “survival of the fattest”, i.e. the most corrupted, influential, rich individuals and families in power, instead of survival of the fittest, i.e. the most innovative, effective, efficient, visionary, sustainable, profitable, etc. When even in EU countries the relation between the state and its citizen is in crisis, the only connection that somehow works in certain relations is that through taxation and “value for money”. Though it is corrupted by EU subsidies and regulations, the good examples (as for Slovakia at least) of transparency and accountability remain on the level of local government. There, financial and political relations are more transparent and results easy to be assessed by every citizen.

Energy trap for liberal democracy means that the liberal world is supporting illiberal governments to receive fuel for their economies. The money paid for this fuel is nourishing the bad governments that do not need to be accountable to their citizens and to develop a value-added economy. This is the same mistake the OECD countries (including Slovakia) repeat by direct budget support of poor states with bad governments.

4. CONCLUSION: THE WAY OUT

How can the EU and Slovakia support development and the spread of liberal values that lie in its roots? The first condition is to admit that development must start in “a developed world” itself. The second is that we need to re-phrase its very definition. Development must involve an element of environmental sustainability and energy reform. That means instead of economic growth, development must discuss the climate, alternative energy resources, innovations, and technologies. Bahrain is an example of one of the former oil states that reformed itself on a value-added economy investing income from oil to education and new skills of its citizens. “The stone age did not finish because of lack of stones.” (Friedman, 2010) Rich countries must get rid of their oil dependency by supporting industries that use other forms of energy.

Development must start by reforming our consumption democracy and get back to its liberal roots. Each reform must respect the dignity of people, refusing to give aid, but support activity and responsibility for one’s own life. Lifestyles alternative from pure consumption should be promoted. Global responsibility of global citizens should be stressed. Citizens of rich countries must be confronted with the global (social and environmental) consequences of their consumption economies.

The EU should resign on spreading democracy, which is reminiscent of spreading untreatable disease. Instead, if we accept with humility that the Global North does not have the medicine, we can concentrate on searching solutions. The essential problem of most of “democratization” programs of the EU and its member states towards their Southern partners is that they concentrate more on transfer of institutions from EU countries and less on understanding the problems in recipient countries. Evaluation of these programs recommends to “deepen the knowledge” on the side of donors, “refine the support”, “understand the local dynamics”, “improve the flexibility of (donor’s) instruments”, etc. (Laporte, 2012) What all that means, in reality, is that a radical change of approach is needed. Instead of imposing solutions
and copying certain models of government and legislature, concentrate on building capacities, facilitating the process of looking for solutions on a local level, enhancing participation, and developing a culture of peaceful conflict resolution. That is the approach that was certainly missing in Ukraine. Despite numerous democratization programs implemented since the 1990s and after the Orange Revolution, there was not enough effort made to develop democratic skills and liberal values on a grassroots level. The country remained centralized in Soviet style, and Eastern regions especially remained landlocked with a bad neighbor (using Collier’s phrase) with little chance to see good examples of European values, democracy, and prosperity.

Democratization also should not mean external financial support of particular political parties or movements. Democratic politicians will not remain democratic if they become used to finances from donors before they can start doing anything concrete for their country. As an example, Belarus can be considered as a country receiving (since 1990s) the biggest amount of financial support for democracy, civil society, freedom of expression and political opposition to authoritarian rule of president Lukashenko. Instead, after more than 20 years of independence the country remains in political apathy, opposition is incapable to challenge the present ruler, and liberal values remain abstract words written in last few independent online journals with negligible readership. Over-financing can kill or at least slow down democratic processes. As an example, foreign grants have been received by activists to pay fines for those arrested in opposition demonstrations. It killed solidarity, participation, and chances for petty civil involvement in protecting human dignity.

Democracy and sustainable development take time. The problem of the EU and other global donors is what P. Vernon calls “the perversity of projects”, which forces the development workers to “chop our work up into bite-sized chunks which can be ´purchased´ by institutional donors.” (Vernon, 2013) So-called democratization projects are often presented as trying to achieve results such as ´enhancing local democracy´, what is impossible to achieve in any project duration. The project approach is very technocratic, and suitable for reporting to the taxpayers of donor countries, but not able to bring sustainable results in the recipient countries. Disrespect to the fact written as a motto of this article had led the big global donors to the list named “Sustainable Development Goals”. (The UN Millenium Campaign, 2014) If the outcome of the evaluation of MDGs is that not all eight of them have been fully achieved and that there were too many parameters and objectives set up, how the outcome for the future may be the list of 17 goals with about 15 parameters each? A big fail of democratization programs comes when they want everything at once: democracy, rule of law, human rights (all of them, including the 3rd generation), gender equality, environmental sustainability, transparency, good governance, civil society, local democracy, etc. To achieve results, however politically incorrect it may sound, objectives must be prioritized, otherwise we meet reality of present Afghanistan or Kenya or many other developing countries, having a bit of everything but without foreign aid probably not much would remain.

When asking what Slovakia can offer to Southern countries, one should look at its achievements in local democracy and community development. Both topics are typical situations where it is impossible to use to use standard solutions. Both need creativity and inspiration by successful examples rather than ready pre-fabricated solutions. Transparency of local government, involvement of citizens into the EIA33 procedure, social inclusion of marginalized groups,

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33 Environmental impact assessment
multi-ethnic local government – they are just examples of topics that are and will be inspirational for many countries. If Slovak development agencies and workers use the right ways of presenting them and helping to facilitate the process of change in the recipient localities, then Slovakia is definitely able to contribute to the sustainable ways of spreading liberal democracy within a sustainable development framework.

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Od vedomostí a činov k hodnotám a spätí
(From the knowledge and actions to the values and back)

PhDr. Juraj Jančovič, PhD.

Abstrakt:
V súčasnosti sú tí, ktorí prechádzajú vzdelávacím procesom z veľkej miery vnímaní ako dvojdimezionalne osoby - „konzumenti a producenti“, čiže tí, ktorí spotrebujú a tí, ktorí vyrábajú. Príspevok rozoberá to, či je významom (globálneho) vzdelávania pripraviť ľudí na prácu v rámci globálnej ekonomiky alebo poskytluť vedomosti, zručnosti a hodnoty založené na pochopení a interpretovaní meniaceho sa sveta, aby sa ľudia stali aktívnejšími a zaangažovanšími občanmi. Historicky je vzdelávanie zamerané na vytváranie pracovnej sily a nie globálne uvedomelých občanov. Aj na tento aspekt upriamuje pozornosť súčasné globálne vzdelávanie. Autor v príspevku rozoberá genézu vývoja globálneho vzdelávania, miestom kritického myšlenia v ňom, rovnako ako formovaním postojov mladých ľudí.

Klúčové slová: globálne vzdelávanie, kritické myšlenie, postoje, hodnoty

ÚVOD
Vzdelávanie v súčasnosti čelí mnohým výzvam a viaceri odborníci na vzdelávanie volajú nie po evolúcii vzdelávania ale revolúcii vo vzdelávaní. Jedným z nich je aj Ken Robinson, ktorý tvrdí, že vzdelávať mladých ľudí v dnešnej globalizovanej dobe spôsobom, ktorý bol vytvorený v časoch osvietenstva a priemyselnej revolúcie nie je možné. Cieľom súčasného vzdelávacieho systému je klást dôraz na intelekt, ktorý by mal byť využitý na ekonomické záujmy krajiny. Školský systém ako taký má veľa spoločného s výrobnými linkami, ktoré môžete nájsť v továrnách. Sú tam vopred predpísané prestávky, samostatne vyučované predmety ako jednotlivé prevádzky v tovární a existuje kategorizácia na základe veku, ako by sa jednalo o výrobky s rovnakým dátumom výroby. Do tohto systému sa snaží začleniť globálne vzdelávanie, ktoré svojimi princípmi má čo robiť, aby sa dokázalo vtesnať do kurikul. Nebolo to vždy až také ťažké, pretože sa globálne vzdelávanie v určitej dobe zameriavalo viac na vedomosti ako na postoje a nebolo vnímané ako prierezová téma, ale ako samostatný predmet.
1. OD ROZVOJOVÉHO KU GLOBÁLNEMU ZDEĽÁVANIU A ĖŠTE ĎALEJ

Mnohí ľudia si dnes zamieňajú globálne vzdelávanie s rozvojovým a zamieňajú si ho oprávnenie. Jednoducho preto, že jedno z družeho vychádza a vo viacerých krajínach sa pojem rozvojové vzdelávanie stále používa, pričom v iných je ten istý obsah definovaný ako globálne vzdelávanie, alebo aj vzdelávanie ku globálnemu občianstvu. Preto v texte používal som rôznu terminológiu, v závislosti od toho, ako je v literatúre uvádzaná. Ako podmienka po poriadku.

Rozvojové vzdelávanie bolo posledných 25 až 30 rokov súčasťou vzdelávacieho systému viacerých krajín globálneho severu (industrializovaných krajín). Bolo inšpirované myšlienkami Paola Freireho a Henryho Giroux a okrem toho, že spochybňovalo dominantné myslenie v societách takisto ponúkalo alternatívnu perspektívu a metodológiu.

Globálne vzdelávanie si teda od svojho vzniku prešlo zaujímavým vývojom. Ak by sme to veľmi zjednodušili, tak od severo-južnej paradigmy sa posunulo k viac globálnej perspektíve. Inými slovami sa v rozvojovom vzdelávaní v minulosti rozlišovalo medzi „my a oni“, „rovnúť a nerovnúť“, pričom keď sa hovorilo o „níz“, tak iba s minimálnym prepojením na „nás“. Ak takéto prepojenie predsa len bolo, tak na úrovni súčita, ľútosti a pomoci. V súčasnom globálnom vzdelávaní hovoríme iba o „nás“. Nie preto, že by globálne vzdelávanie bolo sebeckéjšie a „ich“ si už nevšímalo, ale napokon preto, že vníma všetkých ľudí a obyvateľov jednej veľkej globálnej dediny. Už nie sú „žiadny „oni“ a je na diskusi, kto je rozvinutý a v akej oblasti. Nie preto, aby sme zistovali, kto je „lepší“ a kto je „horší“, ale preto, aby každý mohol spolu vystupovať v sociálny zvysiť a podporovať v súčasnosti svojich kvalítami k spravodlivejšiemu a ferejšiemu svetu. To sú výzvy, ktoré ešte pred globálnym vzdelávaním stojia a som presvedčený, že aj po ich preklenutí prídu ďalšie. Vyplýva to zo samotnej podstaty tohto typu vzdelávania.

Štúdia o rozvojovom vzdelávaní z roku 2010 zrealizovaná pre Európsku komisiu upozornila na to, že veľká časť rozvojového vzdelávania kládla dôraz na aktivizmus a kampane, pričom hlbšiemu vzdelávaniu a chápaniu bola venovaná minimálna pozornosť. Aktivizmus a kampane majú nepochybné svoj význam, ale ich cieľ je odlišný od cieľa globálneho vzdelávania. Cieľom aktivizmu a kampanovania je spôsobiť a advokovať za sociálnu spravodlivosť, pričom cieľom globálneho vzdelávania je podpora kritického chápania sveta, autonómneho rozhodovania a konania na základe vlastného rozhodnutia. Trvalo istý čas kým globálne vzdelávanie do tohto stadia dospelo. Krause rozdeľuje rozvojové vzdelávanie na:

- rozvojové vzdelávanie ako PR pre rozvojovú pomoc,
- rozvojové vzdelávanie ako zvyšovanie povedomia – šírenie informácií širšej verejnosti,
- rozvojové vzdelávanie ako globálne vzdelávanie – zameriavajúcou sa na lokálnu a globálnu prepojenosť,

rozvojové vzdelávanie ako zlepšenie životných zručností – zameriavajúce sa na vzdelávací proces a kritické myslenie.

Manuela Mesa Peinado, jedna z popredných španielskych akademičiek, upozorňuje na to, že neexistuje iba jedna definícia rozvojového vzdelávania. Rozvojové vzdelávanie je dynamický proces, ktorý produkuje reflexiu, analýzu a kritické myšlenie o rozvoji a severojužných vzťažoch, je zamerané na vzdelávací proces, ktorý kombinuje kognitívne kapacity s nadobudnutím hodnôt a postojov a jej cieľom je vytvorenie spravodlivejšieho sveta, v ktorom by každý mohol zdieľať prístup k moci a zdrojom.38

Mesa Peinado vo svojej štúdií vývoja rozvojového vzdelávania v Španielsku39 spomína 5 generácií:
- charitatívny a asistenčný prístup,
- rozvojový prístup a vznik rozvojového vzdelávania,
- kritické a solidárne rozvojové vzdelávanie,
- udržateľné rozvojové vzdelávanie,
- vzdelávanie ku globálnemu občianstvu.

Stále viac a viac rozpráva o globálnom občianstve, ktoré sa čoraz viac stáva nedielnou súčasťou globálneho vzdelávania. V niektorých dokumentoch sa už dokonca nedočítate o globálnom vzdelávaní, ale o vzdelávaní ku globálnemu občianstvu. Čo to teda to globálne občianstvo je? Westheimer a Kahne40 identifikovali 3 verzie „dobrého občana“:
- osobne zodpovedný občan – koná zodpovedne v jeho/jej komunite napríklad tým, že prispieva na charitatívne zberky, zbiera odpad, daruje krv, recykluje...
- participatívny občan – zaujíma sa o to ako vláda a iné inštitúcie pracujú a angažuje sa pri plánovaní a účasti na organizovaných podujatiach na pomoc tým, ktorí sú v núdzi,
- občan orientovaný na spravodlivosť – najmenej sa vyskytujúci – kriticky posudzuje sociálne, politické a ekonomické štruktúry, zapája sa do kolektívnych stratégií, ktoré inicijujú zmenu a upozorňuje na nespravodlivosť a štruktúrne príčiny sociálnych a globálnych problémov.

Z tohto delenia jasne vyplýva, že sa výrazne oslabuje dôraz na zvyšovanie povedomia a jednorazových aktivít, ktoré by mali „rozvíjať nerozvinutých“ a naopak sa snaží apelovať identifikáciu role každého (globálneho) občana a jeho zodpovednosti za aktuálny stav, v ktorom sa jeho užšie ale aj širšie prostredie nachádza. Na to je potrebná reflexia.

V súčasnosti má v rámci globálneho vzdelávania konanie navrch pred reflexiou. Na to aby globálne vzdelávanie napredovalo je viac potrebná práve reflexia, tréning a analýza vzdelávacích praxí.

2. MIESTO KRITICKÉHO MYSLENIAS V GLOBÁLNOM VZDELÁVANÍ


„Mäkký“ prístup ku globálnemu vzdelávaniu je veľmi pekne vyjadrený vo výroku Leva Tostojia, ešte z roku 1886: „Sedím na chrbte človeka, dusím ho a nútim ho aby ma nie sol a stále uistím seba aj iných, že ma jeho osud mrzí a prijal by som si ho odbremeniť všetkými možnými spôsobmi – okrem možnosti zlieť z jeho chrbta dole.”

Rola vzdelávania z pohľadu mäkkého prístupu je zvyšovať povedomie o problémoch, podporovať kampane a zvyšovať motíváciu k pomoci. Pri kritickom prístupe je to nezávislé a kritické myslenie a informovanejšie, zodpovednejšie a etickéšie konanie. Jedným dychom však Vanessa Andreotti de Oliveira dodáva, že “mäkký“ prístup ku globálnemu vzdelávaniu môže byť za určitých okolností vhodný, ale na tejto úrovni by sa nemal zastaviť.

Takýto prístup je často krátko prejavom, že sa ľudia starajú a môže byť prvým krokom na ceste ku globálnemu občianstvu. Ak by sme kritizovali motiváciu týchto ľudí a nepodporili ich snahu, nástojením na tom, že konanie musí prisť ať ať ať ako budú plne oboznámení s problematicou a kriticky mysliaci, riskujeme že sa staneme bariérou a nie podporovateľmi rozvoja človeka.

Rola globálneho vzdelávania je rozvinúť kapacitu kritického myslenia. Paolo Freire vyzdvihol túto myšlienku vo svojom diele Pedagogy of oppressed, kde cituje bývalého pracovníka továrne, ktorý povedal: „Keď som začal tento kurz, bol som naivný a keď som prišiel na to, aký naivný som, začal som byť kritický.”

Čo to teda to kritické myslenie je? Vanessa Andreotti de Oliveira vysvetľuje kritickost v tomto kontexte ako niečo, čo nie je ani správne ani nesprávne, skreslené ani neskreslené, pravdivé ani falošné. Je to pokus pochopiť pôvod našich domnienok a asociačií. V tomto ponímaní kritická gramotnosť nie je o „objavovaní pravdy“, ale o poskytovaní priestoru na reflexiu svojich vlastných domnienok, ale aj domnienok iných.

3. GLOBÁLNE VZDELÁVANIE V OFICIÁLNYCH DOKUMENTOCH


Ústredným princípom týchto cieľov po roku 2015 by mala byť po roku 2015 univerzalizmus – inými slovami že určité hodnoty a princípy by mali byť všeobecne platné všade.

Univerzalizmus spomínam zámerné, pretože ju jedna z popredných odborníčok na globálne vzdelávanie – Vanessa Andreotti de Oliviera opisuje ako nespochybniteľnú vízii toho, aký by mal každý žiť, čo by mal každý chcieť a čím by mal byť. Podľa nej je to prejavom „kultúrnej nadradenosti“ a vnímania severo-južných vzťahov v zmysle, že globálny juh má problémy a globálny sever má riešenia.


V dokumente sa sú zmieňujú hodnoty spolu s vedomosťami a zručnosťami, avšak tieto hodnoty by sa podľa môjho názoru mali vo vzdelávaní podporovať a nie prinášať. Vzdelanie by malo byť participatívne a vytvárať hodnoty by sa malo diať na strane vzdelávaných, príčom úlohou vzdelávateľov by malo byť tento proces podporovať. Dôraz v tomto dokumente prítom nie je kladený na kritické myslenie, ale naopak na motiváciu k pomoci a starostlivosť, čo nepríamo podčiarkuje kultúrnú nadradenosť globálneho severu.

„The Muscat agreement“, vznikol v rámci „Global education for all“ stretnutia, ktoré bolo v máji 2014 zorganizované UNESCOm v Ománe. V dokumente nie je priamo zmienovaná definícia globálneho vzdelávania, ale stretnutie poskytlo platformu na dialóg, koordináciu a spoluprácu na vytváraní nových vzdelávacích cieľov. Jedným z výstupov tohto stretnutia bol

46 http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/
aj naformulovaný cieľ č.5 týkajúci sa globálneho vzdelávania, resp. vzdelávania ku globálnemu občianstvu:

**Do roku 2030, všetci žiaci získajú vedomosti, zručnosti a hodnoty na vytvorenie udržateľných a mierových spoločností, a to prostredníctvom vzdelávania ku globálnemu občianstvu a vzdelávaniu k udržateľnému rozvoju.**

VIacerí odborníci sa vyjadrali o Miléniových rozvojových cieľoch, že sú príliš ambiciózne a ich naplnenie v stanovenom termíne je nerealistickejšie. Pri tomto cieľi sa vynára myšlienka, ako môžeme príslušiť, že do roku 2030 získajú kompetencie na vytvorenie udržateľných a mierových spoločností, keď sami nevieme, ako v tomto zložitom a globalizovanom svete mierové a udržateľné spoločnosti vôbec vytvoríť.

Tretím a najaktuálnejším dokumentom je „Brussels proposal“, ktorý vznikol ako výstup európskej konferencie Citizens for global education, Education for global citizenship, ktorá sa uskutočnila v júni 2014 v Bruseli. V dokumente sa piše, že:

**vzdelávanie ku globálnemu občianstvu je integrálnou súčasťou kvalitného vzdelávania umožňujúcim vzdelávaným získať zručnosti, vedomosti a postoje, ktoré ich môžu podporiť byť aktívnymi a zodpovednými, globálnymi občanmi. Vzdelávanie ku globálnemu občianstvu je ukotvené k ľudskoprávnom prístupe ku vzdelávaniu, využíva participatívnu pedagogiku zameranú na vzdelávaného. Tento typ vzdelávania by mal prechádzať všetkými vyučovacími predmetmi a malo by byť integrované do všetkých spôsobov vzdelávania (formálneho, neformálneho a informálneho). Zároveň by toto vzdelávanie malo byť prispôsobené lokálnemu kontekstu.**

V tomto dokumente je vzdelávanie vnímané ako participatívne a podporujúce. Je to podľa môjho názoru tažšia cesta vo vzdelávaní, ale ovela viac efektívna a v kontexte „Udržateľných rozvojových cieľov“ aj udržateľnejšia.

Barbora Asbrand tvrdí, že globálne vzdelávanie nie je ani o učení hodnôt a postojov ale o umožňovaní mladým ľuďom objaviť svoje vlastné názory. Mimovládne organizácie, aktivisti alebo vzdelávateľa by nemali byť ti, ktorí rozhodujú o tom, ktorému politikovi napišuť, ktorú značku fair tradovej kávy piť, ktorý projekt podporiť alebo do ktorého protestu sa zapojiť. To je úloha učiacoho sa – slobodne si vybrať. Vzdelávateľ môže žiaka viest k paletě možností týkajúcej sa určitej oblasti, ale je to žiak, ktorý musí urobiť rozhodnutie. To je jediná cesta, ako môže globálne vzdelávanie zaistiť vajčsku globálnu spravodlivosť a solidaritu.

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47 The Muscat agreement. Global education for all meeting, UNESCO, Muscat (Omán), 12.-14.5.2014
4. TEÓRIA A PRAX GLOBÁLNEHO VZDELÁVANIA

V predchádzajúcej časti sme spomínali niektoré z dokumentov, ktoré poskytujú základný rámc globálneho vzdelávania na najbližšie obdobie. Dôležité však je, aby sa predišlo tomu, že globálne vzdelávanie sa stane iba definíciou na papieri, ktorá následne nie je implementovaná do praxe alebo napok sa stane súborom techník, hier a participatívnych aktivít, ktoré idú iba po povrchu a nezameriavajú sa na hlbšie príčiny javov.

Mnohé krajiny majú vypracované veľmi kvalitné stratégie na začleňovanie globálneho vzdelávania do školských kurikulí, no realita ukazuje, že tieto dokumenty sa adekvátne nepremietajú do praxe a školských kurikulí.


Podobné skúsenosti majú aj iné krajiny Európy. Na Slovensku sa podobný typ výskumu neuskutočnil, ale možno predpokladať, že situácia nebude veľmi odlišná od Írska.

ZÁVER/ODPORÚČANIA


Na záver si dovolím použiť slová Gillian Temple a Anny Luise Laylock z Oxfam´s Education and Youth team: „Ak nám záleží na „dobre“ mladých ľudí, mali by sme sa starať o svet v ktorom žijú a žiť budú. Ak nám záleží na svete, mali by sme sa starať o hodnoty a konanie mladých ľudí teraz aj v budúcnosti.“

Veľa sa hovorí o aktivizovaní mladých ľudí v globálnych témach. Bez toho aby mladí ľudia hlbšie pochopili komplexitu tejto problematiky a jej príčiny rovnako ako škálu možných riešení, ich konanie môže mať opačný účinok a ísť proti princípm globálneho vzdelávania. Povrchná informovanosť o veciach môže viest k predsudkom a nedorozumeniam. Činy bez hodnôt nie sú cieľom globálneho vzdelávania. To podčiarkuje aj citát Nelsona Mandelu, ktorý povedal: „Vízia bez činov je iba sen, činy bez vízie sú straténu časom, vízia s činmi mení svet.“

Nielen mladí ľudia ale my všetci sme na ceste ku globálnemu občianstvu, z našej role pasívneho občana s morálnou zodpovednosťou ku zbytku sveta k uvedomeniu si plného, aktívneho spôsobu globálneho občianstva. Niektorí z nás napredujú rýchlejšie a ďalej ako iní – niektorí z nás neurobia ten krok vpred pri odhaľovaní svoje vlastnej globálnej zodpovednosti.

51 Bryan, A., Bracken, M.: Learning to read the world? Teaching and learning about global citizenship and international development in post-primary schools, 2011.
Čo je však dôležité je vnímať globálne občianstvo ako cestu. Cestu do cieľa, ktorá však nie je jedna, ale je ich nespočetné veľa a je iba na nás, ktorú cestu si zvolíme.

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Lessons learned from democratization of Slovakia: what can its Transition know-how say about situation of Belarus?

Daniela Kellerová

Abstract:
This paper examines Slovak transitional experience as well as Belarusian mishappenings during 1990s. Slovak ‘crooked’ road towards democracy provided valuable lessons to other post-communist countries in their own struggle for democracy. The paper closely examines three main areas in which transitional experience of Slovakia can produce interesting conclusions when compared to Belarus: institutional set up, international framework and national identity. Paper argues that while institutions provide valuable checks and balances, they do not effectively restrain creeping authoritarian tendencies. Also, the international support for democratisation meets success only if it is either accepted by the ‘state level’ or when the ‘people level’ is able to channel international support to fertile soil for democratisation.

The paper concludes that the main factor that enabled the ‘electoral revolution’ of 1998 was mobilisation of voters in the name of ‘return to Europe’ agenda where democratisation served as a pre-requisite for wished integration to Western structures. Compared to this, weak support for the powers representing national identity and democratisation stand against the successful democratisation in Belarus.

Key words: Slovakia, Belarus, democratisation, national identity

INTRODUCTION

Due to its ‘crooked road towards democracy’\textsuperscript{53} during Mečiar’s government of 1992 to 1998\textsuperscript{54}, Slovak post-communist transition aroused interest of Slovak political scientists and international thinkers alike. During this period Slovakia was dubbed a difficult / hybrid case\textsuperscript{55}, pariah regime / deviant example\textsuperscript{56} or illiberal democracy\textsuperscript{57} as a result of de-democratisation taking place in the country. Even though its democratisation has not been as smooth as those of its Visegrad neighbours, exactly those potential difficulties and their overcoming provide interesting conclusions for countries muddling their way through the democratisation processes.

\textsuperscript{53} Translated from Szomolányi, S. (1999). ‘Klukatá cesta Slovenska k demokracii’.
\textsuperscript{54} With a pause during 9 month Moravčík government from March 15 to December 13 1994.
\textsuperscript{55} Kitschelt, H (1995): ‘difficult case’ because it represents a sort of ‘hybrid’ between typologies of transitions: bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czechoslovakia) with patrimonial (Slovakia).
\textsuperscript{56} Pridham (1999) introduced the term ‘pariah regime’ in respect to Slovakia.
\textsuperscript{57} Zakaria (1997) refers to Slovakia as illiberal democracy.
Why is Slovak experience relevant to Belarus, and potentially to other Slavic former Soviet countries? Slovakia, in contrast to other countries in its region, has undergone full, in words of Kuzio (2001) *quadruple* transition that makes it arguably more comparable to the transition experience of former Soviet countries, as ‘[w]e can observe a serious simultaneity and density of transformation processes that have been in its neighbours much favourably distributed in time’ (Szomolányi, 2004a, own translation, p. 114). Szomolányi (1999a), in her article *Slovakia between Eastern and Central European Ways of Transition* provides differentiation of these two ways of post-communist developments. The author argues that Slovakia during the period 1994 to 1998 slipped away from the Central European model (typical for other Visegrad countries: Hungary, Poland and Czech republic) and got nearer to the Eastern European model (typical of Slavonic post-Soviet countries) marked by disrespecting constitutionalism, power centralising and tendency to ‘practice democracy as a populist-type of unchecked majority rule’ (ibid. p. 25).

Neither Slovakia nor Belarus had tradition of its own political independence before the beginning of the 20th century. According to many authors, especially rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, softer normalisation and overall better experience with economy could have influenced the weaker anti-communism support (see Bútora et al. ibid.). The social engineering of the communist period has not only enhanced industrial development, standards of living, employment and education, it has also ‘advanced the idea that progress is possible without freedom and that it can be achieved even when human and civil rights are curtailed’ (Bútora, 2007, p. 22). In result, it produced society prone to ‘strong hand’ attitude once chaos and pains from post-communist crises were felt.

The transition crises of early 1990s that greatly hit both Slovakia and Belarus and their political culture provided fertile soil for charismatic populists Prime Minister Mečiar and President Lukashenka. In both countries, historical legacies as well as initial problems of transition era such as unpopularity of the current Parliament, dissatisfaction with the harsh transition, problematic nation definition by the pro-reform parties as well as striking agenda of a new charismatic populist mobilising potential of less sophisticated segment of society – mainly socially insecure perceived ‘losers’ of transition processes (see Gyarfasova, 2008).

**1. DO THE INSTITUTIONS MATTER?**

Szomolányi (2013) claims that during the common federation, the essential parts necessary to maintain democratic political system were established. This also contributed to effective democratic institutional set-up for independent Slovakia, so it was not possible to slide down the undemocratic direction anymore (ibid.). Therefore, the slogan of political science ‘the institutions matter’ (see ibid.) could be arguably seen as one of the factors of differing developments in the chosen countries. However, Szomolányi and Gould later wrote: ‘the ironies of democratic transitions is that under the wrong conditions, democratic institutions enabled anti-democratic forces to rise to power through legitimate electoral means’ (1998, p. 5).

Slovakia and Belarus both confirmed this sad irony. Developments in Slovakia in early 1990s showed the difficulty of maintaining the separation of powers in parliamentary systems where executive and legislative branches are connected (see Malová & Rybář, 2000). Parliamentary system is generally criticised as being liable to promote a winner-takes-all approach if a disciplined majority emerged it, as it could support legislation that undermines the
checks and balances and possibly free and fair elections (ibid.). Furthermore, what provided a great window of opportunities for leaders in both countries to act at the range of constitutionalism, were imperfect young constitutions\textsuperscript{58}.

What was different in case if Slovakia, was that facing the political behaviour of the ruling coalition, which Szomoláňyi (1999b, p. 78) eloquently called ‘the treatment with Mečiar’, helped Slovaks to mature politically\textsuperscript{59} Facing worsened democratic conditions, citizens started to care about quality of democracy much more. So whereas Slovak de-democratisation lead to public discontent\textsuperscript{60}, in Belarus referendums establishing factual Presidential dictatorship were endorsed.

What helped in mobilising voters for the 1998 elections, with one of the highest turnouts in Slovak history\textsuperscript{61}, was strong campaigning by civil society and NGOs in the name of clear goals: ousting Mečiar and setting Slovakia back on the track of Western integration. Bútorová (2007) sees the fundamental function of the OK’98 campaign in clarifying ‘the link between a responsible attitude in asserting one’s right to vote and the potential for solving contemporary individual and collective problems’ (Berecká et al. cited ibid. p. 30-31). Furthermore, the author (ibid. p. 40) sees the ‘ethos of victory’ created by the campaign as necessary in overcoming ‘fear of political participation and civic activism, fear that is a hallmark of authoritarian societies’.

In contrast to this, with Lukashenka controlling all the media, the opposition could not reach a sufficient representation (Marpl, 1999). Thus, propaganda against the ‘extreme nationalists’ dubbed terrorists was successful, with Lukashenka’s popularity boosting around 45% (ibid.). The referendum of 1996 was refused by Belarusian Parliament and Constitutional Court and criticised internationally, however, it met with success with the Belarusian electorate.\textsuperscript{62} While Lukashenka’s own political skills undeniably helped him in seizing the power, however, it were also certain features of the society itself which ‘have facilitated the establishment of an authoritarian system’ (Rontoyanni & Korosteleva, 2004, p. 244).

Kuzio (2007, p. 222) sees the difference in Belarus and Slovakia in the fact that while Belarus has a ‘good Tsar, bad Boyars’ syndrome, Lukashenka’s popularity remains high as he is not directly blamed for problems in Belarus. However, in Slovakia there was ‘an unpopular incumbent and a popular opposition’ (ibid. p. 222) so that the dissatisfied citizens could support alternative to the elite, the united opposition in 1998 Parliamentary elections. Consequently, the regime change in Slovakia showed the need of united opposition, active domestic civil society that is able to influence political processes as well as the need of ‘unconsolidated authority’ providing a window opportunity in form of the free and fair election (Silitski, 2007a).

\textsuperscript{58} Belarusian constitution of 1994 provided for foundation of democratic institutions, but according to Bekus (2010a), it also did not exclude the possibility of establishing an individual presidential dictatorship, as some articles could be interpreted ambiguously (Shushkevich cited ibid., p. 102). Also, Slovak constitution of 1993 had its loopholes as discussed by Malova and Rybar (2000).

\textsuperscript{59} Bútorová’s opinion poll analysis (ibid.) showed that support of democratic principles increased from 47% to 59% in the second part of the Mečiar’s third government (i.e. 1996-1998).

\textsuperscript{60} In December 1994 the coalition supported 47.7% of electorate in contrast to 39.3% for the opposition, by July 1997 support for the coalition decreased to 38.8% and opposition support increased to 56.7% (FOCUS, 1996 and 1997 cited in Bútorová, 1998).

\textsuperscript{61} 84.25%. Information retrieved from: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=SK

\textsuperscript{62} 71% voted in favour of the proposed constitutional amendments among others giving President power to dissolve parliament (Korosteleva & Rontoyanni, 2005).
A regime change is possible to occur only ‘once the social demand for political change is firmly in place and once credible and sufficiently united democratic opposition [...] emerged’ (ibid., p. 161). The experience of Belarus showed that ‘civil society without the existence of a strong political opposition [...] is powerless’ (ibid., 161). As Gyarfášová (2012) said in an interview, ‘Mr Lukashenka cannot be defeated by Mr Nobody’.

2. WHEN IS INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION SUPPORT SUCCESSFUL?

Successful Western support for democratisation in Slovakia was essential in developing a strong civil society, financing NGOs and successful campaigns that helped to unite democratic opposition in run-up to decisive Parliamentary elections of 1998. In contrast to this, the ‘ground’ for democratisation in Belarus is less responsive. Moreover, as Russia plays a great role in supporting the current regime, Western support causes Belarus being swept by geopolitical competition that serves in favour of Lukashenka’s regime (see Nice, 2012).

Signing the Association Agreements with the EU in 1991 laid the ground down for ‘return to Europe’ policy in the V4 region and re-signing the agreement in 1993 meant that Slovakia was set fort the basic political criterion to the EU accession. Following the 1994 elections and ruling coalition’s political behaviour, the EU expressed its concerns over the situation in the country when it decided not to invite Slovakia to the accession negotiation in 1997 Luxembourg European Council.

Postponing association talks with Slovakia (while continuing with other Visegrad group countries) unless the domestic political situation and democracy standards improve provided the EU with a positive leverage to the regime. Firstly, the EU impacted directly starting with ‘persuasion’ of the regime, ‘social influence’ and by 1998 focus at the need of ‘free and fair elections’ (Rybář, 2005). Secondly, the indirect influence produced peer pressure, when citizens gradually realised the costs of Mečiar’s politics causing Slovakia’s lagging behind other countries in the region.

In Slovakia, a rather large differentiation between the ruling ‘state/elite’ and ‘nation/people’ level existed in their perception of the West (ibid.). While the ruling coalition paid mouthpiece to the EU, their actions showed the opposite. Once critique to their practices came, the coalition repeatedly dismissed it claiming it was ‘biased, non-objective and unjust’ (Mesežnikov et al., 2008, p. 102). However, mobilising of supporters on the anti-EU anti-integration card was not successful. The opposition used this agenda in their favour presenting its pro-reform pro-democratic and pro-integration character.

What the foreign democratisation support showed was that unless ruling elite is willing to cooperate, the foreign pressure is rather ineffective when addressing the ‘state/elite’ level. However, the case of Slovakia showed that with a strong support for the Western integration on a ‘nation/people’ level, foreign support could bring about positive results. In other

63 Such as stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for a protection of minorities, existence of function market economy. More info about Slovak accession criteria: http://www.slovak-republic.org/eu/

64 Public support for the EU membership was steadily very high, around 70 – 75% (Gyarfášová, 2003)
words, success of foreign support depends solely on the receptivity of a targeted country (see Bunce & Wolchik, 2011).

Joining the EU served as a ‘focal point for cooperation’ (Vachudová cited in Haughton, 2007, p. 10) that kept the broad range of political parties of the opposition together. Szomolányi (2013) points out the need of a critical mass of domestic actors, which can use the foreign support in their fight for democratic institutions. Without this mass the foreign support would be rather ineffective and pointless.

In contrast to this, the EU approach to Belarus has not been systematic as it moves from sanctions to dialogue and back again neither having much impact. Bosse (2012) sees the failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Belarus in lacking prospects for the membership in the EU: ‘the smaller the EU’s “power to attract” becomes, the less leverage will it have to convince neighbouring countries to embark on costly reform and democratization processes’ (p. 368). Rontoyanni and Korosteleva (2012) claim that this can be attributed to ‘the low identification with ‘Europe’ in Belarus’ as well as its ‘reliance on Russia’.

Nice (2012) proposed that the support for opposition is pointless unless it is able to represent interests of a broader society. The loss of Lukashenka’s preferences has not been balanced with support of any other opposition entity (Manaev et al. cited ibid.). Opposition stays rather divided and what is more corrupt (Charnych, 2013) as ‘existence of numerous Western freedom and courage awards fosters a competition for victimhood and mutual accusations [and moreover] nominations are contested in Belarus as they pit opposition and civil society leaders against one another’.

The experience of both countries facing foreign pressure in their post-communist transition paths showed that addressing elites is not successful unless popular will on ‘nation/people’ level exists. In other words, foreign support needs to meet with citizens’ demand for democracy.

3. NATIONAL IDENTITY: A NEEDED ‘KEY’ FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES?

The importance of already mentioned quadruple transition is that it strives for modernity of Western liberal democracies in a way it creates democracy, market economy, state and united civic nation (Kuzio, 2002b). This turn in policies can be metaphorically called a ‘return to Europe’. The national identities inherited in a country determine the strength of ‘societal mobilization for the four pillars’ (Eke & Kuzio, 2000, p. 6) of the transformation. These transitions can be implemented as in Slovakia, rejected as in Belarus or ‘muddled through’ as in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2002b).

From Slovak historical legacies can be clear that nationalism represented rather a problematic issue in country’s origins in 1990s. Krastev and Smilov (2008, p. 10) write that ‘in circumstances where the liberal parties are increasingly losing their appeal and profile […] nationalism and identity politics become more and more attractive to the public’. Also Mečiar establishing himself as a ‘father of the nation’ proved to be greatly useful to him, as this identity agenda further divided the opposition and ‘cut across economic and religious cleavages’ (Deegan- Krause, 2003, p. 14).

According to Fisher (2006), the fundamental cleavage in Slovak politics during 1990s was the division of the ‘Nationalist’ versus ‘Europeanist’. ‘Nationalists’ in Slovakia presented
exclusive nationalism, playing on resentments against Magyars and Czechs and those who opposed Slovak independence. They were represented by the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition. In comparison to that, ‘Europeanists’ presented inclusive nationalism of pro-federalist/pro-Czechoslovak parties, sensitive to Hungarian minority (inclusion in post-1998 government). They were formed of the opposition parties of pro-reform, pro-democratic and pro-western orientation (KDH, DU, SDL, SDSS, SZS, MK and DS).

Mečiar’s success could be attributed to his offering social securities to the socially insecure electorate, while further playing on resentments towards Czechs and later Hungarians. However, it needs to be stressed that Mečiar was not backed by a majority of Slovak electorate. His voters were simply better mobilized. In general Mečiar’s ‘Nationalist’ way was not in tune with overall citizen’s pro-Western perception.

The emergence of this self-perception in Slovakia can be explained by the self/other nexus terminology used by Neumann (1999). In his words, self/other nexus took effect in identity formation of Central Europe as Russia successfully embodied the other for Central Europe as the region wanted to externalise itself from the ‘barbarous east’ in order to ‘boost their own Europeaness’ (ibid. p. 159). Kundera in his essay Tragedy of Central Europe (1984), terms the region ‘un occidente kidnappé’ meaning ‘a part of west occupied by the Russians’. Bútora et al. (2012, p. 8) considered the ‘key stimuli’ for cultural development in Slovakia to be occurring in the context of Central Europe: under Hungary, Austria-Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Therefore, when country came under a Soviet sphere of influence after Second World War, due to facing military threat of Russia, this very situation decreased Russian ‘attractiveness’ as a political model (Neumann, 1999).

The divided political elite on ‘Europeanists’ and ‘Nationalists’ left Slovak citizens to answer a civilizational question about the next geopolitical direction of their country. According to Ehl (2013) the metaphor of ‘return to Europe’ did not have only a formal rhetorical use during the period of Mečiarism but it also represented a clear civilizational choice. For that reason, 1998 elections are by some considered to have required higher citizen mobilisation than events of 1989 as citizens had to move to action rather than passively accepting the change (see Bútora & Bútorová, 1999). Šimečka (2013) saw the 1998 importance also in the fact that it was ‘the very first authentic expression of a national will to organise in the name of a clear ideal: belonging to the West’ (own translation).

In order to understand how as complex issue as nationalism can influence country’s democratisation path and geopolitical orientation, Kuzio explains: ‘different types of nationalism can be used to establish a democratic regime and to promote the country’s ‘return to Europe’ or to institutionalize an authoritarian regime and to turn the country’s back on Europe’ (2007, p.). In Šimečka’s (2012) words, the very key of how the situation in a country will evolve is a mental inheritance of a nation – how it percep itself and its destiny. Slovaks clearly chose the West. In his view, the democracy itself is not sufficient for voter mobilisation. The fundamental step is to find the mobilisation key: In the name of what to mobilise? Slovaks found theirs. What about Belarusians?

The main discourse on problematic Belarusian nation-ness in the academic literature is the debate over ‘the weak national identity’ hypothesis versus ‘two competing national identities’ hypothesis. Both try to explain the ability of Lukashenka to secure and maintain such a high popularity among Belarusians as well as incapability of the pro-Belarusian parties to mobilise voters on their agenda.
The ‘weak national identity’ hypothesis elaborates Belarusians as ‘A Denationalized Nation’ (Marples, 1999) meaning that the nation itself is alienated from its own national identity. This is seen to be the cause of ‘pro-Russian orientation, and [of] society’s acceptance of an authoritarian regime which continues the communist ‘social contract’” (ibid. p. 212) as well as of Lukashenka’s regime and his persisting popularity (Kuzio, 2002a). Since the Soviet identity is retrospective and nostalgic of its past, it is impossible to find the mobilising key for transition reforms (ibid.). In short, in Belarus is ‘the absence of a legitimizing ideology for political and economic reform [so] the transition process lacks mobilizational potential’ (Kuzio, 2002b).

The two competing identities hypothesis answers the tricky question: has nation-building of the Belarusians continued under the Soviet regime or was it destroyed in a ‘period of colonial submission’ (Bekus, 2010a) by the Soviets? Acknowledging that the Soviet identity-building was a part of a broader Belarusian nation-building process, allows us to assume that the ‘official national idea’ is a kind of continuation of the Soviet identity while the ‘alternative Belarusian-ness’ constitutes an anti-Soviet version and seeks the ‘resurgence of the pre-Soviet national tradition’ (ibid. p. 50).

After the independence, Belarusian nationalists were burdened with a difficult task: to literally scratch Soviet legacies off the national identity, fill it with ‘alternative content’ and proceed to the transition period with a complete Belarusian national identity (Bekus, 2010a). In the Neumann’s (1999) terminology, Belarusian nationalists in order to find ‘self’ externalised Russians as their main ‘other’, thus having similar goals to Slovak Europeanists: pro-reform, pro-Western, pro-democratic agendas represented by the Belarusian Popular Front seeking national and, moreover, language revival. However, something like that can be a rather utopian idea in a country of intense Russification and since language use does not predetermine the political orientation.

Rakova (2008, p. 17) maintains that ‘although the number of supporters of close integration with Russia goes down, it is too early to expect it would transform into a mood of pro-European integration’. Therefore, even though Belarusians are often seen by the West as being kidnapped by an autocratic leader (see Nice, 2010), the reality is much more complicated. The fact, that the national opposition has been unable to get sufficient support among the Belarusian electorate means that even if the regime change took place, it is not clear whether Belarus would take a pro-European direction (ibid.). Therefore, when seeking the way of democratisation of Belarus, the EU and the West should take into account the needs of the Belarusian society itself.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNT

The paper discussed factors that could have contributed to Slovak successful transition experience. Institutional set-up and international framework provided an explanation that even

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65 By the time of 1995, as little as 4.5 % of population spoke Belarusian language, while 50 % used mix of Belarusian and Russian and as much as 37.3 % used only Russian. ISEPS opinion poll: http://iiseps.org/trends/11/lang/en
66 Belarusian speaking rural population is the main supporter of Lukashenka and his neo-Soviet identity building (Bekus, 2010b).
67 Opinion poll on the question: ‘If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, which would you chose?’ The support for the Russian integration is decreasing, while the support for the joining the EU has increasing character. Source: ISEPS opinion poll. Retrieved from: http://iiseps.org/trends/11/lang/en
though Slovakia enjoyed rather beneficial conditions for sustaining democratic framework, nevertheless, the trigger for change in form of ‘electoral revolution’ of 1998 had to come from below. It also showed the need of the window of opportunity in a form of free and fair elections requiring ‘unconsolidated authority’ what Belarus lost as soon as 1996. Therefore, the kind of change as happened in Slovakia in 1998, in a form of ‘electoral revolution’, is in current Belarus highly unlikely.

In Slovakia, people mobilised for ‘return to Europe’ agenda, which represented the preferred option for ‘implementation of policies that would make the region more “European” (i.e., richer and freer) via democratic and market-oriented reforms’ (Fisher, 2006). However, in Belarus ‘soviet nationalism exhibited and institutionalized by Alyaksandr Lukashenka has a stronger support base than the discourse of ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism promoted by the democratic opposition’ (Kuzio, 2007 p. 221). But what can we then expect once post-Lukashenka’s period comes?

Lukashenka’s use of foreign rents to maintain social standards rising means, that the country still faces costly economic reforms in the future. As Balmaceda wrote: ‘The need for socially painful reforms has not magically withered away, but has simply postponed’ (2013, p. 190). Therefore, post-Lukashenka regime will undeniably face difficult challenges. The subsidies-dependent and largely indebted Belarusian economy will have to deal with dramatic social costs of the needed overdue reforms (ibid. p. 191). Therefore, Balmaceda impelled the EU to be prepared once post-Lukashenka period comes as, because if the new Belarusian government fails to manage the crisis, it ‘could lead to a quick return to authoritarian politics’ (2013, p. 191). Facing this, Kuzio’s recommendation is relevant, during painful transition processes some kind of ‘legitimizing ideology for political and economic reform’ (Kuzio, 2002b) will be greatly needed.

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Cultural Development of Democracy and Higher Education Policy

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Abstract:
The article describes the roles of higher education policy in the context of cultural development change. Higher education institutions play a crucial role in boosting civil society, implementation of the patterns of innovation, as well as, increasing the capacity of the international exchange. The first part of the article is about the shift in the area of cultural development and its new consequences. The second part describes the challenge of the higher education policy in the context of V4 countries and its partners.

Key words: culture, development, education

1. THE PARADIGM OF THE CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The paradigms of the cultural development theories have been shifting for the last decades. Cultural development describes the role of education, changing the social habits and civil rights\(^68\). One of the most prominent theories of development is written by Samuel Huntington focusing on the clash of the civilizations\(^69\). According to his theory, types of civilizations are mirrored in different world religions. The civilization clash in the world mirrors the cultural backwards as roots of the conflicts. Starting from that point, one can notice that movement in Muslim countries, such as Arab Spring in Egypt, or Libya, show new vectors of the global cultural development. Defining the changes which occurred e.g. in Arabic States, Ukraine and Georgia, one could notice a new factor of these changes which were focused on the category of self. Charles Taylor describes present times as a rising of individual Self\(^70\). It means focusing on individual needs, rights, duties, expectations, etc. it puts individuals in the center of interests. Following by Taylor, new political changes are based on the new concept of individual which is “homo autonomicus”. The structure “homo autonomicus” represents the type of awareness which is opposite to the figure of the possessors of power which is the form of “classic” dictatorship. How the “homo autonomicus” was shaped? One would notice two basic factors that fuelled it.

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First is the media and the second is the feeling of the self-governance of contemporary societies. The protesters in the Arab Spring used Facebook, twitter and social media as the tool of fresh and uncensored pieces of information. Media and social portals have been shaping the new awareness of the young generation. We would paraphrase a famous sentence of Martin Luther King “I have a dream” to the “I watch/tweet/like (in FB) the dream”, the dream of the strip the old regimes of. The attitude of autonomy and the desire to change the world is a new wave of quality in developing societies. The awareness of the autonomy exceeds religion and traditional values and customs and makes it different from the former models of cultural development.

The best example of the nations with inclination to autonomy is Ukraine and Georgia. In 2007 Georgia spurned the postsoviet servitude and since Rose Revolution has been running towards the development and democratization. Now, the new president of Georgia has been chosen through legal and transparent election, without any riots. In spite of the obstacles and many political troubles, the processes of democratization of Georgia have been developing since 2007.

The situation in Ukraine, though, is much more complicated, but again, the protesters in Kiev Maidan showed new identity which is oriented to the open and ordered world, as well as, where the autonomy is the main value. Even if one would reinforced the postsoviet culture in these countries, such a project would never be successful, because new identity and desire of autonomy is now a real and serious social power. However, we cannot predict how the conflict in Ukraine will finish, nobody could imagine the return to the cultural and mental quasi-Soviet vassalage in Ukraine. All these occurred in the political area, but it also took place within culture, the change of “mental genotype” of these societies. It proves that culture does matter. But again, the impulses came from new sources: media, mainly social media which boost the feeling of the autonomy and independency. The political-philosophical sketch of the cultural development is necessary for understanding the current roles of the higher education policy in developing countries. The change of the paradigm of cultural development follows the change of the global ideas, as well as, the aid policy and methods of developments. The “classical” method of cultural development is that exporting different patterns and forcing new ethical attitudes and institutional behavior. That force of development has a colonial face. Again, “homo autonomicus” is rooted in new social circumstances, especially in the “being plugged” to the social network where it is unable to establish the ideology of vassalage. It causes an inclination of self-governance in creating own life. We are the witnesses of the change of the paradigm of the cultural development which is interconnected with political and economic changes. That different paradigm needs a new approach in the developing policy. One would say that it requires the implementation of the processes of participation. Participation rejects the simple import of ideas from developed countries with high standard of democracy. The development as an import of model of behavior is not efficient any more. Development through participation means the cooperation with local stakeholders to find their own ways of transformation. The emerging of the new stage of the processes of emancipation where the social aims and individual awareness and expectations are linked and interdependent shows the need of creating a new approach to cultural development. Participation means creating the unique and own identity. The aim of participation is that building the society of freedom and autonomy, with communities equipped with awareness of the civic values.
2. V4 AND HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY

Central European countries had unique trajectory of development. All members of V4 had to transit from the brink of 1989 to the recovering economy and social issues, including the long way of building new democratic order. V4 countries represent different political interests, and experiences. However, the main aims are common, accomplish successful transformation. On one hand, common for all V4 members is the experience of history of communist captivity, censorship and closed borders in the past, on the other hand, very similar experiences of transformation and the way to the European Union accomplished in 2004.

Now, countries gathered in Visegrad Group play important roles in creating the dialogue with the countries which aspire to membership of European Union, but still need implementing important reforms, mainly in the area of democracy and civil rights. V4 is a financial and political mechanism, but it is also important symbolic power of successful change and implementing of reforms. First of all, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have gone through successful economic transformation and year by year show better performance in their economy. Despite the problem of dramatically low average salaries, low level of medical technologies, problems with insurance systems, and high rate of unemployment, V4 are distinct from other post-communist countries, especially former Soviet republics. Symbolic power means that transformation in 1989 in current V4 countries took place without bloody riots, and successful avoidance of the period of quasi-dictatorship, such as in many post-soviet republics. These experiences give V4 the mandate for delivering democratic experiences to the developing counties.

The important players in the processes of delivering democratic patterns are universities and higher education policy. Since 1989 higher education institutions of V4 have been changing and improving their quality. The institutional processes includes building the accreditation commissions, transformation of the academic career paths, increasing the research capacity, last but not least, creating field of studies suitable to the needs of students from labor markets. However, Central European universities still need reforms and many efforts for further changes, as well as, increasing the public financial resources. Discussing the efficiency of common higher education area of V4, the member countries need new tools for boosting the cooperation. That is why the idea of creating “V4 higher education area” (V4HEA) could enhance academic V4 relations, exchange of students and faculty, especially in the area of economic, social science, humanities and arts, as well as, the system of international internship and training. V4HEA could better influence on the associate EU countries from Southern and Eastern Partnership by common strategies, and exchange of experience. Existing “V4 Fund” is very important step in that policy mainly in culture, therefore there comes a need to create the academic network devoted to academic cooperation, as well in the area of public scholarship and open education. Universities in cooperation with local NGOs could achieve much better performance in developing policy in area of increasing democratization and civil rights using the common policy of all V4 countries, addressed to the local stakeholders. Universities can play important role e.g. by linking the business and industry, but also boosting democratic

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71 K. Brzechczyn, Interpretacje upadku komunizmu w Polsce i w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, Poznań 2011.
72 It is worth look in to the OECD yearly reports Education at glance, which clearly shows the improving of performance of V4 countries in higher education area.
change. If the model of participating development and the domination of the mentality of homo autonomicus is right, the universities could contribute in emerging the social capital and shaping the good practices in democratic actions. In this light, universities seem to be stakeholders of the social processes. Cooperation in the area of higher education could be included within the following actions: creating open lectures and open studies centers, assistance in improving the curricula, building common, international education programs, advancing the exchange of students and faculty. One of the most interesting outcomes here is public scholarship. Public scholarship is engagement of the science and education and academic culture in the processes of the change in public sphere. Involvement here means organizing seminars and conferences about crucial social issues, as well as, offering appropriate trainings. According to the norm of the subsidiarity, public scholarship is addressed to the regional actors, such as local authorities, NGOs, and leaders. Universities are important stakeholders here, they contribute by counseling, coaching and showing good practice in given areas. However, the most important task here is to strengthen the critical thinking and attitude of rights in local community.

V4 countries are experienced in the actions listed above. Since accession to the European Union in 2004, the V4 countries have been improving their international policy, especially student and staff exchange. The “europeization” of Central European higher education area has been pushing national change makers to introduce changes and reforms. Increasing the transparency was the main reason why in Poland were established to independent granting institutions, National Center of Science, for basic disciplines, and National Center for R&D for applied sciences. Moreover, universities strengthen their relations with local environment, through special courses, MBA, but also research projects with local NGOs, cities and regions. The higher education institutions and policies in V4 counties have gone through the waves of transformations and changes.

3. FINAL REMARKS

At present, universities in Central Europe are the part of the civic society. In other words, universities serve not only as educational institutions, but also as the institution of civic mission. Higher education agenda includes civic service, mainly by providing open lectures, debate about important public issues, and the space for intergenerational meetings. Looking at the development paradigms, the involvement of higher education institutions could enhance the processes of democratization and transformation. In new cultural paradigm of development, the processes of education play important role in shaping the awareness of rights and civic autonomy. Universities can play an active role in that process. At present, European Union maintains Eastern and Southern Partnership which includes also academic exchange within ERASMUS program. Meanwhile, it is worth rethinking and reconsidering new tools of involving V4 universities in developing policies and common strategy to the associate countries. Higher education institutions could contribute by sharing good practices of transformation, but also specific awareness and experience of the solidarity of Central Europe with partners from developing countries.

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The Promise and Perils of Democracy Support in Development Cooperation of V4 Countries

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Abstract:
Democracy promotion has evolved as the main feature of the development cooperation policy of V4 countries. This approach now faces new challenges that can have a long-lasting impact. In June, the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza reported that the principled democratisation policy of the Czech Republic is passing away, and the new left wing government “stops protecting human rights”. Then, Poland’s image was embarrassed by the EU Human Rights Court ruling that it had violated human rights conventions allowing for the torture of two alleged Al-Qaeda suspects on its territory. Hungary’s foreign policy is also to be revaluated, after the prime minister, Víctor Orbán, speaking at a lecture in Romania, criticised the Western liberal democracy model and applauded the examples of Singapore, China, Russia and Turkey, countries not known thus far for high democratic standards.

What does this mean for the future development cooperation policy of the V4 countries? Are current problems only temporary hiccups, or a signal of profound change in their approach to development aid and foreign policy. This short essay seeks to find some answers to this question. It first analyses the reasons behind the past policies, then demonstrates the changed circumstances and new challenges in order to present a prognosis for the future.

Key words: democracy promotion, V4, development cooperation

1. THE PROMISE

It is completely understandable why V4 countries chose democracy assistance as the main theme of their development cooperation policies. They all have fresh experiences of their own democratic transformations from the communist system to liberal democracies and from state controlled to free market economies following the end of the Cold War. Growing expertise in transition management and reforms have given them a unique ability to offer assistance in this sector, and it has been tempting to use this for nation branding purposes in the international arena.

74 L. Palata, “Czechy kłaniają się Chinom” (The Czech Republic Bows down to China), Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 June 2014.
Importantly, as V4 countries joined the democratic EU in 2004, their own democratisation experience have been validated and appreciated. This suggested a ready-made idea for development cooperation, which they all started re-establishing around that time. In the end, democracy support is in line with major international declarations, standards and guidelines of development cooperation, from the Millennium Declaration to the EU Agenda for Change.

To large extent, democratic specialisation was dictated by the limited experiences and contacts that V4 countries had in developing countries after cutting old programmes after the Cold War. They all concentrated on countries in their closest neighbourhood – Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, which was an area suffering from democratic deficit. V4 states thus resisted European pressure and calls from some local NGOs to support the least developed countries in Africa and Asia, leaving this traditional assistance to more mature donors.

Moreover, democracy support is mainly technical assistance, which is relatively easier to handle for less experienced and smaller donors such as the V4 countries. Therefore it was better suited to the limited resources and expertise of the new European donors at the early stage of the expansion of their development cooperation programmes. A large part of civil society in V4 countries have also welcomed the focus on democracy assistance enthusiastically, and offered their expertise for development cooperation policy.

Not surprisingly then, all of the V4 countries have gradually recognised transition experience, democracy and human rights as their major comparative advantage and specialisation area in development cooperation. Transition specialisation was also “a perfect tool for justifying the use of tied technical or political assistance for the promotion of political, security and commercial interests” in their neighborhood.

Most of them have created special units and instruments to deal specifically with this subject, such as the Human Rights and Transition Policy Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Transition Promotion Programme as a democracy assistance financial instrument in the Czech Republic, the Centre for the Transfer of Experiences from Integration and Reforms (CETIR) in the Slovak Republic, and the International Solidarity Fund in Poland. Following the Arab Spring, some of them decided that their transition experience may be of interest not only in Eastern European post-communist states, but also to partners in North Africa. Moreover, they undertook several initiatives to prioritise democracy support at the EU level, concluding with the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy in 2012.

2. THE PERILS

Despite these achievements, democracy support is by nature politically motivated and thus it brings certain risks and traps. Although it can be useful to build a self-image of a democratic state and beacon of transition success, it does also expose all deficiencies and flaws of the donor countries’ systems. To be credible in democracy promotion one must first be an exemplary democracy. In this sense, one can assume that the European Human Rights Court ruling regarding Poland’s participation in the U.S. rendition system dealt a serious blow to Poland’s


democratisation agenda. Similarly, democracy support requires a coherent and principled policy towards all partners, otherwise it can be seen as an hypocritical exercise. Democracy support in chosen authoritarian countries (such as Belarus) and at the same time pragmatic and economic cooperation with other authoritarian regimes (for example China or Saudi Arabia) is not what builds a country’s brand in the long term.

This constraint suggests that democratisation specialisation can be sometimes difficult to combine with other national interests in the practice of foreign policy. As a number of attractive economic partners are autocratic states, one needs to make compromises on principles in order to realise economic interests. It seems that leaders in V4 countries have started to realise that “values-based and idealistic foreign policy is no doubt highly appreciated, but at the same time can be much more difficult to pursue than a pragmatic and realistic” one. V4 leaders were thus presented with a crucial dilemma – either to strengthen the more idealistic approach at the expense of economic interests, or to pursue a more realistic policy at the expense of values.

Moreover, concentration on democracy support in recent years has meant that some V4 countries have not fully utilise their potential in other sectors. While traditional donors were for decades active in building infrastructure, and investment in the social and health sectors, the V4 countries have focused more on soft projects. It has made their impact on the ground less tangible, and, meant that development cooperation did not work as way to open doors to cooperation in economic and other areas. Poland, for instance has completely excluded business from participation in development cooperation, which is now gaining strong recognition internationally.

From a political perspective, democracy support policies have often been seen as influenced by the United States and was thus viewed negatively in many countries that are traditionally more critical about U.S. policy. As the economic and geopolitical significance of new emerging powers is rising at the expense of the relative decline of the West, unambiguous association with America in this contentious area can be increasingly harmful to a country’s interests.

One can add here that “democracy promotion” has long been viewed with suspicions by developing countries, and several recent developments, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, through the failed expectations of the Arab Spring to growing destabilisation of the Middle East and Ukraine as a result of popular pro-democratic revolutions, have further undermined belief in the necessity of democratic change. As the V4 countries are more active globally, they are becoming more aware of these constraints.

Another important weakness of the past approach was that the V4 countries have indeed known little about what their democracy and transition expertise was all about. Democracy support worked as a brand and overarching label that could have meant different actions and things in different situations. Mechanisms and instruments were too weak to use it properly as foreign policy tool. It was thus correctly argued that “the transfer of the ‘transition experience’ to the South refers to little in reality”, and recognition of this experience as a comparative advantage of the Central Eastern European states “is a myth”.

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79 P. Kugiel, “Polish Development Cooperation: A Turning Point”, PISM Policy Paper, no. 13, August 2011
These difficulties in the realisation of democracy support policy, together with the growing complexity of the international environment, have led to a re-evaluation of V4 development cooperation policies, as has been observed in recent months. Diverse responses to Russia’s policy in Ukraine this year exposed the superficial reality of the notion of a common, principled stand on foreign policy issues. The V4 countries did not condemn Russian aggression jointly, they differed in regard to the imposition of sanctions, and did not prepare a common package to support democratic transition in Ukraine after the removal of the former president, Viktor Yanukovych. The V4 countries became better aware of the limitations of their democracy support cooperation.

3. THE WAY FORWARD

Over the last decade, the V4 countries have reformed and strengthened their development cooperation systems and secured several achievements in their democratisation support. They have not only developed certain expertise in the area, and built new links on democracy and human rights with some developing countries in Europe, but they have also influenced EU development cooperation policy. Recognition of new Member States’ expertise in transition management is now embedded in major EU documents on development policy and a special European Transition Compendium. Moreover, the whole EU policy is focused strongly on democracy support. V4 development cooperation has therefore moved from the margins into the centre of EU development cooperation policy.81

Today, while V4 members are becoming more mature development donors and self-confident members of the EU, they will need to rethink development cooperation anew. As aid budgets are likely to rise in the future from their current low baseline (between 0.09 % and 0.11 % GNI in 2013), the V4 countries will need to find new, sound priorities and expand their activities into new areas to use the extra resources more effectively. There will be mounting pressure from many partners (such as business and administration) to employ aid in more traditional sectors and blend this with economic cooperation or technology transfers. New trends in EU development cooperation, putting more emphasis on cooperation with the private sector and incorporating climate change concerns, will leave their mark on the policies as well.

Also, as V4 countries are now opening up to the world and looking beyond Europe for new markets in the developing countries, the pragmatism in foreign policy may prevail over idealistic concerns. It seems therefore that the predominance of democracy support in countries’ development cooperation is passing into history. The case of the Czech Republic is illustrative of this. As quoted in the Polish press, the Czech deputy Foreign Minister, Petr Drulak, said that the “previous policy was a mistake”. He called it “a false universalism – a false assumption that the image of the ideal society built by us is something we should impose on others. It was an attempt to fit the complex reality of the world into a simplistic model characteristic of the post-Cold War period.”82 It is believed that the Czech MFA may close down the democracy

81 P. Kugiel, “The Development Cooperation Policies of Visegrad Countries — An Unrealised Potential”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2012, no 4, p.120.
82 L. Palata, “Czechy kłaniają się Chinom” (The Czech Republic Bows Down to China), Gazeta Wyborcza, 09 June 2014.
department and can stop providing assistance to human rights dissidents.\textsuperscript{83} As V4 countries will soon present new multiannual strategies of development cooperation, the continued predominance of democracy and transition experience is not guaranteed.

If V4 countries change their approach on democracy and development, this could pose several challenges to the main players involved in democracy support, most of all non-governmental organisations. To some extent they have adjusted to countries’ strategies in development policy and gained an expertise in democratic assistance. As there might be relatively less priority given to democracy support in the years to come, they will need to adapt to the new conditions and develop new competences in areas of more traditional development assistance. While this may present a serious challenge for some of them, the others, however, may tap into new opportunities, as more money for traditional sectors will be more inclusive and a more attractive offer, also for those players who could not find a place in the previous approach.

Finally, this change can also be problematic for V4 cooperation, as its members’ area of expertise may shift from common insistence on democracy support and transition experience to different and numerous areas. Thus far, despite shared priorities in this area, development cooperation has remained an “untapped potential” for closer cooperation between Visegrad countries.\textsuperscript{84} Some initiatives launched by the International Visegrad Fund (Visegrad 4 – the Eastern Partnership Programme began in 2012) or joint projects run by NGOs from V4 members, were simply not enough to hide the fact that V4 countries perceived the others more as competitors than partners.

Paradoxically, as they broaden their search for their niches in development cooperation the V4 countries may find more complementarities and more reasons to cooperate. If they recognise their new specialisations in different areas, they will not compete on most successful “transformation models” and can be more open to pragmatic collaboration. As new development policies are still in the planning phase, this opens the door for researchers, academics and experts to step in and suggest where V4 countries can find more synergies. A new stage of V4 development cooperation is set to start.

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\textsuperscript{83} Ibid

Let’s not talk about transition sharing, let’s do it.
The potential of the Central and Eastern EU Member States in accelerating democracy support and transition in EU's neighbourhood.

Miriam Lexmann

Abstract:
This paper deals with the question of democracy support and transition in the context of the European external action with a particular focus on the role of Central and Eastern Europe (henceforward CEE). In doing so, the paper reviews major milestones of the EU's engagement in its neighbourhood, especially in the post-Soviet East and the Balkan South. The primary focus is given to the accumulated transition expertise among the EU 'newish' Member States (MS) and its great potential in supporting the pro-reform desire in European countries outside of the EU. If the EU will not find a way to utilise its potential, it will not only be a lost opportunity, it may have devastating consequence for many peoples’ future.

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, transition sharing, democracy, EU development policy

INTRODUCTION

If this article were written a year ago, it would be a rather technical story on the role of the CEE countries in supporting democracy and development in it’s neighbourhood. The story would have its highlights and bumps on the road but would in general fall into the category – business as usual. But the lengthy, misguided relationship with Russia suddenly changed the geopolitical context of the story, making it at the first sight a minor affair in the very complex knot of international and bilateral relationships. As a consequence, the EU aspiration to create a safe and democratic EU neighbourhood, while continuing the enlargement processes, is facing a challenging standstill. In order to win the battle for the democratic future of its neighbourhood, the EU must first become more principled in its external action and second,
better tune its aid programmes, while using the full potential of the Union and its Member States. The following text provides a contribution on the second point.

**EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL?**

All of the 11 post-communist new member states, entering the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 started their journeys to democracy in 1989. While proceeding differently, the transition had a common political, structural and cultural base. The countries had also a common aim – EU membership. The transition process, which was not finished by joining the EU, comprised a whole range of political, legislative and economic reforms. It has also changed the structure of the polity and brought a new interaction between the three main components of society while two of them, the civil society and the private sector had to be rebuilt from scratch.

While still struggling with their own challenges on the way to a fully-fledged democracy some of the new member states, mainly Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia, began simultaneously investing in the democratization processes of their neighbourhood. They have used both bilateral diplomacy as well as civil society, through various state financed aid programmes, as a channel for change of the post-communist space beyond the EU borders. Whereas bilateral contacts were used to exert peer pressure on counterparts with the aim to foster stability and the overall pro-democratic course of the region, civil society organisations from CEE were supporting pro-reform grass-root cells by opening programmes for transferring the gained transition experience over the borders. It has to be highlighted, that these initiatives were not fully funded by the CEE governments, but neither were they covered by the EU. The US and some of the EU Member states were among the main donors. The CEE civil society has grown into a semi-independent power or voice calling for stronger EU engagement beyond its Eastern border. Despite being lamentably malnourished, with nearly zero access to EU funding, this group of NGOs and individuals, who are often current or former CEE political or civil society leaders, managed to exert pressure through different public discourse fora on the highest EU decision making levels.

Various regional or bilateral structures were used to discuss the political, social, and economic benefits of democracy; to persuade illiberal elites in the Balkans and the Eastern neighbours that democracy would be beneficial for them and for their nations; and to socialize representatives from these countries in the practices of democracy. This was backed up by various grassroots projects and peer to peer initiatives with the aim to help the public to gain their say on the future of their country. The Visegrad Four countries have made democracy assistance, mainly in their neighbourhood, a top priority of their official development assistance.

Thus despite the generally more sensitive approach of the newish Member States to different autocratic and totalitarian regimes or political practices, occasional use of double standards

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88 Ibid.
has to be admitted. From time to time criticism was hindered due to different bilateral interests or in cases when the subject—carrier—of the non-democratic behaviour belonged to the otherwise pro-democratic or pro-reform camp or the same European political family.

Recognising that despite the economic crisis the EU’s weight in pro-democratic change in its neighbourhood is stronger than any bilateral programme of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe can exert, the CEE countries sought new ways to leverage the EU’s falling interest in and influence on the target countries. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe kept holding the flag of pro-reform engagement and pro-enlargement openness of the EU to its neighbourhood even after the main incentive for pro-democratic change in the EU neighbourhood—Membership—was undermined by popular talks about ‘enlargement fatigue’. While realising the risks that stemmed from the EU’s new ‘wait and see’ strategy in its neighbourhood, the primary altruistic motion was extended by a pragmatic move to securing stability beyond own borders.

It was mainly the Visegrad group—lead by Poland and supported by the Baltic States and above all Sweden that presented and lobbied for the special EU instrument for the Union’s immediate Eastern neighbours—the Eastern Partnership. With the support of Germany, Austria and the UK it has managed to accelerate the accession of the Western Balkans with Croatia becoming an EU member. Unfortunately the pro-enlargement rhetoric also of these ‘old’ member states has since been silenced.

On top of that, the CEE countries have been the main promoters of different initiatives to provide the democratization laggards incentives for further reforms. This was fostered by their own bilateral assistance programmes, though the zeal to spread the successful Central European experience of democratic transition is far from exhaustion.91

The Czech Presidency guided the finalization and adoption of the concept of the Eastern Partnership and held the first Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009 in Prague.92 The Hungarian Presidency successfully concluded accession negotiations with Croatia. The second Eastern Partnership Summit was held in Warsaw, in the scope of which the Eastern Partnership Business Forum and the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum held their meetings, the regional co-operation (CORLEAP) was launched and the first ordinary session of the parliamentary assembly of the EaP (EURONEST) also took place. Thanks to the Polish Presidency, there was at least an attempt to coordinate a better targeted EU’s response to the worsening situation in Belarus following the 2010 Presidential elections.

In May 2011, a Non-paper—‘European Neighbourhood Policy’s Eastern Dimension’93 was elaborated in the framework of the Visegrad Plus Initiative. Coinciding with the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the document stresses that the two components of the ENP—the East and the South—must be recognized as equally important. The paper was a response to a Non-paper of the French, Greek, Spanish, Cypriot, Slovenian and Maltese
Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the Action of the European Union towards its Southern Neighbourhood, calling for shifting EU funds from the post-Soviet East to the Mediterranean South in the context of the Arab uprising.

The highlight of the Polish Presidency’s aspiration to strengthen the EU external action in the area of democracy building was the initiation of the European Endowment for Democracy – as a complement to EU financial tools pursuing development and democratic change in the EU neighbourhood. Thus far its overall budget is approximately EUR 18 million (for the upcoming 3 years), while the Member States’ contribution vary between tens of thousands to a couple of millions. In comparison to the EU instruments, the EED budget is very humble, though greater flexibility and better targeting programmes involving local actors directly, may also provide better value for money.94

The International Visegrad Fund – founded by the governments of the Visegrad Group (V4) countries95 – is another example of efficient and well targeted democracy support investment. In 2008, the Visegrad+ Program was established with the aim to emphasize projects contributing to the democratization and transformation processes in selected countries and regions, especially non-EU member states in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. Between 2000 and 2013 the Visegrad Fund granted in total EUR 1,115,815 for projects targeting the Western Balkans and EUR 5,640,660 was donated to projects in the countries of the Eastern Partnership.96 Many of the programmes were financially supported by a few EU MS, namely Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as through the US official aid programmes.

The US has swiftly recognised that with their intimate knowledge of the EU accession process, the CEE countries are in a position to draw on the “soft power” credibility of the EU, and at the same time on their own experience of engagement with US democracy promotion.97 In general, the Eastern European democracy promoters, much like the United States, have a more political approach to supporting democratization abroad than the EU and the Western EU countries, many of which share a more developmental approach.98 The last distinctive example of a failure of a state-centred EU aid is the recent support to Viktor Yanukovych’s government in Ukraine. The generous governmental support was led by a belief that the signing of the Association Agreement would provide for the final pro-democratic setting of the key neighbour of the EU. While the aid involved also limited support provided to the civil society, almost no attention was given, at the level of the EU official aid, to the then – opposition political parties. And yet the responsibility to run the practically ungovernable country, facing not only a risk of total economic default but also a civil war and war with Russia, lays currently

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94 For comparison, the EIDHR budget for 2014-2020 totals EUR 1,332,752,000; the overall budget of the ENPI for the 2007-2013 period was EUR 12 billion.
95 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
96 Please note, that the year 2014 was not concluded in the figures at the time of concluding this report; the overall figures for the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership regions will exceed €1.5 million and nearly €7 million respectively.
98 The German, Swedish and Dutch political foundations being notably an exception
mainly on their shoulders. It was only certain US programmes, as well as mainly German, Dutch and Swedish political foundations, that allowed for sharing of transition expertise aimed at civil society, including the pro-democratic political parties in Ukraine.

TRANSITION EXPERIENCE SHARING – A RHETORICAL EXERCISE OR REALITY?

Without doubt, the strongest potential of CEE countries as donors and implementers in the EU neighbourhood lies in their transition experience, which constitutes the primary value added to their development programmes and the comparative advantage they enjoy over other donors.\(^\text{100}\) While their Official Development Aid (ODA) is still limited – though the ODA of EU13 (post-communist EU MS joining after 2004) is sometimes equally low as the ODA of some EU15 (Counties joining the EU before 2004)\(^\text{101}\) – they may be able to provide better value for money as the aid may be provided cheaper and more efficiently, thanks to the post-communist transformation and EU approximation experience and language and cultural proximity to the target countries.

At the same time, the comparative advantage of transition experience provides a chance to leverage the role of CEE in the overall EU foreign policy, mainly aimed at its neighbourhood and thus making it also more efficient and better targeted.\(^\text{102}\)

The transition experience comprises a whole range of reforms going across political, legislative, social, cultural and economic functioning of the state as well as societal and individual endeavours. The term is mainly used in association with the reform processes accomplished by CEE countries on their way to EU membership, with the aim to reach good governance of public affairs based on the subsidiarity principle, predictable and comprehensive legislation, an independent and just judicial system, respect for human rights and civil liberties, a transparently managed free market economy and a strong and responsible civil society that holds state institutions to account and is ready to assume functions the state should not or cannot manage.

And yet, transition experience is a highly fluid concept with no clear definition of what is included and no central authority possessing it. It is rather fragmented and disbursed within CEE societies: ministries, government agencies, civil society organizations, local governments, private companies, think tanks and individual experts, who all can possess certain aspects of this knowledge.\(^\text{103}\)

It has taken some time for the EU to become aware of and recognise its potential in sharing the transition experience of its Members, e.g. European Consensus on Development from 2005; Council conclusions of 18 November 2009 on an ‘Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness’; the Commission’s Green Paper on EU development policy and the European Council conclusions of 4 February 2011. Though, so far, the recognition has not yet left the paper. The

\(^{100}\) Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lowitt, Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement, 2008


\(^{102}\) Karel Schwarzenberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Building Consensus About EU Policies on Democracy Support, Prague, March 2009

publishing of an online database – the European Transition Compendium (ECT)\textsuperscript{104} in 2010, represents the most visible and first practical step the EU has taken in order to enhance its transition potential by utilizing the experience of its own member states. Although the quality of this tool is improving, its potential is far from exhausted.

Apart from the above, the Commission has not taken any further steps or developed a systematic strategy to better utilize the transition experience in its external action. One of the most innovative proposals in this area comes from the European Parliament in its resolution\textsuperscript{105} of 2008 when it calls on the Commission to actively involve the new Member States in the preparation and negotiation of Action Plans and in monitoring their implementation. Although, neither here concrete implementation measures were drawn by the Commission. In 2011, which was the year of the Hungarian and Polish EU Presidencies, eight of the CEE countries, in their Non-paper,\textsuperscript{106} ‘Harnessing the transition experience in the EU’s external relations – from policy to implementation’, have called on the European Commission and the EEAS to develop a more systematic approach towards using transition experience in external relations and thus improve aid effectiveness through enhancing capacity development and closely link EU external and development policies with the focus on the needs on the ground. They have also appealed for maximizing the potential of the schemes (in particular under the IPA, ENPI and EIDHR programmes) and for creating new opportunities for a systematic use of transition experience in the framework of EU financial instruments for the period after 2013 – for example by earmarking funds dedicated to transition cooperation under the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) thematic programmes.

While the “fluid character” of transition sharing may be used as an argument against the creation of special funds, the idea of maximizing the potential of transition sharing within the EU external programmes is in the line of the paradigm change these programmes have undergone in the preparation of the new MFF 2014-2020, mainly through continuous streamlining of ‘democracy support’ in the EU’s engagement in its neighbourhood and in giving stronger impetus to supporting civil society.\textsuperscript{107} For it is solely the civil society that can win the pro-democratic and pro-EU course of a country and its later transformation lies again by significant extent with the civil society, in the form of scrutinising and consulting the government. Unfortunately so far there is no concrete plan of how to utilise the ‘paradigm shift’ in favour of better employment of the EU’s asset – the transition experience.

It has to be highlighted, that the EU understanding of civil society does not include political parties, although a big part of the transition sharing should be aiming at them as potential hubs for reform programs, which run through a regular competition – the elections. This is again a sphere in which the US democracy support leads using transition shearing in training and consultations provided to all democratic political parties -both governmental or in the opposition – in the EU neighbourhood.

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\textsuperscript{104} European Transition Compendium (ECT) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/etc/en/content/home

\textsuperscript{105} European Parliament resolution on the Challenge of EU Development Cooperation Policy for the New Member States, 13 March 2008

\textsuperscript{106} Non-paper by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia : ‘Harnessing the transition experience in EU’s external relations – from policy to implementation’ See more at http://www.mzv.cz/file/591175/non_paper_on_the_transition_experience.pdf

\textsuperscript{107} Miriam Lexmann, Democracy support in EU’s external action – a paradigm shift?, A Vision of Development Cooperation for a Changing World, 2013
The premise that the transition expertise of the CEE countries is highly compatible with the transition needs of the East EU neighbourhood is proven by the huge overlap when aligning the areas of required action in the EU country Action Plans in the five EaP countries with the different transition expertise listed in the ECT database.

But while reform priorities of the EU in the Eastern neighbourhood are aligned with transition experience, the structure and the procurement processes of the different EU development and democratization instruments seems to be an obstacle for new member state applicants, who often lack the experience or capacity (in terms of overall budget, staff, networks and partners or finding resources for the required co-financing) to win the EU financed grants or contract tenders. As a result, only approximately 3.6 per cent of the total value of all grants and contracts aimed at democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbours between 2007 and 2010 were implemented by CEE organisations as leading partners, which means only 30 projects out of 649.

Analysis of other important EU development cooperation programmes allowing for transition sharing, like the EIDHR also revealed extremely limited participation of all EU13 actors in these project schemes. Out of the 3921 grants analysed, only 30 were awarded to EU13 organisations, representing mere 0.75 per cent.

In contrast, EU13 organisations have been quite successful in securing DEAR (Development Education Awareness Raising) grants as they gained 14.1 per cent of the allocated budget between 2004 and 2013. On top of it, 88 per cent of the DEAR projects included at least one partner from EU13 which shows a large extent of partnerships between EU13 and EU15. This is clearly due to a precedent set by Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs that 20 per cent of the financial envelope for all DEAR calls would be allocated preferably to organisations from the EU12, if their quality was sufficient. The condition has not only helped CEE organisations to be awarded, but also increased cooperation between the EU12 and EU15 organisations, which is already a positive starting point for future higher equality in distribution of EU funds.

The very few projects awarded to CEE organisation so far do not provide enough data to be examined in order to justify or disprove the transition sharing efficiency and its possible impact on the overall EU development engagement in South East Europe. The general context, though, and the high overlap between the needs and the offer provides enough evidence to state that higher participation of CEE in EU development programmes, especially in the countries of the EU’s neighbourhood will provide for win-win results. The above mentioned precedent with DEAR calls demonstrates that all is needed is a clear strategy.

Yet when drawing the strategy, it has to be taken into account that the problem has two poles. On the one hand, it stems from the insufficient capacity of the CEE stakeholders to apply, win and carry projects financed by the various EU development and democratization...
tools and instruments. On the other hand, the prevalent political character of the transition and the technical nature of the current EU development policy have to be taken into account, as it significantly reduces the possibility of the transfer.\textsuperscript{114} Only a simultaneous approach from both sides of the poles can lead to an effective strategy. Neither strong, competitive CEE actors in combination with development instruments providing no space for transposition of the political transition experience, nor the opposite scenario will allow for an effective utilization of the EU’s capacity as source of pro-democratic change of its neighbourhood.

But the increased share of CEE actors’ participation in the EU instruments will naturally infuse the transition experience into the work covering all sorts of fields of transition and democracy-building processes abroad and penetrate both horizontal and vertical layers of the polity in the target countries. Moreover, this way corresponds perfectly with the dispersed and fluid nature of the transition experience contrary to the above mentioned idea of an establishment of a special EU instrument for transition experience sharing. Creation of such an instrument risks detaching the transition experience from the overall democratisation and reform processes and so narrows down its efficiency.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

After being woken up by the failure of the November 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit, Europe started to pay for its ‘wait and see’ strategy, not only financially, but also by human lives. What failed in Vilnius was the state-centred aid that the EU development programmes are based upon. The EU’s partner, the president of Ukraine, tried to steer the future of the Ukrainian citizens away from democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and freedom, which the EU represents for them\textsuperscript{115}. And they fought back, many of them losing their lives. This very dramatic and heartbreaking wake-up call must lead to a new impetus in the way the EU engages with its neighbours.

First, the EU must continue to streamline democracy support in its external action. Second, the state-centred aid should be balanced by a stronger emphasis on civil society, as it is the people who must lead the reform processes in their country through elected representatives and by scrutiny of their action. Political parties must belong among the recipients, mainly in terms of training and providing expertise. Third, the EU must look for better value for money and increase the efficiency of its programmes. Not using the potential accumulated in the Member States that joined the Union in the last decade would be a lost opportunity. Especially as there is a demonstrated overlap between the offer and the demand and common desire to share experience gathered on the road to democracy with societies who have this challenge only ahead of them. And finally, all of these reforms would bear fruit only in the context of a more principled EU external action. Because only adherence to the values the EU was built upon can make Europe whole and free, whether inside or outside of the EU borders, but that is a topic for another story...

\textsuperscript{114} Horký, 2012, ‘The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition Experience’ to the South: Myth or Reality?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society

\textsuperscript{115} In all six countries of the Eastern Partnership, the majority of population expects greater role of EU in democracy, source: A. Warren, ‘ENPI Barometer, Taking the EU Pulse in the Eastern Neighbourhood’, 3 May 2013
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Correction system and deradicalization in Kosovo

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Abstract:
Prisons often have been seen as incubator for radical ideology and extremism. Based on the literature survey, there are several models of these programs throughout the world. Some of these models highlight the de-radicalization process emphasizing the individual while others have tried to de-radicalize extremist organizations as a whole. The correction system in Kosovo does not have a single program that will help de-radicalization of its inmates. Therefore, it is necessary for the Kosovo government to partner with NGO’s and other civic society in establishing these programs which could prevent the further radicalization among inmates in the states correction system, as well as general population who are at risk of radicalizing. Furthermore EU can play a more proactive role in supporting democracy, freedom and making sure that human rights are protected in the correction system in Kosovo.

Keywords: De-radicalization, Prison, Kosovo, Islamism, Corrections.

INTRODUCTION

Prisons could be an incubator in spreading radical ideology and extremism (Ashour, 2009). Countries around the world have attempted to establish programs which would help in the de-radicalization/disengagement of their inmates who already have been involved in the acts of violence from far right groups and ultra-nationalist movements (Hogan& Braddock, 2010).

The question of “what works and what doesn’t within the de-radicalization/disengagement program of a country?” remains just as blur as factors that fuel the radicalization process. The scientific research has attempted to establish some cause/effect variables, however, yet there a solid answer to this paradigm. Therefore, more evidence bases research is needed to shed light on how these programs are established, and how success is defined in these programs. On the other hand, European Union with its funding should focus to set up an evidence based program which would help countries to create a plan with regards to the prison de-radicalization/disengagement process.

The framework under which these programs should be developed are behavior principles like cognitive theories of psychology, focusing more on the internal state of the inmates such as motivation, problem solving, decision-making, thinking, and attention. The change of attitude will influence behavior of an individual, which later will help with the disengagement process (Schmid,2013; Ashour,2009).
Many of the de-radicalization/disengagement programs in different countries around the world focus only in one part such as changing the ideology of an individual (de-radicalization) or changing the behavior of the individual (disengagement) but not working simultaneously with these two components. Focusing only in one variable has not shown to be as effective as when the program emphasizes both ideology change and behavior change. Getting the militants to refrain from violence is only part of the program, the other part of the program is to get the individual to change his belief system, reject the extremist ideology and embrace a moderate worldview (Rabasa, 2007).

It is crucial to offer help to the inmate through a professional counseling, dialogue with well known imams and muftis as well as repentant terrorists taking an active part in turning around former colleagues. These are few of the tools that these programs could use in attempt to deradicalize/disengage radicalized extremist prisoners which have shown to be successful.

Incarceration alone will not fix the problem. Many of the political prisoners use their time in prison to write and strengthen the ideology which makes them feel like they are helping the cause of their organization. Therefore without cognitive therapy, dialogue and other de-radicalization/disengagement tools, these programs could be only a waste of resources. On the other hand, many of the individuals, who have been involved in terrorist acts, have acted in such a way as a result of some kind of strain. The strain could have been individual strain based on their experiences (hard to integrate in the society in which they belong), or a collective strain (feeling like their cultural/political/religious values are under attack) upon which they operated believing that their act is serving some kind of “common good of their community”.

Often the issue facing de-radicalization/disengagement is that individuals who are incarcerated for acts of terrorism do not believe that their behavior was wrong. Until they internalize this, it will be difficult to move forward to the de-radicalization/disengagement process. Therefore, religious and well as other types of counseling offered from bodies like NGO’s (not linked directly to the government) could have a better results, as inmates would not feel threaten by the state and have the perception that the purpose of these programs are to “indoctrinate” them.

Based on literature survey, there have been several models of these programs. Some of these models have based the de-radicalization process emphasizing the individual de-radicalization/disengagement (Iraq, Yemen, Saud Arabia, UK, US, Netherlands) while others have tried to de-radicalize extremist organizations as a whole, like the case of Egypt (with the members of IG and EIJ) and Libya (LIFG) (Ashour, 2007; Rabasa at el 2010; Pargeter, 2009) The process of de-radicalization is a very challenging process and sometimes it seems almost impossible for some countries like Israel based on the current De-radicalization program that Israel have (Gonar & Falk, 2013).

This Israeli model has not show much success, because of the approach that has been taken from the Israeli officials as well as the environment where the inmates return upon their release (Ibid).

Furthermore, the overcrowded prisons, corruption and inadequacy of facilities, as well as lack of respect for human rights and dignity of the person as it is in the case of Indonesia, makes it even harder for the de-radicalization/disengagement process to be successful, therefore, some of the prisons have become a recruiting point for new terrorist members (ICG2007; Ungerer, 2011; Prince 2010). To prevent this from happening in Kosovo (turning prisons in “recruiting facilities”) correction system has to establish a de-radicalization/disengagement
program for its inmates. European Union can assist Kosovo and its correction system through financial aid as well as expertise from other countries where these programs already exist (Netherlands, Denmark Sweden and UK).

On the other hand, the dialogue program that was implemented in Yemen, has show little success (Brik, 2009). One of the reasons for its failure according to Horgan and Braddock (2010) has been that the program was focused on refuting the ideology but did not aim to break other types of commitments to extremism. Yemeni program main focus was de-radicalizing inmates while they were incarcerated, and this process did not extend passed their release. Although a probation period (one year) was imposed on the former detainees, after this probation time was passed, a number of those inmates released through the program, were employed by the military (Westervelt, 2005; Willems 2004). The inability of the Yemeni government to extend the support and care to former detainees and their family beyond their release is stated to be the critical point of the programs collapse (Rabasa at el, 2010).

The difference between Yemeni and Saudi program was that the Saudi government had the means to extent its support to the inmates and its families not only while they were going through the De-radicalization program, but also after they were released, critical for the program's success. Saudi Government offered religious and psychological counseling to the former inmates released through the program helping them to stay out trouble. The Saudi Government worked closely with other social programs and organizations designed to help ex-convicts to reintegrate and be productive individuals to the society (ibid).

These programs have not been established only in the Middle East. After 9/11 these programs gain popularity in the western world too. United Kingdom first implemented a counter terrorism strategy in 2003; however this strategy was not fully developed until 2005. After the event of “London Bombing”, the strategy gained more attention (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). The so called CONTEST program focused on working with police, local government and other NGOs to challenge radical Islamism, by increasing the communities’ resistance to violent extremism and offering support to those who have began radicalizing.

At the beginning British authorities worked with Islamist dominated organizations, but as the threat grew, the government drifted its focus on working with organizations that combat the Islamist ideology (Choudhury 2007). According to Brandon (2009), British prison system does not have an adequate program to de-radicalize it inmates, and there is a need for such a program, specially taking in consideration that one of the most important jihadist ideologist Adu Qatada is incarcerated in British penitentiary. On the other hand, after 9/11 the United States have been trying to find the best program to de-radicalize its inmates. Taking in consideration that United States incarcerees half of the world’s prison population, the risk of radicalization and spread of extremism within US prisons is high (Useem, Clayton, 2009).

The radical Islamists are not incarcerated only in Gunatanamo, many of those who have been convicted of attempting to commit terrorist plots within United States (like Portland Case, Time Square case) are incarcerated in Maximum security prisons thought out US (Washington Post, 2009). The gang dynamics within US prison as well as Islam being the fastest religion growing among US inmates (Hamm, 2008), an evidence based De-radicalization program is necessary to prevent another Kevin James case.

According to the research, prisoners who are converting to the non Judeo-Christian religions are mainly searching for “meaning and identity” (Hamm, 2008; Spalek & El Hassan, 2007). Although there is small percentage of radical inmates who turn their ideology into action, according to Hamm (2008) the Kevin James case is not an isolated one. Involvement in
gang activity as well as inmate leadership are linked to radicalization among US inmates (ibid). Radicalization has become an issue with a very high sociopolitical complexity, which is not well understood even by those who run prisons (Hamm, 2012). Therefore, adequate measures should be taken to prevent the further radicalization of these individuals, and others who could be vulnerable to the extremist ideology.

As the literature shows, many of these programs have been very controversial. The lack of accuracy on measuring success (as well as how success is defined), and the implementation of these programs have been one of the main focuses of the literature. Yet to this day, there is not a single program that could be taken as a successful model. Majority of these programs are run by the government and there is little to none oversight from independent bodies, therefore, even when the success is reported for this programs it is taken with a great skepticism. A decade later after 9/11, there is still uncertainty on how the correction authorities should implement de-radicalization/disengagement programs. Furthermore, there are countries like Kosovo, where the justice system lingers and the rule of law is frigid, the corruption and unemployment is high, with a very bad socio-economic status of its people, which factors could fuel frustration and anger in the society, which later manifests in radical extremist acts.

There are sparks of radicalization among the youth in Kosovo, in a country where religious divergences never been a huge issue to increase conflict or become a paradigm shift for the way people lived in this society through history (Pope Francis, 2014; The speech given in Tirana).

Right after the war, Kosovo became a country of no internal control, and where in the name of charity a number organization fulfilled their ultra radical agendas. The state was nonexistent, while the international community lacked of their political will to prevent Kosovo from becoming a laboratory of experiments on different issues included the religious radicalization. The cases of people from the Balkans going to fight in Middle East are not isolated. It is believed that there are few hundred Albanian/Kosovars fighting in Syria (around 600) while 16 of them has been killed in these fights as of August, 2014 (Department of State Report, 2014). Furthermore, there are reports in regards to Balkan fighters from Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (ibid).

Many of these individuals will come back, and the issue is not only the ideology that they bring with them, but the war experience and knowledge in regards to carrying out any possible attacks upon their arrival. Many of them have been trained to act as “lone wolves” which does not necessary requires multiple people engaged to carry an act. On the other hand, Kosovo has proposed a legislature stating that anyone who will be caught fighting outside of Kosovo will be punished with lengthy sentence; however this law has not passed yet in the parliament. One question that should be addressed is in regards to Kosovo’s readiness to incarcerate people who are coming back from battle fields or who have attempted to join terrorist organizations, and what approach it should be taken towards these individuals upon their incarceration?

Incarceration alone could make the matter worst. Without a well planed strategy there is a risk of counter effect, like it has been shown in many countries, incarcerating political prisoners. Kosovo Correction system lacks of having a clear approach on how they will deal with these individuals, so its prisons do not become a place where ultra radical Islam ide- ology is speared (Interview with Deputy Director of Corrections, Sokol Zogaj). Therefore, is it necessary to build a bridge between the modern religious clerics who have shown to have influence among the masses especially youngsters and work with the corrections to help teach modern Islam as well as prevent the further radicalization of others among the group.
through a corrupt Islamist propaganda. The socioeconomic conditions need to improve so the youngsters do not see jihad as an employment option (like it is in some cases in Nigeria), and there should be an open (safe container) debate involving all sides of society, to talk about the de-radicalization/disengagement issue. In this matter, NGO and other civic society could play a role in helping establish programs and partner with the government by offering expertise to this matter.

The NGO network with similar profile could build a net on working with inmates as with the community and families, in preventing the spread of radical extremist ideology. The countries from the EU can play a role in offering support and training for the Corrections, NGO and other stakeholders who could be involved in this subject. On the other hand, working close with the community to reject this kind is kind of ultra radical Islamism approach, have shown to be successful in some countries (like UK, Netherlands, Sweden) and civic society could help promote the traditional values and help communities in the rejection of radical Islam.

On August 11th 2014 Kosovo police arrested 40 individuals who allegedly have been involved fighting in Syria and Iraq among terrorist groups like ISIS and Al Nusra. The action made headlines around the world and the Kosovo Police action was applauded among the vast majority of the population in Kosovo. This shows that Kosovo society is ready to reject the radical Islam, however, there is little to none done by the government in offering support to those who have shown signs of radicalization, and preventing the involvement of young individuals who have been taking part in the fights in Syria and Iraq and rehabilitation of these individuals. This shows that Kosovo government is not ready to fight the radical Islam in multiple levels and in a broader scope.

Prisons in Kosovo operate over their capacity, human rights are not respected, and in some cases there is a lack of professionalism among those who run the prisons. The high rate of corruption and the distrust in the justice system will only help those with a radical extremist agenda in mind. In addition, there are no meaningful vocational programs, training, education classes or other means which could give some kind of skills to the inmates who upon release can utilize those skills and be productive part of the society, with already high unemployment rate. Kosovo correction system should take a rehabilitation approach for its inmates, rather than becoming a holding place for individuals who have been caught in its justice system.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Correction system in Kosovo should partner with NGO’s, as well as take practices from other EU member counties and civic societies there in establishing deradicalization/disengagement programs and preventing the further radicalization of Kosovo society. The programs which Kosovo should take in consideration needs to be a mix model between the Middle East program and the west programs. These programs should not be designed solely based in one model (Middle Eastern or Western programs), because the Kosovo case, is specific, although its population is majority Muslims (they are more oriented towards the western traditions), however a program based in western practices could be unsuccessful as these programs are designed with a focus on immigrant population, therefore many of the issues that these programs tend to tackle will not apply to Kosovo’s case.

On the other hand, Correction System should train it staff on human rights and the respect for the human dignity of inmates, and the role of the EU can be significant in this matter,
by providing funds, expertise and human capacity development. Furthermore, vocational programs need to be implemented so that inmates can gain some skills upon their release. All this could be done throughout partnering with NGO which are willing to help, have professionalism and human resources to carry out programs that could help lower the recidivism rate among former inmates in Kosovo’s prison system.

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Abstract:
Until recently, the major donors in democracy assistance field were Western democracies and multilateral aid agencies; therefore the literature abounds with studies of aid coming from these donors. However, little is known about the effectiveness of democracy assistance from the young donor countries that not such as long time ago were recipient of this type aid. Much of democracy assistance work is done by civil society organizations that collaborate with partners in recipient countries within specific projects. How do these projects impact the beneficiaries of the project? How effective are these project in changing opinions and behaviors of the target groups? Finally, do they contribute to diffusing democratic ideas and behaviors? This paper demonstrates the shortcomings of existing impact evaluation methods to answer these questions and demonstrates the usefulness of randomization method that so far has been widely used in developmental aid.

Keywords: democracy assistance; impact evaluation; NGOs projects; young donors

INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE AND YOUNG DONOR PROGRAMS

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate why democracy assistance efforts of young donors need a new method of impact evaluation and how this new method, so far widely used in development assistance, could be the most credible tool to assess the impact of democracy aid.116

Democracy assistance is an effort of the governments and international organizations to support the spread of democracy as a political system in other countries. It was for a long time the domain of Western democracies (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnell 2000; Carothers

116 The term young democracies or third-wave democracies is used to contrast long-established Western “old democracies” and refers to a group of countries that underwent successful democratic transitions during the widespread, international push toward democracy, called the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). Thus, the term refers to those countries from regions such as Southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa that today are successfully consolidated democracies.
1999 and 2004; Diamond 1992; Lancaster 2007; Pinto-Duschinsky 1997; Ottaway and Chung 1999; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Youngs 2006 and 2008). Thus, the literature has been usually focusing on democracy assistance programs run by quasigovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and international organizations. The major actors examined in the literature are the European Union, the United States government-funded and privately run US-based non-profit organizations and private donors as well as the Western European governmental in quasi-governmental donor agencies.

However, recently young democracies that were recipients of this type of aid not such as long time ago, like the EU new member states from the Central Eastern Europe (especially those belonging to the Visegrad Group), became active in the field of developmental cooperation and democracy promotion.117 The assistance programs of these young donors, which are growing and being institutionalized118 caught scholars’ attention. Scholars have investigated approaches, reasons for a young democracy’s engagement, methods to provide aid, and promote democratic ideas and practices, either focusing on one young democracy’s efforts (Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013; Pospieszna 2010a; 2010b; 2014) or exploring the whole region (Lightfoot 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Ivantyi 2014). From these studies we learn how government and social actors in a young democracy conceptualize developmental cooperation and democracy assistance and how their view on giving aid is different from approaches used by Western donors. Then, how a former recipient country goes about assisting other states in their struggles for democracy are investigated. The studies unveiled the key role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in shaping the state’s democracy assistance and their unique ability to reach civil society groups in recipient countries. This research also revealed a great potential of cross-border civil society networks in diffusing democratic ideas and behavior.

These studies motivated me to ask the question of how democracy assistance efforts by a young donor can be evaluated in terms of their potential to diffuse democracy to other recipient countries. The question addressed in this work arise largely from ongoing debates in the literature on democracy promotion regarding approaches and effectiveness of strategies used to assist recipient countries with their struggle for democracy. However, this study also engages many other literatures in political science. Some of them lie at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations-specifically research on democratization and democratic consolidation (Tilly 2007), and the role of external actors in these processes (Huntington 1991; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1997; Whitehead 1996), as well as on regional diffusion of democracy (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Rogers 1995; Tarrow and della Porta 2005).


118 Some institutionalized ways to provide aid by Visegrad group countries include Polish Aid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Transition Promotion Program by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovak Aid at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, and the Department for International Development Co-operation (DIDC) at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Visegrad Fund.
In order to answer the question of how democracy assistance efforts by a young donor can be evaluated, I would like to follow up on research regarding the role of civil society organizations in democracy assistance and to suggest evaluating the project of NGOs in donor countries in the field of democracy assistance. However, because of difficulties in measuring the impact of democracy assistance projects, this study suggests to focus on projects that are targeted at specific target groups, e.g., young people. The choice of youth is motivated by the fact that this is a very popular target group in democracy assistance, and because the outcome of project directed toward young people can be measurable. The paper suggests using Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) method of impact evaluation, the usefulness and novelty of which is described in this paper.

1. RCTS AND PROBLEMS WITH IMPACT EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

The majority of research regarding the impact of democracy assistance and on civil society development and democratization in recipient countries refers to the Western assistance—governmental and non-governmental aid from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Western Europe—provided in the 1990s to Central and Eastern European countries (Ballentine 2002; Burnell 1996; Siegel and Yancey 1992; Quigley 2000; Wedel 1999) and to Russia (Richter 2002; Henderson 2003; McMahon 2004; Mendelson 2001). Despite the enormous interest and good will of foreign assistance donors, as well as the overall role in fostering democratization in recipient countries, scholars criticized the strategies used by donors which contributed to failure, limited results; or—in some cases—even paradoxical effects of foreign aid. Since young democracies joined the club of donors only recently, there is no research evaluating the impact yet. I argue that randomization method will improve the evaluation efforts thus providing a more accurate answer to the question whether democracy assistance works and under which circumstances.

The problem with findings regarding the impact of democracy assistance is that they cannot be comparable. First, there are very mixed results coming from a substantial literature focusing on democracy assistance in a particular country, or on a particular type of democracy assistance in a particular country or region. Second, there have also been works looking at multiple countries trying to draw conclusions about broader findings on program impacts. Finally, there are only a few using large cross-national quantitative analysis examining the effect of USAID democracy assistance on democracy building. The results coming out of this research present interesting insights, but are far from being conclusive, and they cannot be comparable, because scholars tend to use different measures of impact, and different measures of democracy success. Moreover, scholars tend to adopt different qualitative and quantitative methods, which still are unable to precisely determine how much any observed changes can be linked to democracy assistance programs. If the country slides back toward

119 For example, Carter et al. (2003) study the overall impact of USAID programs in six countries; O’Neill (2003) demonstrates lessons from human rights assistance in various regions; and focusing on post-conflict countries: Pouligny (2005) critically examines the impact of international programs that go to civil society, and de Zeeuw and Kumar (2006) edited volume gives conclusions and recommendations based on different types of democracy assistance (media, human rights, and election programs) in nine postconflict states.

120 Azpuru et al. (2008); Finkel et al. (2007); Tusalem (2012).
authoritarianism amid large volumes of democracy aid, we still know little about whether all the money that donors are putting into civil society organizations matter, and about the effectiveness of specific democracy assistance projects implemented by NGOs’ projects.

There is also surprisingly little systematic and comparative evidence on what works in democracy assistance among NGOs and donors.¹²¹ This is mainly because there are not good impact evaluation methods employed. NGOs and donors are more likely to use process evaluations in which investigators study how the project is implemented and what outcome can be observed. However, this method cannot determine whether key outcomes can be attributed to NGOs’ democracy assistance project. Only recently there is a greater interest among national and international assistance agencies in better understanding “what works and what does not and why” but mainly in case of programs supporting economic development, health and environment.¹²² If practitioners know which projects work best and why and when, scarce resources for democracy may be used more effectively.

Given the problems with impact evaluation methods used by the scholars as well as practitioners (NGOs and donors) randomization method seems to be the most credible and accurate form of impact evaluation, and the best procedure to gain knowledge regarding the effect of assistance projects.

*Why using RCTs to Evaluate the Impact of Democracy Assistance?* The method of RCTs has been popularized especially by a group of economists in the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) founded at the MIT Department of Economics in 2003 which tests and improves the effectiveness of programs and policies aimed at reducing poverty.¹²³ However, impact evaluations in the area of democracy assistance using randomized design are lagging behind the evaluation of development assistance.

According to the proponents of this method, a proper impact evaluation includes efforts to establish the effects of some interventions relative to what would be observed in the absence of such interventions. This requires: 1) collection of baseline data, 2) collection of appropriate outcome data, and 3) and collection of the same data for comparable individuals, groups or communities that did and did not receive the intervention. As such, impact evaluation helps determine what would have happened in the absence of the program. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) method, also known as random assignment studies, randomized fielded trials, social experiments, or randomized design, is the most credible and accurate form of impact evaluation, the best procedure to gain knowledge regarding the effect of assistance projects. In development assistance some efforts have been done to estimate the difference before and after data of selected individuals, groups and communities that did not receive assistance in order to estimate what would happened in the absence of such aid.

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¹²¹ See for example http://fsi.stanford.edu/docs/215

¹²² There are several aid agencies that initiated some new strategies for evaluating the effectiveness of its programs but only in the area of development assistance: USAID’s Strategic and Operational Research Agenda (SORA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) by World Bank. However, the greatest weakness in evaluation studies has been the lack of reference or comparison group to help establish whether other trends and external conditions, rather than USAID’s programs, were responsible to the observed outcomes.

¹²³ For more information about this research centre see http://www.povertyactionlab.org/about-j-pal
2. RULE NUMBER ONE IN RCTS: MAKE IT MEASURABLE

The problem with impact evaluation in democracy assistance is that evaluations lack consistent logical framework that carefully specifies inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact, which undermines good evaluation, as the recent report by National Research Council (NRC) points (NRC 2008). Also, there are not many studies that undertake these efforts mainly due to difficulties in measuring the impact of projects. However, these challenges can be overcome if impact evaluation is carefully designed before the project begins according to the following steps.

First, in order to evaluate democracy assistance of young democracies using RCTs it is important to focus on a specific area of democracy assistance. The literature on democracy assistance distinguishes between four main areas of democracy assistance: election assistance (promoting more genuine and competitive elections and political processes), human rights assistance (strengthening respect for human rights), media assistance, and increased development of a politically active civil society (promoting youth activism, women empowerment). Because most of this assistance is channeled through non-governmental organizations, because of their potential to reach civil society groups in their country or in aid recipient countries, it is legitimate to focus on donor-sponsored NGOs projects in a specific area.

Interestingly, young donors recognize the support for young people as one of the main targets in democracy assistance. Young people groups have demonstrated their democratizing potential and the Ukrainian youth group Pora, which played a crucial role in the protests in Ukraine and which had received funding from external actors, may serve as a good example. Young people also become an important civil society group to work with especially in authoritarian countries where cooperation with civil society organizations is restricted. Polish Aid program run by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, have financed many projects by Polish NGOs that aimed at activating young people abroad.

After choosing specific NGOs projects like those targeted at young people, the next step would be to, as NRC’s report suggests, to answer the questions (such as: What is the target? What are their needs? What is the program seeking to change? What is the precise program or part of program being evaluated?), and to create a logical framework—i.e. inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact of the NGOs projects targeted at specific group.

Having clearly defined logical framework, the third step in determining the impact of donor-sponsored NGO projects would be to include before and after measurements on key outcome variables and measurements on both the group receiving the treatments and control of comparison group that would be not included in NGOs’ programs. In case of NGOs projects targeted at young people, the Treatment Group would be the group of young people who would participate in the project by random selection, and Control Group would include those young people that through randomization will not participate in the project. Then, after the end of the project (the treatment) measurement on the desired outcome should be taken for both groups. If there is a difference in outcomes between the groups, it can reasonably be inferred that the difference was attributable to the project.

125 To mention just a few like: “Transforming Care and Educational Youth Centers in Ukraine,” “Active Youth – the Future of Ukraine,” “Together Again – Youth Exchange Program,” or “Polish-Ukrainian Youth Exchange.” Polish NGOs project in this area also are funded by external donors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) or specifically by the programs meant to support young people like the YOUTH Program within European Commission’s DG Education and Culture.
CONCLUSION

Inspired by the group of economists in Poverty Action Lab, in this paper I suggested using a method of Randomized Controlled Trials in impact evaluation of democracy assistance. It is believed that this method may help solve the problem of causal attribution of specific outcomes to NGOs’ project in democracy assistance. This has not been done in democracy assistance field yet. Therefore with this novel method, this study may be a real breakthrough in evaluating donor-sponsored NGOs project in recipient countries, thus contributing to practice.

Nevertheless, by suggesting this new method of impact evaluation in democracy assistance, the study aims to build better knowledge about the effectiveness of democracy assistance, thus contributing to theory. Moreover, answering the question of effectiveness of young donors from Central and Eastern European region to provide democracy aid may contributes to the body of research on explaining observable democracy diffusion in the region (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Jacoby 2006).

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Interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti ekonómov a ich formovanie pomocou globálneho rozvojového vzdelávania na ekonomických fakultách

Eva Svitačová

Abstrakt:
Priprava absolventov ekonomických fakúlt sa v súčasnosti už nemôže zameriavať iba na získanie odborných kompetencií. Svoju prax budú realizovať v novom globálnom ekonomickom a spoločenskom prostredí, kde budú okrem iného potrebovať aj sociálne kompetencie, medzi ktoré sa zaradzujú aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti. Pomáhajú im rozvíjať spoluprácu s ľuďmi, ktorí pochádzajú z iných kultúr a vyrovnať s rozmanitými úlohami a problémami v novom globálnom prostredí. Na formovaní uvedených kompetencií majú podiel viaceré predmety, zaradené v študijných plánoch ekonomických fakúlt a jednou z cest, ako môžu budúci ekonómovia a manažéri získať interkultúrne zručnosti a globálny kompetencie, je globálny rozvojové vzdelávanie. Potvrdzujú to aj výsledky získané v rámci riešenia projektu KEGA – Implementácia globálneho rozvojového vzdelávania do edukačného procesu na ekonomických fakultách. Obsahová náplň nového systému GRV na ekonomických fakultách má okrem iného klášť zreteľa na to, aby budúci absolventi týchto fakúlt disponovali sociálnymi kompetenciami, medzi ktoré patria aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti.

Kľúčové slová: interkultúrne kompetencie, globálne zručnosti, globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie, absolventi, ekonomické fakulty

ÚVOD

Vzdelávací systém v každej krajine musí reagovať na situáciu vo svete, a tak je v súčasnosti úlohou všetkých vzdělávacích inštitúcií pripravovať absolventov na pôsobenie v globalizujúcej sa spoločnosti. Pre absolventov všetkých škôl, nielen ekonomických fakúlt, je kvalitný vzdelávací systém predpokladom získania zamestnania, a tým aj materiálneho zabezpečenia a osobnej spokojnosti.

Okrem skvalitňovania odbornej prípravy v danom odbore vďaka integrovaniu nových výsledkov vedy a výskumu do študijných plánov, sa na vysokých školách a univerzitách s ekonomickým zamerraním žiada implementovať do edukačného procesu aj niektoré ďalšie poznatky. Tie by umožňovali u študentov formovať aj sociálne kompetencie, ktoré by im pomáhali naplňať ciele a plány a vyrovnať sa s problémami a so situáciami v širšom prostredí (v regióne, v krajinu a pod.). Priprava absolventov vysokých škôl sa už v súčasnosti totiž nemôže
zameriavať len na získavanie odborných poznatkov a odborných kompetencií z daného študiijného odboru. Mnohí z nich budú pôsobiť v rôznych inštitúciách v globálnom priestore, kde okrem odborných kompetencií budú potrebovať aj sociálne kompetencie, pomocou ktorých sa dokážu vyrovnávať s niektorými fenoménmi, javmi či zmenami v súčasnom globalizujúcim sa svete, nadvážať vzťahy a spolupracovať s rôznymi subjektmi v novom globálnom prostredí.

Medzi sociálne kompetencie sa zaradujú aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti, ktoré napomáhajú ekonomom komunikovať a spolupracovať s obyvateľmi v rôznych oblastiach sveta a spoločne riešiť problémy rôzneho charakteru. Príspevok poukazuje na ich význam pre absolventov ekonomických fakúlt, ktorí sa budú realizovať v novom globálnom ekonomickom a spoločenskom prostredí, ako aj na nový vzdelávací prístup – globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie, ktorým iného, môže napomáhať u budúcich ekonómov formovať aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti.

1. KOMPETENCIE ABSOLVENTOV ABSOLVENTOV EKONOMICKÝCH FAKÚLT V NOVOM GLOBÁLNOM PROSTREDÍ

Vychádzajúc z aktuálnej situácie v novom globálnom prostredí, sú aj ekonomicke fakult na Slovensku nútené poskytovať svojim študentom nielen kvalitné ekonomicke vzdelávanie, ale komplexne ich pripravovať na prax v novom globálnom ekonomickom a spoločenskom prostredí. Iba tak dokážu konkurovať ďalším vysokým školám v otvorenom európskom priestore. Vzdelávacie ciele na ekonomickejch fakultách sa preto zameriavajú na vzdelávanie a výchovu vysokoškvalifikovaných schopných odborníkov v oblasti ekonomiky a manažmentu, ktorí sa stanú plnohodnotnou a kvalifikovanou pracovnou silou na európskom trhu práce. Mnohí z nich sa totiž budú realizovať nielen v národnej ekonomike, ale i v globálnej ekonomike, teda v novom ekonomickom prostredí, kde okrem vysoko kvalitného a profesionálneho vzdelávania v oblasti ekonomickejch vied, budú potrebovať aj ďalšie poznatky a kompetencie, vďaka ktorým by sa mali vyrovnávať s rozmanitými úlohami a problémami v novom globálnom prostredí.

Pre realizáciu absolventov ekonomickejch fakúlt a vysokých škôl s ekonomickým zamiením v súčasnom novom globálnom ekonomickom a spoločenskom prostredí, sú dôležitým predokladom najmä ich profesijné a odborné kompetencie, vďaka ktorým získavajú vzhľadom na svoju špecializáciu široký odborný prevádzkový prístup v ekonomik, v manažmente, v marketingu a podobne. Tieto kompetencie korešpondujú s potrebami rozvoja znalostnej ekonomiky a s trendmi súčasného spoločenského pokroku. Avšak v novom globálnom ekonomickom a spoločenskom prostredí si absolventi ťažko vystačia iba s odbornými poznatkami bez toho, aby kriticky dokázali chápať spoločenské procesy vo svete, ktoré sú dôsledkom globalizácie, a následne k nim zaujať kritické stanovisko. Napríklad ku globálnym problémom a negatívnym javom v globálnom prostredí, ktorými sú napríklad nerovnosti medzi krajinami, chudoba ale napríklad i strata bezpečia, neistota či strach, ktoré sú zaradené medzi dominantné problémy začiatku 21. storočia.

Okrem toho, že si budúci absolventi ekonomickejch fakúlt a univerzit osvojívať nové odborné poznatky z oblasti ekonomiky, ekonomiky, manažmentu či marketingu, je potrebné, aby si osvojili aj niektoré ďalšie poznatky, ktoré by im ulahčili realizáciu v novom globálnom prostredí. Takto sa u nich formujú aj sociálne kompetencie, ku ktorým prináležia aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti, ktoré im napomáhajú plniť náročné úlohy v tomto prostredí.
Pojem *kompetencia* možno ponímať ako možnosť či právomoc vyjadriť sa, rozhodnúť alebo niečo činiť. K tomuto pojmu sa vztahujú také synonymá ako schopnosť, spôsobilosť, zručnosť, ale i efektívnosť, kapacita a iné.


### 1.1 Interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti súčasných ekonómov

V súčasnom vzájomnom vzťahu prepojenom, multikultúrnom svete sú prakticky pre všetkých obyvateľov dôležité interkultúrne kompetencie. Ide o „súbor vedomostí, zručností a poistujúcich faktorov, ktoré umožňujú rešpektovať a chápať odlišné kultúry a spolunažívať s ich nositeľmi“. (Základné pojmy v oblasti migrácie a integrácie cudzincov) Od nich závisí socializácia ľudí do nového kultúrneho prostredia, a teda aj úspešná socializácia ekonómov do nového kultúrneho prostredia, a napokon aj ich pracovný výsledok. Vďaka nim dokážu pracovať s ľuďmi, ktorí pochádzajú z iných kultúr, a to buď v ich prostredí alebo v domácom prostredí. V obidvoch prípadoch je dôležité, aby dokázali porozumieť ich odlišnej kultúre, napríklad poznali rôznorodé spôsoby uspokojovania potrieb, ich životné štýly a ďalšie kultúrne prejavy. Vďaka interkultúrnym

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126 1. Schopnosť používať široký výber nástrojov na efektívnu interakciu so svojím prostredím: kognitívne (vedomosti, skúsenosti), materiálne, ako napr. digitálne technologie a tiež sociokultúrne ako napr. jazyk. Dostatočne týmto nástrojom porozumieť na to, aby ich mohli adaptovať na svoje vlastné účely – čiže používať ich interaktívne. 2. Schopnosť v stále viac navzájom závislom svete spolupracovať s ostatnými, schopnosť interagovať v heterogénnych skupinách. 3. Schopnosť preberať zodpovednosť za riadenie svojich vlastných životov, situovať svoj život v širšom spoločenskom kontexte a konať autonomné (Klúčové kompetencie).
kompetenciám dokážu zvládať strety s cudzou kultúrou, nazerať na seba zvonku, vidieť svet očami iných a podobne.

Uspešne realizovať plány a ciele v novom globálnom prostredí napomáhajú ekonomom aj takzvané globálne zručnosti.

Podľa Douglas Bourn127 nachádzame rozličné interpretácie globálnych zručností (global skills), pričom môžeme identifikovať na základe výskumu niektoré spoločné myšlienky. Za prvé – ide o vázbu medzi zručnosťami a ekonomickými potrebami, a to zvlášť v kontexte „síl globálneho trhu“. Toto je často interpretované ako podporovanie potreby priority takých zručností, ktoré súvisia s tímovou spoluprácou, s využívaním informačných technológií, s ovládaním jazykov či riešením problémov. Za druhé, týkajú sa váčsieho interkultúrneho porozumenia, pričom toto sa často vztahuje k cestovaniu po zahraničí, k práci v rozličných krajinách či k poznávaniu zvyšujúcej sa kultúrnej rôznorodosti pracovných síl. A napokon, je to radikálnejšia perspektíva, ktorá je pôvodom mimo ďalšieho vzdelávania, ale využíti požadované globalne zručnosti vidí v podporovaní globalných perspektív a kritického myslenia (Bourn, 2011).


Napríklad mnohým nerovnostiam rizíkám a hrozábom vo svete. Globálnym problémom je nielen rozdelenie sveta na bohaté centrum a chudobnú perifériu a s tým spojený hlad, choroby, negramotnosť v menej vyspelených krajinách, ale aj „obavy o prežitie vyspelých spoločností, v ktorých rastie kriminalita, organizačný zločin, medzinárodný terorizmus, nekontrolovaná migrácia ľudí, či všetko prepájajúce globálne ekologické zmeny a problémy.

Práve D. Bourn (2011) venuje zvláštnu pozornosť zručnostiam pre globálnu ekonomiku a globálnu spoločnosť. Ako uvádza, pre mnohých podnikateľov a zamestnávateľov, je pojem „globálne zručnosti“ s najväčšou pravdepodobnosťou priamo spájaný s prípravou poslucháčov ako efektívnych zamestnancov v globálnej ekonomike. Globálne zručnosti pomáhajú absolventom škôl, ktorí pracujú v novom globálnom prostredí, porozumieť viacerým otázkam, ktoré vznikajú na pozadí prebiehajúcich procesov zintenzívňujúcej sa interkultúrneho života, regionalizácie, globalizácie a ekonomickej interdependencie. Napríklad chápať globalizáciu, ktorá spája, ale aj rozdelenie a diverzifikáciu postihnutých a výhodí na rôznych typoch nerovností, globálnych problémov a hrozí, aby sa postavili vznikáciu rôznych typov nerovnosti, globálnych problémov ale i rizík a hrozíb. A taktiež porozumieť tomu, že vplyvy globalizácie a jej dopady v podobe nákladov resp. výnosov, rozhodne nie sú pre všetky krajinu či regióny vo svete rovnaké. Či porozumieť faktu, že zamestnanosť k tvorbe určitej produkcie už nie je koncentrovaná na teritóriu jednotlivých štátov, ale sa stáva predmetom globálneho a planetárneho prerozdeľovania. Alebo, že v dôsledku globalizácie sa podstatne mení pozícia národných štátov voči transnacionálnej korporácii, ale i pozícia národných štátov v rámci globálneho ekonomického vývoja a mnohým ďalším skutočnostiam.

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127 Douglas Bourn je riaditeľom Development Education Research Centre na Inštitúte vzdelávania University of London, v Anglicku.
128 Napríklad nerovnosť medzi bohatým Severom a chudobným Juhom, ktorá má ekonomické pozadia a v súčasnosti je vážnym zdrojom konfliktov vo svete.
Okrem porozumenia takýmto a podobným problémom, globálne zručnosti následne pomáhajú absolventom ekonomických fakúlt a univerzít, nachádzať riešenia niektorých konkrétnych problémov v globálnom prostredí. Porozumenie týmto a ďalším fenomenom, môže byť pre absolventov súčasne motiváciou k tomu, aby k týmto problémom aktívnejšie pristupovali a participovali na ich riešení.

Jednou z ciest, ako môžu budúci ekonómovia a manažéri získať interkultúrne zručnosti a globálne kompetencie, je globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie (GRV).

2. FORMOVANIE INTERKULTÚRNYCH KOMPETENCIÍ A GLOBÁLNYCH ZRUČNOSTÍ POMOCOU GLOBÁLNEHO ROZVOJOVÉHO VZDELÁVANIA


Cieľom globálneho vzdelávania, ktoré je zastrešujúcim pojmom pre globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie, je rozvíjať ekonomické, sociálno-kultúrne a environmentálne kompetencie, ale aj multikultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti. Práve tie potrebujú aj budúci ekonómovia na to, aby realizovali úlohy v globálnom prostredí, v ktorom si majú vytvárať vzťahy, realizovať činnosti a spolupracovať aj s príslušníkmi iných kultur, regiónov. Následne sa od nich očakáva, že v tomto prostredí nielen dokážu sledovať svoje ciele, ale zaujímať aj stanoviská k mnohým negatívnym javom či participovať na riešeniach problémov, ktoré sprevádzajú globalizačný proces.

S cieľom pripraviať študentov na podobné úlohy pristupovali k riešeniu projektu KEGA č. 006SPU-4/2012: Implementácia globálneho rozvojového vzdelávania do edukačného procesu na ekonomickej fakultách aj jeho riešitelia130. Cieľom projektu,131 ktorého riešenie v súčasnosti prebieha v poslednej – 3. etape (v rokoch 2012-2014), je vypracovať komplexnejší a aktuálnejší

129 Na Slovensku je tiež zaužívaný termín – globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie (GRV), aj keď odborníci v rezorte školstva časťie používajú termín – globálne vzdelávanie (GV) a odborníci z oblasti rozvojových politík pre rozvojové krajiny skôr inštrinujú k termínu- rozvojové vzdelávanie (RV). Okrem toho sa uvažuje o vzdelávaní s globálnou dimenziou, humanitárnom vzdelávaní, atď.
130 Ide o členov týchto katedier z FEM SPU v Nitre: katedra spoločenských vied, katedra pedagogiky a psychológie, katedra ekonomiky, katedra marketingu, katedra matematiky.
131 Uvedený projekt podporuje Kultúrna a edukačná grantová agentúra Ministerstva školstva, vedy, výskumu a športu (KEGA) Slovenskej republiky.
systém GRV pre ekonomické fakulty vzhľadom na ich zameranie a aktuálne úlohy v súčasnej spoločnosti a navrhnutú vhodnú spôsobu jeho implementácie do edukačného procesu. Okrem iného, pri kreovani obsahovej náplne nového systému GRV na ekonomických fakultách je bráný zreteľ na to, aby budúcí absolventi týchto fakúlt disponovali sociálnymi kompetenciami, medzi ktoré nevyhnutne patria aj interkulturné kompetencie a globálne zručnosti. Potrebu vyvážať obsahovú náplň tohto vzdělávania vzhľadom na formovanie týchto kompetencií, bolо zdôrazňované na obidvoch pracovných workshopoch, ktoré boli usporiadané na Fakulte ekonomiky a manažmentu SPU v Nitre v rámci riešenia uvedeného projektu. Na jednom z nich sa zúčastnili pedagógovia z viacerých ekonomických fakúlt na Slovensku (prvý diskusný workshop sa uskutočnil ešte v prvej etape výskumu, 16. novembra 2012132 a druhý, celoslovenský diskusný workshop, sa uskutočnil v 2. etape riešenia, 19. septembra 2013133). Učastníci obidvoch diskusných workshopov súčasne konštatovali, že témy, prostredníctvom ktorých sa u študentov formujú uvedené kompetencie a zručnosti, sú už aktuálne zaradené vo viacerých predmetoch, ktoré figurujú v študijných plánoch na ekonomických fakultách134. Napriek tomu sa spoločne zhodli na tom, že je potrebné dôkladnejšie zvážiť spôsoby implementácie niektorých tém globálneho vzdelávania najmä do povinné voliteľných predmetov.

Konkrétnejšie, vzhľadom na formovanie interkulturných kompetencií a globálnych zručností sa napríklad na FEM SPU v Nitre ukazuje priestor na implementáciu niektorých tém napríklad do predmetov, ktoré sa vyučujú na Katedre marketingu (Medzinárodný marketing, Strategický marketing, Európsky spotrebič a spotrebitelské správanie, Obchodná prevádzka a merchandising, Manažment obchodnej firmy, Zahriadený agrárny obchod, Obchodné služby). Rovnako aj na viaceré odbornej katedre – Katedre ekonomiky, sa priestor na formovanie multikulturných kompetencií a globálnych zručností ukazuje v takých predmetoch ako Medzinárodná ekonomika, Svetová ekonomika, Ekonomika a politika EÚ, Ekonomika polnohospodárstva, Hospodárska politika, Odvetvové ekonomiky, Medzinárodný obchod s agrárnymi komoditami a iné.

Okrem odborných katedier, ktoré sa zameriavajú hlavne na formovanie odborných kompetencií, ale i interkulturných kompetencií a globálnych zručností, sa v štruktúre ekonomických fakúlt nachádzajú aj viacero kateder, ktorých úlohou je zlepšovať pripravenosť absolventov pre praktický život v súčasnej spoločnosti. Aj na základe absolvovania predmetov, ktoré tieto katedry ponúkajú, môžu študenti získať kompetencie (komunikačné, interkulturné, občianske a pod.), a takto rozvíjať svoj lidský potenciál. Napríklad viaceré spoločenskonočné disciplíny (Medzinárodné vzťahy, Podnikateľská etika, Ľudské a občianske práva, Sociológia, Európske integračné procesy, Environmentálna politika a pod.), ktoré sa vyučujú na katedrách spoločenských vied, umožňujú študentom nielen získať prehľad o živote obyvateľov súčasného sveta, ale súčasne u nich formujú aj sociálne kompetencie a zručnosti, ktoré im môžu uľahčovať naplnenie pracovných i osobných cieľov.

134 Problémy, ktorými sa zaberá globálne rozvojové vzdělávanie, sú najčastejšie na ekonomických fakultách implementované do edukačného procesu formami – prierezovosť globálnych tém vo vyučovaní, ktoré sa preliajú cez vzdělávací oblasti alebo formou – zdôrazňovanie globálnych dimenzií vo viacerých predmetoch, ktoré sú zaradené v študijných programoch.
ZÁVER A ODPORÚČANIA

Od ekonomických univerzít a fakúlt, ako aj od ďalších vysokých škôl a univerzít, sa v súčasnosti očakáva, že svojich absolventov pripravia komplexne na plnenie náročných úloh v globalizujúcej sa spoločnosti. Pomocou vzdelávania môžu na nich získavať nielen odborné kompetencie, ale aj ďalšie klúčové kompetencie ku ktorým v súčasnosti prináležia aj interkultúrne kompetencie a globálne zručnosti, ktoré sú v novom globálnom prostredí nepochybné dôležitým predpoklalom k tomu, aby sa absolventi mohli úspešne realizovať v rôznych inštitúciách v novom globálnom prostredí. To napokon od nich očakávajú aj ich zamestnávateelia, uvedomujúc si fakt, že plnenie náročných úloh v globálnom ekonomickom prostredí môže závisiť aj od toho, ako sa zamestnanci dokážu upraviť s problémami v širšom prostredí, s miestnou kultúrou, či s politickým systémom na národnej, regionálnej ako i na globálnej úrovni podobne.

Na formovanie uvedených kompetencií majú podiel viaceré predmety, aktuálne zaradené v študijných plánoch ekonomických fakúlt ale aj globálne rozvojové vzdelávanie, ktoré sa po stupne implementuje do edukačného procesu aj na týchto školách. Okrem viacerých predmetov, do ktorých sú témy globálneho rozvojového vzdelávania implementované, ich je možné formovať aj prostredníctvom niektorých nepravidelných form vzdelenia (napríklad formou školení, seminárov, wokshipov, diskusií a pod.), ktoré vedú odborníci niektorých nadácií a združení. A okrem toho, vzhľadom na to, že globálny vývoj alebo globálne rozvojové vzdelenie má už pevné miesto na mnohých zahraničných ekonomických fakultách, niektorí slovenskí študenti majú možnosť absolvovali a na nich študijný pobyt, v rámci ktorého môžu, okrem iného, získať aj uvedené kompetencie.

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Having entered the international scene of development assistance with relatively underdeveloped institutional frameworks and low available amount of financial resources to be allocated for the sector, the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) sought to establish themselves in the international community as respectable donors by building on their unique character as countries having just successfully undergone a complex change of democratic transition. This new focus turned the V4’s attention to countries undergoing similar processes, among others the states of Eastern Europe. Considering the Colored Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the mass demonstrations – the first so-called Twitter revolution – in Moldova in 2009, and these countries’ growing European aspirations, the region seemed to be a good market for the Visegrad countries experience, especially when it comes to support for democratic transition per se.

The present case study seeks to evaluate, through analyzing the individual countries’ development activities, whether the development practices of the four Visegrad countries in Georgia and Moldova back up their rhetoric of promoting democratic change through sharing transition experience in the two given countries. It will also assess whether the practices in question have changed or were enforced to support this aspect in response to the Rose revolution and the mass protests in Moldova.

VISEGRAD GOALS MEETING EMERGING EASTERN NEEDS

As a requirement originating from their approaching membership in the European Union (EU), Visegrad countries (re-)started their international development cooperation activities in the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. Joining the community of development donors, all four countries chose to emphasize their recent experiences gained through transition to democracy, market economy and the development of an open society as an asset and potentially an added value to their approach to international development cooperation. In addition to traditional development goals, such as reduction of poverty, improving health care and education etc., which were – at least on the level of rhetoric – equally endorsed by the

135 Note: Some aspects of this paper have been previously discussed by the author in “Development Relations between the Visegrád Four and Georgia: Jumping on the Bandwagon?” (co-authored with Balázs Szent-Iványi, manuscript) and in “Visegrad Development Aid in the Eastern Partnership Region” (Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 2014).
Visegrad states, advocating for sharing the so-called transition experiences became a central element of their development priorities. Gaining the support of the European Union in 2005, the goal to share the new member states’ transition experiences was incorporated into the community-level development policy, as well (Council of the EU 2005).

Developments in the EU's southeastern and eastern neighborhoods in the 2000s presented an especially suitable environment for the V4 countries’ new approach to development, and turned the donors’ attention to countries that have newly embarked on similar transformation processes, and therefore to a certain extent away from such natural targets of development assistance as the least developed countries of Africa or Asia. The new goals of the Visegrad states made the countries in these neighboring regions natural targets and consequently prominent recipients of the development assistance of the Visegrad countries. While traditionally Slovakia and Hungary were more engaged in the Western Balkans, Poland and the Czech Republic devoted more attention and resources to Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, as their development policies evolved over time, all countries have become increasingly involved in both regions.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, certain systemic changes already started in the post-Soviet space, but in many cases political power remained highly centralized and in certain countries under the rule of leaders having their background in the national Communist Parties from the Soviet times. Western-style democratic values and a “European perspective,” the desire to strengthen ties with the European Union, came to be vocally embraced in several countries of Eastern Europe only in the 2000s in the aftermath of the Colored Revolutions. In 2003, the Rose Revolution was the first colored revolution in the post-Soviet space, which followed the disputed, fraudulent parliamentary elections of November 2003 and which in the end overthrew the regime of President Eduard Shevardnadze, putting the strongly pro-Western politician Mikhail Saakashvili into power as the new president of Georgia in 2004.

A year after the Georgian unrests, the Orange Revolution led to the re-run of the equally contested second round of presidential elections in Ukraine where opposition candidate Victor Yuschenko defeated then-Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych in the repeated vote and where the opposition achieved Yanukovych's resignation from his cabinet as well.

Both revolutions raised high hopes in the West and in the European Union in particular that the new leadership in these countries would undertake reforms leading to real democracy, the development of market economy and a flourishing civil society in the region. Talks about strengthening the EU’s support for the region’s transformation started to gradually emerge gaining strong support from the newly acceding states of the Central European region led by the Visegrad countries, especially Poland and the Czech Republic. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war gave an additional impetus to European engagement in the region and sped up the launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative in May 2009, which put six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus in the spotlight. In parallel with preparations for the launch of the EaP initiative, protests and a riot broke out in major cities of Moldova upon the parliamentary elections being considered fraudulent by the opposition parties. Although the riot did not oust the incumbent and winning Communist Party led by Vladimir Voronin who had been in office since 2001, the new parliament did not manage to elect a new president and was consequently dissolved. Snap elections were held in July 2009 after which the coalition of four opposition parties, called the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) took power and engaged in a strong reform course to fulfill requirements for Moldova’s association with Europe. While the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war and the launch of the EaP directed
much attention to the region already, the establishment of an outspokenly pro-European political alliance in Moldova put the small Eastern European country on the map and won significant subsequent support for its reforms, as well.

Considering these developments and the consequently increasing potential demand for transition assistance in the East, the 2000s was an ideal moment for the Visegrad states to put their transition experience on offer, join more established donors and create the foundations of their own presence on the development scene, thus moving beyond advocacy and providing their own support for the region. Although being further away and having less ties with the Central European countries in question, Georgia would seem to be a logical place for engagement given its smaller size and the fact that Visegrad countries had (and still have) fairly limited resources to invest in the field of development assistance. It is reasonable to assume that in a smaller country even these limited resources could bring more visibility, which is an important aspect to consider for donors just entering the arena. Similarly, due to its size and even more its proximity, Moldova could be regarded as a sensible entry point for the Visegrad states’ development assistance in the region. For these reasons, in the following part we will discuss how the individual Visegrad countries responded to the Rose and the first so-called Twitter revolution in the framework of their international development policies and will assess if they used the opportunity to promote their transition experience in the region through these channels.

GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA IN FOCUS

The EU’s Eastern neighborhood as such is on the agenda of all four Visegrad countries, especially since the start of the Eastern Partnership program in 2009, and the specific target countries were formally enlisted in their international development cooperation strategies, as well. The traditional wing of the Czech development cooperation policy, that focuses on the classic development priorities, identified Moldova as a program country with a mutually agreed development plan, and Georgia as a project country where cooperation is conducted without an overarching roadmap. As part of the Transition Promotion Program, both states are among the potential beneficiaries. Georgia and Moldova have been identified in 2009 as project countries of Slovakia’s development policy and were also among the geographic priorities of Polish development assistance already before 2010. Afterwards in its new development strategy, Poland extended its focus to the Eastern Partnership region as a whole. Hungary’s geographic priorities were laid down in 2003, when Moldova was selected as a priority country in the region, and according to strategic documents, was even made a program country for the period of 2009-2011. However, the program itself, agreed in 2008 between Moldova and Hungary, was never made publicly available.

136 The Transition Promotion Program of the Czech Republic is the second wing of Czech development policy, building on traditions reaching back to Vaclav Havel’s strong advocacy for democracy and respect for human rights. It aims at supporting transition to democracy in partner countries by providing grant-based assistance to NGOs to strengthen civil society, youth, media and human rights defenders. The program currently works under a multiannual framework for 2010-17 and is coordinated by the Department of Human Rights and Transition Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

137 The policies had to be set up by the time the countries joined the European Union in 2004 and the first Colored Revolution took place in 2003 in the region in question (in Georgia), therefore here we analyze data and activities starting in 2003. The last year discussed is 2012, as OECD data for 2013 is still labeled preliminary.
During the first few years of their development activities in the Eastern neighborhood, the Visegrad countries concentrated very low shares of their bilateral development assistance on Georgia (see Annex 1). While we see a small increase in the allocated amounts after the Rose Revolution in the case of especially the Czech Republic and Slovakia, their bilateral ODA disbursed in Georgia quickly fell again and did not stabilize on the new level. Following the Russian-Georgian war, however, Visegrad countries’ development assistance peaked in the country due to post-war reconstruction assistance. While afterwards it dropped again, the decrease was not back to the levels of the pre-war engagement and a slow gradual increase followed. Hungary, however, proved to be an exception: the war made no visible impact upon the amount of bilateral financial assistance allocated for Georgia.

V4 ODA in Georgia (2003-2012)

With regards to Georgia’s ranking, it was not typical to find the country among the top 10 recipients of the individual V4 countries’ development assistance. The only country where Georgia was continuously in the top 10, albeit mostly on the 10th position, was Poland. After the war, Georgia managed to secure a stable and relatively high position among the top 10 recipients of the Czech Republic’s, Poland’s and Slovakia’s development assistance, therefore we can conclude that it raised its relative importance in the eyes of these new donors. Nevertheless, the increasing donor interest did not lead to Hungary prioritizing Georgia after 2008 either.
The case of Moldova was fairly different already from the beginning. Its relative importance among recipient countries’ was somewhat higher from the start, and in general it was gradually increasing already before the 2009 demonstrations. In the aftermath of 2009, Moldova secured its position among the top 10 aid recipients on the list of Poland and Slovakia, and it became one of the top priorities of the Czech Republic’s development assistance with its 3rd and then 2nd position. In the case of Hungary, even despite becoming program country for 2009-2011, Moldova’s relative importance, when evaluated only based on the ranking, actually dropped. The absolute amount of financial assistance provided for Moldova actually started to increase much before the 2009 power shift. Starting from 2005/06, we can observe a gradual growth in these numbers in the case of the Czech Republic, Poland and to some extent in Hungary. In 2009, the Czech Republic and Slovakia reacted with sudden steep increases, as the chart shows, while Poland started to allocate more for Moldova starting from 2010. Hungary appears to be an outlier again, as it maintained its level of support more or less on the same (low) level as before both in absolute amounts and proportionally (see Annex 1. for ratios).
In order to see what the above discussed numbers represent and whether the various increasing tendencies are due to Visegrad countries stepping up their democracy/transition support, we will assess the content of development assistance implemented in Georgia and Moldova. This exercise, however, is made complicated due to the lack of transparent and detailed documentation, especially during the first few years of the Visegrad countries’ development activities. Prior to the acceptance of their respective legislative frameworks regulating the conduct of international development cooperation policy, annual overviews of development activities are often not publicly available. In this short assessment, we will rely on the publicly available material obtained through the websites of the four countries’ ministries, development agencies and embassies, among them development strategies and annual reports. As of October 2014, annual reports are available in Poland from 2000 on, in Hungary from 2003 on, in Slovakia from 2008 on and in the Czech Republic from 2009 on.\footnote{138} Where applicable, we sought to identify the main areas that re-occur or are present continuously during the studied period.

The \textbf{Czech Republic} has been a strong advocate of strengthening the Eastern dimension of the EU’s neighborhood policy already before its membership to the EU, its commitment to the region therefore goes back to the early 2000s. Although the Rose Revolution led to a slight increase in the amount of Czech ODA spent in Georgia, it quickly fell back and the Czech Republic only started to step up its engagement in response to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war by scheduling post-war reconstruction assistance for 2008-2010 and by making Georgia a project country of the traditional wing of Czech development cooperation.\footnote{139} Its engagement in Moldova has been on the rise though since 2005 based on the absolute amounts of aid and it even made Moldova one of the program countries of its development policy in 2010 after signing an agreement with the country. It also became supporting facilitator of for the EU’s development cooperation in Moldova after the 2009 events, and by now it is the biggest donor of the country out of the four Visegrad states with a very significant margin. Both Georgia and Moldova feature as potential recipients of the Czech Transition Promotion Program, a unique element of Czech aid, therefore they are eligible for support in various domains of cooperation that facilitates transition with the inclusion of the civil society.

Over the years, the Czech Republic channeled its assistance into projects in a few very specific areas and regions usually in cooperation with local NGOs as well as local authorities both in Georgia and Moldova. Many of these were actually in the domain of more expensive classic development activities, focusing on environment, health, agriculture and rural development, but in both cases targeting very specific needs of the countries in question. Most likely, investment in these fields is what really is raising the overall amount of Czech ODA, as transition promotion usually works through less costly tools, e.g. trainings.

From 2010 on, the Transition Promotion Program focused on the local level in both cases on local authorities and NGOs. The general goal was to strengthen NGOs involvement in decision making, their relations with local authorities and to help them develop sustainably. With regards to the local authorities in Georgia, Czech development aid supported public finance management trainings to foster transparency, efficiency and develop the capacities of local administration. Additionally, Moldovan authorities received support on migration and public

\footnote{138} Annual reports and development strategies used for the review are listed under the references. We consider data from 2003 on where possible.

\footnote{139} This means mid-term, project-based engagement without a cooperation program.
finance management and on development of entrepreneurial skills in order to be able to meet European standards in preparation for association with the EU.

From among the four donors, Hungary is the only one that did not identify Georgia as a geographic priority of its bilateral development policy at any point over the past ten years, although it did provide small-scale contributions from 2008 on as humanitarian aid, or in the form of technical assistance (training on law enforcement, European competition law) and scholarships for students in higher education. The absolute amounts of aid and the rankings show that Moldova has been similarly under-prioritized in Hungary’s development assistance even in the period when it was supposed to be a program country of Hungarian ODA. A couple projects were nonetheless carried through mainly in the form of technical assistance for the Moldovan authorities, or in cooperation with civil society organizations working on empowering NGOs (projects carried out by DemNet Hungary with governmental support) or promoting cooperation in the Dniester region between Moldova and the separatist entity, Transnistria, supported by the International Center for Democratic Transition. To give a fuller picture, however, it has to be noted that on the level of political support Hungary did better than in the sole domain of development assistance by operating a center issuing visas to about a dozen European countries – which in a country where such a high proportion of the population works abroad is quite a useful contribution.

Georgia and Moldova were already in 2004 priority recipients of Poland’s development aid and the disbursed amounts have gradually increased in both countries from then on. The Rose Revolution did not bring sudden increase in the case of Georgia from Poland’s side, but the Russian-Georgian war did trigger a higher impact on the absolute amount of allocated assistance. In 2008, at the international post-war donor conference, Poland allocated 5.3 million USD for 2008-2010 for Georgia. Interestingly, in 2009, Polish assistance for Moldova actually dropped but picked up again in 2010, and continued to grow since then. The report about the development activities in Moldova specifically acknowledged the efforts of the AEI coalition and their aim to bring Moldova closer to the EU.

Poland’s development assistance in Georgia shows a strong local character which remained dominant throughout the discussed 10 years of development activities. One of the main areas, where Poland is considered to have valuable experiences to share, is the development of local administration. It even focused its reconstruction assistance among others on strengthening the local administration and the regional development of the country, being the biggest donor focusing on this matter at the time.140 Poland also provided assistance in the field of agriculture for the activation of rural areas pledging support for the diversification of Georgia’s economy, and tried to support small and medium-sized businesses active in agriculture in Moldova.

Poland cooperated with authorities of the respective countries in the form of technical assistance, as well. In both cases these included among others border management, migration, and in Moldova fight against organized crime, human trafficking. Starting from 2010, Poland introduced new and innovative channels of technical assistance available for EaP countries. Representatives of both Moldova and Georgia participated in the so-called Strategic Economic and Security Exercise in 2010-2011 receiving training on the principles of a functioning market economy through simulation exercises, and in 2012, with the launch of the EaP Academy 140 According to the “Information material of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Polish foreign aid to Georgia” between 2004-2009, p.4.
for Public Administration, attended courses on value-based management, management of public finances, security and defense policy. In 2011, the Solidarity Fund PL, similar in its aims to the Czech Transition Promotion Program, launched extensive cooperation with NGOs in order to strengthen civil society and citizens’ participation in the political life of the countries. By 2012, more than 40% of Polish ODA was allocated for good governance projects in Moldova and Georgia, thus becoming the most supported thematic sector in both cases.

**Slovakia** maintained relatively low presence through development assistance both in Georgia and Moldova which did not increase in response to the Rose Revolution, the Russian-Georgian war or the 2009 demonstrations in Moldova. Setting up its mid-term strategic planning, Slovakia identified Georgia and Moldova as project countries in 2009 in its first multiannual program, which according to the website of the Slovak development agency, means that the main aid modality for these countries should be technical assistance to share Slovakia’s transition experience with the partners.141 The annual reports on the country’s foreign policy provide little to no information on Slovakia’s development engagement in Moldova and Georgia, but Slovak Aid lists in Georgia six and in Moldova ten projects that have been implemented since 2010. The projects, all funded through grants and implemented by Slovak and local NGOs in cooperation with authorities, covered various areas but with some exceptions they all focused on sharing the Slovak experience, especially in the security sector. A new tool of transition support, the Center for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reform, under which the countries are eligible for assistance, was established in 2011. Furthermore, both qualify for support from two additional programs of the Ministry of Finance albeit conducted through multilateral organizations. These are the Public Finance Development Program of UNDP and the EBRD Technical Cooperation Fund. To our knowledge, based on online available information, no cooperation took place in these frameworks up until 2012 in Georgia. However, Moldovan authorities (Ministry of Finance) have been the beneficiaries of the former since 2011.142

The following table summarizes the above discussed main areas of V4 development activities in Georgia and Moldova.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
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| **Czech Republic** | **(Social) infrastructure**: health – cancer diagnosis and prevention; education – improving skills of agricultural workers, re-integration of IDPs  
**Agriculture**: support for small farmers  
**Environment/energy**: alternative energy supplies  
**Good governance-civil society**: supporting self-organization and cooperation between the civil sector and local authorities; capacity building for local administration  
**Scholarships** | **(Social) infrastructure**: care for elderly and abandoned children in response to migration, pre-school inclusion programs  
**Agriculture**: counseling, water management  
**SMEs**: business development  
**Environment**: waste water management, sanitation, decontamination, managing environmental damage  
**Good governance-civil society**: gender equality, strengthening public involvement in decision making, capacity building for NGOs also in Transnistria, support cooperation with local authorities  
**Technical assistance**: migration management, public finance management, supporting entrepreneurial skills  
**Scholarships** |
| **Hungary** | **Technical assistance**: training for officials in law enforcement and competition law  
**Scholarships** | **Good governance-civil society**: strengthening public administration, capacity building for civil society, setting up to the Dniester Euroregion (indirect contribution to conflict resolution)  
**Technical assistance**: adoption of European standards in the field of customs, phytosanitary standards |
| **Poland** | **Agriculture**: activation of rural areas, supporting underprivileged groups, support for rural entrepreneurs, vocational trainings  
**Good governance-civil society**: strengthening self-representation, public and local administration, decentralization, support for the civil society  
**Technical assistance**: migration management, financial management, security sector  
**Scholarships** | **(Social) infrastructure**: gasification, hospital development  
**Agriculture**: counseling, local development, support for SMEs  
**Good governance-civil society**: support for the civil society  
**Technical assistance**: trainings for young diplomats, migration management, financial management, fighting human trafficking, security sector  
**Scholarships** |
| **Slovakia** | **Environment**: flood protection  
**Strengthening civil society**: integration on resettled persons, anti-corruption, public procurement  
**Technical assistance**: preparation for adoption of European rules and norms, reform of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, security sector reform  
**Scholarships** | **Technical assistance**: financial management, knowledge sharing (National Convention on the EU), strengthening civil society capacities |

Table 2. Focus of development activities of the Visegrad countries in Georgia and Moldova
CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the present case study was, on the one hand, to see whether the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2009 mass demonstrations in Moldova triggered a response from the individual Visegrad countries in their international development activities concerning these two countries. On the other hand, we wanted to see whether the development practices of the V4 truly reflect their strong rhetoric about sharing their transition experience in two countries where transition support would presumably be high on demand after the aforementioned political shifts. The analysis was based on openly available data on the four Visegrad countries’ development activities in Moldova and Georgia between 2003 and 2012.

We found that responses to the 2003 Rose Revolution were very moderate in all four countries and assistance was not significant in the following years either. In our view, the very young, still developing state of the individual development cooperation frameworks can account for Visegrad countries not yet jumping on the opportunity to level up their engagement in Georgia. Furthermore, at this point Visegrad countries were just about to join the EU and were still more on the policy taker side when it comes to transition and transition support. With time, a gradual increase of allocated funds could be observed in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, and all countries but Hungary reacted already much more prominently to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, as well. Based on the numbers, the war was the apparent trigger of Visegrad countries’ attention. At the same time, part of the newly allocated assistance was spent on reconstruction-related projects, and was not disbursed with the aim of sharing transition experience. While the absolute amounts of assistance dropped in a couple years again, Georgia still holds a high position among the top priority counties of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.

The case of Moldova was significantly different as aid from all countries continuously increased already from 2005/06 on in parallel with the development of the policy itself. The early interest in Moldova could be explained by the relative closeness and smallness of the country, but the fact that Voronin’s leadership was rather open towards the EU could also contribute. This gave ground to build on and start development cooperation with Moldova. The year of the mass demonstrations, 2009, which eventually brought change in the political leadership of the country, went somewhat against expectations as assistance suddenly increased a bit steeper in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but dropped in Poland and Hungary. No unified obvious trend showed. Afterwards though all but, again, Hungary kept on increasing aid allocation for Moldova, which seems generally rather the continuation of the previous trend than a step motivated by the change in political leadership. In the case of Czech development assistance though Moldova received more dominance after 2008 as a program country even though it has been among the Czech priorities since 2004.

Assessing whether the actual content of development assistance changed in the aftermath of the political shifts poses difficulties due to the not always fully detailed and transparent documentation of development activities in the individual cases. In general we can conclude that in the case of the bigger donors – Poland and the Czech Republic – investing more resources in the countries, the activities were multifaceted and included both classic development activities as well as transition promotion. In the case of Slovakia and Hungary, engagement generally can be seen as the latter, and was conducted in the form of technical assistance for the governments and project-based cooperation with civil society actors. Along with the launch of the EaP on European level, the V4 countries also accentuated their
assistance to share their transition experience in the region as a whole as it is illustrated especially be the start of several new programs in the Czech Republic (Transition Promotion Program), Poland (the Strategic Economic and Security Exercise, the EaP Academy for Public Administration, the Solidarity Fund PL) or in Slovakia (the Center for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reform) which often target the Eastern European regions as a whole. Therefore, what we could observe is that instead of answering immediately to individual events in their development assistance, countries rather developed overarching frameworks which react to broader trends, and then provided individual responses in these structures.

ANNEX 1.

Official Development Assistance of Visegrad Countries to Georgia
(in million dollars, current prices)

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Official Development Assistance of Visegrad Countries to Moldova
(in million dollars, current prices)

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Szent-Iványi, B., Végh, Zs. (2014, manuscript) Development Relations between the Visegrád Four and Georgia: Jumping on the Bandwagon?

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Successful transformation – is it really something that Poland can give as an example to less developed countries?

Katarzyna Zalas-Kaminska

Abstract:
Successful transformation, well-developed democracy – terms like that dominate within international relations when talking about Poland. After joining the European Union, the country has evolved from the role of a recipient of development aid to its donor. Around the same time Poland has started looking for its best role in the international development aid system, and has found it in sharing experiences of transformation and democracy. With time it has also become an element used in the promotion of the country – Polish society – according to research – is assessed as showing solidarity and an understanding of the need to strive for freedom and democracy. The question is, to what extend and in which areas of democracy and transformation Poland can, indeed, be an example for others?

Keywords: experience with democracy, transformation system, development policy in the field of democracy, society in democracy

INTRODUCTION

In the international community Poland is viewed as a country that succeed in transformation. Referring to special report from „The Economist”, from 1989 – when Poland was almost bankrupt, without the prospects predicted for Hungary or Czechoslovakia – the country has made huge general progress. It gave Poland economic and political extra weight in the EU. Moreover, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, while visiting Poland in 2014, stressed the importance of Poland in overcoming communism and the meaning of that, not only for Europe, but also for global reality.

Even the Poles themselves see advantages in the democratic system. Three quarters of the population agree that democracy is the best form of governance, and 49% are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Poland.

1. DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPMENT AID

Paweł Bagiński, analyzing the organization of European Union aid for developing countries, shows that 25 surveyed countries are mainly engaged in poverty reduction (and also sustainable development). Democracy is one of the other objectives of development aid for such as Lithuania, Slovakia, Luxembourg and Poland. Apart from this, the use of experience of transformation in the field of sustainable development has increasingly become emphasized in the international environment.

Around the same time, Poland, looking for its role in the international development aid reality, first launched (with Sweden’s support) the Eastern Partnership (2009), which offers cooperation and transformation support to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The purpose of this support is to bring those countries closer to the European Union (and finally to join). The European Endowment Democracy (EED), strongly advocated within the European Union by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, was the next Polish step. Poland originated this idea in 2011 in the context of the ‘Arab spring’ and with the aim of damping protests in Belarus. Nowadays it is seen as another Polish success in the field of promoting democracy and transformation.

A significant element of Polish activity for democracy and transformation was the resumption of The Polish Know How Foundation for International Development Co-operation (now Solidarity Found PL). This State Treasury Foundation, which operates under the honorary patronage of the President of Poland, can, using different sources of funding, support countries facing particular (and difficult) political situations. For example in 2012 SF PL realized, with the participation of Polish NGO’s, a programme called „Democracy support”. It was addressed to pro-democratic institutions and organizations in partner countries.

Of course, Poland, as with other EU countries, is fighting against poverty and nowadays does it mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa. But, at the same time, the Polish transformational experience has become one of the most significant elements of Polish development cooperation and is important in its multilateral and bilateral dimensions. It is based on three main goals. One is that partnerships are the basis for successful cooperation, second – aid corresponding to specific needs is the most effective, and the last one – durability of changes gives aid recipients engagement. The areas in which these goals have been realized are diverse. They apply to both ‘good governance’ (eg. training in public administration) and regional development (eg. territorial reform). Examples of projects – see table 1.

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145 P. Bagiński, Europejska Polityka Rozwojowa. Organizacja pomocy Unii Europejskiej dla krajów rozwijających się, CsDeWu Sp. z o.o., Warszawa 2009, s.84-86.
146 P. Kugiel, Zmiany we współpracy rozwojowej UE: skutki dla Polski, PISM, Nr 46, 17.04.2014, s.1
147 see more: http://solidarityfund.pl/pl/, access: 08.08.2014.
148 For example in 2012 ‘good governance’ was one of the most important sectors of bilateral Polish development aid; 23,33% of all allocated for this goal; more allocated only on scholarship policy (34,45%), see more: Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2012, MSZ, Warszawa 2013, s. 12.
149 Polskie doświadczenia transformacyjne w programie polskiej pomocy. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa 2013, s.5.
Table 1. Examples of projects 2010-2012. Own interpretation based on data from MFA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training for Afghan administration (2012)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>professionalization of civil servants</td>
<td>KSAP (National School of Public Administration), MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic workshops (2012)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>support systemic transformations</td>
<td>MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Centre for Local Government of Moldova (2012)</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>increase the capacity of local government to plan and implement development policy</td>
<td>Solidarity Fund PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy of Public Administration of the Eastern Partnership (eg. 2011)</td>
<td>EP countries</td>
<td>strengthening public administration</td>
<td>MFA, KSAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of NGO’s-local newspapers coalition to monitor the activities of local government and to promote local interests (2011)</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>increasing the role of the independent media, building ‘good governance’ at the local level</td>
<td>East European Democratic Centre (EEDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical activities in technical rescue and medicine (2011)</td>
<td>Georgia, Ukraine</td>
<td>increase the powers and efficiency of public services</td>
<td>SC PSP (The Central School of the State Fire Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the participation of private companies in public transport (2010)</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>improving the quality of management and delivery of transport services</td>
<td>CASE Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Ukrainian administration in the field of migration policy coordination (2010)</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>implementation of the national migration policy</td>
<td>The Institute of Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the capacity of the public administration of Georgia in the field of regional policy and European affairs (2010)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>increase the capacity of the public administration of Georgia in the fields of economic and regional development</td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Development</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2. POLISH SPECIALITY

In all these contexts it is very often said that the promotion of democracy within successful transformation is something that has become a „Polish brand”\(^{150}\) or a „Polish specialty”. It is also a part of the government’s policy, realized mainly by the Polish development aid system. In the „The Long Term Plan of development cooperation for the years 2012 – 2015” it is clearly identified that sharing experiences of transformation and democracy are strategic elements of Polish development cooperation\(^{151}\). On the other hand, in an official document concerning possibilities of promoting Poland, it is mentioned that development aid is still not used enough in terms of promotion\(^{152}\). One of the recommendations is to change it. This recommendation comes from the idea that Poland is an economically developed country that has successfully evolved from the role of a recipient of development aid to its donor. Nowadays Poland is a modern country – responsible, economically stable, and involved in solving the problems of the modern world. As it is pointed out by different researchers, a more balanced and better-resourced development policy may „strengthen the brand of Polish solidarity”\(^{153}\).

And it has been happening, not only among beneficiary countries, but also in Europe. For instance Poland wants to increase Europeans’ awareness of Polish success in transformation. One of the ideas as to how to do it was a new spot promoting Poland (as a part of the image campaign called „Poland. Spring into new”\(^{154}\)) which – among other things – has been broadcast in the most popular TV stations in UK since June 2014.

3. SOCIETY AS AN ELEMENT OF DEMOCRACY

Society is one of the most important components of democracy. In the context of the Polish development aid system this element has a special meaning. Polish NGO’s are one of the major partners of the government in the implementation of development projects. They also conduct projects connected with global education within Polish society, which is most important because of increasing awareness of international responsibility. What is interesting is that, although the majority of Poles support providing foreign aid and are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Poland, the majority of them think that supporting democratic reform is only the sixth most important area in which Poland has the most to offer to less developed countries.

According to the research, called „Poles about development aid”, 46% of Polish society thinks that improving the level of education is something that Poland can give as an example. In the second place Poles mention the improvement of health services (38%), then – crisis prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (23%), development of agriculture and supporting of economic growth\(^{155}\).

\(^{151}\) The Long Term Plan of development cooperation for the years 2012 – 2015, MFA, Warsaw, 2012, p.5-7.
\(^{154}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umDOHnTQdFo, access: 10.08.2014.
It probably does not so matter much when we have been dealing with the situation like the Ukrainian crisis of 2013/2014, which has raised a very important question concerning fighting for freedom and democracy, but also international solidarity. The truth is that when the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France were on their negotiating visit to Kiev\(^\text{156}\), and then – when there were many global discussions at the highest political level, the ordinary citizens also started talking about the situation in Ukraine. Especially at the beginning of the crisis, it was highly visible among Polish society. People wanted to show some support to Ukrainians and – beyond their mental support – they started organizing some financial and medical help for the Ukrainian population.

When Angela Merkel came to Warsaw, in the media we could hear how Germany may envy the Poles’ solidarity with Ukraine. In Slovakia we could hear that they may be jealous of the „Polish claw“ on the Ukraine case. At about the same time, students from different countries who come to study in Poland discussed – during their classes in the faculty of international relations at the University of Wroclaw – the role of media in development aid and also about the international support for the Ukraine in crisis. One of the students, from Central Ukraine, explained why the support is so important and what distinguishes Poles from other nations. According to her point of view, Poles are valuable, because they don’t say what and how Ukrainians should do. They only – and stress – say how they did do it. It is an example, not a requirement. Each society has to change its reality in relation to its specific political, economic and social situation. Poles can really understand it. And this understanding has a huge influence on the positive way that Poland is perceived among developing societies\(^\text{157}\).

**CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS**

All of the elements mentioned don’t mean that there are no doubts about the size of this Polish transformational success (for instance, level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Poland was not always as high as mentioned above). And, simultaneously, it would be difficult to determine whether democracy in the Polish edition is better than – for example – the other V4 countries. But, still, sharing experiences of transformation and democracy are something that Poland can, at least in some areas, give as an example to less developed countries and doing that in the framework of official development aid, makes sense. Moreover, with a little cynical point of view, it can be concluded that Poland has nothing else to offer in development aid. We can see that Poland is not able to be a rich donor, like Germany or Japan. It is not possible even though Poland survived the economic recession in 2008, and in 2006 was the country – from the group which joined EU in 2004 – that paid the most to the EU aid budget\(^\text{158}\). Poland is still a small donor and it does not seem likely to change over the coming years.

Despite that fact, using the Polish geopolitical position (bridge between East and West), combined with its increasingly better international perception (economic indications, social

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\(^{157}\) Own materials from students’ classes conducted at the University of Wroclaw.

satisfaction) may contribute to the development of global partnerships, so much needed in
the system of international development cooperation. The international perception of the role
of Poland in the field under discussion will largely depend on what happens in the Russian-
Ukrainian crisis and how it will influence other countries that are priorities for Poland in devel-
opment aid (for instance Belarus and Moldova).

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NON-ACADEMIC PAPERS
Transition Experience 2.0: A new way to close the gap between the Central European human rights and development policies

Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň

Summary and recommendations
After twenty-five years of independent foreign policy making, the Central European countries must rethink their post-communist experience that found its expression in the promotion of a reduced understanding of human rights. The Transition Experience 2.0 narrative links the relatively successful development of the region not only to the political rights gained after 1989 but also to the social rights inherited from the socialist era.

The application of Transition Experience 2.0 can mobilise the limited foreign aid resources of the Central European governments and increase their effectiveness by enlarging the scope of the supported human rights groups abroad to social and environmental movements as well as by applying the rights-based approach to their development cooperation programmes and emphasizing their political dimension.

Further impacts can be achieved by coordinating strategies and applying one public diplomacy brand to human rights and development policies without merging them, by harnessing the resources of the Visegrád Fund and other European partners and by using Transition Experience 2.0 as a starting point for a serious discussion on policy coherence for development.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE GLOBAL MESSAGE OF CENTRAL EUROPE 25 YEARS AFTER 1989?

The 25th anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain is a good opportunity for a reflection on the recent history of the Central Europe countries and their global presence. The last twenty-five years saw the sudden dissolution of their foreign aid under the umbrella of the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as well as its reconstruction and alignment to the current models led by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union. Nowadays, the Central European donors are even becoming members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, which attests that their institutions for providing foreign aid meet the minimal standards of the experienced Western donors. However, their aid volumes have remained negligible at the European as well as the global level, which lead the Central European governments to focus on the quality instead of the quantity of their aid and forward the transfer of their transition experience as their main added value.

By using the aid effectiveness argument, these governments have built their rhetoric in the global development arena on their unique experiences of transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and from centrally planned to free market economies. Some minor
bilateral policy instruments for the transfer of their specific transition experiences were already created. However, they still make up only a small part of their projects in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and they are absent in their projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America. So far, the implementation of the European Transition Compendium, an address book of the transition experience initiated by the European Commission, has also been quite a disappointment.

Moreover, in the Visegrád Group that gathers together Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, both the economic and social aspects of the transitions remain relatively isolated from the political transitions, and they are often implemented by two different tools—development cooperation, and human rights and democratization policy. While the Polish development cooperation has been traditionally focused on the support of the civil society, it founded a separate International Solidarity Fund in 2011. Slovakia also created its Centre for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reforms (CETIR) in the same year. But only Hungary has supported the activities of its individual non-governmental organizations without creating parallel institutions. The cleavage between the social-economic and political areas is perhaps the strongest in the Czech Republic, where the so-called transition policy and development cooperation developed independently much earlier. Therefore, this analysis is based mostly on the Czech example but it is still highly relevant for the other Central European countries and, more specifically, the Visegrád Group and its Visegrád Fund.

The goal of this paper is to propose a new narrative for the post-communist Central Europe called Transition Experience 2.0. The case for an upgraded version of the Central European transition history is that the dominant interpretation of the transition experience is one-sided and reductive. Indeed, the success of the post-communist countries that have become donors, which is seen as a proof of their belonging to the materially rich Global North, is based on the largely shared assumption that political freedoms are a necessary if not a sufficient condition for social and economic development. Yet the social and economic achievements during the socialist period that served as a base for the political emancipation are generally disregarded. A critical reflection of the changes that occurred in 1989, the year we are now commemorating, can help the Central European governments narrow the gap between their human rights and development policies.

So far the post-communist countries have intentionally promoted political and civil rights as the primary if not the only important group of human rights while they marginalised their rhetorical support for social, economic and environmental rights worldwide. And in turn, they left the realms of social, economic and environmental rights and obligations to the seemingly technical development cooperation, in which they were completely disconnected from the political dialogue with and democratization of the partner countries. Sometimes, they have even supplied authoritarian governments with development aid. This gap in coordination and complementarity is unsustainable. The policy areas of human rights and development should not merge but they should move towards each other in two ways: by enlarging the scope of human rights and by systematically introducing the rights perspective in the development cooperation. This double movement would bring Central Europe and the Visegrád Group more coherent foreign policies internally and externally. Also, implementing the new spirit of Transition Experience 2.0 would eventually benefit the poor and disempowered of the global South, including those of the former Eastern bloc that did not benefit from the fall of the Iron Curtain.
THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE REVISITED: RELINKING POLITICS, ECONOMICS, SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

History is written by the victors. The experience of the dissidents fighting communism in the relatively egalitarian socialist countries without substantial pockets of poverty has led them to put their accent on claiming civic and political rights to a different extent. Most Czech intellectuals considered the relatively high quality of public services and social safety nets provided by the socialist state as natural. The Solidarity movement in Poland originated as a trade union with a predominantly social agenda, but it gradually moved towards political demands. The Slovak dissidents focused more on religious liberties and environmental issues and the latter also led to massive protests in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, but the current remembrance puts emphasis on freedom of expression, the rule of the law, non-discrimination of minorities and other basic characteristics of liberal democracies that were denied by the ruling communist parties. In addition to that, the social and economic rights of the second wave of human rights were adopted by the United Nations during the Cold War at the initiative of many Third World countries and the Soviet Union, i.e. the very same power that denied the first generation of civil rights. It is only understandable that many opponents to the communist regimes felt distrust towards or even rejected the second and third generations of human rights. Moreover, this critical discourse trickled down to the formulation of the Central European foreign policies and even to their implementation – by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example. It is only logical that the reduction of human rights to their civil and political dimension has petrified the reduced political understanding of the transition as a strong foreign policy feature of the former communist countries.

In consequence, this narrow view of the transition persisted in the 1990s and beyond. The diverse social groups that became the new elites of Central Europe were often unaware of their privileged initial conditions as compared to the conditions of their Eastern and Southern neighbours, not to mention those of the overseas countries. Despite their slightly rising income inequality and poverty rates, and the acceleration of the rise of income inequality and poverty that was caused by the global recession, the Visegrád Group countries still rank globally among the countries with the lowest levels of income inequality and relative poverty. The initial high level of human development brought by the state-owned system of education and health care combined with the maintenance of the social safety nets from the communist era during the radical liberalization of the Central European economies in the early 1990s resulted in a unique success story. Despite all the shortcomings that we know very well, a large majority of the citizens of the region could benefit from the combination of political freedom, economic growth, the low poverty rate and a significant improvement of the environment, at least in the areas of water and air pollution. Of course, the advancement in the early 1990s was due to the greater democratic participation, but at the same time this political participation was enabled by the existence of the educated masses, which were only at a small risk of social exclusion. The role of the social policies during the transition cannot be emphasised enough, but this is not to deny that new forms of exclusion appeared, primarily due to the unemployment of those unable to keep up the pace with the economic transition and the rising consumerism, namely the ethnic minorities of Central Europe. The deeper discrimination of the ethnic minorities has other than economic reasons but more generally, it is difficult to find any other region than Central Europe where such a massive economic liberalization produced relatively fewer social disparities.
In contrast to that, today, most of the world’s poorest populations currently live in the middle-income countries, which face a growing internal inequality and a continuing degradation of their environment. These countries can afford policies to mitigate the negative impacts of the economic growth on the poorest people. Yet a large part of the Central European development assistance still consists in technology transfers provided by private companies or in charitable community projects of non-profit organizations, but these will not solve the problems of the poorest one billion people around the world. On the contrary, the emphasis must be put on building the social and environmental policies of the countries in the global South. Many Central European governments paid a lot of attention to them on their own soil in spite of their market-oriented ideologies. However, these issues are largely absent from their political dialogue with the governments in the global South.

In sum, the Visegrád Group must rethink its story of the transition experience. It is not only a story about the brave individuals who sacrificed their own liberty for that of their fellow citizens, as is frequently reductively stated nowadays. Nor is it an account of one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions. Such a limited concept of transition would be reductive, out of context, and ultimately not transferable to the countries that do not share similar economic, social and cultural conditions as Central Europe. In fact, Transition Experience 2.0 is a story about the indivisibility of political and civil liberties from social and economic rights and the environment. It is a story in which sustainable social development cannot be achieved without profound political changes towards accountability and in which a certain level of social equality is a necessary condition for the political participation of the people in selecting their own future. It is a story that refuses to consider the social and economic development as a problem that can be resolved by the enlightened experts, leaders and other elites in a technocratic and authoritarian way. Transition Experience 2.0 is a story that the Central European diplomacies and the Visegrád Group can jointly promote in the European and international debate on the future common framework for global and sustainable development that will replace the Millennium Development Goals after 2015.

TRANSITION EXPERIENCE 2.0 IN PRACTICE: AN EMPOWERED HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY...

The new narrative cannot inspire the domestic, European and global audiences if it does not trickle down to the existing foreign policy instruments. In order to gain some credibility, the national positions towards international priorities, norms and budgets in Brussels, Geneva and New York must be supported by the concurrent implementation in the bilateral policies of the Central European countries. This is a difficult task, however, since their democratization and development policy budgets are already tight. The ‘new’ EU member states dramatically failed to reach the already decreased commitments on Official Development Assistance, which includes the volumes spent on both human rights and global development. Hence the only solution is for them to combine the strengths of their relatively tiny foreign policy instruments in their long-term strategy as well as in day-to-day operations.

As far as human policy and democratization policy are concerned, the Central European foreign ministries and the Visegrád Fund can support civil society groups that defend not only political but also social, economic and environmental rights. This is already happening in a few cases. For example, the Czech foreign ministry is currently supporting an NGO that helps the
citizens in a certain Bosnian district to mobilise and use the law to defend their families from a major air polluting plant that belongs to a transnational company. The NGO builds here on its experience in mobilizing citizens to rise against the same company in the Eastern part of the Czech Republic. That means that in this case, the rhetoric of the enlarged understanding of human rights is seconded by the domestic experience of the social and environmental movements. In regard to many countries of the world where it is impossible to raise the issues of political and civil rights openly, this step can serve as a Trojan horse for activating the sense of citizenship in the issue areas that are sensitive to their more or less authoritarian governments. In any case human rights defenders should continue to be supported notwithstanding the will of their governments.

In the Czech Republic, the current centre-left government has recently supported the enlarged understanding of human rights. However, its critics are suspicious of this move. The traditional actors fear not only the possible diversion of financial funds towards new non-governmental organizations, but they are afraid that the more comprehensive approach might dilute the stress on human rights at the expense of the business interests in the practice of the foreign policy. This objection is highly relevant for Hungary, where the ruling government is questioning the values of liberal democracy. However, the critics are also suspicious of the enlarged understanding of rights as a concept because of their lack of experience with the global South at large. They are right when they say that social rights, or, more concretely, sustainable human development and poverty eradication, cannot be achieved in the long term without free access to information and equal participation of women and men in the making of local, national and global politics. However, the poor and especially women cannot be expected to take full advantage of their formal civil rights if they lack access to water and food, and their sustainable livelihoods are threatened by the destruction of the environment and indecent work. The social rights to education and health are crucial too, since political participation is barely possible when people lack the ability to read and write as well as adequate health care that would keep women, men and young people from contracting debilitating diseases.

This is evidenced by two examples. In spite of being the largest liberal democracy, India is now home to the largest group of the poorest people on the planet, and the enforcement of civic rights is highly problematic for them. On the other hand, China’s unprecedented yet unevenly distributed economic growth is accompanied by the growing discontent of its population, who suffer because of the devastated environment in China and exhausting working conditions and are frustrated by their inability to stand up for their rights. The calls for specific rights depend on groups and situations, and hence a narrow understanding of such calls for rights is not sufficient. Moreover, while the first generation of human rights was enacted by the West alone, the second and third generations of rights benefited from the participation of more or less democratic Third World governments in their creation since their inception, which underlines the indivisibility of human rights. The enlarged understanding of human rights is hence more sensitive to the cultures and local needs of the world’s communities and polities. It widens the thus far narrow Central European understanding of human rights that is limited by a lack of global perspectives that was caused by the relative isolation of the West-oriented elites before and during the transition.
...AND A RIGHTS-BASED DEVELOPMENT POLICY:
NO MERGER, BUT DIFFERENT TARGET GROUPS

Transition Experience 2.0 can have more far reaching benefits for the Central European countries and their partner countries when it is applied to their development policies. The reason is very simple. The international development cooperation budgets, both bilateral and multilateral, are far bigger than the democratization and human rights policy budgets. To take the Czech example, the bilateral development project budget alone is ten times higher than the democratization and human rights policy budgets and the potential of increasing its impact is also much higher than the potential of increasing the impacts of the other two budgets. On account of the public diplomacy, it could be argued that the Central Europeans have already helped to promote social, economic and environmental rights by channelling their aid into social, business and environmental sectors. But the rights-based approach to development as a necessary expression of the enlarged understanding of human rights is not merely about labelling. One-shot deliveries of goods and services by the Central European NGOs and businesses to the social and environmental sectors in the partner countries do not necessarily empower the citizens in the partner countries to claim their rights, including political and civic rights. To be sure, right-holders must be met by those who have obligations towards them, which are often carried out in the form of a service provided by the state, a local government or a private company. However, the evaluation reports also show that the ownership of the Czech development projects by the partners is weak, which is a problem that the other Central European countries probably share as well. In addition to that, the evaluations also reveal the low sustainability of the projects. This is due to the fact that the projects are often based on the identification of needs and solutions by the donor rather than on unfulfilled rights in the partner countries and a participative approach towards them among the citizens, including the most voiceless and vulnerable ones, and their political representatives.

The rights-based approach not only leads to more sustainable activities in the public or private sector. It also gives more power to the citizens instead of considering them as passive aid recipients and hence it creates more egalitarian relationships between the donor and the partner. It would also increase the effectiveness of the Central European development cooperation by discarding bad project proposals that do not pass the test of whether they empower people to claim their rights as well as empowering the authorities to provide them with the related obligations where possible. With this practice, the unsustainable charity type projects of NGOs that see aid recipients as victims and export-oriented projects of private companies that consider them as customers would not become eligible for public funding anymore. The application of the rights-based approach requires a sustained dialogue with the partner organizations, and hence the presence of the Central European development agencies or at least development diplomats in the partner countries is also an institutional condition for its implementation.

The Central European diplomacies have already emphasised the role of human rights in development in the Council of the European Union and in relation to the post-2015 global development framework. However, this accent will not be credible if they do not learn from other multilateral and bilateral donors as well as international non-governmental organizations. Many of them have developed detailed frameworks for implementing the right-based approach to development cooperation in the programme and project cycle management. As a first step, however, a simple checklist of human rights and the related obligations in the
identification forms would help to identify the projects with the highest potential for making a lasting change in the lives of the partner countries. In any case, the rights-based approach is incompatible neither with the requirements of the EU and the OECD in the field of development cooperation nor with development effectiveness commitments.

The enlarged list of human rights as well as the rights-based approach to development open an important problem. After all, is there any difference between the upgraded human rights and development policies? It is clear that there is a thematic overlap between both foreign policy instruments but this is no reason for a merger between them. The main difference consists in the target groups of the two policies. The human rights and democratization projects should continue to aim at the civil society and social and environmental movements in countries where it is impossible to achieve respect for the rights of the people by cooperating with the government, as the governments are often the main abusers. This does not mean that the Central European governments should not raise human rights issues in the political dialogue with the authoritarian governments, quite the contrary. Complementarity is an imperative in the development cooperation priority countries where governments abuse human rights. At the same time the development cooperation should remain faithful to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and give a clear preference to the cooperation with the local and central governments and build their capacities so that they would honour the rights, including political and civic rights, of their citizens instead of bypassing them. The choice is not exclusive, and in many countries human rights and development policies can and should coexist, which is already the case in many East and South-East European countries. The day-to-day implementation of Transition Experience 2.0 is more about continuity than change, but the Central European foreign ministries need to coordinate strategies for the human rights and development areas in order to tackle the overlaps and define the best mix for each priority country.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION EXPERIENCE 2.0 FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, CENTRAL EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND POLICY COHERENCE

During the global recession, many Central European governments have decided to decrease or at least freeze the funding for raising the already low public awareness of their development cooperation programmes. This is also due to the fact that development policy is a part of their foreign policies and hence a part of their public diplomacy, which is another weak point of the foreign ministries in the region. The joint approach to human rights and development should not stop at the conceptual implementation levels but it should also reach the public awareness activities in those two fields as well as the related field of humanitarian assistance. For example, the Czech Republic can use its brand and logo Česká republika pomáhá [The Czech Republic helps] not only for its development cooperation but also for its transition projects and humanitarian assistance. Whether these public diplomacy campaigns are implemented directly by the foreign ministries or outsourced to non-governmental organizations and public relation agencies, the individual projects and their implementers should not be presented at the expense of the more general idea behind the Central European foreign policies that is closely related to people’s own experiences.
Further synergies between human rights and development can be created across the Central European borders. This does not concern only the Visegrád Group, which has the big advantage of having the Visegrád Fund as a financial tool that can support initiatives such as Transition Experience 2.0. As the example of the European Transition Compendium shows, so far the initiatives of the ‘new’ EU member states, including the Baltic States, have suffered by the fact that they were neither shared nor understood by the ‘old’ member states. Transition Experience 2.0 is based on a reinterpretation of the post-communist experience, yet its message is universal and hence it should be supported by other Central European countries. The cooperation between the Central European countries must carefully balance the uniqueness of the experience with universality in every aspect of the narrative as well as self-reflection with a results-oriented approach. Hand in hand with this, the concept of transition must be handled with care and always in relation to the specific post-1989 experience. It should serve as a background, but not as a goal in itself. The word transition by itself might even be avoided in the global South because it implies a movement from point A to point B rather than an open-ended process that meets the specific priorities of an empowered polity in a different social, cultural and economic context. In the same vein, the word democracy should not necessarily imply the same political organization as the one in Central Europe.

Finally, unlike most of their Western and Northern neighbours, the Central European countries consider development policy as an integral part of foreign policy. This is often considered as an obstacle for prioritizing poverty reduction as the main goal of development cooperation. However, the presence of the human rights and development departments within the same foreign ministries is also an opportunity for a greater internal coherence. The external coherence remains a far bigger challenge. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment of the linkages between global politics, economy, society and environment is the first step for the Central European foreign ministries to take in the process of taking the crucial agenda of policy coherence for development seriously. The narrative of Transition Experience 2.0 can be used as a starting point for the dialogue with other ministries whose positions on climate, trade, agriculture and financial policies, to take a few examples, may deepen the poverty and harm the political, economic, social and environmental rights of the citizens living in the global South. After 25 years, the remaining empathy of the Central Europeans towards the endeavours of their neighbours for better lives, especially those in the former Soviet bloc, merits both reflection and concrete actions.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTRIES**

1. After twenty-five years of independent foreign policy making, the Central European countries are still looking for a way to define and implement their specific contribution in the field of global development and human rights. It is time for them to reflect upon their past experience of their transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime and from a centrally planned to a free market economy and stress the link between politics, economics, society and the environment in their unique experience.

2. The upgraded narrative Transition Experience 2.0 promotes the view that sustainable social development cannot be achieved without a profound increase in political accountability, and at the same time a certain level of social equality is a necessary condition for
the political participation of the people in selecting their own future. The Central European diplomacies and the Visegrád Group should promote this approach in the largely depoliticised European and international debate on the future common framework for global and sustainable development that will replace the Millennium Development Goals after 2015.

3. In order to gain credibility, the national positions towards international priorities, norms and budgets in Brussels, Geneva and New York must be supported by the concurrent implementation in the bilateral policies of the Central European countries. The Central European foreign ministries must accordingly enlarge the scope of human rights they promote in their democratization policies as well as introduce a rights-based approach in their development cooperation.

4. The Central European foreign ministries and the Visegrád Fund should financially support civil society groups and social movements that not only defend the first generation of human rights (civic and political rights) but also the second and third generations of human rights (social, economic, environmental and other human rights). The enlarged understanding of human rights is more sensitive to cultures and the local needs of the communities and polities. It also increases the impact by activating the general sense of citizenship in the issue areas that are not necessarily controlled by the authoritarian governments.

5. As a complementary step the Central European governments should use the leverage of the substantially higher development cooperation budgets by applying the rights-based approach to development cooperation. Instead of considering the partners in development as passive aid recipients, the rights-based approach would increase the effectiveness of the Central European development cooperation programmes by discarding bad project proposals that do not pass the test of whether they empower the citizens to claim their rights as well as empowering the authorities to provide them with the related obligations.

6. In spite of the thematic overlaps Transition Experience 2.0 does not erase the division of labour between the human rights and development policies. The human rights and democratization projects should continue in aiming at the civil society and social and environmental movements in countries where it is impossible to achieve the desired respect for rights by a cooperation with the rights-abusing governments and through a sustained political dialogue. Human rights defenders should continue to be supported notwithstanding the will of their governments. At the same time the development cooperation should remain faithful to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and give a clear preference to cooperation with the local and central governments and build their capacities to honour the rights of their citizens instead of bypassing them.

7. The Central European foreign ministries should use their limited budgets for increasing the public awareness of human rights, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance by using a unique brand. The individual projects and their implementers should not be presented at the expense of the more general idea of foreign policy that builds on the domestic Transition Experience 2.0. Yet the concept of transition as independent from the specific experience associated with it might be avoided abroad since it does not imply an open-ended process that would be specific to the different cultural context of the global South.

8. Given their limited budgets and global impact, the Central European governments should join their forces and use the channels and tools of mutual cooperation with a special focus on the Visegrád Fund to promote their unique approach to human rights and development. However, the Visegrád Group should also involve other Central European countries
to balance the particular post-communist experience and the capital of empathy that it entailed with its universal message.

9. Harnessing Transition Experience 2.0 as a way of closing the gap between the human rights and development policies globally is facilitated by the fact that the Central European countries consider both development and human rights policies as integral parts of their foreign policies, which increases the chances for an internally coherent policy. However, the Central European foreign ministries should use the Transition Experience 2.0 narrative that relinks global politics, economics, society and the environment as a starting point for a serious discussion and actions in the field of policy coherence for development.

Note: This policy paper is based on an IIR Policy Paper published in Czech in June 2014. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international conference Development and Democracy. Development Ecosystems in V4: the New Role for Civil Society Organisations and Business beyond Millennium Development Goals in Bratislava on 15 October 2014 and it was also published in its proceedings. The author is grateful for the comments by the participants of the round table where it was presented as well as those of Katarína Šrámková.

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There has been much research on the effects of the EU on Central and Eastern European (CEE) international development policies which emerged after the turn of the Millennium, but CEE impact on the EU’s development policy has received much less attention. The CEE countries have achieved some results in shaping EU development policy, but government officials and NGOs seem unsatisfied. This brief contribution examines why CEE influence has not been as successful as hoped, using the example ‘transition experience’ as a case study. We try to explain why the CEE countries have not been more successful in convincing the EU to make greater use of their transition experience in its development policy.

TRANSITION EXPERIENCE

Transition experience, the collective body of knowledge that the CEE countries have accumulated in their process of transition from autocracy to democracy, command economy to market economy and integration in the European Union since 1989, is seen to be the ‘comparative advantage’ of these countries in international development cooperation. Many developing countries are trying to cope with processes of economic or political transition, and CEE experience could be helpful in these processes. The narrative of transition experience is present in policy documents, and dedicated programs, funds and agencies have been created. A number of national policy documents stress the importance of transition experience, such as the Czech Republic’s Development Cooperation Strategy for 2010-2017 and Hungarian International Development Policy Strategy for 2014-2020. Transition experience is integrated into bilateral assistance as outlined by Romanian aid: bilateral aid provides us ‘with the means to efficiently promote the expertise we accumulated during the transition period to the benefit of our priority states’.

LIMITED RESULTS

We have seen some mention of the concept of transition experience in EU documents as well. These include the European Consensus for Development (2006), Article 33, which states that ‘the EU will capitalize on NMS’ experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen the role of these countries as new donors.’ The creation of the European Transition Compendium in 2011 was also seen to be an important document and both the Council
Conclusions on Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies (2013) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument’s regulation make reference to the importance of transition experience.

However, it is clear that the CEE states have not been as successful as they would have liked in ‘uploading’ their preferences onto the EU level. In 2011 the CEE states issued a Non-paper which called for mainstreaming transition experience into all external programs and earmarked funds. The evidence to date suggests that CEE actors possessing transition experience do very poorly in winning EU grants for projects in developing countries. The following sections analyse why the CEE countries have achieved less than they hoped for.

WHY LIMITED UPLOADING?

Development is not a priority policy for CEE countries, which means that governments are unlikely to put their full weight behind it. CEE states are relatively new at the EU game and perhaps have lacked the skills at alliance building and bargaining. Combining these two factors means that other states are unlikely to see transition experience as a deal breaker, i.e. something that the CEE states will fight to defend. CEE development policy is run by diplomats who often have no background in development. There is a high staff turnover and low institutional memories. In many cases there are limited instructions from the capitals for the national diplomats in Brussels. All these factors combine to weaken the policy preferences and also help send a message that development policy is not a salient issue for the CEE states.

The CEE states also lack the ability to argue that a given policy proposal is actually in the Community interest. CEE states have yet to find a narrative that links transition experience with the community interest. Finding this narrative is important because some older member states feel that transition experience is threat to the EU development policy’s poverty reduction agenda and focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, as transition experience is seen most transferable to the Post-Soviet neighbourhood. Transition experience is also seen to promote bad aid practices, as it is seen to be donor driven, tied, and unaligned to recipient priorities.

SUMMARY

We can see that the weak influence of CEE states is compounded by the relatively low weight they ascribe to development policy. Policies like structural and regional policy or agricultural policy are highly salient for the new member states, and development is not. Academic analysis highlights that in areas of political salience, the NMS can influence EU policy preferences. Given the lack of salience, it is perhaps unsurprising that the NMS have not been successful at building alliances or bargaining as they have very little to bargain in this policy area. Admittedly, the CEE states are only just learning how to play the game in Brussels in relation to building alliances. The example of the Eastern Partnership, proposed jointly by Poland and Sweden, shows that some states are able to join forces with other member states and pitch a policy proposal as being in the Community interest. The lack of capacity in relation to skilful diplomats, a clear policy position, instructions from the capital etc, add to the factors that hamper the influence of the NMS in development policy.

Full academic paper and references are available on request from the authors.
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